In a couple of the accounts, the US Soldiers on the ground fired at the Pakis in retaliation.
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both sides since 2002. It surfaces to the media on occasion but not always.
Some times, there are casualties. Here's one I happen to know personally; note the date. The articles is not quite correct -- some of the Pakistanis helped the US, others engaged and a healthy fire fight was going on before it got calmed down. LINK
Pakistan Policy, 29 Sep 08: Ahmed Shuja Pasha, New ISI Chief
Quote:
Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha has replaced Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj as director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
The Australian reports that Washington had been pressing Islamabad/Rawalpindi hard to replace Taj as late as Sunday night. President Asif Zardari reportedly met with CIA Director Michael Hayden this weekend in New York. What they discussed specifically is unclear — but Hayden reportedly provided Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani will a proposal for “ISI reform” in July.
Taj, a Musharraf relative and appointee, is depicted as the face of the organization’s alleged double game vis-a-vis militants along the border with Afghanistan. He will now head Gujranwala’s XXX Corps.
Pasha, just promoted from major general, had been director general of military operations (DGMO). In this capacity, he headed the Pakistan Army’s operations in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and so his appointment provides no indication of a change in the military establishment’s war on terror policy.....
USIP, 2 Oct 08: The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan
Quote:
.....Washington needs to rethink its approach to Pakistan. If we genuinely believe that a stable, prosperous Pakistan is in our interest, we must be much smarter about how we work with Pakistan and what sort of assistance we provide. As the September 19th bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad demonstrates, there is little time to waste. Our options in Pakistan are diminishing rapidly.
Political developments in both Pakistan and the United States, however, make this an opportune moment to recalibrate U.S. policy. A new civilian government headed by the Pakistan People’s Party has emerged in Pakistan, and President Pervez Musharraf has departed the scene after nine years of military rule. The upcoming U.S. presidential election will similarly bring a new set of policymakers to power and a potential willingness to consider fresh approaches to managing the difficult but exceedingly important U.S.–Pakistan relationship.....
Apologies for late addition thought I'd dropped the link in.
IN mid-September the American think tank Council Foriegn Relations published a report on 'The next chapter in US-Pakistan relations', a good overview and described the options available for the next US President:
http://www.cfr.org/content/publicati...roupReport.pdf
davidbfpo
The more I follow the complexities of the Pakistan and Indian involvement in A-stan, the more I fear we are trying to sit on the fence, with all the risk of serious groin injury that this entails. I think the time has come to seriously re-evaluate the sides we have chosen in this fight. In the following LINK, two passages stand out to me. One.
Does anyone here have confirmation of this? To me this is big, if the Pak Intelligence community is still supporting terrorist activities in A-stan, my support for them would be gone.Quote:
Wednesday's attack could have a negative impact on Indo-Pakistani ties, which--due to revelations of Pakistani intelligence involvement in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008--were already strained.
Two.
My embarrassing random thought of supporting India as the key counter-terrorist agent in the region has begun to seem less whacko to me all the time. I understand the desire to appease everyone in the region, but my gut says that this is a bad idea, and we will lose ALL support and influence in the region if we keep it up.Quote:
The historical animosity between Pakistan and India has also begun to increasingly manifest itself in Afghanistan, where Pakistan fears it is losing influence to India. New Delhi has pledged over $1 billion in assistance to the Afghan government and increased its political and economic influence throughout the country over the last few years. Pakistan's ability to maintain influence in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s stemmed from its support to the Taliban, whose leadership is allied with al-Qaeda. Other than strengthening ties to Kabul through stronger economic and trade linkages, Pakistan now finds itself with few options to project influence in Afghanistan; any further dealings with the Taliban risk isolation from the international community.
Reed
Any thought on how peacekeepers from either Pak or India would be viewed by the Afghan populace compared to the US and NATO?
Rand Paper Abstract
I would love to get the whole document but this abstract sums up the challenge and options fairly well.
The Indians would be regarded as just as foreign as NATO, and—given how Indian RoE work out when they are under threat—likely involve even more collateral damage against the civilian population as things got messy. More important, any Indian troop deployment would be considered by the Pakistani military-intelligence complex as confirmation that the Karzai government is a major strategic threat, and would lead them to throw their full-blown support behind the Taliban as a strategic counter. (While there is no doubt that elements in ISI currently provide some support to the Taliban now, it is very, very far from full fledged institutional support at present.)
