Re-structuring the BCT

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Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii

So its really more of an ACAV Sqn (as per the ACAV regiments) than a recon outfit right? Can it manouvre and conduct recon or only accomplish one mission at a time; me thinks the latter. recon.

Still, I can see from the simple reorganisation you propose that one could get greater bang for ones buck without needing to drastically shake up the entire system. But you really need to address the above problem.

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Agree with the first half of the first statement. The intent was to re-create a more viable force using the same set of pieces. I disagree with the second part about not being able to conduct "Reconniassance"

When we say a unit is conducting reconnaissance, what do we mean? I mean the unit is out executing a tactical operation that seeks to confirm or deny assumptions made by staff/planners that will enable the commander to make effective tactical decisions.

Is that really an enemy force of dug-in infantry supported by tanks across that river or are they just high-res decoys? (composition/what they are) and dispostion/location-where they are). I also need a force that has the capability of acting as the advanced guard for the BCT to confirm/deny the enemy's INTENTIONS.

Lots of sensors of various types (SIGINT/ELINT/HUMINT/UAVs) are capable of determining the location and suspected composition of an enemy force. This can often be conducted passively from stand-off.

However, without the actions of the Adv Gd, we may never know if those bunkers are occupied, are those tanks real? is the enemy's plan to defend, delay, retire and attempt to break contact or surrender?:confused:

Discovery of the enemy's true intentions are as important (if not more important) then just figureing out who is where.

I believe that my suggested Recon/Cav Sqdrn can do both. Based on a read from the Intel guys, the BCT and recon commanders can determine/agree on a scheme of maneuver for the ARS (Armored Recon Sqdrn). Lead with Hvy Recon only, Light Recon only or combination of both.

With only two maneuver battalions, none of the BCTs can afford an entire battalion's worth of resources designed, equipped, manned and trained for two relatively simple tasks - conduct recon and conduct screen. Recon should be a tactical task or mission that any/all units are capable of executing within their own specific limitations.

Effective March of this year (2010) the doctrine changed and now "allows" ARS to be employed to conduct guard missions as well as attack & defend. However, the baseline organiozation has yet to be adapted to make that possible.

Thus my proposal.

PS. Secondary efforts were to address the tactical limitations of the two-platoons troops, the fact that the ARS brings nothing to the fight other then C2, and to begin simplify the organizations of BCT scout/recon platoons and troops.

Once the 3rd ACR transforms to and SBCT, there will be three seperate and distinct monuted recon platoons, the 3X5 CFV-HMWWV platoon found in HBCTs, a 6 HMMWV platoon found in IBCTs and a 4 Recon Carrier Variinat found in the SBCTs. There are also two seperate/distinct troop organizations, troops of two platoons in the HBCT and troops of three platoons in both the IBCT and SBCTs.

TAH

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Originally Posted by TAH

I also need a force that has the capability of acting as the advanced guard for the BCT to confirm/deny the enemy's INTENTIONS...Discovery of the enemy's true intentions are as important (if not more important) then just figureing out who is where...I believe that my suggested Recon/Cav Sqdrn can do both.

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Far more important -- and correspondingly far, far more difficult to ascertain. Exponentially so...

OTOH, your force can determine his capabilities which are the next best thing. :wry:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Far more important -- and correspondingly far, far more difficult to ascertain. Exponentially so...

OTOH, your force can determine his capabilities which are the next best thing. :wry:

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Ain't that the truth. In all my time in Recce I don't ever remember being tasked with discovering the enemy's intent. His location and activity yes.

intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners

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Thus I was ordered to:
Make reports on enemy activity and locations
Capture prisoners.

Discover the enemy's intent NEVER featured in a stated mission.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners

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Agree with both up to a point...

Point 1, what if the reports we are intercepting are part of the enemy's deception plan? :eek:

Point 1.1 BCT has only a very limted capability in its MICO to accomplish directly got the BCT CDR. An attack by a "Re-org" ARS can achieve the results shortly after contact.

Point 2. See above about who has the capability to conduct (hint the Counter-Intel and/or the HUMINT folks in the MICO, assuming they have the correct language capability).

Point 2.1 While some EPWs will get nabbed "steathly" the majority will come following a successful attack. Consider the Brits in the Fauklands, the Italians in WW2, the Iraqis in the first Gulf War....

The ARS was designed based on the "Quaility of Firsts" (Now out of Voque). It was intended to be a Recon-pull Organization. May have worked great twenty years ago. Against any OPFOR that is well-trained, well-armed and primarilty dismounted the wheels begin to come off as it crosses the LD.

We tried the same "Recon by Steath" approach in WW2 with the mounted Cavalry/Recon units. Mounted fails against anything other then lmited resistence. Dismounted can, given time and suitable terrain work but the overall OPTEMPO must allow for it.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners

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but will it give you that enemy commanders intentions or merely his capabilities and some indications? I don't think either of those will put you inside the mind of an opposing commander. Not to mention a good deception plan can lead one astray. Badly...

This is partly semantic but it has very real and important point. You can learn things, assess what you've learned and usually determine possibilities and even occasionally, enough to ascertain probabilities -- however you must consider that the other guys is at least as smart and experienced as are you and is as capable of a startling and innovative effort. Not stating his 'intentions' is simply to avoid the mindset "that's what he's going to do..." That's a strong human predilection without reinforcing it by believing you might have learned his intentions.

It is simply avoiding target fixation. More particularly, potentially wrong target fixation...

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Thus I was ordered to:
Make reports on enemy activity and locations
Capture prisoners.

Discover the enemy's intent NEVER featured in a stated mission.

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While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabiities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.

Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.

