Which is precisely why we're seeing these new digital camouflage patterns.
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Been my observation that's also entailed in conventional war -- different levels to be sure but the issues are still there.At the risk of inviting a fire storm, I suggest the level of training and capability of the opposition has a strong bearing on whether those things need to be considered and how much rolling and blasting one is going to do. A fairly low level opponent allows unthinking violence -- you try that with one that thinks and is equipped as well or better than you and you're going to get a shock. In Korea, as my ever wise Company Gunny pointed out, "Them Chinese ain't got a lot of stuff we got but they're smart, shifty and there sure is a bunch of 'em and they won't quit."Quote:
These are issues that I never needed to consider as we rolled across the Kuwait desert and blasted the s*** out of everything that appeared, human and machine. However, on Grenada we had to much more circumspect. ;)
I strongly disagree with that-- while conceding that you are right . What you say is true because in most units, that's the way it's done because it's easier on the NCOs and Officers.Quote:
My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat Soldiers and Marines obey the orders given, almost without question.
That's also in large measure because we have not done in any war time training since 1945 -- the mothers of America don't want the training loss that realistic training would force so we soft pedal and half train people. We train better now than we ever have -- far better, in many respects -- than when I went through P.I. but we're still only half training the kids.
There are some units that encourage Snuffy to think and while that puts a bunch more work on the chain, those units function better. In fairly low level combat such as that of the last 30 years, that's okay that just some units function really well instead of adequately -- but in a major war, that will not be adequate. EVERYBODY has to think. In COIN and low tempo Ops, the NCOs can direct Joe -- given a major war of movement, they can't-- Joe has to know what to do. So do the NCOs -- and the LTs; the Bn Cdr won't be micromanaging...True -- and I submit that to really do that well takes more training, smarts and effort that does the COIN bit. COIN operations are a pain in the tail, are tedious, frustrating and challenge your social skills. But they are not complex, they're just common sense and decent behavior.Quote:
If the orders are to lay waste to every living thing in your path, we certainly can do that; but if the orders are to be nice to all the people because we're here to protect them (even though we may suspect some are assisting the bad guys), we can do that too. The former requires the synchronization and orchestration of a very deadly war machine, the latter a more attuned sense of social, political, and ideological issues. While in both instances Soldiers and Marines will follow orders and utilize basic combat skills, in the first instance, that of 'conventional battle,' there are additional very specific skills needed to ensure the that the plethora of weapons systems are properly employed.
Not a bad simile but I strongly suggest you consider the quality of the opposing Aussie Rules team -- that makes a very significant difference in the way your teamwork and synergies work out -- and you find that it takes a whole bunch more than brute strength to eke out a draw, much less a crush against a team that's as smart and strong as you are. One that will pay no attention whatsoever to attempts to impress...Quote:
I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too. :D
Those folks that say COIN is the graduate level of war are, I believe, wrong. Major conventional operations against a peer opponent as well or better equipped than you are the graduate level, fail the test and you're out-- COIN against even skillful opponents but basically low tech equipped is all the anxiety, tedium, squabbles and pain of the 8th grade all over again. Neat thing is you can get a few Ds and Fs and still move on...
I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions. :D
Alas I do not benefit from the infinite array and vast range of experience you possess; probably because I was not issued leggings and an M1 in boot camp. :D
However, by "obey orders" I did not mean in an automaton way. I meant in the way that if we are in a full up battle with a peer opponent and I order the platoon to take a position, they apply all the violence necessary to take the position. In COIN if I order the squad to go into a village and help the people and do no harm, that's what they do. If we were barbarians it would be easier in COIN just to wipe out the village. No one shoots at you if they are all dead or cowering in a hole. Counterproductive in COIN...certainly; is it "easier"... yes.
When we rolled into Kuwait we were supposedly facing an enemy that was battle hardened, well trained, and would inflict huge casualties on us. Hindsight proved otherwise. But I wouldn't call it "unthinking violence." If I'm in a battle zone where there are only combatants I know that anyone I lay my sights upon is either a good guy or bad guy, thus I am fully authorized without seeking prior approval to waste the bad guy. COIN has more subtlty in whom you can kill. If that makes any sense.
I totally agree that ‘conventional’ warfare is the graduate level, and that is why we still need to train up to that level. I think that is the crux of what Gian worries about, that the Army will sacrifice the graduate level training it needs in order to mass produce too many community college grads.
Because the leggings permanently remove all the hair off your legs from ankle to below the knee which means you look funny to your kids in swimming trunks. Plus having the seven digit serial number of that first M1 running around in your head almost 60 years later can be mildly annoying when you're trying to recall a newer phone number... :DMe neither -- so we can both sleep good...Quote:
I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions. :D
I figured that but the fact that we force these kids (well, most of 'em, anyway...) to under achieve has always irritated me. They'll do what you train 'em to do and they can do more than most people are willing to let them do, unfortunately. That and our very poor initial entry training are my pet rocks.Quote:
However, by "obey orders" I did not mean in an automaton way. I ...certainly; is it "easier"... yes.
True dat. One of the reasons why it's so frustrating -- sometimes the one you can't zap tries to get you the next day. Enough to hack off the Pope.Quote:
... COIN has more subtlty in whom you can kill. If that makes any sense.
Also true. Worries me as well...Quote:
I totally agree that ‘conventional’ warfare is the graduate level, and that is why we still need to train up to that level. I think that is the crux of what Gian worries about, that the Army will sacrifice the graduate level training it needs in order to mass produce too many community college grads.
...and I was being pedantic at your expense. ...but you raise an excellent point, and that is training, and doctrine. At the risk of being boring, the US is or was failing to differentiate War from Warfare. A certain vision of War, creates a certain type of warfare.
Nothing feeble and good on you. That's the critical bit.Quote:
My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat
Interesting analogy. I actually know far more about ballroom dancing that I do Aussie Rules!! :rolleyes:Quote:
I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too. :D
William, you raise an excellent point, and share a position that is fairly common. My short answer for why it is important to differentiate between types of war is so that one can put together a proper solution that will achieve their desired ends.
