Colombia: Betancourt, US Hostages Freed
AP - Colombia: Betancourt, US hostages freed
Quote:
BOGOTA, Colombia (AP) — Colombia's military says it has rescued 15 hostages, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. military contractors, from leftist rebels.
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos made the announcement at a news conference on Wednesday.
Just saw this on CNN as Breaking News. Cannot find much on the Internet as of yet. MTF.
Currently, it is being reported that the hostages were rescued in a military operation as opposed to being released.
WaPo - Colombia Rescues Hostages Held by Guerrilla Group for Years
Washington Post - Colombia Rescues Hostages Held by Guerrilla Group for Years
Quote:
Santos said the rescue, dubbed Operation Jaque and carried out by Colombian military intelligence, began with the infiltration of a FARC squad commanded by guerrilla known as Cesar. The squad has controlled a group of hostages in recent years, he said. Jaque is a Spanish chess term meaning "check."
In a ruse in which Cesar was told the hostages were to be flown to a meeting with the FARC commander known as Alfonso Cano, the hostages were brought together and put on board a helicopter supposedly operated by a humanitarian organization, Santos said. In fact, the organization was fictitious, and the helicopter belonged to the Colombian army, he said.
While the hostages were flown to freedom, Cesar and another member of his squad who were to accompany them to the meeting were "neutralized in the helicopter" and will be brought to justice, the defense minister said.
Wow. How disrupted must command and control and overall communications within FARC be to allow an operation like that to succeed? Or is it more likely that "Cesar" is now going to disappear into a Witness Protection Program with full amnesty?
Quote:
As for about 15 other members of Cesar's squad, as well as other FARC guerrillas a few kilometers away, "we decided not to attack them" in hopes that the rebel group will reciprocate by releasing the rest of its hostages, Santos said.
I wonder what those 15 are doing, and thinking, right now...
Surprised not more SWJ attention to Columbia. . .
. . . I know we are a very (and probably rightly) ME-focused community, but I think the Betancourt rescue has some serious implications for the future of the Colombian Civil War:
- Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? FARC was long considered nearly impervious to the type of infiltration that pulled off this operation. They have rapidly wavering support among the villagers in the ever-shrinking areas it controls, it has taken big hits in 2008 (Raul Reyes KIA; the discovery of its Chavez ties; Sureshot dead) already, and it is widely considered a vestige of political movements gone by (even though it always was a Marxist-lite operation). Usually infiltrations of guerrilla groups lead to major counterintelligence purges and witch-hunts in the group itself; FARC is slipping so much it may not be able to afford an overzealous purge.
- Uribe's popularity - no longer just in Bogota but nationwide is extraordinarily high (70% + in many areas), and likely to continue to rise in the coming months. The support for his continued prosecution of the war is at an all-time high, and concerns over continued corruption in Bogota, the struggles against the coca crops, and his increased centralization of power in the presidency (plus coming Constitutional issues as he contemplates messing with the election cycle) will likely fade for a time, particularly among the international community.
- The Colombian military would not have been capable of this operation 10 years ago. Maybe not even 5. The OPSEC required for this kind of operation simply didn't exist in a military riddled with both leftist and paramilitary informants. It also shows a good deal of daring, planning abilities, and - perhaps most importantly - patience on the part of Colombian command. Probably makes Chavez glad he didn't pick a fight earlier this year.
So, what is the future outlook? Particularly, 3 questions:
- Latin American geopolitics. Colombia has faced a lost of ostracizing within the Latin American community, particularly as it has grown closer to the US while the rest of LA moves away since 9/11. It's appearance as the US local lapdog may not change, but it becomes harder to ignore the fact that it is a capable and powerful "lapdog" that is winning its civil war. Do the pro/anti Washington dynamics at work change as Colombia becomes recognized more and more as it's own, viable state?
- What impact will this have on the drug trade? FARC's shrinking support base is a great opportunity to take control - not just spray and fly away - of many coca-producing areas. But if the Colombians aren't prepared to administer the alternative-development assistance that these small farmers will require, they never will gain their true allegiance to Bogota.
- Will the US follow up its massive and apparently effective military aid with a new developmental assistance program? "Plan Colombia" was proposed by the Pastrana administration as largely an economic aid program, a "Marshall Plan" for Colombia, as it were. It became, thanks to the Republican congress (and later the Bush administration) a largely military aid program. Washington, I believe, needs to be prepared to (1) provide a large amount of economic development aid if the war continues to go Bogota's way, and (2) renew pressure on Uribe's administration to respect human rights, fight the corruption in Bogota, and not take advantage of the political moment to fiddle with the Constitution.
Looking at that, it looks kind of like a call that the war is over - it most definitely is not, so my apologies if it sounds so. But I think we need to start thinking about the next stage; after all, our involvement in Colombia has always been predicated upon counternarcotics - and defeating the FARC may not put much of a dent, at least immediately, on the drug trade.
Regards,
Matt
Although I understand the reason for concern
Quote:
Originally Posted by
mmx1
And it is a valid one, it brings to mind some questions .
1- Have the FARC been respectful of Red Cross immunity in the past?
(do they respect them and treat them as nuetral)
2- How do we know this is that symbol, its is during the rescue vs recovery, it is an actual use for deception,etc?
3- This isn't just spin trying to give a now probably very paranoid organization an excuse to trust noone / possibly take some softer targets hostage?