Could the HBCT use a CAB instead, sure, but with only two it limits the flexibility of the exiting HBCT.

A similar epiphany is occuring at the division, corps and JTF levels with the realization that the "old" dic cav and ACRs are gone and that the Battlefield Surveillance Bdes lack the resources to execute many their old tasks (conduct guard, conduct cover force, conduct economy-of-force, conduct reconnaissance-in-force etc). Div and above cdrs are now having to employ a BCT instead.

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Originally Posted by TAH

While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabiities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.

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Well I believe commanders should base decisions on what is actually known about the enemy and not what is suspected. One of our huge doctrinal faults is basing plans on predicted enemy courses of action, and not on actual observed enemy courses of action.

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Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.

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True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy. That does not leave you open to deception unless you are very stupid and the enemy knows you are watching. Fighting the enemy (nose punching) is an entirely different objective, which basically tells the enemy you've found him.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Well I believe commanders should base decisions on what is actually known about the enemy and not what is suspected. One of our huge doctrinal faults is basing plans on predicted enemy courses of action, and not on actual observed enemy courses of action.

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Amen Brother!

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Originally Posted by TAH

...AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.

Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent.

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and is easier said than done.

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By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.

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No one here is suggesting that, only saying that all the aggressive recon work in the world will not reliably and accurately provide you intentions. You ascertain capabilities and infer probabilities but you cannot determine intent.

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True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy.

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A bit of semantics here too, I think.

Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not.

A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,

A time and a place for both types of gathering intel.

My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.

COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.

An intersesting note to me is that a USMC Division has both a Recon Bn (with the sneak and peek types) and a LAV Bn for "Classic" CAV missions.

TAH

Operational deception is a problem for MI analysts and commanders, not for recce folks in the field. They report what they have.

Large-scale deception works rarely, and almost never without the assistance of the fooled ones. The German army had almost no air reconnaissance on the Eastern Front after summer of 1944 and never got seriously surprised again.
Large operations require large preparations.

I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.

Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.

Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.
Everything can be misunderstood - even orders (charge of the light brigade...).

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Operational deception is a problem for MI analysts and commanders, not for recce folks in the field. They report what they have.

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True -- and they can be and have been fooled by tactical deception...

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I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.

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Totally true -- and a belief that they knew the opponents intent lulled them into not expecting the magnitude of the attacks. Thanks for recalling that... :D

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Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.

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How?

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Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.

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True and no one here is saying that it is as nearly as I can tell. However, recall that some Commander, somewhere, is going to make use of those reports to determine capabilities and to try to infer probabilities. He will not in most cases be able to get into the mind of his opponent.

What Wilf and I are saying is that you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions. Further, that even if you were able to do so, he can change in a second to do something unexpected and you can be working of what was or has become an erroneous conclusion. You have to ass u me intentions, never a good plan...:D

Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato :)

Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think. :)

Target on the Mover ???:confused:

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Originally Posted by TAH

A bit of semantics here too, I think.

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Words matter

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Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not.

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Nor do I.

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A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,

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IMO, its even more simple. Reconnaissance is seeking. Surveillance is watching. Both are normally done by the same folks.

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My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.

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I think the "fight for information" is less useful, than "seek to contact." Contact may just mean locating the enemy and not blundering into them 25m the wrong side of the ridge line.

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COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.

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You still need to find the enemy. Different type of enemy, that's all.

Good stuff TAH. You've clearly given this stuff some thought and that is always good regardless of my pedantry!

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Originally Posted by TAH

Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato :)

Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think.

Target on the Mover ???:confused:

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Your "within some limits" sort of equals my "...you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions." (all emphasis added / kw). That's sorta semantic, I guess...

As an aside, I agree with you on the principles of cavalry / reconnaissance operations and capabilities with the caveat that recon by stealth can work in MCO and it has been done by us if rarely. Other armies do it more often, we just don't usually have the patience for it ala your comment on OpTempo (as desired by some Cdr somewhere...). :wry:

So, as on old Cav Colonel once said "...we just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have armor." :D

Here's a really simplified description of ground recce. I just feel like dropping it here. :cool:

Commanders send small units on reconnaissance missions till they run into a deadly ambush in order to avoid that the whole formation runs into deadly ambushes.


From this point of view, it's no wonder that modern ground reconnaissance doesn't seem to be highly successful. Nowadays, we want to keep all own troops away from deadly ambushes.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

So, as on old Cav Colonel once said "...we just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have armor." :D

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Now that resembles the Army I knew... I know... and that I have no reasonable expectation will change (regardless of merit) :eek:

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Originally Posted by TAH

While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabilities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.

Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.

Could the HBCT use a CAB instead, sure, but with only two it limits the flexibility of the existing HBCT.

A similar epiphany is occurring at the division, corps and JTF levels with the realization that the "old" div cav and ACRs are gone and that the Battlefield Surveillance Bdes lack the resources to execute many their old tasks (conduct guard, conduct cover force, conduct economy-of-force, conduct reconnaissance-in-force etc). Div and above cdrs are now having to employ a BCT instead.

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Hmm... enough of an epiphany to actually *do* something about it? (Besides dismantling the last heavy ACR on schedule, of course...)

It's funny, whenever I hear of proposed changes (read: increases) in headquarters or intelligence personnel, I see leaders reaching for the rubber stamp that says "Approved" - REGARDLESS of the rationale. ...but when it comes to increasing combat power, it's always met with a cautious "Well, there's a lot to consider..."

It's as if increases in support are seen as the "mature" thing to do - but I don't ever see anyone saying "Enough!" We'll end up with an army composed of just one rifle squad and 500k+ of "multipliers".