Goes to Old Carl's point of "the first thing is to know what kind of war you are in."
The conventional force in the US is new to this business, and learning most of its lessons in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, and using that experience to provide context to the study of Insurgency to draft the current COIN doctrine and TTPs that are coming out. This stuff is pretty good. Where it is off is usually by a few degrees of azimuth; but for those who have experience with indirect fire or long distance land nav, you know how far off you can be from the intended target if you are off by a small azimuth error at the start.
I tend to be a purist on definitions, and tend to wince when varioius sources start mixing terms. Its all part of staying on azimuth.
Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved. The populace wages insurgency to change the politics, and there are three broad categories of insurgency: Resistence against a foreign invader, revolution to change the government of the entire state, and separatist to break a segment away (note, all three of these have been going on in Iraq, and all require unique solution sets). COIN is the efforts of the state to resolve these family disputes.
FID are the efforts of an outside third party to influence this state dynamic on the behalf of the current government. FID runs a tremendous scale, from routine exchanges with allies that have very stable governments, to full scale combat like we have been experiencing in places like Vietnam and Iraq.
A new twist with globalization is the rise of non-state powers, and also the greater connectivity of populaces with like populaces from other states. This does not change the nature of insurgency, but it certainly changes the environment in which it occurs, and requires new tactics from those employed successfully in the past when populaces could be isolated. It also means that non-state entities can now act in state-like ways by using networked operations, and also without the achilles heel of a state that can be targeted, or that must be defended. Think AQ
That brings us to UW. UW is the efforts of an outside party to incite or exploit an insurgency on the part of the insurgent. This is what the US did in the initial phase of Afghanistan (then we transitioned to the FID we are doing there now). This is also what AQ is doing through out the Middle East. Note, that this is the MISSION of UW. We in the SOF community use UW skills and tasks in FID and COIN as well.
Mao described three phases of insurgency, essentially starting with organized low-level violence. As I have studied the problem, I find it helpful to in effect add a phase zero to Mao's time proven model. If one considers that every populace is waging insurgency, and every government is waging COIN at all times it helps in two major ways. First, it recognizes that what most think of as insurgency is caused by the failure of government to meet the expectations of its populace. That this effort is continuous, and that it is largely civil in nature and requires civil lead. Second it helps the military responder to remember that he is last in and should be first out in helping to resolve a situation that has grown beyond the civil governemnt's ability to handle. It also helps the military to remember that the insurgent is part of the populace, and that their mission is not to defeat the insurgent, but instead to help resolve the problem. Most governments and populaces are happily down in phase 0, but by monitoring phase 0 closely, one can implement efforts early, far short of conflict, to keep everything stable. Every Cop, every garbageman, every politician, etc is waging COIN everyday. I believe that if they recognized and embraced that noble role, there would be far fewer "classic insurgencies" that we all think of with G's and the military going at it.
The last real American Insurgency and COIN was the Civil Rights movement. This was a shining moment for COIN, as the civil government recognized that it was wrong, and conceded powers to the insurgent that it did not have too, causing the insurgency to move back down into a more peaceful norm short of bringing in the military to suppress or defeat the insurgent. This raises the common issue of "appeasement." A government can not appease its own populace. To meet the needs of ones populace is the duty of government. Appeasement is when government act counter to the needs of its own populace to make concessions to the government or populace of another.
Purpose for action and status of parties, and a true understanding of the environment in which such a conflict is happening are all critical pieces of information for the FID or COIN elements if they want to design and implement an effective campaign.
Just 2 cents from an SF guy.
We talked about this in detail a good while back. My position was that according to our form of government there are only two types of War. Declared and Undeclared! By it's very nature declared war is conventional...by declaring it we define it. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined....hence the other side will break all the rules, because their aren't any.
I think that both the content and method are suspect.
Regarding method, the author argued in an earlier piece on the assumption that our successes since 2007 somehow detract from the sacrifices of his Soldiers in 2006 and earlier. But he cannot seem to argue his case without indirectly belittling the sacrifices made since early 2007. He mischaracterizes those sacrifices as simply "buying off" our adversaries or ignores them completely by assuming that Sadr simply had a change of heart. Those arguments form the core of the issue that he seeks to address. Those arguments are bogus.
If it were as simple as "buying off" former insurgents then this conflict would already be over. See an earlier response from Cavguy. And I am still amazed that in December 2008 the author still thinks that Sadr's decision to scale back the tomfoolery of his militia was unrelated to our seen and unseen efforts. I understand that the author left Iraq in 2006 and may not have visibility over what we did in the meantime to specifically, deliberately, and relentlessly force Sadr's hand, but I would think that even without that knowledge, one would still find the notion that Sadr just had a change of heart to be absurd on its face.
He may have the right conclusion regarding Afghanistan, but how he gets there and how he backs it up detracts from his argument. I think it should be reason for pause when the editors at IHT eat this stuff up, but the crowd at SWJ chew it up and spit it out.
Slap, I hope you aren't serious.
Well, it would certainly make things easier.
"Congress, how do you want to play this one"? The military would ask.
"We believe we'll issue a declaration of war." Congress would say.
"Excellent, then this is a conventional war and we will execute such a strategy immediately."
"Good job men, we'll see you all back here for Christmas, parades, and awards ceremonies!"
Bob, not exactly. I will have to kind of bring you up to date so this will wander a bit.
Our for fathers being incredibly wise figured out that there are two types of war. Declared usually conventionally state on state but not necessarily. They also realized that there would be situations where military intervention would be needed because of an emergency situation that would require them to act without the formal consent of congress but the authority of the president. And at that time they would generally fall to the Navy and the Marine corps.
If they could not be resolved quickly then a declaration of war would be required at which time the ARMY would submit a plan to cover men,material and costs of such a war.
In short the USMC would be the first to FIGHT but the ARMY would be the first to FINNISH, and would require a more diverse nature and capability set.
