China-made truck used in North Korea parade to show submarine-launched missile
http://reut.rs/2pcubco
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China-made truck used in North Korea parade to show submarine-launched missile
http://reut.rs/2pcubco
I find it interesting that while all state what they state the only American with a relative deep negotiation skills with NK in eight trips there for a long number of days Bill Richards who has no dog in the fight suggested the following;.....Quote:
Originally Posted by Azor
All previous US comments whether from Reagan...Bush...Obama and now Trump has actually reinforced the NK image that the US wants to totally and completely defeat NK and reunify it with the south....that is at least their perception....and based on all the sanctions they could actually believe it....
AND you read the Deputy FMs comments that "Gadhafi was crazy for giving up his nuclear drive in exchange of being accepted into the West...WHAT did it get him...shot in a ditch" ...
You can actually understand NK....anyway maybe the current leader is not as "crazy" as we make him out to be.....
Richards went on to say use economic and humanitarian aid and help to their electrical power industries to entice them long term that 1) the West is not out to destroy him or NK and 2) long term entice him off nuclear weapons if for a long period the West does not attempt to destroy NK...
Basically he went on to state that the Trump bluster and carrier strike force just reinforces what NK believes to be the reality of the US...the destruction of NK...
BTW...even the Chinese are now admitting they have limited abilities to reign in NK nuclear/missile development.....
AND the current Trump FP is to lean on the Chinese to lean on NK in order to be not called currency manipulators....
Not a thoroughly thought out FP strategic strategy if you ask me....just tactical responses to a thoroughly strategic problem...
Trump says North Korea ‘outplayed’ Obama — but the truth is much more complicated
http://read.bi/2pwilcS
BREAKING: Japan is considering preparations for refugees from North Korea
BUT WAIT...I thought Pence was in SK to condemn NK actions...BUT now it is really about trade it appears....
Pence takes a hardline on renegotiating the US trade deal with South Korea
http://read.bi/2pPbyrh
Reality: our IC has too little HUMINT & SIGINT on North Korea.
Which makes Trump's tweets even more dangerous.
Nobody really knows what's going on inside North Korea. Not even US spies.
Here's why that's bad.
http://observer.com/2017/04/north-ko...sile-test-cia/
Remember that 'armada’ Trump was sending to Korea? It is sailing the wrong way,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...41_story.html#
AND this is not a true "Wag the Dog moment"??????
Eyewitnesses from Shenyang reporting mil. movement heading Dandong close to North Korea ("many medical vehicles")
https://already-happened.com/2017/04...-def-systems/#
Citing Bill M in part:I skimmed the BBC's interview with the Deputy FM this morning, but will now read it fully. The reporter concluded:Quote:
AND you read the Deputy FMs comments that "Gadhafi was crazy for giving up his nuclear drive in exchange of being accepted into the West...WHAT did it get him...shot in a ditch" ...
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39626011Quote:
The message is clear. Militarised and isolated, North Korea has the right to follow its own path and, Mr Han apparently believes, no one will be able to stop it.So far, he has been proven right.
I trust Bill Richardson on North Korea as much as I trust Dennis Rodman.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Are you serious?Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
The record shows frequent and deadly North Korean acts of war against South Korea, Japan and the United States, which have not been responded to in kind, in addition to the unilateral withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from South Korea. In return, North Korea has continued to develop nuclear weapons that can reach the United States and has threatened nuclear war on a number of occasions. Pyongyang has been handled with kid gloves and that approach has not worked. Now, the window of opportunity for decisively stopping the threat is closing.
Why would I read what I already know to be true?Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
You will recall that I have consistently argued that U.S. intervention in Libya drove a nail in the coffin of non-proliferation, which was given the coup de grace by Russia in Ukraine three years later.
Yet both you and CrowBat whined that Gadhafi was a butcher who needed to be ousted. Well, Obama ruined the only positive developments from Bush’s aggressive non-proliferation focus, and the point was not lost on either Pyongyang or Teheran for that matter. If there is war on the Korean peninsula again, save your condemnation for Clinton and Obama: at least Bush was consistent. Gadhafi was never “accepted into the West”, but there was a gentleman’s agreement that relations would be normal again and he would not be subject to “shock and awe”. After Operation Odyssey Dawn, why would Teheran, Pyongyang, Islamabad, Damascus or any other rogue nuclear or would-be nuclear power ever trust Washington? That is the reason that the JCPOA is a failure: because Teheran has no incentive to comply for the duration.
