Wilf, you may need to dust off you atlas
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Huh? How is it given "brief coverage?" He clearly and usefully explains what it is. What screws everything up is folks trying to change the inconvenient truth of what he states. A COG is something you strike. If you cannot strike it is not a COG! The whole concept is about harming the enemy.
That is simply is not true. Empires have been sustained and created by crushing rebellions. If you say Rebellion or Revolt instead of insurgency, then I think this clarifies the issues in a historical context. It certainly gets puts all the new words and concepts in context.
It's a map well supported by 3,000 years of history of how to use armed force to set forth policy. It works if done by the skilled and fails when done by the un-skilled.
I will not argue that empire after empire pitted their armies to suppress the insurgent will of the populaces they exercise dominion over. I will not argue that such efforts have sustained such emipires long after the populaces contained within them desired them to be gone. But I also will not argue with the facts that such efforts always ultimately fail.
This is why The USSR is but a blink in history, England is but an island; Rome is but a city, and Greece is in foreclosure. The list is as long as history to support my point; where is the history to support yours?
Not to stir up the CoG debate, but
I have a feeling that there is a basic incompatibility between the Jones Model and the application of the CoG concept. Basically, i would suggest that they are based on different analogies: CoG (and Schwerpunkt) is based on a Newtonian understanding of physics, while the Jones Model is, implicitly, based on a more complex field model (sort of a la Kurt Lewin).
Getting back to Slap's point about Voodoo, then the factors / dimensions in the Jones model are not so much indicators as conduits / flow channels for the reification of perceptions / beliefs. "Governments" (and insurgent movements, religions and other groups of people) in and of themselves, do not exist outside the minds of those who believe in them and inasmuch as those people impose that belief, through their actions, on others. It is this belief when coupled with actions that helps to create the "mass" that CvC was referring to. In a military (conventional) context, think about "moral".
The creation / maintenance of this "mass" (and the means of continually re-producing it) is what a COIN fight is all about, and that means guarding and controlling the conduit channels of "belief" and consequent actions. It is not so much about applying your "will" to a group so much as it is about focusing your will to enforce a belief system about "reality".
Shessh, I think I need more coffee......
Some only need the model, some need a methodology.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff ;).
Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.
Recently MG Carter looked his commanders and staff in the eye and told them during a planning meeting for Kandahar: "The key to Hamkari is the creation of representative governance and representative opportunity."
Now, this is very much in line with what is proposed in the Jones Model, and I knew immediately what he was getting at, and more importantly, why it was so critical. To create these two conditions would strike at the heart of the causal perceptions of poor governance in Kandahar Provence.
Afterwords several of the commanders were discusing the meeting. One of them said: "I understand what the General wants, I just don't know what he wants me to do." This drew several nods and grunts of agreement.
This is complex stuff. Many well intentioned and very smart and experienced operators in the military, governance and development business are all doing their best to do what they think will bring stability to Afghanistan. All are operating within the guidance provided to them by their leadership. Many, however, know very little about insurgency.
Many military people want to simply defeat insurgent formations and disrupt their ability to generate decisive effects.
Many in the development business believe that if one brings electricty, paves roads, builds schools, etc stability will occur.
Many in the governance business believe that if they conduct elections and attack corruption stability will occur.
The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.
The COG-based methodology provided here is for those who need a way to turn a fuzzy concept into specific things they can task, manage and execute. If it helps, use it. If it does not help, don't worry about it.
I have, however, made a few tweaks to the chart I provided to begin this thread, that I may post tomorrow.