Part two guerrilla warfare,terrorism,subversion are more a discussion of what TTP's will be allowed(by law) by our side than it is a type of war or warfare.
Make any sense?
Slap,
I will say that your position makes sense in that I understand what your position is.
As to it making sense in that I agree with your logic, I can't go there.
It would take volumes to address every component of your position, so I won't even try, but I've read enough of your posts to know that you are able to consider new arguments to help you refine your viewpoints.
1. When America was founded, the world was made up of Kingdoms, and war between kingdoms (I.e., funded by the sovererign's purse for his goals) is a far simpler affair than wars between nations (the full resources of the populace behind the effort, and not controlled by one man).
2. Similarly, the environment that popular uprisings occur within has changed dramatically as well with the communications tools that fuel globalization.
3. "small wars" back in the day were also typically purely an assertion of will by the strong over the weak for economic purposes. Empire building. Now, while there remains plenty of economic motivations for warfare, we also have a lot of conflicts today that are the backlash of suppressed populaces, either against the colonial master directly, or more often, against a "puppet" government that has been sustained in power over them by some outside power that is extracting resources from their country.
So, much has changed in terms of the environment that warfare occurs within.
The only other comment I would offer is that I believe that the full spectrum of warfare could fall under either of your two umbrellas, so I don't think it is very helpful. At the end of the day, you have to take each conflict as a unique problem set, make sure you understand exactly what it is you are trying to accomplish for your nation, and then make sure you fully understand the environment that you are going into, the threat you are facing, and tailor a campaign plan accordingly.
One new development to help staffs be more effective at this are two competing processes for developing this broader understanding. One is the "Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design," that is favored by the Army and is being codified currently by TRADOC. The other is "Systemic Operational Design," which is a more eclectic process developed by Brig Gen Naveh, a brilliant retired Israeli officer.
I'm all about seeking simplicity, but recognize that lot of complex thinking has to occur first to achieve the simple.
Bob
Hi Bob, yes much has changed. It was actually being dealt with in the original posts ahwile back. Yes you could have both types of operations under each umbrella. Which is what Tom Odom brought up with his friends paper "Compound Warfare" or my newer SBW (Slapout Based Warfare):eek:
The reason to declare or not declare war is still valid today and hasn't changed. In fact it is more important than ever because it will establish our moral, legal authority and it will also define or should at least our enemy..nation,group or person. We have a big problem with this.
As for your last point about SOD and OP Design we have been talking about that since I came here...I believe in the original Systems theory as taught by Col. Warden (5 Rings analysis) and was involved with it in LE in Counter drug and some other things not the EBO crazy stuff that it turned into.
But SBW beats em all. "Use people as soldiers that don't look like soldiers,use things as weapons that don't look like weapons, and use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefields."
Will pop in and out to discuss if you want but have to get ready for the Alabama vs. Florida game. Rollllll Tide:)
PS Tom Odom....Shirley:):)
Football time here too. Since OSU let the Ducks crush them last week, I have to hang my Rose Bowl hopes on UCLA taking down USC today and opening up the back door.
Best of luck to your Alabama boys, because down here in Florida I'm hearing a lot of smack from the Gator gang... I don't buy into Florida schools having a right to win any more than I do California schools (yet today I have to root for one. Go Bruins!)
you say that like it's a bad thing.:D
I'm really glad Gian has used the word dogma. I'm an ad guy and the one thing I'm qualified to comment on is people's perceptions, beliefs and actions. I really believe we got into a mess in Iraq because a bunch of people said things that sounded true "democracy is a good" and treated it like dogma, when they should have been on the lookout for evidence that we just might need to offer a little bit more than democracy.
Things that disturb me: the belief that since counter insurgencies take a decade or two, everything will work out all right if we hang around for a decade or two. No. If we're wrong about something, we need to adjust now; if we wait a decade or two before adjusting, you won't see any results for 20 to 40 years.
I also believe there is huge confusion between "protecting the population" and "population control." You stop insurgencies by physically preventing the population from supporting insurgencies. The most effective way to do that is by building fences. ("Pre surge" Iraqi insurgents used to go back to the areas we left. Now, we build a fricken fence so they can't go back. The biggest problem in Afghanistan: no fences. (You have a bunch of people who dogmatically believe the things you do after the fences have been built to try to build support for the legitimate government - i.e. build better roads - will fix the problem. They won't. The population can use the roads to support insurgents.))
All dogma is bad. Semper gumby.
Insurgencies are seldom "internal". In fact, some factors we need to deal with are external sanctuary and external support. There are several great threads relating to those issues.
Getting back to the mainstream thread -- I disagree with Gian and more recent posters that my Army has adopted COIN as a "dogma". Big green Army is hunkered down in the fetal position, hoping that this inconvenient COIN thing (and other IW unpleasantries) blow by it, so it can get back to business as usual. Hence, my original post -- from where I sit, there are still not enough folks even trying to understand COIN challenges, much less adopting COIN as a dogma.
To Rank Amatuer and Old Eagle.
First, totally agree that rare is the insurgency that is not influenced by outsiders waging either UW or FID, depending on which side they wish to prevail. That does not change the need to understand what insurgency itself is. Also, rare is the insurgent who will not take advantage of a convenient border, or any other legal ploy, to gain some advantage in such a conflict.
As to "spreading democracy," in my opinion this is the most arrogant and flawed aspect of our current strategy, and completely at odds with our own ideology captured in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. Better that we back off from trying to make everyone like us (we know how we felt when the Soviets were trying to make everyone like them...) and instead take a more pure position. I recommend we support "Popular Sovereignty." While we lose some control (last I checked, these weren't our countries or our populaces) we are less hypocritical if when we intervene we simply level the field so that the populace and the government can sort out their differences. Any form of government they choose for themselves, is better than any form of government we impose upon them.
As to "draining the swamp," that is what 95% of FID is that we are doing around the world everyday. Preventing insurgency is far wiser than allowing it to fester to a degree where the military is required to help counter it. But even in combat FID the main effort when applying the Indirect Approach remains in effect, draining the swamp. As we build capacity in the HN government that we are assisting, we also guide them to similarly making this their main effort for COIN.