By the time that “long period” is over, North Korea will have a minimum credible deterrent capable of reaching the U.S. and extorting it, South Korea and Japan for aid. There is no reason for Kim to believe that anything other than a nuclear deterrent will protect his regime. Neither Washington nor Moscow can go back on the messes they created in Libya and Ukraine, respectively, and the broken agreements.Quote:
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Well, hold on. Iraq never surrendered its nuclear weapons program; on the contrary, it ran out of resources due to the disastrous wars in Iran and Kuwait.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
The countries that did dismantle their nuclear programs or weapons are:
- South Africa
- Ukraine
- Belarus
- Kazakhstan
- Libya
Of these, Libya was invaded less than eight years after it abandoned its nuclear weapons program in return for normalized relations, and Ukraine was invaded and partitioned nineteen years after surrendering the nuclear weapons in its possession.
The fact that these gentleman's or non-binding agreements were violated by key guarantors is not lost on Iran, North Korea, Pakistan or even Syria.
Quote:
Originally Posted by AdamG
Quote:
Were Kim Jong-Un's missiles FAKE?
Critics claim 'wonky' rockets put on display ahead of failed test launch were not real weapons
North Korea unveiled new weapons during a display of the country's military
But people have started questioning the validity of some of the missiles on show
One in particular looks as though the nose is either fitted incorrectly or a fake
Parade of weapons was part of the celebrations of Kim Il-Sung in Pyongyang#
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...#ixzz4ee4jQTIY
https://tanchoppa.files.wordpress.co...issile_624.jpg
Nice analysis from Tanchoppa
https://tanchoppa.wordpress.com/2012...a-parade-fake/
See also
https://jesamine1983.files.wordpress...ojanrabbit.jpg
Someone with a firm grasp of the blatantly obvious
https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-say...-politics.htmlQuote:
WASHINGTON (AP) — North Korea's nuclear weapons development may be designed to take over archrival South Korea and coerce the United States into abandoning its close ally, a senior White House official said Tuesday, questioning the North's stated purpose of warding off a U.S. invasion.
Ruminating about Pyongyang's possible motivations, Matt Pottinger, the Asia director on President Donald Trump's National Security Council, said there may be some truth to claims that the North wants a nuclear deterrent to protect its communist dictatorship. But Pottinger said the country's robust conventional military has worked as a deterrent for decades.
Pottinger is partly correct. Certainly, Pyongyang believes that a nuclear deterrent will allow it to blackmail the international community to prop up the Kim dynasty materially as North Korea will be "too big to fail". This would echo the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, where the U.S. keeps Pakistan close more to ensure that its nuclear weapons are secure than because of Pakistan's "counter-terrorism efforts".Quote:
Originally Posted by AdamG
However, after the advent of U.S. precision-strike in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Iraq again and then Libya, it became clear that the KPA was obsolete and could be annihilated with impunity from the air. Therefore, while the KPA would deter a ground invasion and occupation, it could not prevent devastating airstrikes. Thus, Pyongyang does believe that only a nuclear deterrent will keep the B-2s at bay...
https://mwi.usma.edu/thunder-run-seo...oreas-war-plan
By Lt. Col. Raymond Farrell, Canadian Forces
Selected Excerpts:
Quote:
The North’s Attack Plan
...They therefore plan to win by striking quickly, by surprise, while ROK forces are still mobilizing, US reinforcements are not yet in theatre, and while our airpower is largely committed to overcoming the DPRK integrated air defense system and targeting WMD storage sites, launchers, and command, control, and communications (C3) networks.
Recognizing that ROK forces will be on some degree of heightened readiness during a crisis, the regime will use its formidable intelligence and special operations capability to obscure preparations for an attack and slow ROK responses. Its own past history of symbolic attacks, placing its forces on alert, and angry promises to destroy its enemies will actually work in its favor in this case: ROK/US intelligence agencies will expect some kind of posturing from the North and may therefore misidentify attack preparations as lesser actions. DPRK agents will also count on the psychological reluctance of the South Korean population and government to believe that war is imminent. They will actively seek to influence the ROK democratic decision-making process to get inside our decision cycle. In particular, ROK mobilization will require a political decision and every hour of delay imposed through threats, deception, information and cyber attacks, or direct action will have consequences. In the end, even if ROK/US commanders do recognize the signs of an attack before it begins, it will still take time to react. In that time, DPRK commanders hope to win.
There will be no need for detailed orders. Just as ROK forces know and rehearse their war plan, DPRK forces are largely in place, in numbers sufficient to achieve some local breakthroughs on the major routes towards Seoul—their first operational objective. North Korea will hope to begin mobilization before South Korea does, and thereby turn their currently modest advantage in numbers into a temporarily significant one. DPRK forces will rely, Soviet-style, on the use of overwhelming artillery and rocket fires to break through ROK prepared positions along the DMZ, while using deep fires to attack C3 nodes, routes forward, and mobilization centers. Strikes against targets in Seoul and the surrounding urban areas will have the additional useful effect of causing fear and choking routes with a panicked populace.
