Slim is missing the point
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posted by jmm99, It is in their own enlightened self-interest to assist in doing so, and also in the interests of their populations. But, as Sheriff Slim says, the mission is "to preserve and encourage a safe community", not to build one.
Good post, but one that I thinks supports a PCE approach. One element of good governance is providing security to its populace, failure to do so is a failure of the government of the worst type. Your argument only addressed one aspect of the government, which is the police. Jone's is arguing for a Whole of Government Approach, so at the town level, we're talking about everything the Mayor can influence, and what is overlapped on top by county, State, and Federal Government.
Sheriff Slim sounds like he lives/works in a relatively safe community, but I would argue the mission statement would change if you were a cop in a city where certain sections of it were controlled by gangs (or insurgents). Law enforcement then has an obligation to build a safe community, failure to do so could result in the people organizing to address the security problem (outside the law), or seeking relief by joining forces with the criminals or insurgents because the government failed them.
You're points on targeting the criminals were correct. This is the apparent weakness in the population centric approach, although Jones did state it allowed TCE when applicable. Of course if it is applicable if you're fighting an insurgency; however, the there are different ways to get after the threat. Using Jones' example of the Civil Rights Movement, the government took away their cause, thus prevented an increase in tension and defused the situation. The government may be able to turn the populace against the insurgent as we did in Al Anbar. Ultimately the government must get the people to support the government without coercion or the government loses. All that said, key enemy subversives must still be neutralized. The difference is now the TCE is a supporting activity, not the main effort, and never a strategy.
There is much to disagree with in Jones' article, but
Perspectives, Perspectives
The more this discussion progresses the more I keep thinking about the whole idea of Insurgent, causes, coercion, etc and it occurs to me that honestly isn't the greatest thing any insurgent these days has going for them is that they don't really have to wait for a govt to get to the point where it can't provide enough services but rather with the information age and of course massive growth of younger population simply choose to propogandize new and often unfeasible requriements for a govt that are very far outside of its ability to address simply due to the lack of need for such things before.
In this context pretty much any country US, UK, Canada, Iraq, Balkans, Russia, China, you name it are easy targets for outside interests simply due to how foreign they are and what "new" requirements they or their cause bring with them.
??:confused:
Hi, Bob's World - Governance & Ideology
Starting first with governance, where you use the American Revolution as an example, you define your terms as follows.
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(from bob's world)
I will just add that there is a significant difference between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance."
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Good vs Effective must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question. If that populace is not satisfied, then that governance is not good, regardless of how effective it might be.
A few months back, Marc Tyrell and I discussed - with general agreement between the two of us - the failure of the US to gain support from either Canadian language group (from my perspective, the French speakers) in both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.
There, I used the term "legitimate government" (also in quotes there) in a manner substantially the same as your definition of "Good Governance" - that is, it must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question.
In 1776-1815 Canada, we have the French-Canadians (from my viewpoint), the Scots and English (from Marc's viewpoint) and the United Empire Loyalists who came to Canada after the Revolution (again from Marc's viewpoint). No doubt that that mixed population came to the conclusion that the Crown was both "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance".
So, however you define it formally, we agree that "Good Governance" depends on the "perspective of the populace in question."
Now, moving to the "States", we can examine the perspective of the colonists as a matter of history. All who examine the historical record can agree that there were three groups in the North American colonies (excluding Canada): UELs, Neutrals and Rebels. Where people differ is what %s belonged to each group, variations by region, etc. Which brings me to my practical question.
How do we measure "Good Governance" in a particular country today with the sort of accuracy that would allow accurate intelligence analysis to inform a counter-insurgency effort ? Would you poll the populace to determine the "UELs, Neutrals and Rebels" ? What questions would you ask ? In short, what is your outlline for using the concept of "Good Governance" in the field ?
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Ending up with Ideology, you and I would have some differences as to what is the "American Ideology" - even in (or perhaps because of) the stripped-down version you present. However, there is little point to two lawyers yammering on about Con Law and the Foundations of our Republic.
To me, there is a more basic issue which goes to the heart of the question - should we be marketing "American Ideology" at all (assuming arguendo that we could agree on what that is); and, if so, to what extent and to what purpose ?
If our focus is on the population of a foreign land, it seems more logical to me to learn the ideologies which are native to that land - and market the indigenous ideology that is most likely to aid us in reaching our endgoal (assuming that we know what that is). E.g., in a given country, communism might be the best answer, simply because the other ideologies are not going to be helpful (even if some of them are closer to "American Ideology").
Note that I have no objection to presenting the "American Ideology" (assuming arguendo as above) to explain where we are coming from - to inform others. Perhaps that is what you are saying; but you seemed to be propounding a broader agitprop agenda than that.