Pakistani peacekeepers in Afghanistan? I wouldn't assume that they would be seen as much more "local"—the Pakistani army is seen as already "foreign" by many Pakistani Pashtuns in the FATA/NWFP/etc. It would also be resented by many local pro-Karzai Afghans as an extension of (malevolent) Pakistani influence. Finally, I have serious doubts about the PKO or combat efficiency of the Pakistani armed forces (their performance against radical Islamists within Pakistan, or on PKO missions such as Somalia, is far from stellar).
It's not known for sure, but it's likely ISI had some involvement in the attack. Whether this was limited to general support for the group or whether it provided direct assistance in support of this particular attack isn't known. There is a very important distinction there between general support and specific support for a particular attack.
Also, one thing you have to keep in mind about Pakistan is that it is a factional country that lacks the kind of centralized power and authority that we have here in the US. The civilian government, military and intelligence services all have a lot of independent power - indeed the civilian government serves at the pleasure of the Army - so there are many times when the right hand not only doesn't know what the left is doing, but the foot is doing something completely different and lying to both hands about it. And there are times when the government may want to do something and the military say's no. In those arguments, the military usually wins and gets its way.
This makes choosing "sides" difficult when talking about India/Pakistan because when something like the India Embassy bombing occurs, and there are indications of Pakistani involvement, we don't know if that involvement was an official act of the Pakistani government, or just another in a long line of ISI going off the reservation and pursuing its own, independent agenda. It must be quite frustrating to the civilian government as well, who might find out that an instrument of its supposed national power has gone and done something from al Jezeera or when the US Ambassador calls.
This reality in Pakistan makes dealing with them very complex and frustrating, but they still remain an ally of necessity. Even if parts of the Pakistani government are working against us, we need those parts which are working for us if we want to continue operations at all in Astan.
I also strongly endorse Rex's comments. Pakistan has long sought to control Afghanistan to gain strategic depth against India. It's one of several reasons why Pakistan does not want to see a strong, independent government in Afghanistan. Indian "peacekeepers" in that context would be seen as an existential threat to Pakistani interests. In fact, the main reason India is playing in Afghanistan at all has little to do with Afghanistan and everything to do with causing problems for Pakistan.
strongly disliked in order, Pakistanis, Brits and Russians. Guy I know with two tours and current contacts there tells me that's still true.
That suggests that any thought of Pakistani troops in Afghanistan would not be a good idea...
Entropy is of course correct on the problems that Pakistan possesses as a nation. There is no easy solution there or in Afghanistan and there was never going to be one. We did something that needed to be done, are still doing that as best we can and that's good. The bad thing is that it seems to me we have yet to determine what we can and will accept as an achievable end state. We really need to do that, be very clear and public about it and set out to achieve that goal.
I think your take on the ISI is well placed. I think the Pak govt serves at the pleasure of the army, while the ISI upholds the agenda of the "true believers", while allowing the govt and army "plausable deniability".
Every so often the ISI will provide a scape goat and talk about reform.
The bottom line, IMO, is Pakastan's pathological fear of India. That fear determines Pak foreign policy. If Pak continues to see US policy as favoring India we can only expect more "disappointments" from Pak.
Unfortunately, others are not operating without a strategic goal. Events may pass us by while we try and figure out what to do. The SCO grows, while NATO shows it's impotence.Quote:
The bad thing is that it seems to me we have yet to determine what we can and will accept as an achievable end state.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JL09Df02.html
Since about 1965 China has been Pak's most important strategic partner, while USSR/Russia has ebbed and flowed with India. I don't think the GWOT has altered the China/Pak relationship at all.
I read these recently and thought there were some interesting points.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JL06Df03.html
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JL09Df01.html
Some people don't like the source, but I think it provides a good start point to do further research. I think the region gives a new meaning to "Byzantine politics". Just 2cents from someone trying to learn about the region.
The entire document is here: The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India
I accept "sitting on the fence" can be painful, but the campaign in Afghanistan does not face the dilemma of choosing between India and Pakistan.
Neither nation can really supply "boots on the ground", for a variety of reasons, although I'd be interested to learn how the small Indian para-military presence, guarding road builders, has gone down with the Afghans (sibject of a thread a long time ago).
IMHO India can only play a small part whilst without Pakistan's assistance we cannot campaign fully in Afghanistan; as discussed on the supply routes thread recently.
We do need to work on ensuring India and Pakistan do not return to their historical bickering etc. Reinforced by the Mumbai attacks and the attendant allegations of a Pakistani state role.