On the subject of routes it is worth considering the limited space for mechanized maneuver in central Korea: The eastern half of the peninsula is largely mountainous with roads running along valley floors. The grain of the country will tend to push DPRK forces southwest (towards Seoul). The western half of the peninsula around Seoul and the Han River system is slightly flatter, but at least south of the DMZ the land is now so built up that once major routes come under fire it will be slow going for both sides. It’s not good country for heavy forces, and until recently both sides planned to use mostly lighter infantry to fight on the line. Recent announced changes to ROK force structure see a much greater emphasis on heavy forces—perhaps to get more combat power out of a smaller overall force—but the terrain suggests that such forces will likely be difficult to maneuver. Furthermore, DPRK tactics emphasize the use of infiltration to achieve local penetrations and attack deeper, tactical targets. Their line formations include elite sub-elements specially trained for these tasks, and the terrain—whether urban or forested mountain—is ideal for it. Road-bound heavy forces will be especially susceptible to such tactics.
The final element in the DPRK plan is an extensive deep battle across the entire South Korean depth using some one hundred thousand special operations forces (SOF). An interesting feature of this war is that since both sides look and speak more or less alike, covert insertion and operation is easier for each side—but especially so for North Korean agents who may move freely within South Korea’s open society.
Some DPRK SOF will have been pre-positioned. More will be inserted by sea, air, and ground infiltration shortly before the main attack, exploiting—little-green-men-style—any public uncertainty or national command paralysis for temporary deniability. One of the main tasks for DPRK SOF in this preliminary phase will be to support the deception plan by encouraging and magnifying whatever confusion and chaos may accompany a crisis, and especially to foster political uncertainty and indecision in the critical hours before the main attack. Deniable attacks against political leadership, false-flag provocations, staged anti-war protests, terrorist attacks aimed at causing panic, and limited attacks against key C3 nodes will begin in this stage. This phase could last for days or even weeks, but hours are more likely.
Once DPRK main forces attack across the DMZ, the remaining DPRK SOF will surge south by sea and air towards targets in Seoul and in depth. Many will be destroyed en route by defending ROK forces, and more will be defeated at their objectives, but DPRK planners hope to overwhelm ROK defenses by sheer numbers of SOF and inflict temporary but serious damage while they still have operational surprise. SOF targets in this phase will be national C3 nodes, including political leadership, mobilization centres, airfields, ports and naval bases, and choke points on major routes. As with artillery strikes, fighting by SOF on objectives in Seoul will be aimed at heightening panic and demoralizing political leadership, and will be exploited by DPRK information warfare agencies to give the impression that the front has already reached the ROK capital.
With luck, DPRK planners hope to have main forces entering Seoul within the first week, from which position they can either transition to defense and negotiate from strength or, if conditions permit, push on to decisively defeat ROK forces.
But this plan is very optimistic. ROK planners understand it well and are prepared to counter it. Forces defending along the DMZ are in strong, prepared positions supported by obstacles. ROK C3 is hardened and redundant. Rear-area security forces are substantial and their plans are kept current and rehearsed. Even given some disruption by DPRK SOF, mobilization is expected to generate millions of men within days.
The Unknowns
There are three main variables which might affect this estimate: First, the combat performance of either side cannot be known for certain. My own guess is that ROK forces would fight very well—especially on defense. But there are ways in which North Korea may attempt to undermine ROK morale: Both sides consider the other to be cousins awaiting liberation and this could be used as part of a skillful information operations campaign—particularly if ROK forces seek to advance into the North. The possible combat performance of DPRK forces is even less predictable. On the one hand, the DPRK population has been brainwashed from birth. On the other hand, North Korea’s people fear their own leadership and are often on the brink of starvation. It is possible that they might fight fanatically, but also that, given a chance, they would turn on their leaders. We simply don’t know.
The second main variable is the potential DPRK use of WMD. Finding and killing these will be a high priority for ROK/US commanders, but it is possible that some will survive, especially in the first few days. The North’s leaders may decide to use chemical weapons for battlefield advantage or, if they fail to enter Seoul, may seek to blackmail the ROK government with the possibility of chemical or even nuclear attack against it. Of course the use, or even threatened use, of WMD might invite US retaliation in kind, but a desperate or simply risk-taking Kim regime could gamble that our side would blink first.
