Well, if we have to talk about music as a basic combat fundemental...
The Red Hot Chilli Peppers? Nah! :rolleyes:
CCR when things get gloomy? That's a step in the right direction. ;)
Want 'em to march forever? This is what it sounds like done right.
Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsIqEq9OFxE
Slapout will appreciate that. It's right from his era and area. It's also the best rendition I've found.
By the way, that's a '76 concert in the UK. Skynyrd opened for the Rolling Stones. Those people waving the Stars and Bars are a bunch a fish and chippers! Skynyrd was such a hit that the Stones delayed coming on stage because they didn't want to follow them to closely! The Stones never had Skynyrd open for them again after that! I guess Jumping Jack Flash couldn't compare. :p
You're correct on your major point -- but I still agree with Fuchs...
Occupation is not only often unnecessary, it can be counterproductive. No question one needs to be prepared to do it but one should be prepared to do many things one hopes one will never have to do and one should actively seek to not do some of those things. I can recover some aircraft from a spin and do a fishhook turn in my car but I work at not having to do those things..
Cases in point:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Michael C
...who really would have said Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11?), but describing what it could look like is...Failure to win the peace, as in Iraq twice and Afghanistan once, will cost us dearly.
I believe that to be a double misstatement of what actually occurred. First, both Afghanistan and Iraq were totally predictable and what in fact occurred (before, during and after...) had been predicted by many. Both nations as problems and the aftermath possibilities were well up on the radar screen. The difficulty was that no one involved in policy making at the national, DoD, HqDA and TRADOC levels (remember those last three for the future...) was remotely interested in hearing any of that. Domestic concerns took -- always take (remember that also for the future...) -- precedence. :mad:
It's well known fact that Armed Forces do pretty much what they're trained to do. Conversely, they are unlikely to do what they are not trained to do. The force that went into Afghanistan did its job beautifully -- then we inserted forces we did not need there to do things that did not need to be done there and said Forces were not trained to do what was asked of them. That is at one time a policy, a military advisory and a training shortfall that created the situation that led to your unit being better trained and more capable than its predecessor was 12 years ago.
That same cluster held true in Iraq; the initial entry and action was great; good people doing what they'd trained to do and doing it very well indeed. Then, the lack of training showed in the tolerance of looting, excessive reliance on force and the abject failure of the intelligence system -- and those forces and their commanders -- to predict Saddam's publicly announced initiation of an insurgency. The fact that all that was also eminently predictable is shown by the Franks deal with Rumsfeld -- "I'll take Baghdad for you but then I want to immediately retire..."
Secondly, the initial failure in Iraq was one of political will and not of capability (more with Viet Nam experience about; plus I cannot see Norman Schwarzkopf ever tolerating looting...:D), the second failure was engendered by a good case of merited and desirable political will but a badly flawed assessment of capability; it also happens to not necessarily be a 'failure' -- too early to tell. Same thing is true of Afghanistan. However, failures or there is no doubt that both were and are extremely costly endeavors that did not have to occur. That fact remains true with or without our being better trained at the time than was the case.
So even though it does reflect much current thought, your assessment of how we got where we are is, I believe, incorrect. The good news is that this comment by you, your bottom line, is totally correct and bears emphasis:
Quote:
So this brings me to the original point of this post: we need to train an army prepared for high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict--and everything in between. We need leaders who are adaptable, but still knowledgeable in the core competencies of moving, shooting and communicating; then acting like diplomats, police and trainers. (emphasis add / kw)
I totally agree and have been banging on that drum for almost 45 years of service and work and the fifteen years since I've been fully retired. You are correct. That is an achievable goal.
IF...
We scrap our flawed personnel and training processes and do not delude ourselves that everything in Afghanistan and Iraq would have been alright had we simply been more proficient in actions after the attack, COIN efforts and FID skills -- that is a very dangerous over simplification of the problem. Hubris can be its own worst enemy.
For example:
Quote:
Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.
