Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh 'will not return home'
The headline says it all and is if by magic:
Quote:
Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen's embattled president, who is being treated for shrapnel wounds in Saudi Arabia, will not return home, according to a Saudi official.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...turn-home.html
Yemen, AQAP, and Counterterrorism Opportunity
This week, Frank Cilluffo and I co-authored an article on the spread of AQAP, the collapse of Yemen and a small window of counterterrorism opportunity that is currently available.
We advocate for the use of drones and SOF to remove AQAP's key leaders planning attacks on the U.S.
Yemen's shift to a 'failed' state provides the U.S. an opportunity to engage AQAP without being forced to go through the Saleh regime.
We are also interested in how Yemen is indicative of future scenarios the U.S. will face and how we can identify alternative CT & COIN strategies that are effective and efficient in disrupting threats from failed and weak states.
For those interested, the article is available here at the Homeland Security Policy Institute via this link:
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss..._yemenAQAP.cfm
Looking forward to any of your thoughts on this issue....
Countering AQAP in Yemen: Continued Debate
I posted the original introduction[/URL] to an article written by Frank Cilluffo and Clint Watts. The debate has continued on this topic and we would enjoy hearing the perspective of CT/COIN practitioners as we search for viable solutions to counter AQAP in Yemen.
Last week, Gregory Johnsen of Waq-al-Waq crafted a thoughtful response to our article “Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity.” Below is our response to further what we believe to be a particularly important debate. We will begin by addressing Johnsen’s conclusion and then discuss each of his points individually. For each point of debate, we attributed original quotes from the article as Cilluffo and Watts and quotes from Gregory’s post at Waq al Waq as Johnsen.
Quote:
Johnsen- “I think this is what happens when smart people tackle a complex problem in an environment they don’t know particularly well. “
While we respect Johnsen’s knowledge of Yemen, we likewise believe his criticisms reflect what happens when smart regional experts encounter a complex enemy they don’t know particularly well.
Ten years of American counterterrorism efforts demonstrate that the best way to defeat al Qaeda is to go directly after al Qaeda. Bin Laden’s personal notes articulate that building schools in Afghanistan didn’t slow down al Qaeda but drone strikes halted many of their operations. Johnsen’s title “The Allure of Simple Solutions” suggests the only way to deter AQAP in the near term is via a complex solution instituted through a failed Saleh regime or its successor. Pursuing such a solution will fail to stop AQAP’s immediate threat to the United States and is not feasible in light of the current situation in Yemen.
As we noted in our original article, we believe our recommendation is neither comprehensive nor simple, but instead the best option for achieving immediate U.S. national security interests with regards to AQAP. If we’ve learned anything from the past ten years, it is ‘yes’ sometimes simple (as distinguished from simplistic) strategies with clear goals and objectives work far better in achieving our near term interests than costly, complex strategies spread across convoluted bureaucracies. Increased use of drone and SOF forces, when executed as designed, can help eliminate the immediate threat of AQAP and improve U.S. options for pursuing a long-run Yemen strategy less encumbered by counterterrorism concerns.
We respect Johnsen’s opinions and rely on his analysis of Yemen to improve our perspective. However, we have yet to see any other feasible near or long-term U.S. strategy for mitigating the threat of AQAP. We welcome any feasible alternative solution put forth. However, until that time, the U.S. must protect its citizens and interests. The AQAP threat remains acute and inaction is not an option.
We thank Gregory Johnsen for his thoughtful analysis and look forward to his policy recommendations with regards to Yemen. We’ll quickly respond to each of his individual points below with short rebuttals.
For the complete discussion on Dr. Gregory Johnsen's assumptions, we invite those interested to read further at the Homeland Security Policy Institute:
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/
Change in Yemen: nothing is due to change
An Australian academic, Dr Sarah Philips, from the Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney, has published several papers on the crisis in Yemen, partly based on first-hand research in-country.
'Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State' (Feb 2011) is on:http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/P...is%20State.pdf
A summary:http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/P...20Division.pdf
Quote:
Deeply patrimonial systems of power are not transformed overnight, and many of Yemen’s structural and human barriers to developmental change remain in place. The defection of key members of the inner circle to the opposition was not in itself a signal that a more developmentally inclined elite is in the ascendant, although many of the young protesters have been articulating demands for a fundamental revision of the political system. Those who defected from Saleh’s inner circle have been instrumental in instilling the dysfunctional political settlement that brought Yemen to this point. By joining the protest movement they have not necessarily heralded a new era for the Yemeni people. Indeed, none has gone so far as to openly renounce the patrimonial system of government, or the ‘rules of the game’ that will shape the behaviour of anyone who might follow President Saleh.