Last you ask about "denying safe haven." Excellent question. This is one of the greatest areas of misconception in COIN theory. Many seem to believe that sanctuary lies within ungoverned spaces. If this were true, AQ corporate HQ would be in Antartica. Insurgency is a people business. Sanctuary lies within a populace, not any given terrain feature. Granted, some terrain is more favorable than others, but at the end of the day, if you have popular support (to include the kind that comes from fear and coercion) you can hide in plain sight. AQ is in the FATA because of a favorable populace first, terrain second, border to hide behind third.
These are the types of subtle nuances of insurgency that were missed in big Army and big Marine Corps rush to publish a COIN manual. There are older SF COIN manual's out there that are better resources. Also if I was only going to read one book I'd read Galula. He discusses all levels Strategic to Tactical, and gives great examples.
Bob,First all crimes and wars are committed by people, so it makes sense that any major counter strategy must include a population based solution, hence my interest in your PCE theory. However control of the terrain is critical in fact land ownership and usage is often at the base of some insurgencies. There was actually a paper that was published about how fencing should be our main strategy, I think it is in the SWJ library somewhere.
Second Rank Am raises a very important point in that many infrastructure projects can actually enable the insurgency and we should be careful about building them.
Which goes back to my original point about defining our enemy. Part of SBW is the OPS theory. Other Peoples Stuff. Criminal organizations/Drug Dealers do this all the time and so do Terrorist Organizations and they can be very difficult to track and to attack because the cure can be worse than the disease. They use other peoples terrain but don't own it,they use other peoples money but not their own. We do not fight these organizations very well because of this. There is no COIN solution for them and Gian is right in that respect in that we should not go hog wild on COIN everything as opposed to creative use of more conventional forces.
IMO how we should fight AQ and UBL in Astan has nothing to do with COIN or at least it shouldn't have. We got into a lot of trouble when we attacked the Tali-ban instead of staying focused on AQ.
Gian, is also right in that we haven't Won anything yet.....we have certainly improved the situation through COIN TTP's but it ain't over by no means.
Some interesting dialouge, not sure where it is going. Bob is once again trying to redefine everything, Slapout has presented an unorthodox theory, and Rank Amateur has redefined populace control.
Bob wrote,I think your trying to over simplify for clarity, and as I argued elsewhere when you oversimplify a problem you fail to adequately address the scope of the problem. Old Eagle already addressed part of the issue by pointing out the foreign intervention in support of insurgents, which you hand waved off as UW, but it is not that simple. In many cases there wouldn't even be an insurgency without outside intervention to mobilize a select target audience, then train and equip and advise them. I disagree with your argument that all insurgencies are internal (most may be, but not all). Second you state that one of the forms of insurgency is resistance against an invader. Following that logic, if the foreign invader has become the defacto government like we did in Iraq during the transition period, then we were conducting COIN against the insurgents.Quote:
Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved. The populace wages insurgency to change the politics, and there are three broad categories of insurgency: Resistence against a foreign invader, revolution to change the government of the entire state, and separatist to break a segment away (note, all three of these have been going on in Iraq, and all require unique solution sets). COIN is the efforts of the state to resolve these family disputes.
FID are the efforts of an outside third party to influence this state dynamic on the behalf of the current government. FID runs a tremendous scale, from routine exchanges with allies that have very stable governments, to full scale combat like we have been experiencing in places like Vietnam and Iraq.
Rank wrote,Rank, protecting the populace is a subset of populace and resource control (PRC), which is a wide range of activities designed to control the populace and designated resources to isolate the insurgents. PRC facilitates 3 objectives:Quote:
I also believe there is huge confusion between "protecting the population" and "population control." You stop insurgencies by physically preventing the population from supporting insurgencies. The most effective way to do that is by building fences.
1. Isolate the insurgents from human and resource support.
2. Isolate the insurgent from the populace.
3. Identify and neutralize insurgent infrastructure.
Since many insurgents (if not most) use coercion to garner support from the populace, at least during the initial phases, then protecting the populace is key to severing the insurgent influence on the populace. I don't disagree with the requirement for fences, but is it feasible for the U.S. to advocate and support locking large groups of people up behind fences like the Brits did in Malaysia in 2008? How long do you think world opinion would allow us to continue now that path?
Slapout wrote,I don't get it? We declared war on Japan and Germany, and while the conventional war was the main effort we supported substantial unconventional operations, terrorist tactics, assassinations, fire bombings, and even the A-Bomb. In our war against insurgents we have actually been forced to follow more restrictions than we would in a declared war.Quote:
We talked about this in detail a good while back. My position was that according to our form of government there are only two types of War. Declared and Undeclared! By it's very nature declared war is conventional...by declaring it we define it. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined....hence the other side will break all the rules, because their aren't any.
Now this I like a lot:
Slapout can you send me the link to Tom's paper you referenced?Quote:
Criminal organizations/Drug Dealers do this all the time and so do Terrorist Organizations and they can be very difficult to track and to attack because the cure can be worse than the disease. They use other peoples terrain but don't own it,they use other peoples money but not their own. We do not fight these organizations very well because of this. There is no COIN solution for them and Gian is right in that respect in that we should not go hog wild on COIN everything as opposed to creative use of more conventional forces.
Good discussion all, though to be fair, it is the neo-COIN community that is revising definitions, and I can post open source quotes from Admiral Olson, CDR of USSOCOM that essentially take the same position on definitions that I laid out above.
I also agree that dealing with non-state entitiies that use other peoples terrain and populaces for their own means is, while often intertwined with insurgent movements, a very different problem set requiring different solutions. We produced an unclassified strategic appreciation of the dynamics going on in the world today, and one of the major overarching themes is that of "a competition for sovereignty." BLUF is that people have greater choices than just the state these days for the various things they need. Charitable NGOs, profit oriented corporations, states, and transnational criminal organizations, and politicallly motivated state and non-state actors.
