Where is the tipping point?
I am not a student of revolution / violent changes of government and so rely on some history and observing recent events - say back to the fall of the Shah in 1979.
In Tunisia the catalyst appears to have been the student trader's arrest and self-immolation. After several days of nationwide disorder, none of which affected key institutions, there is reporting that the Army commander declined to order troops to use live rounds to quell the disorder. Today the BBC has reported police and para-military police have joined demonstrations.
When does state coercive power, including Information Warfare, cease to have an impact and why? Capability, non-lethal and lethal; lack of will, confidence etc. I do recall the fall of East Germany, the GDR, was attributed to a clear Soviet stance and so without the Soviet "muscle" the GDR was unable to use coercion.
I am uncertain that faraway observers, like me, can discern the tipping point beforehand; leaving aside how often the tipping point occurs and is avoided. Nor that extensive intelligence-gathering and awareness can help.
It puzzles me, how can ruthless states apparently cease to function. Not to overlook that such states can falter and then crush opposition - Tienanmen Square for example.
Talking to Muslims and reading the often cited tipping point into radicalisation, not violence, is a human rights violation that has impact.
Where are the Islamists- one opinion
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Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
David-
One opinion from a Professor Roy of the EU Institute in Florence was on the NY Times website today.
I suspect the truth is somewhere in between Prof Roy's position and that of the article you posted.
V/R,
Cliff
The False premise and promise of GWOT Strategy
Regardless of what we call the surge of politically motivated, Islamist- Ideologically fused rise of act of terrorism against Western targets, the premise for the Western response possesses some major flaws. These flaws are of such a nature that they could actually make the problems for the West worse rather than better.
1. Promote sustainment of the status quo of political rule in all "allied" states.
This is foundational to the colonial intervention approach to foreign policy. Establishing and sustaining in power governments that are supportive of one's own national interests. Much of US COIN doctrine is built upon this foundation of colonial intervention, so has this problematic fault line of exercising control over (through subtle to overt means) the political processes of others.
2. To quick to promote overthrow of rule in non-allied states, or even those that disagree with us, and replacement with a regime that will support our national interests in the region.
3. Overly quick to brand non-state organizations that are emerging to positions of influence as "terrorist" organizations. This enables greater freedom to wage CT activities against these groups, but also effectively closes the door to other more productive forms of engagement. The State Department does not worry about establishing diplomatic relations with an organization, regardless of how influential it may be, once it goes on such a list. At that point it is just a "target" or a "threat" to be attacked or defeated.
4. Over reliance on CT tactics to target individuals and organizations that emerge to challenge the status quo through illegal means.
5. Over reliance on building the CT capacity of allied nation security forces to more effectively engage or suppress such nationalist organizations that emerge from their own populace to illegally challenge the status quo government.
6. Being so desperate for "friends" that we begin to hang out with some very shady characters, or just as bad, ignore the growing unacceptable nature of the behavior of our old friends.
EX:
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The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten released a series of US diplomatic cables from 2006 on massive and pervasive corruption and nepotism in Tunisia and its effect on economic development and social problems. The cables show that the United States government was fully aware of the dangerous and debilitating level of corruption in Tunisia, and its anti-democratic implications. But they raise the question of whether Washington was wise to make Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, despite his clear foibles, the pillar of its North Africa policy because of his role, as a secular strongman, in repressing Muslim movements (as William MacLean of Reuters argues).
The US embassy in Tunis noted the contradictions of what was once called "the Tunisian miracle" - relative stability and security and 5 per cent growth a year, but with mafia style corruption on the part of ruling cliques that was discouraging foreign investment and contributing to failing banks and high unemployment.
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth...299907176.html
7. The coming shift of lead from Defense to State (good); and from combat to development (ok...) without a corresponding shift of Strategy.
We are merely changing the Ways and Means without updating our Ends or our understanding of the problem. Massive development in support of illegitimate and failing regimes is no more able to prop them up against a growing Tsunami of popular opposition than massive military support is. In fact, if suppression of symptoms is the goal, history is on the side of ruthless application of force as the most effective technique.
My point on this Tunisian thread is that here is an event that pokes big holes in the "expert" positions that have shaped our GWOT strategy and engagement over the past several years. Here is an opportunity to take a hard look into that hole, and gain a clearer perspective of what is going on and why. Here is an opportunity to make a substantive change in how we see and address such problems; and in how we promote and preserve our interests. The world is changing, the US and the West must evolve as well.
Be careful which reeds you lean upon...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
This is an important read (and think) piece.
It's a think piece alright. Written by a known "America is evil and the problem" guy with a checkered history. Like many articles, it contains some fact, some opinions and some questionable items...
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This cuts to the heart of what Muslim support to AQ has been all about. For the fear mongers in the US,... They are, and have been, wrong.
Perhaps a bit. Both fanatics and the fearful often do get things wrong.
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This has NEVER been about ideology, it has been about oppressed people and the pursuit of liberty. Ideologies are just the tools employed to get there.
In many cases that's true, however, if that's the tool being used, does it not at least mean the ideology is part of the problem? It certainly means that if the ideology is not the issue then it is being used as a catalyst to manipulate people to achieve certain ends which may or may not comport with that ideology.
One can make a valid case the Shah of Iran was a despot. However, his subjects were not so much oppressed as dirt poor and he truly tried a bit to improve their lot. Khomeini and Co. used 'ideology' to depose the Shah -- and replace him with a regime that was and is far more despotic, that killed more people in its first two years of existence than the Shah had in the previous 25. So it's not all about oppression, the ideology is not benign and the change wrought may not be an improvement. :rolleyes:
I suspect the truth lies between Falk-like fear mongers on one side and the "Islam wants to kill us all" fear mongers on the other. Fanatics of any stripe and type are best ignored but watched. They tend to take a speck of truth, amplify it beyond all reality to suit their needs and create a lot of confusion. Most do not merit circulation or promotion. Manipulators are similar. Fanatical manipulators are just dangerous. Manipulators of fanatacism doubly so. Why, they can even induce fear in otherwise rational people. Hmmm. That raises a question, do such manipulators merely implant, enhance or abet fear mongering or are they themselves fear mongers? ;)
Or is it about the economy?
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
It's a think piece alright. Written by a known "America is evil and the problem" guy with a checkered history. Like many articles, it contains some fact, some opinions and some questionable items...Perhaps a bit. Both fanatics and the fearful often do get things wrong.In many cases that's true, however, if that's the tool being used, does it not at least mean the ideology is part of the problem? It certainly means that if the ideology is not the issue then it is being used as a catalyst to manipulate people to achieve certain ends which may or may not comport with that ideology.
It may also be about the economy - see here for another opinion on the source of anger. Politics has a role, but the economic side is also a big factor.
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I suspect the truth lies between Falk-like fear mongers on one side and the "Islam wants to kill us all" fear mongers on the other. Fanatics of any stripe and type are best ignored but watched. They tend to take a speck of truth, amplify it beyond all reality to suit their needs and create a lot of confusion. Most do not merit circulation or promotion. Manipulators are similar. Fanatical manipulators are just dangerous. Manipulators of fanatacism doubly so. Why, they can even induce fear in otherwise rational people. Hmmm. That raises a question, do such manipulators merely implant, enhance or abet fear mongering or are they themselves fear mongers? ;)
I just made the same point over on the Globalization thread... :) A lot of the hatred is spurred by folks using what is esentially propaganda to gain control. They would invent stuff to be angry about if it didn't really exist... because it gives them power.
V/R,
Cliff
Your ability to avoid a point is awesome...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
..certainly the perceptions of the governed regarding how one rose to power and how one is sustained in power is nearly as important as is how they feel about how one governs while in power.
