You'll be pleased to know
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
...pimping out their shiny new HMMWVS and MRAPs. An hour or two from the fight, dwelling on college courses, the olympic sized swimming pool, open mike night, and the suf and turf night, we could have them reinforcing Nuristan in the larger fight.
I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.
Silly me, outside of a tourniquet and battle dressings so everyone knew where to find those, I'd have told people to put stuff where it worked best for them. Want to keep your mags in an old Canteen pouch? Go for it...
We've been in a war for nine years and people in high places are saying things that stupid? I said earlier we've forgotten how to fight on foot. Maybe we've forgotten how to fight altogether... :(
Sad. Scary.
Ab so lutely. IF the current personnel and rank system remains in place.
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Originally Posted by
82redleg
The problem is that these very senior NCOs exist outside of where they are needed. CSMs can do a lot of good at the BN level. Above that, they probably don't need to exist. If a COL hasn't figured out leadership issues by the time he is selected for BDE command, having someone to whisper in his ear isn't going to help.
I totally agree. I've been both a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime in and in combat; three Bns, two Bdes. The Bde CSM is a totally wasted slot. A Bde CSM has a lot of negative influence but very little positive capability unless many factors hit just right. I had more positive influence as a Bde Ops SGM --also both in peacetime and in combat -- than I did as a Bde CSM -- and in both Bdes I was fortunate in being able to work for very fine Colonels and in both I was the Ops guy who became the CSM (that worked often for many people until the number of CSMs grew to its current proportions. I'm old... :D).
A Bn Ops Sgt (I also disagree with making them SGMs) is too busy so at Bn the CSM makes sense. At Bde, with the larger (too large?) staff, the Ops SGM has adequate time to counsel COLs who are about to step on something and they can also arrange troop help stuff better than can their counterparts at Bn.
The CSMs are generally a waste at Bde; above Bde they literally have no function and some have a terrible propensity to concentrate on eyewash and little else -- except their next job...
I'll caveat all that by saying that a portion of that relative lack of merit is in many senses a function of how the guy is employed; the Army has not directed adequate responsibilities to and for the job, so in most cases, the guy or gal writes his or her own job description. Some do that better than others. Some Commanders give them far more to do and place far more trust in them than others. I have literally been directed to take command of a Company in a fire fight and OTOH, been barely listened to (in peacetime by a fair LTC who was an Aviator on a ground tour and who almost certainly had a really poor Platoon sergeant when he was a 2LT...:o).
It can be fixed and improved significantly. First and easiest by making those guys (and 1SGs) the unit trainers. Not responsible for training, that's the Cdr -- but trainers; doers and subordinate directors. That's still a band-aid. The entire personnel system still reflects 17th century practice and WW I methodologies. It and the pay system are in need of major overhaul. We need to be able to reward or pay people more without applying the Peter Principle and promoting them past their optimum level. That and moving them too often contribute to a lack of trust up and down the chain...
Yes. Even better -- don't do fixed bases in bad places...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much. The enemy would have massed against another base instead.
Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts...
All true.
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Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....
That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.
Yes...
Fuchs, finish your thought
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.
Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....
Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.
Now in Afghanistan, it obviously wouldn't be a Sunni Awakening, it would be something else. But right now, the Taliban and their ilk don't have to threaten the local populations to live off of them. They get to do so willingly. Now, if they had to attack local populations with force to survive, the population would be driven into our hands.
As to the attack at FOB Keating compared to the luxury life at BAF. Don't just look at the numbers, look at the amount of ordinance dropped. Something like 1 percent of all ordinance expended in Afghanistan occurs around BAF. Basically, when historians write the history about failure in Afghanistan it will be a history of greed, gluttony and sloth by upper leadership (division level and up).