Though all of this is indeed very complex, and deriving effective solution sets even more complex, it is possible and extremely helpful to bin these players out into the simple, enduring categories that I laid out so that you can begin figuring out how to deal with each. Today's environment is much more complex than the old Red vs Blue world that our intel community still tries to bin everything into; or even "your either with us or against us."
One mission set that does not exist that I believe is helpful is that of "counter unconventional warfare." This would be the entire family of engagement that one would employ to stop an outside entitiy from waging UW in a given state/populace. It would include the full DIME, CT, etc. I beleive this is more helpful than just labeling a state as "rogue" or an organization as "terrorist" At the end of the day do we need to "defeat" AQ, or do we simply need to neutralize them? In fact there are many that think that AQ is fading due to its overreliance on violent ways, and failure to adapt more political wings like the IRA and Hezbollah. If this is true, I think instead of cheering the demise, we need to be very concerned about what replaces them. The conditions that gave rise to AQ still exist in spades. Here I agree with Gentile, there is no victory. By changing our campaign to a more holistic counterUW campaign aimed at neutralizing AQ by rendering them irrelevant to the populaces they seek to influence we have a better chance of not giving rise to a second, more sophisticated generation of non-state actor that comes in behind them to continue the mission. Counter UW works for states also. Clearly we do not want to "defeat" Iran to prevent them from waging UW in Iraq, or Lebannon, but we do need to devise a sophisticated, holistic scheme of engagement to counter this UW effort and it destabilizing effects that are counter to our national interests.
So, yes it is complicated, I fully appreciate the complexity. Any simplifications I offer, however, are based upon refining that complexity down to its essence, which is far different than just scraping a simple observation off of the top.
Bob
Bill not my paper but an anthology gathered by a friend at CSI
Compound Warfare: An Anthology
Bill Moore, under declared war we did the one thing we have not done and should have done. We mobilized our entire country to fight the war. Which gave us the resources to do anything necessary to win. In short we had a plan for victory...it was all Strategic and Stuff. Now we have a very good and professional Army that is being worn out. That sucks and it ain't right to keep doing that. If this GWOT,Iraq,Astan,Mexico, is truley a war for our national survival than we need to fight it as a nation, not just the Army (Army/USMC all military don't mean to leave anyone out).
I read Tom's paper while eating chicken wings at work, best way to do it:eek: I know it's not Tom's paper but Tom posted it so I just call it that for short. Important paper and worth the read.
Bob's World, there is actually a book online about the history of UW,Guerrilla warfare that talks about renaming missions just like you propose, In fact it was done that way for awhile. It talks about creating counter organizations for specific enemies. Anyway I will find the link and post it for all to read.
OPS is a critical part of understanding how to fight these RICO organizations because that is what they are IMHO more than anything else.
Alabama lost:(:(: but it was a good game. Roll Tide!
BobW, and everyone else here is the link to the book I was talking about. Since it's inception the US COIN, special warfare community has been trying to define what it is and does according to this book. It is well researched and provides extensive references. Also seems to favor the USMC small wars approach above all the Sneaky Pete type stuff.
You can read by chapters online or print by chapters. Excellent research and historical source. I found this a couple of years ago and should have posted it then but stuff happens.
http://www.statecraft.org/
Tom, thanks for the link. Slapout, this document is over 300 pages, that is a lot of chicken wings brother!
Responses to Bob,
First, understand that ADM Olsen proposed this hypothesis about FID and COIN, I just don't think it will hold water when it is put into practice. I'm going off memory, but I believe COIN (probably an outdated book) was mission set under FID? I'll look it up someday, it is a worthwhile discussion that will help focus policy, doctrine, and training. Back to your quote above, Ken and I debate this frequently when I challenge the legacy definition of COIN. After reading your post, I'm not sure sovereignty is the right word (I guess I should look it up :)), but many of these organizations are interested in overthrowing the State government, but rather controlling some terrain (physical, human, cyber, etc.) within that State and others, so they can defy the State's laws and implement their own law of the land. It is an immature idea that I need to further develop, but by all means please tell me where you think I might be off track.Quote:
one of the major overarching themes is that of "a competition for sovereignty." BLUF is that people have greater choices than just the state these days for the various things they need. Charitable NGOs, profit oriented corporations, states, and transnational criminal organizations, and politicallly motivated state and non-state actors.
I like this, and it might be useful to refresh DoD's and the USG's knowledge base on how to wage this type of war. I think we did a decent job countering unconventional warfare against the Soviets during the Cold War. There is much, much more to it than chasing HVIs, which we still tend to confuse with decisive operations (there usually isn't a decisive operations in this environment). One area I think that is sorely lacking is the counterintelligence field, we seem to have diverted (at least in the military) CI focus from rooting out subversives to locating HVIs, which is a misue of a critical asset in counter UW. More to follow on this whole discussion of counter UW.Quote:
One mission set that does not exist that I believe is helpful is that of "counter unconventional warfare." This would be the entire family of engagement that one would employ to stop an outside entitiy from waging UW in a given state/populace.
Posted by Slapout,When we expanded GWOT into Iraq, I was frustrated about the lack of mobilization also. However, for mobilization to be most effective, it needs to be implemented during patriotic phase of the conflict. I think attempting to mobilize the populace now to reinforce our tired ranks would be counter productive, due to the potential second order effect of giving the anti-war movement more propaganda material. Also, now that we're attempting to shift our main effort to more of an indirect approach, there may not be a need for mass mobilization. Good points.Quote:
under declared war we did the one thing we have not done and should have done. We mobilized our entire country to fight the war. Which gave us the resources to do anything necessary to win.
that it was / is necessary for this effort? Or, more importantly that it could have been done with over 30% of the voters opposed to invading Iraq before the fact? Or would / could have been sustained with over 60% opposed to it at one point?
Slap, one thing you might want to consider about 'declared war' is that we've been in several since the last that had an actual Congressional Declaration of War and that during that war and its concomitant full mobilization a number of laws were passed that gave the Federal Government some truly awesome and draconian powers during a 'state of war' i.e., a declared war IAW the Constitution. Avoidance of triggering those laws is one significant thing has driven Congress to deliberately avoid declaring war since 1945...
