"Everyone is entitled to my opinion"
And that's all they are, opinions... ;)
Interesting you mention Bliss (where I think that along with Dona Ana and White Sands the Combined Arms Center should be) and Hood -- which I think can support the range requirements. Though admittedly the range training, firing and qualifications processes all need refinement. Hopefully, for small arms the Army will stop insisting on the helmet and go routinely to hot ranges, that would speed things up a great deal... :D
So would moving Tanks and other tracks without ground guides. Never ceases to amaze me that we can and do manage that in combat but cannot do so in training. Sort of makes "Train as you will fight" suspect... :wry:
'Safety' is vastly overdone in training, the excessive and poorly thought out training safety guidelines are a significant training distractor. Risk avoidance, like Scotch, is an acquired taste...
I say all that about Bliss and Hood because the move to Benning is going to create major problems in regard to ranges and training areas (benefit of a political rather than a practical decision) and barring a major war, I'll be surprised if anyone can fire a tank main gun east of the Mississippi in the next twenty to forty years due to 'environmental' constraints -- activism, actually...
Not a TRADOC apologist, but...
As the title indicates, I'm not a TRADOC apologist. Stove pipes abound and despite the efforts of several professionals they tend to remain in place regardless of how many times they reorganize the deck chairs. That said, much has been done in the past three years to address issues described throughout the thread....
1. Initial Entry Training has moved out of the classroom and into the field. Warrior Tasks are trained in conditions that replicate (as best they can) the operational environment. Whether to standard? That is a leader issue, but it is the TRADOC commander's explicit top priority. From time eternal everyone has lamented the Soldier that comes out of BCT as "not good enough" - but he's alot better today than in 2004.
2. All new 2LTs and WO1 (loggies, JAG, MC as well) go through the Basic Officer Leader Course (I believe 6 weeks) that is conducted almost entirely in the field. It is only after this that they go to branch specific training. Again, are they competent combat leaders as they exit - probably not, but the product is a heck of a lot better.
3. All NCO courses are less than 8 weeks (possibly two exceptions), Tasks formerly in ANCOC are now in BNCOC, ANCOC is mostly old 1SG Course, 1SG course is dead. Again, nearly all the "filler" is done upfront using dL. Mostly MOS specific field craft. Perfect - nah but better
4. CCC (formerly known as OAC) is in the midst of the same type of change (refrained from using transformation).
To be clear is all this good enough - nope and more can and should be done from a generating base perspective.
As for unit training, units are assembling and deploying on short time lines and I won't second guess commanders who are trying to prioritize what they train and do not. I do agree in the strongest terms that units/Soldiers rise (or not) to the level of their leader's expectations.
Live well and row
Many thanks, Hacksaw. That's all good stuff and
even with Google, it's hard to track down. Lot of guys in green right now aren't aware of all that (including my kid the know it all -- though he did tell me some of the bit about OSUT). An ORF like me is way outa the loop... :o
Still, I know we do better now than we've ever done, far better that in my day and even better than in 2004 as you say. Thanks again.
All you say is accurate, Rob and I don't entirely disagree.
However, three thoughts occur. I have three good friends, all retired COLs. the Tanker went to Leavenworth and later taught there. He agrees with you on all counts but even he admits that the length is nice to have as opposed to totally necessary. The FA guy went to the AFSC at Norlfolk, shorter and he later served on two Joint staffs and commanded twice as a LTC, one FA Bn and one more exotic outfit. He was quite comfortable with the AFSC as opposed to CGSC. The Infantry Aviator OTOH didjn't go to any comparable course and contends he never missed 'em. Different strokes...
In any event, that's above my pay grade; you Field grades can sort that out... :D
Second thought is that in seven years as a Civilian Instructor and Branch Chief at the Armor School, I noted that a surprising number of the Advanced course Classes adopted "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights" as the Class song. Sort of funny but that was actually the case, honest.
At the same time, the AOBC classes generally felt short changed on time. When Shy Meyer as CoS, Army tried to change TRADOC's approach, he didn't succeed in getting the OBCs to nine months to a year but he did get them all increased by a month or more. His attempts to get the Advanced Courses chopped to two to twelve week courses tailored specifically to the individuals next assignment flopped totally. Most cited the rationale you cite, the extended learning environment, for their resistance to his ideas. Unfortunately, the TRADOC Manpower audit process that determines School staffing on Instructor (to student) Contact Hours would have had a significant bearing on that proposal in the form of manpower cuts and thus made those arguments at least a little suspect...