I agree that you and we are better for it but I also submit that by pegging it against the Army of the 90s you are setting a pretty low standard. Nor is a Ranger Bn anything special -- if you had their selectivity and their money, you might well be able to do a better job than can they. :wry:
More apt comparison might be the less 'well trained' but slightly more all round capable Army of the early and mid 60s before the late 1967 Viet Nam malaise set in and led to the Army of the 70s through the 90s, the Army that created Ranger Bns to fill an obvious shortfall in Infantry capability induced by a deeply flawed training strategy and a culture of risk aversion that was developing. The capability of the Infantry has been regained in part, the risk aversion is a societal thing and will be more difficult to dispel.
Never forget that same 70 to 90s Army made Tommy Franks a four button... :rolleyes:
You may qualify it any way you wish.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
I would qualify that with the term "effective fire". If you come under effective fire, or you exchange effective fire or you deliver effective fire in the enemy.
However, if one has seen a few people killed by random, even unintended, fire one will probably look at a definition of 'effective' in a different light than others.
Quote:
There is all this talk about long range "contacts" (500-900m) in Helmand. This can not be effective fire for most platoon weapons. Does one even bother to take cover?
Depends on the weapons. If the opponents have SVD(s), any of the PK series or even old Nagants or Enfields -- even an RPK -- much less a Dshk, they can bring very effective (by any reasonable definition) fire on you at those ranges. Conversely, the M-14 series, the M240/MAG 58s and the various other long range weapons can initiate or return effective fire at those ranges. So whether one even bothers to take cover is -- as always -- situation, state of training and / or experience and all that METT-TC stuff dependent. The only rule in combat is that there are no rules... ;)
Quote:
...ah but as per my many previous comments about strolling around over open ground I guess the soldiers led into harms way by and idiot officer will probably feel a little vulnerable.
Or the Soldier led into harm's way by a quite competent officer or NCO not by strolling -- as you so repetitiously, drolly and ignorantly put it -- but by crossing open areas that are forced upon them by the situation in as tactically sound a manner as is possible.
The good news is that you don't have to worry about any of that, you can just fulminate at length over the internet while a lot of others ranging from more competent than you or I ever were to those incompetents you seem to see everywhere get on with business... :wry:
The only nerve exposed here is thine...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
In Section Battle Drill 2 - Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire (the Brit version) it is as follows: "Effective enemy fire is fire which is causing casualties, [B]or likely to do so if the advance is continued.[/
B]" Does not matter what source.(emphasis added / kw)
Thank you for confirming my comment with British doctrine. It must be terribly conflicting to have been trained under it, quote it often and yet have to denigrate the nation that produced it.
That's an inane and inept add-on of yours. The source does matter. The difference in the effective range of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54 rounds can and does matter...
Quote:
...The question needs to be asked again what are the troops doing out in the open and exposed to someone with any weapon 900m away?
The answer is again provided -- Moving from one point to another. Sometimes that's necessary, sometimes not. We usually cannot tell from our distance which is which. I have no problem saying it's possibly not smart or required on occasion -- you seem to have a problem acknowledging that mission dictates and METT-TC can occasionally force one to do things that are undesirable. You also discount the terrain of Afghanistan and try to equate with that in your locale. It's rather different.
Quote:
I appreciate it touches a nerve with you Ken but your responses don't address the issue. I ask again what do these patrols wish to find out there on the open ground they walk over?
I can't answer your question -- nor can you. We aren't there and cannot know whether there is a reason (whether sensible or not); you just wish to be negative -- you do that well if snidely...
The snide factor does indeed touch a nerve; mostly because it's counterproductive and cloaks your value as a commenter. It does you no favors. The rest of the rather ill informed comment, not at all ;)
Quote:
... If they were there to draw fire that a few Gunships would respond to then I can understand it. But then we know this is not the case.
There you go again. "we" do NOT know -- you assume. You also apparently assume there are more gunships available and that they can respond to every Platoon sized patrol from over probably around 3,000 or so platoons involved, perhaps about a quarter of which may see some activity daily. Figure 20% of them may make a minor contact -- that's a minimum 150 or so actions a day in a nation twice as large as was Rhodesia. Plus maintenance and other stuff going on like escorting MedEvac and resupply birds. Not that many gunships.
