Used As a Military History Lesson
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If this alignment of interest between Amal and Iran would not have ensured a problematic occupation in and of itself, Israel’s actions in the south at the invasion’s inception virtually ensured a permanent schism between Israel and the Lebanese Shiite population. Avner Yaniv argues that Israel had no plan for administering the power vacuum that it created in the south through the destruction of the PLO mini-state. Ad hoc improvisation, which had always been a component of Israel’s conventional, offensively minded doctrine, led to “a series of reflexive fits drawing on Israel’s previous experience with comparable problems in the Sunni, Christian West Bank and Gaza Strip.”31
This had an almost instant deleterious effect on Israel’s relationship with the Shiites. In the early days of the war, while the siege of the PLO in Beirut was still ongoing, the Higher Shiite Council, led by Amal’s Shams al-Din, Sadr’s successor, urged the Shiites of Lebanon to reject as illegitimate Israeli interference in southern Lebanon and the imposition of Israeli-backed administrations in Shiite towns and villages. Shiites were urged “to reject the occupation and not to cooperate in any way with the Israeli-imposed local administration.”32 When I asked Baruch Spiegel if the IDF had done anything initially to win “the hearts and minds” of the Lebanese Shiite population, his answer was simple. “Not immediately. It took time until we modified. It took time.”33 If there was ever a real window of opportunity to win over the Shiite population, it was shut by the time the IDF “modified” its practices.
This installment of the JRTC CALL Cell BiWeekly History Lesson again turns to a product from the Combat Studies Institute. Occasional Paper 21 Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982 - 2000 by Daniel Isaac Helmer provides an in-depth analysis of Israel's 22-year long venture in Lebanon.
Helmer describes this Israeli experience as a defeat on three levels. The Israelis went into Lebanon to destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organization: they won sweeping tactical victories but never succeeded in their aim to crush the PLO. More importantly, the sustained existence of the PLO as champion for a Palestinian people was a strategic defeat directly tied to the beginning of the First Intifadah. The Israelis stimulated the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and then lost the asymmetric fight with the Shia militia, in the process turning the militia into a global threat. Finally as described by Helmer, the 1982 Invasion was to destroy the "terrorists" and as he shows, the net result was an increase in terrorism from pre-1982 levels.
As a former United Nations Military Observer in southern Lebanon (1987), I found this paper to be balanced and accurate. In many ways it explains what happened to the Israeli Defense Force in the 2006 fight with Hezbollah. But this paper transcends its role as a study of the conflict in Lebanon. It is very much a study of the unconventional versus the conventional. As such it is also quite relevant to US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
V/R
Tom Odom
Israel: Winograd Committee Report Released
39 April Jerusalem Post - 'Olmert Nade the Decision to go to War Unprepared'.
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After months of waiting and speculation, the Winograd Committee's interim report harshly criticizing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and former IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Dan Halutz over their actions during the first five days of the Second Lebanon War was released to the public Monday afternoon.
In conclusions much harsher than those expected ahead of the report's publication, Judge Eliyahu Winograd said in a press conference that "[The committee] established that decisions and the way they were taken suffered from the most severe flaws. We put the responsibility for these flaws on the prime minister, the defense minister and the former chief of staff."...
The prime minister bore supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the IDF, according to the report.
Olmert made up his mind hastily, the report said, without asking for a detailed military plan and without consulting military experts. According to the findings, Olmert made a personal contribution to the fact that the war's goals were "overambitious and unfeasible."...
Behind the Headlines on the Winograd Commission’s Interim Report
Haninah Levine e-mailed a link to his Center for Defense Information article Behind the Headlines on the Winograd Commission’s Interim Report.
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In late April, the Winograd Commission, appointed by the Israeli government last September to examine the events of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, published its interim report. Media coverage of the interim report, which is not yet available in English, has focused mostly on the commission’s harsh evaluation of the nation’s civilian leaders, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz.
The 170-page document offers far more than just a report card on these politicians’ performance, however. It examines the behavior of the military, the government, the National Security Council, and even the media and the electorate over a six-year period which begins with Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon and ends on July 17, 2006, nearly a week into the war. It is both uncompromisingly honest and scrupulously fair, offering a 15-page discussion of “The Principles of Responsibility” and weighing at every turn the balance between individual, collective and institutional responsibility and plain bad luck. (The breadth of the commission’s findings reflects its composition, which includes Israel’s leading experts on public administration and human and civil rights law alongside two reserve generals.)...