Formal & Informal Governance
This article, recently threaded here, has a good comment on the dichotomy between formal and informal governance in Afghanistan:
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(pp.4-5)
Key to understanding the operating environment is both understanding the specific causes of conflicts in your tactical area of operations and understanding exactly what “governance” means to local Afghans. Coalition forces have proven notoriously incapable of differentiating between conflicts involving insurgents, vice local conflicts over scarce resources vice intra- or inter-district struggles over the distribution of power. Related to this, there does not appear to be widespread understanding of the relationship between the informal and formal structures of political power.
In its most basic sense governance is the provision of essential services, such as human security, food, water and shelter, as well as an acceptable degree of conflict resolution and justice for wrongs committed. This basic type of governance has been prevalent in rural Afghan communities for centuries; however, it is under threat today not only by insurgents but also by attempts to overlay a more formal governance structure on top of the informal structures. There has been historically, and it remains today, tension between the informal structures of political power (the mullahs, the mahliks, the tribal shuras) and the imposed, formal structures of political power (District and Provincial Governors, the ANP) at the local level. All politics is local, especially in Afghanistan. Understanding this distribution of local power is vital if we are to promote “legitimacy” of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster. A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome. And it should not be assumed that ANA or ANP, just because they are Afghans, inherently understand the tensions between the two structures of local governance or that they will be necessarily capable of maintaining a suitable environment of co-existence without substantial prompting, persuading and persistent encouragement.
Comprehensive understanding of the operating environment only comes through persistent and pervasive interaction with the people who determine the social dynamics of the environment. [italics in original] ...
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs...tt-agoglia.pdf
The article does not outline a methodology for determining the precise metrics of support for one form of governance or the other. The concept of "pervasive interaction with the people" looks field anthropological.
The comment quoted does not as such distinguish between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance"; but (see quote from p.3 below) they do speak in terms of "legitimacy and effectiveness."
Based on the following comments, "the imposed, formal structures of political power" is neither (the context is primarily the Pashtun areas):
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(from above)
Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster.
(p.3)
In many parts of the country, especially outside of major population centers, the legitimacy and effectiveness of GIRoA is under considerable threat not only from insurgents but also from widespread corruption and patronage, traditional tribal power structures, a xenophobic society in the south and east, and a lack of tangible, synchronized reconstruction and development.
The authors recognize primacy in their focus on the population, with secondary focus on the enemy's armed force:
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(p.6)
3. Protect the people. If SCHB is to work, it is vital coalition forces (and by default the ANA) achieve the right balance between “hunting insurgents” to disrupt, and protecting the population and contributing to building human capacity. The former - killing and capturing insurgents - does not always contribute positively to the need to protect the people and build capacity and in our attempts to kill or capture we often sacrifice longer term enduring positive effects for short term tactical effects. This distinction between being population centric in our operations, which should be the main effort, vice being enemy centric, which is a supporting effort and a means to the end, sets the tone for the way we conduct operations, the way we interact with the people, and the way we relate to ANA, ANP and other GIRoA agencies. We do not have the balance consistently right across Afghanistan.
A caution is probably due here - based on history.
From the fall of DBP in 1954 to approximately May 1959 (start of the Laos dustup and formation of Transportation Group 559), one can fairly argue that the Diem government should have employed a population-focused approach - it did to some extent. In later 1959 through 1964, the PAVN (NVA) unleashed its cadres into SVN (roughly 100K southern Viet Minh traveled north in 1954-1955 for training and incorporation into PAVN).
After those 1959 events, GSV faced (but did not really recognize) the advent of the Second Indochina War - an externally-supported threat. See, Pentagon Papers, vol. I (esp. last section before the documents annex); and Fall's, The Two Viet-Nams, for a more professional analysis. The point is that the balance in a "small war" can shift rather quickly.
Well, in a sense you've answered my questions
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
I hope everyone is keeping in mind as they read any of the articles that I have written, or the strings of commentary provided here, that what I am proposing, in its simplest terms, is merely a change of priority and focus, and a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad...
Which were:""Now that what is happening to us? In what way are we blind? What could we do to avoid 'it?'"" However, I think that one item in your recent comment:
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Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings...
will significantly impact the ability of the US to do what you suggest. That statement gets me to the not fully answered item in my queries:
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So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.
I suspect most here -- most in the US, maybe even the world -- would agree with that. Many of us have long believed along those lines to one degree or another. The question is:
How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?
Partial answer and ramble.....
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?
I don't know that you can...without some major restructuring and rethinking of some basic operating methods.
Most US things these days run on a two-year election cycle. It's short term thinking at its finest...or worst. As an institution the government (and by extension our education system) doesn't value history or the contextual thinking that goes with good history, so they look for brand names or Band-Aids that can be slapped on and carry something through the next election cycle. Since the average decision-maker only knows the US system, he or she assumes that it must be best...because it's worked for him or her. I think it also matches up with the technology obsession that seems to drive much of our thinking. If you can build a better chip, or change a blown fuse, certainly you should be able to apply the single part idea to something as complex as a region or a culture....:eek:
To break the cycle you'd need some good, long-term planning (as in something more than two years or less), and people who actually have ability with cultural and historical analysis (and this isn't as common as many might suspect). Then you'd have to have leaders who are willing to listen to and act on those recommendations. Needless to say, I'm not overly optimistic.