Quote:
I asked this question before and now I ask it again: ... but will forget that under such circumstances the requirement is to picket the high ground).
You do that a lot; mostly because you apparently deliberately choose to ask generic questions that cannot be answered for various reasons, most frequently a lack of situational context and / or knowledge. Old and tired debating technique, that. I will point out that the Western Forces and the Afghan government forces in the fight do not have sufficient personnel strength to adequately "picket the high ground" on a constant basis (as many have repeatedly told you). More pointedly, I'll also note that you've been provided a few pictures -- and Google has many more --of the terrain there and if you're foolish enough to think that 'picketing' the high ground on a ridge that is two miles away from a valley or Village one has been directed to patrol to and conduct a search is going to do much good, you have my sympathy.
Quote:
Then we got into the supposed need to get from point A to point B. And it turns out they wanted to have a chat with the civvies in the villages.
That's the theory...:cool:
Quote:
Its called the pursuit of excellence Ken. Keep questioning and keep trying to improve. The competent will continue to learn and improve and the incompetents will continue to go like lambs to the slaughter.
I agree with the last portion, you're correct on that. On the first part, as on the rest of your comment to which this responds, you aren't "pursuing excellence," you're merely carping -- and doing that about a war you seem to choose to deliberately misunderstand and misrepresent. Sensible and knowledgeable suggestions can aid in the pursuit of excellence, obviously ill informed or deliberately elided and notably biased sneering comments will not. Your choice...
Sigh. Once more into the broach...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
If you read widely you will see that the issues I have raised re the conduct of the Brit forces in Helmand are hardly if at all being contested now days...Am I too expect a defence of British tactics in Helmand from 2006 to the present from you to prove me (and a host of others - mainly Brits themselves) wrong?
Nor have I questioned them here, I do not disagree with you; the quote "Lions led by Donkeys" is older than you or I and I probably was aware of it before you were born. ;)
What I have questioned is your tone on the topic and your frequent assertions of your opinions as incontroverible facts. Both those things are mildly bothersome and IMO, do not do you or your message any favors.
Quote:
Read the definition of effective fire again. Effective fire is effective fire.
I knew what that was before you were born also, possibly experienced it long after your last bit. :wry: The point was that the right weapon or caliber enhances the possibility of effective fire at extended ranges. Surprised you missed that simple and basic fact.
Quote:
My information is that movement over open ground is treated like the words of the song of that song about Old Man River in that they just keep rolling along. There is no longer any pretense of dealing with such open ground as an obstacle and treated as such.
I hear the same thing -- unlike you, I know it's due to the vast extent of open terrain -- there are few options. It's not a matter of choice, it's a matter of getting where you need to be and few alternatives.
Quote:
Now think about it. This patrolling pattern gifted the Taliban with an opportunity to maintain the initiative by choosing the time and place for initiating contact with ISAF forces at ranges they know can't be accurately responded to.
Incorrect; cannot be adequately responded to with the 5.56mm round we're saddled with; the 7.62mm weapons in the unit can and do respond; thus the Talibs are smart enough to stay where many weapons in the Platoon cannot tap them -- but not all. They also have range limitation in that most are armed with AKs.
Quote:
Now we hear that 52% of contacts are at ranges out beyond 500m. ... the soldier with one ear covered can't use his hearing to the maximum.
Yep, confusing isn't it. Conflicting figures abound. What's an armchair warrior to do... :D
Quote:
The tactical problems are self inflicted and the enemy is taking advantage of the "Keystone Cops" situation presented to them.
Of course they are, wouldn't you? Though I suggest your Keystone Cops comment is specious, made from a position of incomplete information and thus amounts to speculation and is unduly pejorative to no good purpose.
Quote:
I never discount terrain (in fact careful use of terrain will compensate in large part for a lack of knowledge of the enemy). I look on in horror how some of the best soldiers in the world are failing to use ground correctly. What ever happened to conducting an appreciation of the ground prior to movement? The sad point has been reached where an MO has been developed and Brits when asked as to why they do things that way the answer is "that's the way we do it over here." Unquestioning acceptance of a failed tactical approach... which is heartbreaking.
