Done.
Printable View
So how exactly did the Mar 14 movement succeed in driving Syrian troops from Lebanon without a shot fired? They may be besieged, but the Mar 14 coalition is still in power in Lebanon, and certainly their names are being spoken quite often in Beirut and throughout the region.Quote:
@ Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.
I think you are dramatically overestimating the power of brute force. Even after Hafez Assad smashed the Ikhwan at Hama, the Ikhwan survives in Syria, and the Ikhwan never had anywhere near the strength that Hizbullah commands amongst the Lebanese Shi'i (indeed, it had already largely severed its own support among the larger Syrian Sunni religious community through its violent terrorism against regime targets and several indiscriminate car bombings).
I largely agree, Tequila. I do, however, think Hama/1982 does illustrate the utility of massive, raw brute force--when coupled with sustained and effective authoritarian controls. However, the fact that the Syrians couldn't use similar levels of brutality to maintain their position in Lebanon, to eliminate Arafat in Tripoli in 1983 (or to eliminate Fateh in Lebanon thereafter), or even to force their way into Sidon against the PLO/Joint Forces in 1976 highlights the constraints that even highly authoritarian countries face in using it.
No one will be using Hama levels of brutality (2-3% of the civilian population killed per week) in Lebanon (thank goodness!). Given this, I would suggest that "of course they can be destroyed" is an abstract possibility at most. We could also be on Mars in three years. We won't be.
Which gets back to the political puzzle of how best to "moderate" Hizballah's behaviour and gradually shift it away from armed activity. Here we face several problems. The first is that hopes of integration into Lebanese politics (including cabinet participation) leading to greater Hizballah moderation have been challenged both by its recklessness in sparking the war in 2006, and in its subsequent recklessness in trying to bring down the Siniora government (although I'll add that not all of their gripes are without foundation). Second, and as I've suggested before, resolution of the Shaba Farms issue--something that might also facilitate the demilitarization of the movement--is much more remote in 2008 than it was before 2006. Finally, in the absence of a Israeli-Syrian peace deal the Syrians have no interest in a demilitarized Hizballah, and in the current context of Iranian-US relations, nor do the Iranians. Quite the contrary.
In order to keep things neat (and since this was originally an IDF COIN discussion), I've posted by response to this Lebanon thread.
This is a well-crafted, unique and insightful piece; unfortunately it is addressing an exhausted topic. It may still be worth publication based on the unique perspective of the author...would require the introduction to be cleaned-up--adding clarity to the situational background (stage setting).
JCPA, Apr 08: Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience
Complete 42 page paper at the link.Quote:
Contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. This study will detail the six basic conditions which, if met, enable an army to fight and win the war against terrorism, among which are control of the ground where the insurgency is being waged, acquiring relevant intelligence for operations against the terrorists themselves, and isolating the insurgency from cross-border reinforcement with manpower or material. It will also examine the factors that can help drive a wedge between the local population and the insurgent forces seeking its support. The principles of war will also be analyzed in terms of their applicability to asymmetric warfare to show how they still serve as a vital guide for armies in vanquishing terror. Finally, the study warns that if the U.S., Israel, or their Western allies incorrectly conclude that they have no real military option against terrorist insurgencies – out of a fear that these conflicts inevitably result in an unwinnable quagmire – then the war on terrorism will be lost even before it is fully waged......
JFQ, 3rd Qtr 08: Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories
Quote:
.....This article assumes that the government’s response to an insurgency plays a predominant role in explaining insurgent success. It examines Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and observes when there are reductions in the frequency and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. This does not mean that factors other than the Israeli government’s response have had no influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. In fact, the physical and political environment, the insurgency’s level of organization and unity, and insurgents’ strategies have also played a role. Still, “of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response.” This study does not develop a comprehensive explanation for Palestinian insurgent strength, but merely identifies Israeli occupation policies that have coincided with COIN success and failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future research the explanation of why these associations exist.....
Whole comment.
I had a few problems with the study, to be honest.