The third and related variable is what the DPRK regime would do in defeat. Facing defeat, it is possible that army commanders, or even their troops, would turn on the leadership and depose the regime. On the other hand, if Kim retains enough control over his forces but believes that he is on the brink of being deposed, it is possible that he could—with nothing left to lose—simply unleash whatever WMD he still possesses.
The Takeaway: DPRK Will Make it Ugly
Recognizing that in war nothing ever goes entirely as expected, and that there are some major unknowns, this is based on what we do know about North Korea’s force structure, its comparative strengths, and terrain and other considerations—along with my own assessment of how Korean War II would initially unfold. But regardless of how it played out, one thing is near certain: It would entail horrific destruction and suffering. Tens or hundreds of thousands could become casualties. In defeat, North Korea would become a 25-million strong humanitarian catastrophe. And that is just with conventional weapons: The possible consequences of attacking Seoul with WMD are almost too awful to contemplate. There is a role for force here—a strong ROK/US posture has certainly constrained North Korean aggression for decades—and in no way should DPRK threats be simply acceded to. But under current conditions, and given the scale of likely destruction, planners should strongly question whether each DPRK provocation—even the imminent development of a ICBM—justifies risking such a war.
https://mwi.usma.edu/thinking-north-korean-downfall/
By Maj. M.L. Kavanaugh
Quote:
He did it. Kim Jong Un defied the world, again. Despite the American warships, despite the Chinese pressure, North Korea’s leader tested another illicit missile. Even if the practice launch “fizzled,” as with gifts, it’s the thought that counts—and in this case, the thoughts are pretty disturbing. And he’s still got a nuke “all primed and ready” to test.
Of course, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests on five previous occasions, including twice last year (not to mention 24 provocative missile tests in the same twelve-month stretch)—and US aircraft carrier visits to the region are not rare. But the backdrop of palpably increased tensions against which these developments are taking place gives them a particularly ominous character.
While an outbreak of war remains unlikely, because this recent cycle continues a long, dangerous trend, we have to ask: What would a war to end the North Korean regime look like? What historical example could we reach to? It is critically important for planners to set their scales correctly to understand the scope war might entail. And in this case, the task’s enormity demands accurate forecasting.
Twenty years ago, an American commander in Korea estimated a war with North Korea would take a million lives and cost $1 trillion (and that was against a pre-nuclear North). More recently, about a year ago, the previous US commander in Korea, Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, testified to the US Congress that, “Given the size of [North Korean] forces and the weaponry involved,” a war there would be “akin to the Korean War and World War II—very complex, probably high casualty.” Translating this most recent assessment from alpha to numeric puts us somewhere between 40,000 and 400,000 battle deaths. That’s a lot, but, it does get us to a historical precedent. Another major Pacific operation featured similarly high casualty estimates: Operation Downfall. This was the planned invasion to defeat the Empire of Japan at the end of the Second World War—and it never actually happened because the Japanese surrendered before it kicked off. Still, thinking through the similarities is a worthy activity in the face of such a high-stakes endeavor.
The planning for Operation Downfall had many features that would be similar to a conventional assault on North Korea. The first is that against Japan, the US objective was unconditional surrender to remove a distant, significant threat to US vital interests. Against North Korea, the US objective is verifiable, complete surrender of its nuclear program, another distant, significant threat to US vital interests. The geographies have remarkable similarities, if one considers the combination of the nearly impenetrable DMZ and non-accessibility of the North Korean-Chinese border for US military use—a fact that makes North Korea into a sort of manmade island (like Japan 1945), which drives US military options centered on long-haul power projection and amphibious approaches. Also, in 1945, US war planners’ first assumption was they would be “opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population.” Modern North Korea is similarly hostile; loyalty is strong and a not-insignificant number of civilians will fight hard. Lastly, the defender’s strike threats are actually fairly comparable—Japan had thousands of kamikaze planes and kaiten (suicide) boats which acted as human-guided deep-strike munitions, while today’s North Korea similarly has thousands of missiles and rockets, which are tech-led deep-strike munitions. And both foes used years to dig in and improve defensive positions ready for oncoming attackers. 1945’s Empire of Japan and 2017’s North Korea pose many similar military challenges.
