The Civil War wasn't different?
Posted by William Owen
Quote:
Sorry, but I profoundly disagree with this assertion. The "Europeans" studied the US Civil War in great detail - but saw nothing that new, bar the use of telegraph and railways, and were not short on their own combat experience from the Crimea. The war that was improperly studied, and could have aided some thinking was the Russo-Japanese War.
I think some key historians would disagree with you. The theory I seen was that the wars in Europe prior to the American Civil War were wars between kingdoms and the focus was on defeating the other side's military. On the other hand, the American Civil War was focused on the society as a whole, not just against one another's Armies. Some called it the first total war in the Modern Age.
Agree or disagree, and I'm simply voting present on this one. I think the argument is relevant, because the principles of war are very applicable to Napoleon's Day where great Armies determined the outcome of the conflict. To some extent that held also held true through the Great World Wars, but in WWII there was considerable coercion conducted against the civilian populations (carpet bombings, Hiroshima, etc.) where the center of gravity shifted from fieled forces to the opponent's national will to continue, verus the material means to continue.
Since the nature of war has changed, it would seem that the principles would have to be adjusted accordingly. It is more than adjusting to the information age, we now have enemies that we cannot mass against, that do not have a center of gravity, etc. Great Armies will not determine the outcome of asymmetrical conflicts.
A principle by definition means it should never be violated. Using that as a standard, and using the Global War on Terrorism or Long War as the model, it should be relatively easy to see what principles apply and what ones don't. Furthermore, if the principle applies in one situation (like Desert Storm), but not in another like our current fight, is it still a principle?
Does it even matter in the long run?
Here are three examples of the principle of Mass in unconventional conflict:
LINK.
LINK.
LINK.
These were all successful, none are literally 'conventional armies fighting similar opponents.' There are many more examples though few US available for study due, principally, to excessive caution (a US trademark), our distressing tendency to overclassify everything and too many senior US people sharing your incorrect view of the principle. One noteworthy thing about all Cited actions is that there were no General officers involved in the actual operations...
The intent of the principle is to provide adequate combat power (people, firepower, activity) at a decisive point to achieve temporary superiority over the opponent for long enough to achieve a favorable result. Further action may or may not be necessary or desirable.
One should use some care in the use of the words 'victory, 'defeat' and their synonyms -- those words can paint a false picture in the minds of many.
I am incapable of thought...
My wife says it's the result of too much bourbon over too many years. :eek:
However, do recall these are principles, not rules -- therefor the interpretation is broad. In your scenario, I suggest it IS necessary for the insurgents to mobilize (their peculiar type of combat power) at a decisive point and time to achieve temporary superiority. An example would be the massing of local citizens in Afghanistan to protest US air strikes insuring that foreign TV cameramen were present while doing so -- no intent to destroy the opponents forces but only to influence opponents actions by swinging public opinion. Another is the disruptive fights and tactics in the Iraqi Parliament to protest possible acceptance of the SOFA.
Yet another is the currently favored massive use of IED and suicide bombers to achieve not a temporary military superiority or an expected physical destruction of the enemy but to psychologically convince the voters of nations involved in operations to withdraw their troops simply due to upset and annoyance at the loss of even small numbers of troops with little apparent progress. Since each strike is by itself inconclusive, they mass the number of strikes in an attempt to obtain a conclusive result.
All those provide or seek a temporary superiority of one sort or another over their opponents by the application of more than ordinary effort at a point or time when it is believed advantage may be accrued. Of course, if the insurgents are engaged in any combat operations, then the more directly attributable and combat power related 'mass' -- more people (or firepower) at one point than the COIN effort can muster -- applies.