First, as the author notes, "tactical success" (insurgents stopped/killed/etc) is far from being the same as "strategic success" (which is what counts in the end). In the IDF's case, it might well be argued that some of its tactical counter-terrorism measures, while enhancing immediate Israeli security, have fanned radicalism in the long term--for example, the election of a Hamas government in 2006, and its subsequent take-over of Gaza.
Second, I'm a little unclear whether the post-2005 data includes rocket attacks from Gaza. If it did, and the data were extended through to the end of 2007, the trend lines would look far more negative than Figure 1 suggests. It certainly doesn't include Israeli external operations related to Palestinian armed groups, notably the 1978 invasion of South Lebanon, or the 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon. (Also, given that the data is from terrorism database, it presumably should exclude attacks against the IDF and only include attacks against civilian targets.. which again may raise some questions about the utility of the data.)
Third, Figure 3 gives a rather particular view of settlement growth, suggesting that it flattened after the mid-1980s. This, however, is because the chart depicts numbers of "settlements" not the "number of settlers", and most settlement in the 1990s and subsequently has occurred by the expansion of existing settlements or the establishment of satellite settlements (or outposts) rather than "new ones," as the chart below shows:
http://agonist.org/files/active/1/Is...20settlers.jpg
(In fact, the numbers are higher than this, since CBS data excludes East Jerusalem.)
Same here. I also question his highlighting of Israeli development efforts after the 1967 War. From what I read those development efforts were targeted toward settlements and improvements for the Palestinians were side effects rather than objectives.
Overall it is a good article; it would have been a better article had he broadened his sources. I agree with Wilf's concerns that direct comparisons can be misleading and in all fairness I think the author sort of says that at the end.
Tom
I didn't get into that issue, but you're correct. The primary driver of Palestinian economic growth in 1967-93 was access to the Israeli economy (for both goods and labour), coupled with petrodollar remittances from the Gulf. It was not Israeli development expenditures--indeed, in most years Israel put few net resources into Palestinian development (these were largely financed by Israeli-collected Palestinian tax payments).
Through 1994-present, the economic costs of mobility restrictions more than offset international assistance, as the World Bank constantly reminds donors.
On another note, public opinion survey data shows that there is actually very little linkage between socio-economic conditions, or social class, and Palestinian political attitudes (especially in terms of support for militant groups).
The study does suggest, however, that building fences around the population works: at least tactically and operationally. And - to address Rex's point - IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."
I disagree with your last sentence.
While I don't doubt that diplomacy has a lot to do with success, I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."
Quite so. I could dredge up a number of historical examples to support this. If anything, the trend has accelerated many-fold based on "near real time media." A screw-up on the ground that comes out in almost real time puts higher-up in immediately reactive mode and can snowball into something that cannot be contained (or managed).
Perhaps diplomacy is the wrong word. What do you think if I replace diplomacy with "hearts and minds" or "political reconciliation" or "the emergence of effective local governance?"
in scope and application. Each situation, each nation is different and there is no one size fits all. All those things have a place, as does the tactical aspect.
And just to make your life easier, which item is pre eminent is situation dependent and almost infinitely variable within a given situation. In either Palestine or Iraq (two vastly different scenarios), the esoteric aspects are now of principal importance -- that can change in either nation overnight and the tactical aspect could dominate all other effort. ;)
A. Will set you free.
B. Is rarely obvious.
C. Is always obvious.
D. Is sometimes unpleasant to contemplate.
:D:D:D
You should use the ploy the Tactics guys at Leavenworth use; "What we are about to tell you will work on a pleasant June day in gentle terrain and if you have all your personnel and equipment fully mission capable and will confront a mediocre enemy force. If any of those parameters change even slightly, you'll have to adapt." ;)
I'm working on an essay that attempts to prove that in a multi factional insurgency with a weak government (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) strategic success is detached from tactical success: which is not the case in a traditional binary insurgency (like El Salvador.).