Re: post # 50. Simply, ....
an excellent point summary. Period.
And, it includes an unintentional "funny" as well. The concept of a COL at SOCOM making a "a call to coddle criminal actors" gave me a mind's-eye picture that I wish I had the talent to draw. Anyway, thanks for a bit of cheer in what is a bleak, rainy day outside.
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Since Tim McVeigh is mentioned, and the Civil Rights Movement has also been mentioned, I offer a brief comment. Some might well argue that the CRM was not an insurgency - whatever. Along with the CRM went another movement - let's call it the Anti-CRM; and parts of that were definitely into terrorist territory. From that latter movement, descended a number of groups and individuals who moved far out of the mainstream of their populace - and, for that matter, far out of the mainstream of "right wing groups".
Unfortunately, Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols (a Michigander from Dexter, not far from the U of M) were not "nut jobs". From all I've read of them and the case, they had their ideology; probably saw themselves as patriots; and took it as their right and duty to rebel against what they perceived to be an oppressive government. The Turner Diaries and the Declaration of Independence make a bad combination.
While people can say "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", that equation fails when you are the recipient of the terrorist's act - whatever he might think of himself.
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I do have one question based on your first sentence: "... a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad."
Could you give us a point summary on that, as well. That is a question that many have raised and are raising - e.g., who is in charge in Iraq ? (not seeking an answer for that country, but a generalized one for the future).
All makes sense and I'm sure many here agree. Know I do...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
In theory, State Department, through its Country Ambassadors, is in charge . . . This is made murky by the concept of "GWOT," which is a DoD lead . . . DoD has the people and the resources, but is too threat centric in its approach. . . what of all of the short of war engagement required to keep a situation from sliding into full blown conflict? Result is confusion, inefficency, and a generally disjointed scheme of engagement.
I really do agree. "However," he said, clearing his throat...
I'm not at all sure the GWOT or Long War is the problem; it doesn't help, certainly but that dichotomy existed long before 9/11 and the GWOT concept. It even existed prior to Goldwater-Nichols although in a less obvious and powerful version. Since G-N, DoD has been fairly well funded and has extended the reach and clout of the CinCs while State has been consistently underfunded and undermanned. The fault for that can be laid at the feet of the Congress while acknowledging that neither DoD nor State has been exactly forthcoming, helpful or above board in this matter.
Thus, I think just eliminating dumb terminology won't fix it, it'll be applying a band aid -- and a Sponge Bob bandaid (apply appropriate TMs to the foregoing) at that; We Americans excel at that and most of them are worthless. You've got to turn Congress, DoD AND State around. Thus my question HOW do you do what you suggest.
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Its complicated. We work better with simple. ("Don't complify, simplicate!"). Easiest way from my foxhole is to simply call an end to the GWOT. I can work with guidance like:
"The war is over, but the mission continues. State, take point. Defense, help them formulate a plan of action and be prepared to provide a lionshare of the manpower and resources to implement it . . . The Cold War has been over for two administrations, so ensure this plan looks at the whole of government and recommends institutions, policies, and relationships that are long overdue for a major revision . . . And never forget, there are those out there, both state and non-state who want to see us fail, and failure is not an option."
I strongly agree conceptually, practically, I think you forget:
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The President-elect is not a Cold Warrior. What was widely attacked as his greatest weakness, lack of foreign policy experience, may in fact be his greatest strength...
while all that is true and he can -- may well -- dictate what you suggest. Unfortunately, long experience shows us that his predecessors have done such diktats with little success. His ability to get Congress, DoD and State to do what he tells them is severely constrained by the bureaucracy and those in it who will not agree with him and can -- and will -- stall until he's gone. Thus my question, how do you get the Elephant to turn? Much less be agile...
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...Idealistic? Certainly, but then I am an American, and idealism comes easy to us.
Yes it does and me, too. However, over 45 years of working for our Fedrul Guvmint done taught me to be one a them awful cynics, too. :(
I should have something intelligent to add, but ...
All my mind's eye sees is - A pink bunny in a tux, with a bullwhip, turning elephants ....
I like that concept; but it won't replace Roadrunner and Ole Wily Coyote..
I did have a relevant thought before the cartoon flooded my head - that being that the respective functions of DoS, DoD, and the rest of the cats that have to be herded - now image of a border collie herding cats intervenes - have to be defined by numerous laws, regs and interagency agreements.
Thought also occurs that some of this may be found in the Operational Law Handbook (2007; should be a 2008 update out or soon). Perhaps, we should be looking at the present normative structure - and working from there ?