I'd further suggest that your theory of declared versus undeclared wars has merit with respect to the intent of the founders but have to question whether a literal interpretation along your lines affords the flexibility needed today. While there is no question that the Armed forces could be restructured to operate within your parameters, I suggest you'd be confronted with an Army that sat stateside and trained along with an Air force that was minimally employed and a Navy an Marine Corps that were overworked.
Obviously, the Navy and Marines could be enlarged and better funded but this would have to be at the expense of the CONUS based Army and AF which would impact their size, equipping and training. Those services would wither. Not a big deal to me but some would get ferociously upset at that -- the more important issue is not the politics, it's the practicality of such an eventuality.
An item to note is that the current system has produced the most combat experienced armed forces in the world today and most other nations Ministers of Defense are well aware of that and don't want to consider a couple of million combat experienced Americans anywhere near their nation. I doubt they'd be that concerned if we were talking about just a few hundred thou Marines and an Army that had been sitting at home training marginally -- and peacetime training is ALL marginal, CTCs or no.
You also have USSOCOM to deal with. Whatcha going to do with them? :D
However he also has some flawed ideas -- and an agenda:
Michael Mcclintock.
I second Selil's earlier comment regarding COIN/conventional as being a continuum, rather than an "either/or". I would also add that I think Rupert Smith has it right in The Utility of Force*: "if a decisive strategic victory was the hallmark of interstate industrial war, establishing a condition may be deemed the hallmark of the new paradigm of war amongst the people... as the political aims have changed, so has the use of force: the conflicts are fought for sub-strategic objectives."
I think he's generally correct regarding the changing nature of our objectives - and thus - the changing nature of how we must fight. I don't know anyone who thinks that COIN is the end-all-be-all of the future of warfare, nor do I know anyone who thinks the same of conventional, but there certainly are too many who think one is significantly more important than the other. Selil is right in that the two are part of a continuum over which we may frequently shift back and forth from day to day. After all, that is how we are currently fighting. Even in 2005, my battalion was kicking in doors one day, providing medical screening to kids at a school the next day, and then doing a joint Army-Marine WWII-style hammer-and-anvil sweep through the desert 3 days after that. It's a continuum that we shift back and forth across.
* - By the way - does anyone know of any criticism of Smith's book? I thought he had it right, but I'm curious if there are any opposing views.
Schmedlap, here are a few I found. I keep bumping the book down my to read list, but now I think I will crack it open.Quote:
By the way - does anyone know of any criticism of Smith's book? I thought he had it right, but I'm curious if there are any opposing views.
http://www.d-n-i.net/dni_reviews/the...y_of_force.htm
http://johntreed.com/utilityofforce.html
I offer these two not as a endorsement, but rather because they offered some good fodder.
Bill Moore, 300 pages that is what I said. I took Tom's advice read a little, chew a little.:wry:
Ken White, I understand your point but you wouldn't have to do it like that. One, the criticisms of Draconian measures you mentioned are valid and I hoped we have learned from that. Two, we would not have to mobilize the entire country like WW2 but certain arrangements should have been made to insure we had immediately available back up production of needed machines and materials and even a modified national service program to support and relieve combat units and perform support services that are being contracted out at a huge cost to the country and a war tax to avoid borrowing the money.
No modification of Navy/USMC needed. In fact that is the point of the declaration to state what we need in terms Army,Air,Space Navy,USMC,Special Warfare. All which was done in WW2, we should have done it on an appropriate scale based upon the....drum roll....METT-TC!
Forgot, I agree it is to late to do it now, but there will be another one...sooner or later.
Wouldn't have to what like what???The point with those measures is that they are still on the books as laws and become automatically active IF a war is declared, that's why Congress is not going to declare a war unless it becomes a truly and obvious existential requirement.Quote:
One, the criticisms of Draconian measures you mentioned are valid and I hoped we have learned from that.
We can disagree on most of that; is partial mobilization like being partially pregnant? The only problems with materiel were due to laws Congress passed about the DoD acquisition system that put that huge inefficient bureaucracy in place; every thing that was NEEDED -- not everything that was wanted or the ignorant media got on about -- was provided as soon as the system could get it there. Both the body armor and the MRAP things were way overblown by the dumb press and partisan stupidity in Congress. You want something to get upset about; the M855 5.56 round and that stupid M9 pistol the army insists on hanging onto...Quote:
Two, we would not have to mobilize the entire country like WW2 but certain arrangements should have been made to insure we had immediately available back up production of needed machines and materials and even a modified national service program to support and relieve combat units and perform support services that are being contracted out at a huge cost to the country and a war tax to avoid borrowing the money.
I do not support or agree with a national service program; a lot of folks agree with me and I believe more do than would support it. Nor do I agree with more taxes -- better distribution of what's there, yes -- not more.If they're going to pick up the slack in todays world for the Army which you want to retain statside to train for a big war, they'll need modification.Quote:
No modification of Navy/USMC needed.
You're mixing apples and kiwi fruit. Here's the declaration of War for WW II LINK. Note what it says. Actually, the WW II armed forces were effectively decided upon and designed in 1939-40 and early 41 BEFORE the war was declared.Quote:
In fact that is the point of the declaration to state what we need in terms Army,Air,Space Navy,USMC,Special Warfare. All which was done in WW2,
Actually, it WAS done to that criteria -- you just don't agree with the way it was done (I don't either). A 'declaration' was not going to happen and wouldn't have changed much; as you can see from the WW II job, it effectively gave FDR a free hand.Quote:
we should have done it on an appropriate scale based upon the....drum roll....METT-TC!
Of course there will -- and unless it is a war of national survival, it won't be declared either... ;)Quote:
Forgot, I agree it is to late to do it now, but there will be another one...sooner or later.
Ken, read this WW2 Mobilization plan.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htm
and mobilization was one of my core tasks. What does that have to do with declared versus undeclared war or to do with the forays into Afghanistan or Iraq?
Not trying to be difficult, I just don't understand the connection... :confused:
Er, you did note that it confirmed what I said -- most of the mobilization planning took place before the Declaration of War (and that Pamphlet Gordy Sullivan put out before his Louisiana Maneuvers refreshed my memory on that score back in '92.
The difference in language between these two acts by Congress evidences a difference in national strategic policy.
The language is very specific in ratifying an armed conflict with a single nation, to bring that conflict to a successful termination, and all the nation's resources were pledged.Quote:
WWII Declaration of War (link by Ken)
.... the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
On the other hand, we have the Tonkin Gulf resolution, which is here.
The language is specific in ratifying armed force; but does not focus on a single nation; does not focus on a specific armed conflict, or in bringing that conflict to a successful termination; and certainly does not pledge all of the nation's resources.Quote:
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
What was going on here ? The resolution is area-focused - on SE Asia and maintenance of peace and security in that area - read that as limitation of communism in that region, and as a rejection of an agressive roll-back policy. The termination condition was when "the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions".
That portion of the resolution does not mention Indochina (or its then four component parts), except indirectly (Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were "protocol states" under SEATO). That evidences the continued primary focus on SE Asia as a whole - of which, South Vietnam was but a component part - and, individually, not a very important part.
-------------------------------------------
Now, my point is not to debate the relative merits of these two acts of Congress - or what speculative alternatives any of us might draft as being "better". My point is that the two different national strategy approaches resulted in different approaches by the "National Command Authorities" in military strategy, operations and tactics in each conflict.
The result of our military action in Vietnam (no matter how flawed or unflawed you want to make it) was consistent with the termination condition set in the national strategy evidenced by Tonkin Gulf (and other NSC statements, as well). Ran into the following by GEN Westmorland in Infantry Magazine (Garland), A Distant Challenge, which is available here:
The salient point is that, regardless of the technical form of the Congressional act, the national strategic policy and the resultant military plans must mesh. Otherwise, we do get mired in dogma - and disputes about what should or should have been done in the past (e.g., Summers vs. Krepinevich).Quote:
A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)
Foreward
Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.
Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.
William C. Westmorland
April 1983
Since we don't have a single nation to declare war against, what is our area national strategic policy for South Asia in 2009 ? I haven't the foggiest idea beyond killing Bin Ladin, Zawahiri and AQ there.
JMM, can you declare war against an Organization? I know of no precedent or standing to quote. It would take care of the problem with just declaring war on a single country as you pointed was done in Vietnam...ah SE Asia.
only nations and some international organizations are recognized.
However, that being said, GC III Art. 2 recognizes "Powers" to an armed conflict - they do not have to be nation-states or recognized governments of nation-states (e.g., the Taliban, and possibly AQ). If such a "Power" accepts and applies the GCs, its combatants flow into Art. 4 (PW/POW status) provided they meet its requirements. Otherwise, their status is governed by Art. 3 (the non-international armed conflict provisions),
I see nothing problematic about declaring an armed conflict to exist between a nation-state and such a "Power"; but it would not be a formal declaration of war. In fact, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was aimed at communism and a region, SE Asia. Similarly, the AUMF was aimed at terrorism and was global - as they say in other contexts, overly broad and vague.
From the standpoint of US Con Law, the use of both formal declarations of war and joint resolutions was recognized early on - with both coming under the Congressional power to declare war. However, as Ken points out, a number of statutes and executive orders are best interpreted as requiring a formal declaration of war.
That's the law as I see it. Others will disagree.
PS: we might have "lost" the Vietnam War - Let the Summers-Krepinevich disciples argue that one out. We won the Southeast Asia Armed Conflict and that's where I count the guys and gals on the Wall - that one's an emotional issue to me which I don't like to argue.
I wrote a piece where I made a statement that our young men and women on the ground for the GWOT were giving an A+ effort to execute a C+ strategy; and that sadly the end result was a C+. That we as senior leaders owed them better than that, and that our populace expected better as well. Needless to say my Army War College professor had a cow.
Strategists and campaign planners let the force and the nation down in Vietnam, and it is happening again. Military victory that does not produce the required (not to be confused with "intended") strategic effect is sadly wasted.
With my oldest son, an E-4 11B on the ground in Iraq for his second tour, it is easy for me to stay focused on this as I wage the good fight with those who craft strategy and draft campaign plans to raise their game.
As to war and states vs non-states; this is one of the bold new areas that we enter into as the world flattens, as populaces become more connected and empowered, and as the Westphalian system morphs. Clearly now, while we still struggle (as are the Indians with their efforts to sort out how to respond to the Mumbai attacks) with how to effectively deal with an act of war committed by a non-state entity. To wage war against a non-state group? To wage war against a tactic? To attack a state who is perceived to have allowed this organization to develop the capability for the attack? There is no clear answer to this, and no precedent to rely on. We must move forward with an open mind and create new precedent. GWOT is a school of hard knocks for the U.S. in this regard.
It is, however, clear that an organization can wage war against a state, and that they can act in very state-like ways. Consider the UW campaign beign waged by Al Qaeda. They reach out to incite and facilitate popular uprisings around the Muslim world, each with it's own unique motivations, but all with a common thread, and collectively helping AQ move its own selfish agenda forward.
This is why I get a little tight when people try to make sense of what is going on by misapplying sound concepts. Everything is not COIN, and clearly all future battle will not be COIN. The U.S. military's no-fail mission is to fight and win our nation's wars, regardless of form. However, in this new and messy peace, they must create new and flexible capacity to apply tailored capabilities to conduct FID in ways they are not used to doing, and with command and control relationships they are not used to submitting to. Concepts like "global insurgency" aggragate diverse threats and facilitates the type of polarized thinking that Gentile warns against. Insurgency in a globalized world is a far different thing than global insurgency, and while we need to be able to mitigate and prevent these many uprisings from getting out of control, we must also regain and sustain our warfighting skills as a whole.