Lastly, back then, when we at the Schools developed a new POI, we had to simultaneously develop a Mobilization POI for the course (or a replacement or similar course) to be taught in the event necessary. Those POIs were invariably more intense, covered more tasks and were much shorter in duration than the peacetime versions. I always wondered about the logic of that.
You also said:
Quote:
"This trickles right on down the line in different ways and in different measures, and hopefully never impacts the basic things we need to do in order to meet the primary mission of defending the Constitution and the state from the Huns - but does get back to why you have a military - and what types of policies will require (or stand a chance of requiring) military power to achieve. At that point I think is where we get (or should get) rational we need for basing agreements, long term contracts, how many C-17s and TSVs we buy, etc. (with a healthy dose of domestic politics for good measure) - but our foreign policy often seems "jumpy", inconsitent, and sometimes vague about what is really important to us - which should drive all the DOTLMPF train - maybe that is the nature of who we are -but it makes focus not so easy.
Boy, ain't that the truth...
I think you have the right of it
Hey Eden,
Pretty much concur. The problem I think comes with the clarity which provides the linkages to make it all flow, as well as issues that come with trying to turn the super-tanker (some good things about it, some bad).
Given the nature of what I think you pretty accurately describe - it may be the best we can do. However, if it is possible to change it (or desirable) then I think it might have to begin with clarity of purpose - the NSS I think sets the tone - all the other documents get their bearing off of it (as it should be). Could it be more succinct? I'm not sure - even if I wish it were - it is after all the "National" Security Strategy, and sometimes being more concise means being more constrained. So the essential tasks in the NSS state:
- Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
- Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends
-Work with others to defuse regional attacks
-Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with WMD
-Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
-Expand the Circle of Development by opening the societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
-Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century
-Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization
might be broad enough to encompass everything we might find ourselves doing, or required to do, but I'm not sure they do (or can) provide focus (they are not prioritized - nor does it say which ones might be more vital then others) - it kind of reminds me of writing your OER support form at the end of the rating period (I say sort of ;))
As they get translated along with other policy documents and speeches, etc. there are allot of disconnects that leave the pot holes you mentioned (or in some cases they might be broken bridges). Here is where leaders have to make decisions abut where to put the available resources (people, time, $$, land, etc.) Sometimes we get it right, sometimes not so much, and sometimes we get it wrong. There might be an element of risk at work here as well - it might be aversion or it might be mitigation - depends on how you look at it I guess. Could we do better - I guess that is the question on my mind at the moment, and if so how?
Best, Rob
Hi, Rob. Good stuff as always.
Oh, the FOs are almost all great guys -- I never ran into a bad one; just think it's overkill for the job. We may move away from that, may not -- but in the interim, I understand the new Combined Arms or Maneuver Captains course at Benning post 2012 will also include Fires guys; that's good.
Quote:
I don't think we should shape policy goals - but I do think we have a responsibility to inform about consequences and effects - particularly if a belief exists that a military COA to achieve a political end is feasible based on faulty assumptions for whatever reasons; or if the military analysis on what the consequences of doing something (or not doing something) are incongruent with the civilian side. Being prepared to do our job may require keeping those who appropriate and allocate resources in the loop about how things play out on the ground, or are likely to play out on the ground based on our best judgment - which is what GEN (R) Shinseki was asked by Congress to give ref. his estimates on the size of the force required to secure and stabilize post invasion Iraq. It is a curved and grey line at times I think.
Best, Rob
Emphatically agree. We have an obligation to inform as accurately as possible and take it to the mat. That means that it is incumbent upon both the administration of the day AND Congress to listen and assess. It also means we have to be absolutely honest and not play games with either of those two --a, ummm, minor shortfall on our part on occasion -- to keep credibility.
I think we need to do a better job of educating the American public about the Armed Forces, what we do, who we are and why we do some of the things we do. The loss of a lot of 'veterans' in our society has had an adverse impact (as has been discussed here and elsewhere).
Back on track, while I know Congress in particular causes some of those games and we're sort of forced to play, I personally believe that we're smart enough to outflank and out think Congress and we should do that rather than get annoyed at them and tend to blow them off (which we tend to do too often to the incompetents in media as well. Yeah, I know... ;) ). I also know that doing that is extremely tricky and it would be easy to slip into something akin to politicking.
Not only a curved and gray line, I think it's a snake that can pop up and bite if it's stepped on... :(
Guess that's why the gen-gens get the big bucks. Hmm. Given the sometimes awesome scope of responsibility versus the comparatively low pay, maybe I should say "very slightly bigger bucks." :wry: