Ken, strong points, but not much related to mine.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...
As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...:wry:
My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.
Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own.
At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.
When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :
"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."
De Nile is a river in Africa...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.
Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...
My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:
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When tasked to help suppress an insurgency...say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :
"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."
You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...
Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:
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"Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own."
Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...
My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:
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At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.
that my initial statement was and is correct:
"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."
Thank you for your support. ;)
Applied results of non-kinetic TTP's...
I would like to emphasize some of the deep and subtle insights made so far on and compare them with a 'real-time' report regarding the interdependencies of the trinity of governance, economics, and security...
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."
Thank you for your support. ;)
...and from Dr. Marc Tyrrell
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The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.
From today's Washington Post by Blaine Harden: In N. Korea, a strong movement recoils at Kim Jong Il's attempt to limit wealth (H/T to Daniel Drezner)
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It was an unexplained decision -- the kind of command that for more than six decades has been obeyed without question in North Korea. But this time, in a highly unusual challenge to Kim's near-absolute authority, the markets and the people who depend on them pushed back.
Grass-roots anger and a reported riot in an eastern coastal city pressured the government to amend its confiscatory policy. Exchange limits have been eased, allowing individuals to possess more cash.
The currency episode reveals new constraints on Kim's power and may signal a fundamental change in the operation of what is often called the world's most repressive state. The change is driven by private markets that now feed and employ half the country's 23.5 million people, and appear to have grown too big and too important to be crushed, even by a leader who loathes them.
It is a dangerous misperception not because I do not agree,
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.
or because others do not agree with you, it is a dangerous misperception because as you say:
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No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure...
It is simply inaccurate and misrepresents history and if one is a strategic planner and one plans on what one admits is an even slightly flawed assumption, then I suggest it becomes potentially dangerous and if one admits it's a misrepresentation -- or a hyperbolic statement if you prefer -- then I suggest my tag is valid.
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If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.
I'm sure that is an accurate statement, our thinking will evolve. Nothing wrong with being a Lone Ranger but one does need Silver Bullets for that role. :D
We all use hyperbole to make points. Nothing wrong with that. I do believe, however, it is critical to not believe ones own hyperbolity. ;)
Tough question - an Afghan answer
Jon,
In post No.57 I said:
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(Taken from)..surely the local populace need to know what the message is? What is the minimum level of co-operation expected etc. ...In the Afghan village context is this message clear? I do not mean 'fight with us', give us information how to fight and the rest.
Jon Custis replied:
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(Taken from) Tough question David. My experience in Iraq leads me to think that the answer lies in having the time to be present and watch/observe/judge what is going on around you in the village... It takes time and presence to make sure any message does "sink in."
Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288
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(In part)Yes, the Afghans are great fighters, but that does not mean they wish for a war all their life. We needed to fight against the Russian invasion and I still strongly believe we have done the right thing defending our country and nation against Communism; as I said earlier, things went wrong when these so-called Mujahideen or Freedom fighters leaders started fighting one another. I believe every Afghan wishes for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Yes there are some who will continue fighting, but we all know they are small in numbers and are not significant. (My added emphasis)The reason many young men are part of the Taliban and other insurgents is the lack of employment , lack of better life conditions and of course lack of any positive attention from their government in Kabul. At this moment if you ask me, why are these young men are turning to Taliban and are fighting the US, NATO and the Afghan government? You will hear a simple answer from me and that is lack of employment opportunity for these youth who are mostly uneducated.
I believe the Afghan government and the US/NATO should provide training programmes to all those young Afghan men at around age of 16 and above who have lost the chance to go to school and get education. By learning skilled trades, I believe they will be in a position to earn a loaf of bread for themselves and their family and in this way we will prevent many young men from falling in the trap of believing being a suicide bomber means a life in the hereafter with the 72 virgins which will await them at the corridor of heaven.
I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.