(The Israel/Palestinian situation sort of fits - and sort of doesn't - but in that particular case the idea of "strategic failure" assumes that the strategic objective is a political agreement, which is why I used the word diplomacy.)
Back on topic. If you can prove that I'm wrong - and show me why tactical success will lead to strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan- you'll save me a lot of work. It'd be much appreciate it too; the weather's beautiful and there's cold beer going to waste while I try to find time for the essay.
As usual, your quest to be contrarian overshadows your ability to read my post completely:
I never said tactical success leads to strategic success. You said that strategic success was "IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."" I think that viewpoint discounts the impact poor tactical operations can have on the strategic outcome and eventual success.
Let me put it this way. If you've never played darts, this won't work, though you could probably substitute blackjack for darts.
Say you and I are playing 501 on the dartboard. Whoever gets exactly 501 points first wins. There are literally millions of ways someone can get to 501 but there are many more ways to lose. Hitting the bullseye 11 times won't win the game; it will make you bust. Tactical indiscretions can be the 11th throw to the bull. My point was that poor tactical operations can define strategic failure sometimes even faster than diplomatic measures (ie. Abu Gharib, the Hit USMC shootings, the Jesus coin distributor, 1-8IN in Balad, etc...)
Either way, I don't have time to do your work or prove you wrong - I have 250 lieutentants I'm training in the next 3 months with 40% of them deploying by Christmas to try and win this thing.
...and there's the difference between the IDF and the US/UK/NATO Armed force. No one in an IDF platoon is even ever going to mention religion to the Arabs.
Some of the Platoon maybe Muslim, and a lot from families from Arab countries, with grand parents (or even Parents) who speak Arabic as a first language. Some of the platoon may even have been have been borne and grown up on the West bank. A proportion of the Platoon will speak Arabic to varying degrees (some will speak more than one dialect of Arabic), and psychological screening should have kept the fanatics out of the combat platoons.
I'd go with C: because its always obvious to someone, somewhere
The catch is what it takes for it to become obvious to those involved in it:wry:
And as to the other, We do occasionally throw in a rainy day on concrete, with lunch served at three rather than 2:cool:
ANALYSIS / Two years on, IDF starting to look like an army that can fight a war, Haaretz, 12/07/2008.
Quote:
The satisfaction on the faces of the senior officers who came to observe the training exercise of the 7th Brigade in the Golan Heights last week was unmistakable. The Israel Defense Forces is once again starting to look like an army that knows how to deal with a conventional war, a challenge that - due to more pressing troubles - it downplayed during the years between the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War, whose opening shots were fired two years ago tomorrow.
...
In Lebanon, says a senior Armored Corps officer, "a situation arose in which the whole chain of command didn't know what the true level of fitness was of all the forces. The philosophy was, 'We'll do our best with what we have.' There had been a prolonged erosion in the army's fitness, and we were all a party to it. When a battalion commander who has never been through a battalion-wide drill goes into a brigade-wide battle in Lebanon, how can anyone with a head on his shoulders expect him to succeed?"
"We're still seeing a lot of rust," said one of the senior officers after the exercise. "The difference is that, a year ago, people weren't even aware of what it was they didn't know. Now they know what they're lacking. But by the end of the exercise, a certain amount of experience is accumulated, capability is built up. It's still a process and it's happening very slowly." The regular units, in his assessment, are gradually returning to their level of fitness from 2000, on the eve of the intifada.
"The reserves are in less good shape. They have too few training exercises. I don't see any reserve brigade successfully completing a drill like the one the 7th Brigade just did, and there's no substitute for that kind of training. It's not the same as a simulation in an air-conditioned room. A tank battalion has to have the real experience of moving a column through the field in difficult circumstances, over the same small bridge. When you don't do it like the real thing, that will show when it has to be done in reality."