Colombian Soldier Wore Red Cross Logo in Hostage Rescue
This may seem like a good idea to some but I can't begin to explain why in the long term this is going to hurt the cause. Although I'm happy that these hostages are free, the use of well known humanitarian symbols as an integral part of the mission will feed into the belief that humanitarian NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross are all just tools of the US and full of spies. Does the end justify the means on this occasion? Hard to justify to me, but like I said I’m happy to see these guys back home.
I believe 'War Crime' is a bit of a stretch.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
It doesn't apply in this case--while international humanitarian law often allows a degree or exigency (or military necessity) to be balanced against harm to civilians, there is no such exemption for use of the red cross symbol (for the obvious reasons that people would constantly be using ambulances to gain tactical surprise). Misuse of the ICRC is an absolute war crime, against which IHL would allow no such defence.
Without getting into the semantic and legal argument about whether there is such a thing as International Humanitarian Law (as opposed to the existence of international norms, which I fully acknowledge and further acknowledge cover the use of such symbols), use of the Red Cross -- or it's allied symbols including the Red Crescent and Red Star of David (or red Crystal :rolleyes: ) -- in an operation may be acknowledged by treaty to be misuse but I don't see how it rises to 'war crime' status. No such misuse is generally likely to produce massive or repulsive damage equating to a war crime.
As to its use of symbols on ambulances to achieve tactical advantage; I've been the recipient of three attempts to do that on two continents -- all were unsuccessful. My favorite was the US Peace Corps Nurse in the Dominican Republic in mid-1965 who attempted to smuggle two 'wounded' Rebels and about 500 pounds of miscellaneous ammo and weapons past us to the Rebels. When we insisted on searching her ambulance, driver and patients (though not initially her) she proved she was not a lady...
Nor did the Indian Major general who was the UN Military rep there at the time prove he was a neutral observer with his attempt to defend her and accuse us of a 'war crime.' I'm no lawyer but some of them came to our defense and it was pretty well acknowledged that no crime had been committed by us or her. :cool:
Red Cross probes emblem 'misuse'
Misuse of the symbol undermines Red Cross neutrality
Quote:
The Geneva-based ICRC says the footage shown on Colombian TV on Monday indicates that the emblem was being used before the operation to free the hostages from Farc guerrillas had even begun, indicating intentional misuse.
"If authenticated, these images would clearly establish an improper use of the Red Cross emblem, which we deplore," said ICRC deputy director of operations Dominik Stillhart.
Mr Uribe said he had apologised to the Red Cross for the error, which he said had been made by a nervous soldier acting against orders.
International support for the FARC
I thought about posting this in the Latin American section, but decided there are relevant points in this article about international support (both State and non-state) for insurgents and terrorists are relevant on the global level. The take away is that the McCormick Counterinsurgent Diamond model argues you must isolate the insurgents not only from the populace and but also international support. Of course theory is always easier than practice.
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscel...eption0908.pdf
Quote:
This paper examines:
• The FARC's long-standing ties to Latin American countries such as El Salvador
and Nicaragua,
• The information-sharing with other terrorist groups, particularly the Provisional
IRA of Ireland and the ETA Basque separatists of Spain, and the role this
collaboration played in allowing the FARC to develop weapons that primarily
targeted the civilian population,
• The FARC's role in founding and directing the Coordinadora Continental
Bolivariana (CCB), an umbrella group active in much of Latin America.
• The FARC's European network,
• The FARC's attempts to acquire weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, from a
variety of countries and intermediaries of different nationalities.
National Drug Threat Assessment
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf
Quote:
DTOs rapidly adapt to law enforcement and policy initiatives that disrupt their drug trafficking operations. Law enforcement and intelligence reporting revealed several strategic shifts by DTOs in drug production and trafficking in 2007 and early 2008, attributed in part to the success of counterdrug agencies in disrupting the operations of DTOs. Many of these shifts represent immediate new challenges for policymakers and resource planners. The National Drug Threat Assessment 2009 outlines the progress and emerging counterdrug challenges
in detailed strategic findings, including the following:
• Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States. The influence
of Mexican DTOs over domestic drug trafficking is unrivaled. In fact, intelligence estimates indicate a vast majority of the cocaine available in U.S. drug markets is smuggled by Mexican DTOs across the U.S.–Mexico border. Mexican DTOs control drug distribution in most U.S. cities, and they are gaining strength in markets that they do not yet control.
• Violent urban gangs control most retail-level drug distribution nationally, and some have relocated from inner cities to suburban and rural areas. Moreover, gangs are increasing their involvement in wholesale-level drug distribution, aided by their connections with Mexican and Asian DTOs.
Unfortunately no good news in this report, but it is excellent study on international criminal networks (with many parallels to international terrorist organizations). One reader criticized the report due to its sole focus on illegal drugs, while failing to show the ties between the illegal drug trade and terrorists.
The war on drugs is a failure: report says
A report by an Inter-American body and a commentary on a US news website: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/art...he_drug_w.html
davidbfpo
corrupted institutions....
Blowing the Whistle -- and Paying the Price: For one compliance officer, blowing the whistle opened a can of worms, By Bill Alpert. Barron's, March 9, 2009.
Quote:
WHEN WACHOVIA BANK COMPLIANCE OFFICER Martin Woods started seeing traveler's checks arrive at his London branch from Mexican currency exchanges in 2006 -- sequentially numbered, improperly endorsed, large denomination -- he became suspicious.
They always shoot the messenger.