This week IISS has published an extended edition of her work, Adelphi Paper 'Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis' and earnt this review comment by Nabeel A. Khoury, director of the Near East South Asia Office of the US DoS bureau of political analysis:
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An important, timely and well-written book that delves into the country’s informal power structures and comprehensively addresses the Yemeni dilemma for Arab and Western governments.
Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/ade...manent-crisis/
Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency
Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency
Entry Excerpt:
An American-designed strategy attempts to link counterinsurgency and traditional development programs in Yemen and thereby provide a model that can be applied elsewhere. Rapidly changing conditions with simultaneous multiple small wars impair the ability to design and implement such a challenge. At the same time, there are legitimate questions about the thinking that went into the original formulation.
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Try again, SWC may respond?
CWOT has tried to get a response on SWC with his two thoughtful comments, but to no avail - this does happen here and can be rather predictable.
Perhaps the linked SWJ article will prompt reflection and response(s). See 'Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...ew-coordinate/
Note please there are two threads on Yemen, 2010 & 2011, plus IIRC a couple of others.
This guy really, really wants to run the show in Yemen.
Apparently Saleh wants to be in charge of things in Yemen until the day he dies. Fortunately for him any number of people are interested in helping make that happen.
A dead cleric has what local impact?
From the BBC:
Quote:
US-born radical Islamist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a key al-Qaeda leader, has been killed in Yemen, the country's defence ministry said.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15121879
No doubt much ink will be spilt on the demise. MY interest is the local impact inside the Yemen as it appears to lurch along, with neither of the many sides making gains and bloodshed notably in Sanaa.
Book Review: Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis
Book Review: Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis
Entry Excerpt:
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BBC Inside Al Qaeda's Yemen
Yemen appears to have disappeared from the limelight of late, even though President Saleh is bound for the USA, for medical treatment. So it was a surprise to hear a BBC reporter actually in southern Yemen reporting on the growth of jihadist control.
A podcast:http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today...00/9685172.stm
A written article:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programme...lk/9682753.stm
Yemen after Saleh: between uncertainties and divisions
A different, detailed commentary. The agreement to remove President Saleh:
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..do(es) not appear to herald a break with the past and the beginning of a process of appeasement and democratization.
Indeed, although the caretaker government also contains elements belonging to the opposition, some weak points of the agreement drawn up in Saudi Arabia regarding the deep divisions within Yemeni society indicate not only the attempt by the Republican faction to maintain strong control over the country, but also that the initial protests of Yemeni citizens against their autocratic leadership have been gradually transmuted into a military conflict between the state and the tribal confederations, plunging Yemen into a more acute domestic crisis, with obvious repercussions at regional level.
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/maria-s...-and-divisions
So the Yemen has a new government, which faces the same problems and decides on "more of the same" with "a few chairs changed on a sinking ship". Great result for diplomacy.
U.S. Teaming With New Yemen Government on Strategy to Combat AQ
A grand sounding title from the NYT and:
Quote:
The plan’s two-pronged strategy calls for the United States and Yemen to work together to kill or capture about two dozen of Al Qaeda’s most dangerous operatives, who are focused on attacking America and its interests.
At the same time, the administration will work with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf allies to train and equip Yemeni security forces to counter the organization’s wider threat to destabilize the country and the government of its newly installed president, Abed Rabu Mansour Hadi.
I wish this idea well, but cannot think of a more hostile place to try it (OK Afghanistan, oh it works there):
Quote:
One main proposal, he said, is to pay Yemeni troops directly rather than through their commanders.....(Citing Mr O'Brennan) We’re trying to ensure that the aid is very tailored, so it goes to those units that are professional, that fall within a command and control structure that reports to Hadi, that are addressing Al Qaeda and domestic threats to Yemen, and are not engaged in any political shenanigans.
In response Gregory Johnsen, a Princeton scholar who closely tracks militants in Yemen.:
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Some independent analysts aso warned that the administration’s approach amounted to picking and choosing favorite Yemeni generals, which could backfire over time. “Any time the U.S. gets into where it’s favoring certain generals or trying to play generals off each other, it is a very dangerous game,” said
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/wo..._r=1&ref=world
Narratives and Strategies of AQAP
Somehow I missed the release of this RUSI report in December 2011, 'The Language of Jihad Narratives and Strategies of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and UK Responses' and have just skimmed through it, looks like a very good read. It is 55 pgs and has chapters on
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Terrorism, Communication and Strategy; The History of AQAP; The Language of Jihad; Conclusions and Recommendations; Postscript
The authors aim to:
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...look to understand the situation in Yemen and the possibilities for AQAP gaining further traction in the region, through garnering a greater understanding of the underlying issues that allow such groups to operate.....What is certain is that AQAP will be watching closely to capitalise on any mistakes that are made and will bide their time ready to fill any vacuum that appears.
Link:http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets..._Jihad_web.pdf
Yemen: A U.S. Strategic Partner?
Yemen: A U.S. Strategic Partner?
Entry Excerpt:
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