I'm sure a lot of people here are regular readers at Abu Muqawama's site - I know I am. I found this exchange between Col. Gentile and an anonymous (but well-informed) poster very fascinating and informative. Scroll down and look for the exchange between "Looking Glass" and Col. Gentile. Great stuff:
Read the whole thing. I think he was able to poke more holes in Col. Gentile's arguments than anyone else I've read, and I consider myself more a "Gentilist" than not.Quote:
Gentlemen, I am not a battlespace owner. I never will be. I am a guy who operated with his boots in the dust on a continuous basis and saw (and still sees) the spotty application of the tools that others have proven will work; not exactly in each case but adaptively to particular situations. While you discuss such lofty things as future procurement budgets, I'm telling you that we are at war now and the horses are still being machinegunned from under their riders as we write. Young company grade officers are still being blocked from doing what they know to be best in their AOR's. COIN is still something that has not reached the strategic Corporal. He can't be strategic; the strategic Captain can't even be strategic. While Colonels dicker about the new tank, the Captains are still horse-bound. The Army has still not bought the weapon of choice for the war in which primers are being dented daily. COIN is still a subject of acceptance. This was touched on in the "some units were doing good COIN while others weren't" discussions on this thread.
Would we have accepted such random achievement in a conventional conflict fought under AirLand?
Not just "no," but "hell no."
Great stuff indeed, food for thought ...
I'll add Abu Muqawama's site to my list, thanks for the hint.
Yes, Ex and crew do a great job at AM.
What the articulate Looking Glass says in even more words than I would use is that:
- We blew the well done fighting entry into Iraq because we had no doctrine for, had not trained for and did not plan for Phase 4 / occupation -- and the likely ensuing activity. True. Most all of that simply due to a lack of training; we wiped it out of syllabii and no one knew what to do.
- We're not really practicing COIN operations in many ways because we're still in a pre-2001 NTC mindset. True -- but hopefully he realizes that's because all the Generals and Colonels are products of that period and are reverting, as we all do, to the way they were trained *...
- We can probably produce a force that can do both MCO and LIC if simply train correctly. True.
- Our training is pathetic. True.
So, yeah, he's got it pretty well right and he's trying to educate Gian... :D
* Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.
[ Count the number of times the word 'train' or its derivatives appear in this post. ;) ]
I'm always a bit perplexed that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.
Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.
Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).
The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
It sucks.
Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).
There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.
It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)
Preparations for more small wars in the future?
Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice.
Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).
Not to worry, give it some thought...Some give orders too; over here they're asked for their opinion -- sometimes they're listened to, sometimes not but here everyone has a right to state their opinion and most of us will.Quote:
that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.
You're living in a dream world; most western politicians today have stayed as far away from the armed forces as they possibly could.Quote:
Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.
Agree they should, shame they don't -- or when they do, don't do a better job of it...Quote:
Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).
Yep. Makes no difference. Those politicians you talked about earlier will keep sending soldiers off to do work that sucks...Quote:
The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
It sucks.
Greece. Philippines -- didn't we do this before? Why bother; what's past is irrelvant; politicians not only can't spell Army, few of them know much history.Quote:
Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.
I'll forward your recommendation to the White House; you'll hear from them soon, I'm sure.Quote:
It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)
There you go, being logical -- you don't need to tell us all that -- tell the politicians.Quote:
Preparations for more small wars in the future? Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice. Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).
I don't know who Looking Glass is, but I like the cut of his jib.
EXACTLY! This never-ending debate is like the kid who checks under the bed and checks the closet every night, afraid that the bogeyman is there. He's not. But the kid keeps worrying. Gone too far with COIN? The doctrinal publications are very nice. They have neat illustrations and interesting concepts. The cover designs are swell. But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country." And back home, over half of the pre-deployment training is the same old weapons qual, reflexive fire, squad/section evaluations, and Table 8/Table 12. Procurement is still churning out big heavy vehicles, boats, and aircraft. And Officers are still learning how to draw big sweeping arrows (though now in PowerPoint format, projected on a 42" plasma screen).Quote:
Just look at the MITT/ETT program... the treatment and support of these teams when they operate in another's battlespace tells most of all how much our Army "gets" COIN.
Gentlemen, while you address this matter in such scholarly fashion, men are in crude places poorly supported and repeatedly countermanded by senior officers, your brethren, who just plain don't "get it." As long as that is a consistent narrative, any discussion of, "has our Army gone too far with this COIN thing?" is pointless.
Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?) responds:
It's a damned good muddy-boots view of the ivory tower, in my opinion. The discussions are purely academic, in spite of the operational experience of the participants. The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers. Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.Quote:
Your quip about our discussions here of being "scholarly" has a whiff of condescension and implies a muddy-boots view of the ivory tower... this blog has many participants some with experience, but most with lots of knowledge and interest in these important matters.
Since you ask I am an active duty Army Colonel presently posted as an associate professor of history at West Point where I run the military history program. I have done two runs in Iraq. The first was in 2003 as a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit and the second was again in 4ID in west Baghdad in command of an armored recon squadron in 2006.
For whatever it is worth I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the Air Force's World War II Strategic Bombing Survey and in it I was highly critical of the air force for using it to shape their future visions of an independent air arm.
I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.
Totally true and it will have no effect on what really happens -- but I'm retired and don't have much else to do... :D
It doesn't really mirror reality because most of those decisions have been made for the next five years and the few that haven't been will be made mostly by Congress and not be me or anyone involved in the debate including the big names or the Think Tanks -- or their graduates. Or Gian. Or Looking Glass. ;)I don't think we have and know we will not go far enough to get good at it -- we can and likely will go far enough to do okay for the most part.Quote:
Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.
I still contend however, that we should avoid it where possible; it's un-American. That, BTW, is a serious comment, we're too impatient and selfish to do it well. More importantly, we are too widely disliked in most of the world to do it because we become targets, everybody wants a shot at the big guy. On top of that, the One Third and Two Year rules apply. :eek:
Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with
"It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."
It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.
Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.
Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.
Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.