The Israeli consulate (@israelconsulate) of NY is holding a Twitter "citizen press conference" today between 1-3 EST.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...646948,00.html
NY consulate counts on Twitter
Israeli consulate uses social networking service as part of Gaza op PR campaign Ynetnews
Published: 12.30.08, 07:06 / Israel News <http://www.ynetnews.com/home/0,7340,L-3082,00.html>
Between 1-3 pm (EST) Tuesday, the Consulate General of Israel in New York will hold a live Citizen "Press" Conference on Twitter in order to directly answer the public's questions regarding the current situation in Israel and Gaza in wake of the IDF's operation in the Strip.
Twitter is a fast-growing social networking service, and the consulate's intiative is the first time that a government is holding such a conference via the service
"We are constantly getting questions from the public regarding the situation in Israel and Gaza," David Saranga, Consul for Media and Public Affairs, said. "We are answering the public's call and holding a Citizen Press Conference on the social networking site, Twitter, to answer these questions directly."
Twitter users can take part in the Citizen "Press" Conference by going to: http://www.twitter.com/IsraelConsulate and directing their messages to @israelconsulate and including the tag #AskIsrael.
Questions will be answered on Twitter, with a link to IsraelPolitik if the answer exceeds Twitter’s maximum length of 140 characters.
Also: In addition to the above see www.youtube.com/user/idfnadesk
Not exactly, but perhaps rather a way to get the Israeli side of the story out in short bursts?
Have they coordinated with the Palestinian sec forces in the west bank to be able to move in and establish security once they get done breaking down Hamas to a level where thats doable?
Are the Egyptians at least capturing those who seek to get away through the tunnels?
Whats the plan for establishing any sort of order in Gaza post Hamas?
I doubt that Hamas will damaged enough for any of that to happen. Moreover, for Fateh to reassume of Gaza "on the backs of Israeli tanks" would make them look like the worst kind of collaborators in the eyes of many Gazans.
The Egyptians are angling for Fateh/PA to reassume control of the Gaza border crossings. That *might* be possible.
Columbia University Press is pleased to announce the publication of The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism by Ami Pedahzur, professor of political science and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas.
The book questions Israeli strategy in fighting terrorism, criticizing the use of a "war model," which Pedahzur argues is motivate more by politics than sound strategy.
Please let me know if you would like a review copy of the book.
The author is also available for interviews and to contribute to your site.
Praise for the book:
"Replete with detail, vignettes, and insights, this book provides a unique inside account of the Israeli intelligence and security services' sixty-year-long struggle against terrorism. It is the most comprehensive and authoritative depiction and analysis of this struggle currently available in the English language." — Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism
Read more reviews.
About the book:
How successful has Israel's renowned intelligence operation been in stopping terrorist attacks?
While Mossad is known as one of the world's most successful terrorist-fighting organizations, Ami Pedahzur shows that Israel's strict reliance on the elite units of the intelligence community is fundamentally flawed and has not decreased the incidence of Palestinian terrorism. In fact, the diversion of funds and manpower to anti-terrorist activities has put Israel in greater danger from its enemies. The "War model" that Israel has employed, Pedahzur argues, should be replaced by a more defensive model.
An expert on terror and political extremism, Pedahzur analyzes and conveys in vivid detail Israel's past encounters with terrorists, specifically hostage rescue missions, the first and second wars in Lebanon, the challenges of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian terrorist groups, and Hezbollah. He brings a rare transparency to Israel's counterterrorist activities, highlighting their successes and failures and the ways in which politics and in-fighting between various services shape Israeli policy toward terrorism. Pedahzur concludes by outlining a strategy for future confrontation that will be relevant not only to Israel but also to other countries that have adopted Israel's intelligence-based model.
"Ami Pedahzur has written an astute, well-documented, and compelling analysis of Israel's reliance on the 'war model' to combat terrorism. Israel's political and military leaders were consistently unable to resist the temptation of dramatic and costly uses of force when modest defensive or conciliatory measures were preferable. This lesson should not be lost on any national policymaker confronted by terrorism." — Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University
About the author
Ami Pedahzur holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Haifa where, from 2000 to 2004, he served as a senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center. In 2004 he was a Donald D. Harrington fellow at the University of Texas, and in 2005 became an associate professor in the departments of Government and Middle Eastern Studies. In 2007 Pedahzur joined The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and currently serves as associate editor of the journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. His books include Suicide Terrorism and The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence: Defending Democracy.