Heartbreaking? Are you perchance a dramatist? In any event, I suggest that yet again you're projecting for some obscure reason. I doubt your stated points are accurate.
Quote:
I am not hear to earn any favours (with a U). I will continue to plug on with basic aspects which so many people merely pay lip service to.
Good, do that. Does that mean you'll try to post in a civil manner and avoid speculative and judgmental pronouncements? That would probably help your stated cause. Plugging on is good. Does help if one has one's act together while plugging.
Quote:
Hmmm... 150 contacts per day. I wonder when we will get some analysis from the Wikileaks documents to show what results and kill rates are being achieved in Afghanistan.
Sigh. There you go again -- you do know that "150" is only my broad 'estimate,' a hypothetical figure and could be terribly incorrect. Surely you won't go elsewhere and announce, authoritatively, that "The NATO force in Afghanistan has 150 c0ntacts a day..."
Quote:
...they saw likely camp areas would drop to tree top level and overfly the areas to try and draw fire...
Yet another US Air Cavalry tactic from Viet Nam you folks successfully later employed. Good for you. ;)
Quote:
Last time the aggressive tactical use of helos was suggested we had half a dozen people around here collapse in a heap shouting RPG... RPG!!!
Surely you jest. Better go back and review the comments, I was in on that and as the Bard said, "Thou doeth protest too much..."
Quote:
We are taking about 52 % of contacts being initiated at ranges from 500-900m... so where does the two miles come from?
I thought you said you never discounted terrain. It came from the pictures you've seen and obviously forgotten at this (LINK). If one wanted to operate on any of those flats, the nearest ridge top is some hundreds of meters -- a couple of miles in two cases -- away. I thought surely the good soldier would remember those...[quote]OK so ISAF have been at it in earnest for 5 years now and a tactic for dealing with "shoot and scoot" contacts has not evolved yet? Maybe its because the troops rotate at too short an interval to learn this stuff? (Oh yes... its all about PTSD isn't it?)Yes, it is indeed due to the tours -- but that's democracy for you. That's five years (or nine, depending on how you're counting who. Or more...) separate and not always equal one year or less tours. Not a thing you or I can do about that so you might as well accept it. The Troops who go and do it are; you're the one doing the sniveling -- and doing it in a pejorative manner that isn't in your professed interest.
As for the PTSD, don't think any one here said that. They did point out that it was a societal / political concern. Not much any of us here can do about that, either. So why get snide and stroppy with people who are inclined to agree with you and generally have on more points than not -- until you get unduly and egregiously bitchy and effectively imply that some who served there are lying or shading the truth at best. You're too cagey to accuse them but you drop a lot of innuendo -- unnecessary innuendo.
Quote:
There are obviously so home truths which are unpalatable to swallow. It is only through the efforts (as unpopular they may be among the guilty) of people like Stephan Grey, Anthony King, Theo Farrell and others that the Brit politicians and senior officers will be shamed into taking the long overdue corrective action.
That is as may be and I wouldn't take bets on the corrective part. If those people achieve that, good on 'em. OTOH, your making yourself a minor pain here by pursuing fetishes to excess and offering gratuitous slaps to fellow posters here is hardly likely to help anyone.
ACOGs rock, in moderation
An ACOG is like a machine gun, if everyone in the platoon had one it would be way too much of the same thing. As an ISR asset at the platoon level, it rocks. My gunners in trucks had them and binos, I had one as the PL and my expert marksmen had them, in addition to more advanced scopes on M14s.
The magnification definitely helps in positively identifying, then eliminating enemy threats. I, though, have always been a fan of more accurate fires as opposed to more fires, which is what most people tend to overreact with.
Didn't helicopters get invented in the 20th Century?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
Nothing new under the sun Ken, wonder where the US Air Cavalry learned that.
Actually I think the large scale use of helicopter insertions really was something new under the sun that was devised by the US Army.