Recommendations? The 2006 Lebanon War
I'm eagerly looking for stuff on the Lebanon War of 2006, but I know it's too early - all I've found are some articles online, and some interesting stuff about Hezbollah's anti-tank exploits using the RPG-29 (which apparently is one nasty mother).
Anyone know of anything in the works or available?
Matt
In re: MattC86 and Second Lebanon War
First, two apologies:
1) That I seem to have been tardy in posting, and thus the thread seems to have proceeded beyond the topic;
and
(2) That perhaps this would be better posted in the thread Jedburgh noted; relatedly, apologies if some of these links have already been posted in that thread.
Apologies stated,
Some sources are:
The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv U) - albeit with a new name - has articles on the war in its journal, Strategic Assessment: http://www.inss.org.il/publications....=&read=839#9.3. It also has some books out or coming out, but those appear to be Hebrew-only.
The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Volume 20, Issue 4, pages 583-601, December 2007) has "Israel's Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War," by Uri Bar-Joseph.
Apparently the Journal of Strategic Studies will be publishing an award-winning article, and posting it online for free, in its January 2008 issue: Avi Kober, "The IDF in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?" http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/01402390.asp.
Tony Cordesman had a nice, long lessons-learned on the war posted soon after it ended, but I can't seem to find it on the CSIS website: my hunch is they wanted to ensure this book - http://www.csis.org/component/option...,view/id,4168/ - would sell. If you want, private message me, as I downloaded a copy when it was downloadable.
It appears preliminary findings of the Winograd Commission are available:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854051.html
Parameters had two articles in its Spring 2007 issue:
"The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned” by Sarah E. Kreps
“Israel’s Uncertain Strategic Future” by Louis René Beres
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/P...g/contents.htm
Regards
Jeff
Detailed Tactical / Operational History of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War?
Anyone know of a good detailed Tactical or Operational History of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War? I am not looking for a political history but rather an account of what happened on the battlefield.
Suggestions?
OP 26: We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbolla-Israeli War
Latest history lesson I sent out.
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"The lackluster performance of the IDF in the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war was the result of a multiplicity of factors. Halutz’s steadfast confidence in air power, coupled with his disdain for land warfare, increased the strength of the IAF at the expense of the ground forces. While continuing COIN operations against the Palestinians, the IDF saw its budget for ground forces slashed and training for major combat operations by divisions and brigades greatly reduced. Within the IDF reserve, equipment was not replaced or repaired, and the tactical skills of both reserve and regular ground forces continued to decline. Training for reserve tank crewmen was all but forgotten...
... The missteps committed by the IDF in this war provide the US Army with valuable examples of potential difficulties when counterinsurgency operations are abruptly changed to major combat operations. For the US Army, which has been almost exclusively involved in irregular warfare for years, this issue is of paramount importance. While the US Army must be proficient in conducting major combat operations around the world, it is possible that years of irregular operations have chipped away at this capability, not unlike the situation encountered by the IDF."
This history lesson looks at the Combat Studies Institute's Occasional Paper #26 We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War by Matt M. Matthews. It makes a great follow up to OP21 Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000 by Daniel Isaac Helmer.
Matthew's monograph is interesting reading. This is a study of a military in war befuddled by confusion in its own doctrine and its own reputation. The introduction above offers ample reason to read this book. I would also offer a couple of caveats to this study. Armies develop cultural trends over the years of their existence and the IDF is no different. As a military built around short wars and aversion to casualties, the IDF has since 1948 put its greatest emphasis on the Israeli Air Force and its second greatest emphasis on its armored forces. Aside from certain units, infantry has been a distant third. Combined arms operations using all elements in concert has not been a hallmark of IDF operations. So as you read this understand that, while years of irregular operations in the territories exacerbated these tendencies, those traits did not necessarily originate there.
Secondly I would add emphasis to certain points. The IDF and Hezbollah have nearly a quarter century of history as enemies. It is true enough that Hezbollah was well supported and supplied by Syria and Iran over that period; it is also equally true that Hezbollah has remained very much a Lebanon-centric organization. As such it has had repeated opportunities to study previous IDF incursions and occupations of the area contested in this particular war. It is terrain that favors the determined and prepared defender. As a UN Observer in 1987 I watched these two antagonists spar repeatedly. Hezbollah began preparing for this match before the IDF pulled back in 2000. Finally I would say that while confusion of doctrine played a large role in this episode, the alternatives discussed concerning a rapid push to the Litani River to "demolish Hezbollah in six days" are just as disconnected from the reality of southern Lebanon as EBO and SOD proved to be.
You may download a copy at
CSI
Best
Tom