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Some classic Afghan quotes on this decision
The commander of the Afghan army's 215th corps, Mohammad Moeen Faqir:Citing Abdul Jabar Qahraman, presidential envoy for security affairs in HelmandQuote:
Their presence in the area did not mean anything...We will use them in battle with enemies in other parts of Helmand province
Link:http://news.yahoo.com/afghan-troops-...72916177.html?Quote:
There wasn't any deal....We learnt that there was no need to continue the fight in that area.
A short BBC report from Helmand Province:Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36941267Quote:
It's almost two years since British Forces pulled out of Helmand. I watched them leave. At the time we were told by both politicians and senior military officers that the Afghans were ready to take care of their own security. Hindsight proves they were wrong
(Concludes) Helmand shows that, without international support, it can unravel as fast as lightning
A WaPo article, by a former Marine, from Helmand; it is hardly encouraging on the ANSF, which need Allied help (mainly US and some Germans):https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/...lent-province/
Hat tip to WoTR for identifying this Army Times piece on the Afghan Air Force (AAF):http://www.militarytimes.com/article...ian-casualties
From my "armchair" the AAF is hampered by things like these:Quote:
...according to the United Nations’ latest assessment is responsible for a troubling pattern of botched airstrikes that have led to a stunning rise in civilian casualties.
Compared to 2015, last year the loss of innocent life caused by Afghan-initiated airstrikes doubled to 252, according to the U.N.
Quote:
the A-29, which joined the Afghans' fleet only last year, currently lacks the sophisticated communications equipment to make it truly effective in a close-air-support role. In fact, the aircraft can radio their operations center only within a 14-mile radius, U.S. officials said.
Last summer, NATO and U.S. forces introduced a program to train Afghan tactical air controllers who guide pilots to their targets. The training lasts about four weeks......To date, the program has graduated 30 students, with ongoing courses in Helmand and Logar provinces. By the start of the next fighting season, in April, officials anticipate there will be more than 40 Afghan tactical air controllers qualified to coordinate airstrikes.
Babatim aka Tim Lynch, an ex-USMC officer who was seven years "outside the wire" in Afghanistan, has a blog on his experiences and today an update was spotted - as he seeks funds to enable a return trip to Helmand, to accompany a small USMC contingent. See Post 201 & 212 on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=5975&page=11
The update has a comment on the ANA in Helmand, plus this on the preparation of the Marines:Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=6239#commentsQuote:
....both Carter Malkasian and Mike Martin have been working with the Task Force to help them sharpen their understanding of the human terrain and inter-tribal conflicts in the Helmand. This was the best news I’ve heard in a long while. If you’re interested on gaining a thorough understanding of the inter-tribal dynamics that drive the cycle of violence in the Helmand Province there are just two books you need to read. The first is War Comes To Garmser written by Carter Malkasian, an American and the second is An Intimate War by Mike Martin who is British. Both men spent years on the ground in the Helmand and both are fluent Pashto speakers.
After last week's attack on an ANA base @ Mazar-e Sharif, BBC News asks 'Can Afghan military turn the tide in Taliban fight?' and here is a "taster" passage:Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39705124Quote:
Last year a record number of Afghan forces were killed - 6,800 in total. That is three times the losses of American forces during the entire 16 years of this conflict. And many thousands more Afghan military personnel were either invalided out of service or simply deserted.
It emphasises once again the key problems the Afghan forces face: inadequate training and a lack of commitment from recruits, exacerbated by terrible conditions, corruption in the officer class and poor air support.
From my faraway "armchair" the cumulative impact of deaths, injuries and desertion since the ANA was reborn or reformed must now be sizeable. Having a significant number of ex-veterans, even if they served for a short time, would normally have an internal impact - there appears to be none.
Given the political performance of the GIRoA; which is described briefly in the article - why would any soldier think his life is valued?
So, casting caveats aside, the answer to the question is No.
