In regards the conversation as a whole
I think Mr Collins had it right back in 85, As you get better in one type of fight the threshold for a different type of fight is lowered. Would seem to reason as wel for HIC/LIC, CONV/COIN, whatever as it did for Conv/Nuclear
In that that doesn't mean either type won't happen just seems that it's all the more important to figure out just what "Balanced" looks like and get to working on it.
It is indeed well worth a read.
This, in particular is worthy of being burned in the memories of many people:
Quote:
First, we can somewhat mitigate RMA uncertainty by means of extensive, independent, and competitive experimentation, field trials, and exercises - both single service and joint. We also can seek to sharpen the debate among competing RMA schools, service visions, and branch perspectives - while insulating these from partisan politics and commercial interests.
Second, despite our best efforts, a substantial degree of uncertainty will persist; the only decisive test of vision is war. This humbling fact argues for avoiding over-commitment during periods of great strategic uncertainty, retaining flexibility, and developing our facilities for rapid adaptation. Adaptation is best served by substantial equipment and unit prototyping, which would offer multiple potential paths of development. Also useful is modularization of capabilities, units, and training regimes - an approach that allows rapid change through "add-ons" and supplemental training. (emphasis added, both / kw)
Third, pervasive uncertainty tends to strengthen the position of the status quo, especially during periods of significant strategic change. For institutional reasons, the default position may be to extend the status quo into the future. However, this is not a neutral position. When the world is changing rapidly the preservation (or recapitalization) of the status quo involves a "future vision" as risky and open to question as any - if not more so.
Finally, "uncertainty" by itself does not constitute a strong rationale for either sitting still or moving decisively down a new path. It lends positive support only to efforts to reduce uncertainty or improve our capacity to react, recover, and respond to surprise (that is, to adapt).
All simple basic common sense -- and all far too often ignored totally due to egos and agendas.
That I underlined is harsh reality, that I placed in bold type is the only way to preclude not being prepared for that reality; one or the other will not work -- we have to be able to do either/or. Or even 'whatever'...
I'd certainly endorse that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
... I don't think we know what the future will look like, and developing capabilities to address a wide range of potential threats is prudent, but a capability is not a strategy, it is simply a tool in the tool box. Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum?
Strongly endorse, in fact...
I'm still agreeing with you
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
...On further thought, that professional development revolution needs to be pushed throughout the Whole of Government WOG...Dynamic leaders push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, then let bureaucracy catch up with reality. The key is to success is to develop these leaders, and then reward them with the right incentives to stay in, not place them in a dead end job because they're making waves. When people see innovative behavior rewarded, we'll once again see our greatest resource (our people) raise to the occassion of today's and tomorrow's challenges.
However, that is going to require Congress to change their ways to an extent and I'm not sure that can be done.
What the Army -- all of DoD -- can do is take your thought and apply it internally at all levels. I'd submit that in addition to a revolution in professional development, we need and can have a revolution in initial entry training, officer and enlisted.
We also need and can have a significant loosening of the systemically imposed stifling and initiative killing cultural norms to achieve real loosening of the de facto, over-cautious restraints on leaders so they not only permitted but actually encouraged to be dynamic leaders and push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, and let the bureaucracy catch up with reality.
That is 'do-able,' Congress really can't stop it and those serving and most Americans will applaud it. Do wonders for the retention of Captains... ;)
BG McMaster on the Army Capstone Concept (Quicklook Notes)
Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept
Certainty vs. Uncertainty / Theory vs. Recent and Ongoing Conflicts (Then and Now)
- Knowledge centric vs. fighting and politics centric.
- Planning process vs. design and education.
- Synchronization vs. initiative.
- Centralization vs. decentralization.
- Risk avoidance vs. risk mitigation.
- Efficiency vs. effectiveness.
- Fires vs. combined arms fire and maneuver.
- See / quality of firsts vs. find and understand.
- Rapid, Decisive Operations vs. sustained campaigns.
- ISR vs. recon and security.
- Command from the FOB vs. command from the front.
- Systems approach (EBO) vs. complexity (design).
- Dominance vs. strategy and continuous interaction.
- MCO focus vs. spectrum of conflict.
- Capabilities Based Assessment vs. Threat Based Assessment.
- Vagueness vs. transparency.
- Linear progression (leap ahead) vs. interaction with adversaries - continuous innovation.
Implications for the Army Capstone Concept
- Conducting operations under the condition of transparency.
- Conducting operations with partners and amongst diverse populations.
- Overcoming anti-access in the context of a joint operation.
- Conducting and sustaining operations from and across extended distances.
- Fighting for information (physical reconnaissance and human intelligence).
- Employing the manpower, mobility, firepower, and protection to close with the enemy.
- Conducting area security operations over large areas (including population security; precision fires to limit collateral damage).
- Developing partner capabilities (e.g. Security Force Assistance).
- Protecting the network and routinely fighting in degraded mode.
- Overcoming hybrid threats / complex terrain and overcoming enemy count-mobility efforts.
- Reshaping logistics and the demand side of sustainment to ensure operations without pause and freedom of movement in non-contiguous area of operations.
The first post (and subsequent) whilst intriguing,
lack context in the 'vs' , Can you elaborate?
Thanks
Mark
But can the U.S. build the Army McMaster wants?
BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.
McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.
During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.
The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.
-Robert Haddick