I'd be interested in this one as well, as I did some work on the West German terrorist groups back in the 1980s and it's always been an area of interest. Again, I'll defer to a more specific subject specialist if one wants to take on the book (Jed, for example....:cool:).
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict
Entry Excerpt:
Glory Restored?
The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict
By Dr. Russell W. Glenn, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions.
This study, sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, has been approved for public release. To the best of our knowledge, Small Wars Journal is the first organization to publish this study on the Internet. This material is based on work supported by USJFCOM and the JIWC under Contract No. N00140-06-D-0060/065. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJFCOM or the JIWC.
From the preface:
The closing of the July–August 2006 Second Lebanon War left the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) an introspective organization. Once an example looked to by much of the world for lessons on martial prowess, the nation’s military—indeed, the country at large—found its performance against the Hezbollah enemy a far more punishing and less effective experience than expected. Some of that outcome was attributable to the foe’s preparations. Yet there were also self-admitted deficiencies in the areas of leadership, intelligence, inter-arms cooperation, decisiveness, and other areas that political and military leaders alike recognized had to be addressed. It was more than a matter of pride. In a region none too friendly, reestablishing the reputation of the IDF was felt to be a deterrent against further assaults.Twenty-eight months later, the IDF attacked into Gaza after rocket attacks on Israel originating there spiked late in 2008. It was an attack made after a number of adjustments over the two-plus years since the Second Lebanon War. Operation Cast Lead, the designation for the undertaking, demonstrated renewed confidence blended with improved tactics, leadership, and joint cooperation.This document reviews those adjustments, analyzes their effectiveness, and considers Israel’s performance in Gaza more generally. The report concludes with 12 recommendations pertinent to future U.S. operations in what has emerged as an era of persistent conflict.This document will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibilities include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, or other forms of stability operations in both the immediate future and longer term.Glory Restored?: The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict
During his 22-year career with the U.S. Army, Dr. Russell W. Glenn served in Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and locations throughout the United States in addition to a combat tour with the 3rd Armored Division during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Dr. Glenn was a senior defense analyst with RAND from 1997 to early 2009 after which he joined his current organization, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions. Dr. Glenn has a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and Masters degrees from the University of Southern California (MS, Systems Management), Stanford University (MS, Civil Engineering and MS, Operations Research), and the School of Advanced Military Studies (Master of Military Art and Science). He earned his Ph.D. in American history from the University of Kansas with secondary fields of military history and political science. His military education includes Airborne, Ranger, and Pathfinder qualifications. The author’s publications encompass some 50 books and reports in addition to over 20 articles regarding counterinsurgency, urban operations, counterterrorism, and other fields. This research was conducted within the Global Security Solutions division of A-T Solutions, Inc.
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Hat tip to Zenpundit for his new thread 'Alice’s Wonderland Battlespace', which potentially gives rise to several issues, including MOUT and intellectual issues of mapping for example:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4280
The article cites a 2005 academic article by an architect and opens with this citation (in part):I have not linked the cited article due to SWC rules on Scribd.Quote:
The maneuver conducted by units of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier General Aviv Kokhavi, as inverse geometry, the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions. During the battle, soldiers moved within the city across hundred-meter-long “overground-tunnels” carved through a dense and contiguous urban fabric. Although several thousand soldiers and several hundred Palestinian guerrilla fighters were maneuvering simultaneously in the city, they were so “saturated” within its fabric that very few would have been visible from an aerial perspective at any given moment. Furthermore, soldiers used none of the streets, roads, alleys, or courtyards that constitute the syntax of the city, and none of the external doors, internal stairwells, and windows that constitute the order of buildings, but rather moved horizontally through party walls, and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as “infestation”, sought to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares.