But they’re not the same—so, what makes these two operations different? First, the most obvious is the nuclear genie is out of the bottle now, having been let out at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nobody has the ability to question or “un-know” that nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and devastating; because we have two mushroom-clouded data points, today’s planners understand the gravity of the situation better than they did in 1945. Second, another departure point is that we live in an unconstrained media age today, where just about anybody with a laptop can get in the news game. Oppositely, the Second World War was a relatively controlled era, in which governments had much more say in how and when stories broke. A case in point is that New York Times journalist William Laurence was essentially given (and handled in the release of) the story on the first atomic bomb. Modern technology makes everyone a reporter and broadcaster; yesterday’s Edward R. Murrow and Tom Brokaw regularly get scooped by today’s smartphone-wielding Jane and John Q. Public—and while this means broader coverage, it also means public panic has the potential to escalate rapidly. Third, we live in a relatively multipolar world compared to the end of World War II, when much of the world lay in ruin and the United States was in a much more dominant position. Lastly, the lethality of today’s weapons technology threatens high casualty figures in societies where nations have fewer children and seem relatively less willing to spend them at war. Another contrasting data point.
What does it all mean? Stepping back from these broad points of comparison between planning Japan’s “Downfall,” and an invasion of modern North Korea—what can we learn?
Here are some initial thoughts, from the hip, that seem like useful crossover points in thinking through such a serious undertaking. Several considerations come to mind, the first of which is to be prepared to change demands and make concessions during the endgame-bargaining stage with your opponent to achieve swifter strategic victory. For example, in Japan, the United States ultimately dropped the pursuit of an unconditional surrender in favor of allowing one condition (letting the Emperor remain), thereby avoiding a long, drawn-out fight to compel the surrender of millions of Imperial Japanese soldiers still left in the Japanese home islands and in China. Second, technology like nuclear weapons might provide a way to a cost-effective outcome, but there’s no such thing as a cost-free outcome—use of such a weapon still carried a price in that the world held the United States accountable for using a fundamentally indiscriminate weapon that killed many innocent civilians (even if most agreed with its military necessity). And, with respect to the broader issue of ethics, we must think utilitarian when considering options for situations like Japan 1945 or North Korea 2017, because no matter what, somebody’s getting hurt, it’s just a question of who and how (i.e., even doing nothing is a choice that allows continued destabilizing nuclear progress and leaves millions of North Korean citizens in de facto slavery). It is imperative we seek the best outcome that minimizes harm and maximizes benefit. Lastly, coalition assembly is required, for such an enormous operation in the Pacific makes it necessary to break beyond service and international and institutional challenges. When it’s this big, we cannot fail.
History tempts us by demonstrating that we occasionally don’t have to follow through on our planning for the hard ones (like Japan’s “Downfall”). It gets us thinking: Maybe Kim Jong Un won’t push the next button? Maybe the North Koreans will come to the table? Maybe the United States won’t have to attack North Korea?
Or, this time, we might just have to follow through. And so while it’s natural to desperately want to avoid it, it’s necessary to start thinking through a North Korean “Downfall.”
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/...cid=spartandhpQuote:
SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea said on Monday that the missile it launched a day earlier was a new ballistic missile that can carry a large, heavy nuclear warhead, warning that the United States’ military bases in the Pacific were within its range.
North Korea launched what American officials called an intermediate-range ballistic missile on Sunday from the northwestern town of Kusong. The missile, believed to have a longer range than any other North Korean missile tested so far, landed in the sea between the North and Japan, sparking angry comments from President Trump, as well as from President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan.
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The North’s official Korean Central News Agency said on Monday that the new ground-to-ground missile, Hwasong-12, hit the targeted open water 489 miles away after soaring to an altitude of 1,312 miles. The missile was launched at a deliberately high angle so it would not fall too close to a neighboring country, the news agency said.
Mattis: Defeat-ISIS 'Annihilation' Campaign Accelerating, On War With N. Korea, NATO
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From the UK Defence-in-Depth blog an ex-NSC staff member, Dr. Paul Miller, which takes a broad view and here is a sample:There's also the Trump effect:Quote:
These three challenges—a difficult and destructive conventional war; a massive and expensive post-conflict operation; and a first-rate diplomatic challenge—mean that the Second Korean War would carry the biggest stakes of any initiative in American diplomacy in generations. And that is only considering the military, strategic, and diplomatic implications of a hypothetical war. The hardest part is political.
Link:https://defenceindepth.co/2017/06/07...ean-peninsula/Quote:
And even the best and most experienced staff in the world would not be able to compensate for an erratic and unconventional President who lacks foreign policy experience and appears unwilling to adapt to the steep learning curve.
"...assumed to be anti-ship missiles"
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/asia/n...nch/index.htmlQuote:
(CNN)North Korea fired four anti-ship missiles into the sea east of the Korean Peninsula Thursday, which the South Korean military said was intended to demonstrate its "precise targeting capability."
*
North Korea has launched 16 missiles in 10 tests so far in 2017, and Thursday's test was the fourth since new South Korean President Moon Jae-in took office in May.
ftfy.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo