Who put YOU on the Red Team?
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Originally Posted by
Gnaeus
This may seem childish, but it served a useful purpose for me...what if I really was a individual who meant to do real harm and was able to get in there.
Yeah, it does.
Other than amusing yourself, what useful purpose did you serve?
If you have legitimate concerns you could have addressed them to the NCOIC of the facility, or to PMO, or to the Force Protection Officer. Or you could be real grown up and express your issues to the SOC-SMG Site Manager. Be sure to have your plausible explanation for how screwing with the Ugandans is within your lane.
Hmm. Good thing I wasn't the Gunny
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Originally Posted by
LawVol
...
Speaking as one who has performed security guard duties, using another's ID to gain access isn't screwing with someone if they're doing their job. If it had been me, rest assured he wouldn't have gotten in with another's ID. I would have turned him away and would have made him use another entrance just to show him that I'm master of my domain (General Order #12 is always in effect).
in that scenario 'cause I'd have had strip of hide. What if he went to another entrance and someone not as alert as you let him in? Depending on the local rules, he shoulda been detained -- at a minimum you should've confiscated the improper ID to turn in. Attempts and tricks like that just for fun may be tolerated nowadays but let me tell you, Mac, back in the Old Corps, we usedta ... :D
All hypotheticals (and in fun) of course but even as long as it's been I still remember both the 12th and the 11th GOs... ;)
Testing and Evaluating the Guard Force is not in everyone's lane
Quote:
Originally Posted by
LawVol
Force protection is in everyone's lane.
Complying with FP regulations, cooperating with FP personnel, and reporting FP threats is in everybody's lane. Instigating controversy for ####s and grins just gets the Ugandan sent home and ends up making it a helluva lot harder to get everybody fed at lunch.
People want to play games, each and every uniformed service member can have their CAC card run through a Hand Held Terminal and recite their PIN every time they want to eat.
How can you address the issue from back in the rear?
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Originally Posted by
Gnaeus
Did you mean what useful purpose did it serve or what useful purpose did I serve?
What useful purpose did your little Red Team exercise serve? What deficiency did you identify to anyone who could correct the deficiency?
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I will assume you mean the former.
Ass U Me. Not out of me, Devil Dog.
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First, maybe childish and just for fun were bad choice phrases to use.
Particularly bad if you consider any agreement with your own characterization a personal attack.
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There was necessity in doing this. First of all, we had a job to do and tasks to accomplish. Has one of my fellow Marines forgotten thier ID card and then when they returned to the FOB, only then did they realize that they did not have it.
Your fellow Marine was in the wrong.
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Sure...that thing could have possibly happened over the course of a deployment. So, now, we are posed with a delima. Do I try to explain for 15 minutes to a security guard that this Marine left his ID on the FOB, but verify to him...who has no authority over me
Does a security contractor manning an entry control point not have the same authority to challenge you or your CAC cardless buddy when you try to get into his DFAC as you have over him when he tries to get into your ASP?
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even though this security guard can barely understand English.
Is this another assumption on your part, or did you attempt to explain? Most of the Ugandans speak some English. He wasn't in radio contact with his Supervisor?
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Or, do I make another choice. We're tired, hungry, and the sun is down. We may have returned to our FOB, but it will still be another serveral hours before we finally rack out. Do I really have time for this? By the mere fact that I could have pulled this off, shows the whole internal security situation to be a farce.
Your buddy is running around without his CAC card, you are aiding and abetting unauthorized entry into the facility, and the whole internal security situation is a farce because both of you aren't face down in the gravel?
[QUOTE] Second. There was no PMO. The first, MP unit to roll into our FOB arrived as we were preparing to leave. But, as you probably know, just being an MP unit doesn't make you PMO.[/UNQUOTE]
No Facility NCOIC? No Force Protection Officer? No Guard Force Supervisor?
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Third. I literally had about a hundred tasks to accomplish in a single day. What number do you think talking to the site manager was on my list?
Quite low, obviously. What has caused this incident to rise to the top of your priority list so many months later?
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After we were able to get through the first time this peaked my interest. So, we "tested" it a few more times. This was by no means a normal or everyday occurance. 99% of the time we went through the regular routine, all presenting our own valid cards, and proceeded about normally.
Who did you report the results of your "test" to? What use was made of the information you obtained? What deficiencies were corrected through your diligence as a self-appointed Assistant Contracting Officer's Representative?
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Maybe it would have been better to say it was an experiment born out of a situation that arose during a specific time period. I recall something similar to this happening in the news when agents smuggled bomb making materials through TSA checkpoints. Fortunately we had only ourselves and our equipment to bring through the gate.
What gate would this be?
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Now that I'm back in the States I can address this issue.
Negative. The time to address the issue in a positive manner was when you discovered the deficiency. The people who should have been made aware of it at the time have been deprived of your input from then until now. And many of those people may well be gone by now.
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I assumed that taking it to a fourm for discussion would be a good starting point.
See paragraph 4 above.
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Criticize the issue, but do not go into a personal attack.
If you consider criticism a personal attack, perhaps you can understand how people who work for SOC-SMG or who have worked with them could consider your statements slanderous.
1-866-369-9100 is the toll free number to SOC-SMG.
ce_pao_watch_officer@mnf-wiraq.usmc.mil <ce_pao_watch_officer@mnf-wiraq.usmc.mil> can probably hook you up with AT/FP at the FOB in question.
Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising
Lessons Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising by Peter W. Singer at The Brookings Institution, 12 May 2008.
Singer is with Brooking's 21st Century Defense Initiative which is charterd to produce cutting-edge research, analysis, and outreach that address some of the most critical issues facing leaders shaping defense policy in the coming century. The initiative focuses on the following three core issues: The Future of War, The Future of U.S. Defense Needs and Priorities, and The Implications for the U.S. Defense System.
From Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising:
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One of the key questions surrounding the government’s escalating uses of military contractors is actually not whether they save the government client money or not (this, however, is getting harder to argue with the more than $10 billion that the Defense Contract Audit Agency believes was either wasted or misspent on contracting in Iraq. Rather the crucial question that should asked at the onset of any potential outsourcing is simple: Should the task be done by a private company in the first place?
...the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.
This one is a doozy of lessons not learned. First off, outsourcing training of the Iraqi military has been tried before and is actually one of the many, many factors into why we have had such a hard time...
Second, to turn over the task of advising the Iraqis now, at such a critical stage in the war effort as we try to translate the limited tactical success of the surge into something more permanent, is not just horrible timing. In the words of one U.S. Army officer, it is “definitely not a job that rational USG policy-makers should want in the hands of U.S./western contractors anytime soon.”...
Thirdly, the resultant messaging and long-term effects have to be a cause for concern. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified a few weeks to Congress that building up Iraqi capabilities was the priority in the year ahead. Contrast this with the message that this contract sends to Congress, the American public, and most importantly, our Iraqi counterparts...
But, fourth, advising a partner military is not just about building up their military skillset. It is also about passing on values and building long-term relationships. When you contract out military advisors, the values of civil-military relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills, not always the best message in a developing democracy. In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...
Much more at Brookings. Hat tip to Phil Carter at Intel Dump for the e-mail pointer to this piece.