Alas neither nation is readily amenable to diplomacy and pressure. The two rival intelligence agencies are known to "play games" in Afghanistan, much to the annoyance of former Western government figures. The Indian Embassy attack has been widely leaked as being linked to ISI, sometimes in surprising detail in semi-public forums; whether there is any foundation to this remains elusive.
The real issue in Afghanistan is securing Afghan support, preferably in the fight; I exclude what our objective is (covered in another thread) and whether an Afghan nation state exists that can provide that support.
Reed - I hope this helps.
Found on another site and on my first read an interesting story, which I suspect has gained prominence with Gordon Brown's visit to the region: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle5337881.ece
Note the dead Pakistani general is SF.
davidbfpo
(Added here as the latest thread on the issue, although there are other threads).
Wheels inside of wheels...:(
CSIS, 27 Jan 09 The Afghan-Pakistan War: The Rising Threat: 2002-2008
Quote:
NATO/ISAF, the US government, and UN have provided some unclassified data on the rising intensity of the conflict, but coverage has often been limited and much of the data are contradictory. Other material has been leaked by the UN, or has been complied by private organizations like Senlis -- whose results are generally more negative than those of the US and NATO/ISAF.
This paper provides a graphic comparison of such data in graphic and map form. No one source can be said to be reliable and no one set of trends is definitive. The only way to track the the trends in the war is to look at different sources and metrics.
The reader should also be aware that there are particularly sharp differences in estimates of Taliban and other insurgent influence depending on whether that influence is measures in terms of clashes, poll, presence, or risk to NATO/ISAF, and UN/NGO personnel. This is clearly reflected in the maps in showing the rise of violence, high risk areas, and areas of Taliban influence.
The data are further limited by the fact that NATO/ISAF, the US and other sources do not cover the Pakistani side of the fighting. This ignores one of the most critical aspects of the conflict.
CSIS, 27 Jan 09 The Afghan-Pakistan War: The Rising Threat: 2002-2008
Jedburg's comments are deeply appreciated and on target.
Pakistan has been "overlooked" for way too long.
A rebellion is going on inside the FATA, Waziristan, and related parts of the NWFP for some months now.
In Swat the Taliban and al Qaida, but especially the Taliban, are slaughtering the locals, who ethnically are not all Pukhtuns.
I get pleas for help frequent via private e-mails, starting from when I wrote/published a letter during 2008 testing the waters on theme "what if the US/NATO" came across the borders in force, literally?
Nub of most replies I got was they would prefer "us" the Pakistan Army and their ISI.
Problem is this is a backward, feudal, tribal society which cannot be changed for time to come, could take 100s of years. Bad as the Pak Army and ISA may be, they of late appear to be doing a better job, and should police up their theoretical provinces.
However, it is worth noting that these and related areas in Northern Paksitan allege to hate and oppose the terrorists, Taliban and al Qaida, but they, themselves have to get their guns and butter from somewhere? Guess who? From the Taliban and al Qaida, and lately from the Pakistan Army who have tried to sign up "enmasse" whole tribes to fight against sthe Taliban.
Convoluted and confusing for sure.
Again, thanks much for Jedburg's remarks and references.
During 2008 a perhaps young Pukhtun man 20s age, posted on HUJRA ONLINE website (part of Khyber Watch.com syndicate of websites) a photo of himself in front of an Austrian syndicate built in Swat ski lodge/resort, coupled with photos (this was spring, 2008) of fast flowing area/nearby streams/river.
Within a few months the Taliban or al Qaida, probably the Taliban, had burned/blown up the former ski resort hotel and the young man who made the mistake of posting his own photo standing in front of this now gone Swat ski resort has not been back "on the air," most likely, my guess only, murdered by the Taliban.
The Taliban are using low strength FM radios to communicate and push their agenda in Swat and elsewhere in these northern areas. My antique knowledge of radio is that AM radio waves bounce and work best in mountaineous/hilly terrain. FM radio waves move in a straight line.
I assume you all know what I am saying.
Tough doings over there. Also last spring [2008] the Taliban fighters in some strength came into the NW city limits of Peshawar, a sprawling frontier city of a couple million folks, while Musharraf was still in power. Pakistani Army, Froniter Corp, and Peshawar Police battled for weeks, on and off, and lost then regained a major auto tunnel used on a main highway in and out of northern parts of City of Peshawar.