I know MOUT was the springboard for SWC, but on a quick search could not find a suitable thread.
In July 2009 on another thread I found Mike Innes referred to the author:Quote:
Eyal Weizman In Hollow Land: The Architectures of Israeli Occupation (Verso, 2007), he writes about the various spatial contortions that can be read into and physically observed of the Israeli-Palestinian experience. Terms like "prosthetic sovereignties" and "politics of verticality" feature prominently.
To be perfectly honest, the piece(s) slightly annoy me because I think much of it falls into the perennial old wine/trendy bottles category.
First (as both Cameron and Weizman note) "mouse-holing" one's way through the three dimensions of urban terrain is as old as urban terrain itself. All the complicated words used by Weizman just obscure what is a fairly obvious process, and probably say more about the need to make obvious things sound clever than they reveal anything new about MOUT.
Indeed, I just watched my son undertake "reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of microtactical actions" some twenty minutes ago in a popular video game. He didn't know he was "involved a conception of the city as not just the site, but the very medium of warfare — a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux" ... he just thought it made sense not to walk out in the open where he would get shot, and to make best use of both the cover and fields of fire that an urban environment offers. He'll be pleased to discover, however, that his virtual "reversal of our normal understanding of space is both audacious and brilliant."
Second, while Weizman's writing on the politics of verticality in the occupied Palestinian territory is quite accurate, again i don't think it comes as any particular revelation. It's an interesting think-piece for those unfamiliar with the setting, but its well known by those who work there--and somewhat deficient in its focus on static spatiality with no reference to either the control of movement or the intricate network of intangible legal controls and overlapping jurisdictions.
A Wider Siege of Israel?
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Video: 14 Nov IDF Pinpoint Strike on Ahmed Jabari, Head of Hamas Military Wing
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Hamas and Israel Agree to Cease-Fire, Clinton Says
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
This film looks very good. Six former heads of Shin Bet site down for a The Fog of War style documentary.
http://www.thegatekeepersfilm.com
Trailer Link
Quote:
Short Synopsis
For the first time ever, six former heads of Israel’s domestic secret service agency, the Shin Bet, share their insights and reflect publicly on their actions and decisions.
Since the Six Day War in 1967, Israel has failed to transform its crushing military victory into a lasting peace. Throughout that entire period, these heads of the Shin Bet stood at the center of Israel's decision-making process in all matters pertaining to security. They worked closely with every Israeli prime minister, and their assessments and insights had—and continue to have—a profound impact on Israeli policy.
THE GATEKEEPERS offers an exclusive account of the sum of their successes and failures. In the process it sheds light on the controversy surrounding the Occupation in the aftermath of the Six Day War.
Israeli ex-security officials largely favor peace, by Aron Heller. Associated Press, Feb. 20 2013.
Quote:
JERUSALEM (AP) — Israel's Academy Award-nominated documentary "The Gatekeepers" has won rave reviews for the candid soul-searching of its chief protagonists — the six living former directors of the country's shadowy domestic spy agency — and their somewhat surprising conclusion: That force has its limits and Israel must ultimately take advantage of its military superiority to seek peace.
It's no surprise, though, in Israel. Top security officials have a long history of favoring dovish political parties and criticizing government policies toward the Palestinians after their retirements. Those who have battled Palestinian violence with the harshest methods possible are oddly those often most amicable to compromise.
Saw it in LA a couple weeks ago, highly recommended. Great interviews with the Shin Bet heads, all of whom are incredibly candid. Some good info in particular about the Rabin assassination and what preceded it. The filmmaker could have been a bit more artful with some of the stuff that brackets the interview, the re-enacted stuff was a little hoky, but that's a minor quibble.
Trying to find a sowing somewhere in north carolina. Looks like a good time
Director Dror Moreh is going to be the guest on Fresh Air today (28 February 2013).
I caught The Gatekeepers at a matinée yesterday and much enjoyed it. I would not have minded it being a bit shorter but I did not find it tiresome. And it is not just a collection of talking heads as some reviews have suggested.