True -- but little to no bearing on my points that "it's not all about oppression, the ideology is not benign and the change wrought may not be an improvement." :confused:
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But now it is 2011. The Cold War is long over, though the majority of our governmental and diplomatic framework for waging it remains rusted in place.
I agree but, again, that has little to do with the facts that ideology is not benign and all 'popular' change is not necessarily for the better...
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But the U.S. need not, and should not abandon these governments... Play this right and we turn down the flame beneath the boiling pot of popular discontent that we call "The War on Terrorism"...We need to lend stability to these inevitable transitions, to empower and facilitate evolution of government in order to prevent revolution of government. This means a mix of both assuring allies and cautioning/threatening them to be careful in how they respond to their populaces. Similarly to be supportive and cautioning/threatening to these populaces as well in regards to how we support peaceful evolution, self-determination and the principles we proclaim so loudly in our own founding documents; but that we will not stand idly by to outrages on the part of either side.
IOW, we can interfere in the affairs of others and should do so...
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This is where the real lesson from Malaya comes to play. If we enable the right governmental reforms, then when the dust settles and the Islamists come in from the cold looking for support, they will find that the populace no longer needs what they are selling and is moving on without them.
"What is this 'we' stuff, White Man" quoth Tonto to the Lone Stranger? :D
Yet again you say we must support, encourage, threaten, enable or otherwise stick our oar in -- yet you say 'they' must determine for themselves...
Yet again I say -- you cannot have it both ways.
Either we interfere or we do not. If we do, the results for many reasons will be uncertain and there is no guarantee that the result will be satisfactory in anyone's view. More on this below.
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We have an opportunity for "Malaya in the Desert," but that will only happen if we can break our Cold War paradigms and find the right balance between stability and change, between governments and populaces, between influence and control.
I respectfully suggest that there is no corollary to Malaya (also again... :rolleyes:) and that while I totally agree the Cold War paradigms must go (long overdue, that...) and finding that balance is desirable, so far all you've done is indicate the two poles:
They determine. But...
We
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...need to lend stability to these inevitable transitions, to empower and facilitate evolution of government...cautioning/threatening them to be careful in how they respond to their populaces...supportive and cautioning/threatening to these populaces as well in regards to how we support peaceful evolution, self-determination and the principles we proclaim so loudly in our own founding documents; but that we will not stand idly by to outrages on the part of either side.(emphasis added / kw)
Where is this balance of which you speak?
I submit you haven't outlined it because you cannot -- each nation, each upset situation will be different, will require a different blend of reactions and those cannot be predicted due to the vagaries of the nation involved, its people, our political process and the rotation of policy makers in that process. Thus ideologies -- ours and theirs -- have an important bearing on what occurs. It may not be 'about' ideology but you cannot discount the effect of that or them.
Thus, if we enter into the issue in any measure -- and will have to do that for various reasons on occasion -- then we are interfering and we will almost of necessity attempt to influence the outcome and the results are not, can never be, certain. What occurs is that the policy makers of the day have to react to the information available, the circumstances as far as are known and make a decision. It will often, in hindsight, be wrong -- as was emplacing the Shah. Rectification can be messy -- as it was. That rectification may produce a worse situation -- as it did.
You desire to preclude this minor chaos and to codify our responses. Admirable but unlikely. You suggest, in essence a policy, you do not provide strategies.
I agree with your desired policy (as I have always done since you came up on this Board) and I suggest you can provide no strategy due to that varied situation factor and the US political system (as I have always done since you came up on this board).
Thus while I agree with your western enlightenment ideal of what should be done in the somewhat different east I'm forced yet again to suggest that your goal is not totally realistic and that we have never been prone to strictly adhere to "the principles we proclaim so loudly in our own founding document." Nor have we been able to do so for a variety of reasons, some valid, some specious -- all real...
That paragraph should be worth at least two bonus points. :D