If the ANSF cannot 'turn the tide' what is our strategy as their allies? A question and sometime debate seen in other threads in this arena.:mad:
The latest Soufan briefing asks similar questions, here is one point from BLUF:Link:http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intel...n-afghanistan/Quote:
In what is already the longest-running war in American history, the Trump administration faces the prospect of an unending combat commitment with increasing costs and diminishing returns.
A first-hand report by a journalist in Helmand, or those town still controlled by GIRoA. Though the title implies this is a 'America can't win' the focus is on the Afghans, so the USMC presence is not included. Needless to say it is not optimistic.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...s-rights-peace
Within a report on DoD contractor waste this gem, which reflects how Afghanistan works alas, with my emphasis:Link:https://www.theguardian.com/global-d...a-457m-failureQuote:
Sigar has long criticised the Pentagon for wastefulness during the US’s longest war. In January, it told a Washington thinktank there was evidence that Taliban leaders had told their commanders to buy fuel, ammunition and weapons from Afghan soldiers because it was cheaper.
A typically thorough assessment by Anthony Cordesman, from CSIS; the full title being: 'Afghan Desertions in the U.S.: Assessing the Desertion and "Ghost Soldier" Problem in Afghan National Security Forces'.
Link:https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan...ional-security
On my first reading there is much more than the ANSF, such as the population explosion and need to create 400k jobs per year!
A couple of sentences:Quote:
Afghanistan lacks coherent political leadership, and the World Bank governance indicators rank it as one of the worst governed and most corrupt countries in the world....The problems not only affect the morale, motivation, and leadership of Afghan defectors in the United States, they have a major impact on every soldier, policeman, and local policeman in Afghanistan.....At the same time, the other side of the story is the mix of pressures that can force men into the security services regardless of their loyalty until the real-world strains of combat, corruption, casualties, and being deployed far from home leads them to desert or leave. Afghanistan has become the equivalent of an economic nightmare for all too many of its citizens.
The Case for Counter Insurgency ‘Light’ in Afghanistan
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
The cited SWJ Blog linked above IMHO contains some facts that reinforce concern that the ANSF serving the GIROA:For more explanation and a new strategy see the full article:https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...an_113012.htmlQuote:
By the fall of 2017 GIRoA only controlled territory containing less than 60% of the population which was down from over the 70% they held in 2016, and down from the 80% they held in 2014 when the lead for security operations transitioned from NATO to GIRoA. The remaining 40% was either controlled by the Taliban or was considered "contested". The ANDSF were incapable of recapturing the contested portions of the country, or those portions under Taliban control without increased levels of U.S. support.
From 2010 to 2012 the U.S. led coalition conducted a full spectrum, comprehensive COIN campaign aimed at defeating the Taliban...The coalition, along with the ANDSF, was driving the Taliban, GIRoA had control over approximately 80% of the country, and security, governance, and basic services were largely in place. The ANDSF were maturing, and the transition of responsibility for security operations to Afghan control was underway. So what went wrong?
Cross-posted from the thread on the Taliban.
A report from the probably independent Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) on the recent attack on Farah city. It opens with:It ends with:Quote:
An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.
This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.
Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org...e-for-farah-i/Quote:
With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces.
The author is:It is a curious article which seeks to provide an answer to:Quote:
Tamim Asey is the Chairman of the Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS). Previously, he served as Deputy Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Link:https://globalsecurityreview.com/eco...curity-forces/Quote:
Back in 2004, when Afghan and American generals were laying the foundations for the post-Taliban Afghan army and security forces the number one question in the minds of everybody around the table was “who will pay for it?” In those days, it was assumed the burden would fall on the United States and its allies, but that calculation is changing fast with President Trump in office and war fatigue across the capitals in Europe. Today, the answer is simple: Afghans will pay for it through revenues from its vast natural resources and geographical position combined with a national conscription system.
Sorry from this faraway armchair the answer is bizarre - when will these revenues come on stream? Leaving aside the likelihood others will divert such revenues.