Some bits and pieces of references as background for a few observations.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jammu_K...t_(Yasin_Malik)
http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/sh...gle+Parliament
http://www.asinstitute.org/
(I referred in a Jan. 31, 2008 posting to University of Lahore. CORRECTION: I should have referred to University of Punjab in Lahore, Pakistan. George Singleton.)
Here are some opinions which I invite comment, criticism on from my fellow SWJ thinkers and writers.
- Russia has agreed to have it's territory used vs. Pakistan for land movement of military supplies for NATO in Afghanistan.
- I believe that the sudden collapse of the Russian oil and gas money based national economy created to me a literally overnight opportunity for NATO shipments as this is a new revenue source to a financially upset and distressed Russian national and provincial economy(s).
- The hoped for benefit as we attempt a new form of surge inside Afghanistan is now based, for the time being, on a less threatened by Taliban and al Qaida land route vs. Pakistan where the Khyber Pass has been a narrow bottleneck attacked more regularly in recent months with pretty much impunity by the Taliban terrorists.
- Pakistan's government and military can now suck air and contemplate cooperating more fully in what was supposed to be a common war on terrorism, as Pakistan, too is faced with a heavily upset national and provincial economy(s) and in great need of the revenue from movement of NATO supplies on land through Pakistan.
- The newly opened Port of Gwadar, in Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea, built by the Chinese for Pakistan, needs the cargo revenue of continued movement of NATO supplies through Gwadar, by road up to the Khyber pass and thence into Afghanistan.
- Confused with the terrorist war with the Taliban and al Qaida is one camp of peaceful proponents of an independent Kashmir, composed of both Pakistan and Indian occupied parts of Kashmir. One of the above posts provides background on a heavily overlooked [my opinion] profile of Yasin Malik, who is Chairman of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front.
- One of Yasin Malik's chief fund raisers is Sagir Ahmed of Bedford, England. Sagir started e-mail correspondence with me at the end of 2001 when I started having artices and letters giving an American's point of view, one who lived and worked in then West Pakistan at the old US Embassy, Karachi, as the liaison officer for the US U-2 base [U-2s and comm intel] at Badabur, which is a suburb of Peshawar, Pakistan.
- As is true historically with Europe, the Indian Subcontinent is filled with different cultures, tribes, alliances which in many instances are violent, but in his instance the JKLF has moved past violence to a peaceful process to seek political change in Kashmir.
- Side note: There is a third small piece of Kashmir held by China since their invasion of Tibet in 1960 (date ?). I don't attempt to address it, nor does Yasin Malik clearly try to address it, either, but you guys and gals may want to add it to the discussion I am seeking here.
- A final thought: Yasin Malik did a speaking tour of campuses and other groups here in the US circa 2006. I noted at the time that Howard University in DC was a major point of his visitation and lectures. I tried hard, without success, to get the then Chancellor of Vanderbilt University to invite Yasin Malik to speak with or without a panel at Vanderbilt in Nashville. Lack of a more open academic platform to such peaceful revolutionaries here in the US bothers me, but understand, I don't pretend to know everything about anything. I just think we could have and can in future do better.
Hoping for discussions of any tangental or synthesis nature now from you all.
The problem is Pakistan and our self-deceit.
This war, and the taliban, have no traction in the absence of external sancturary provided by the GoP. In the absence of such, all things ARE possible and we hardly can imagine what the possible positive permutations might have arisen.
It's not to be so long as we aid our enemy in making war upon ourselves. There is, evidently, little recognition by Pakistan of the infectious influence the "good" taliban and their associates- A.Q. Haqqani & Son, and Hekmatyar have had upon the likes of locals like Nazir, Bahadur, and (most notably) Mehsud.
Equally, in their obsessive quest to deny Afghanistan to India and thus dodge the "envelopement" bullet, the GoP fails to see the final manifestation of a re-empowered taliban gov't and its friends.
That, of course, will be the cooperation between "good" and "bad" taliban to seize Pakistan. And they shall.
We've deliberately steered politely around this harsh reality about our ostensible "ally"- rationalizing our need for access to trans-ship goods/equipment. We've justified this by believing that no alternative exists and that we must "engage" them to gently sway their perspectives our way.
We've failed and now aid an enemy opposed to the U.N. mandate and prepared to use proxy armies to achieve it's ends.
Everything else trickles from that leaky faucet...
S-2, the Paks are for over two years or more now using primarily air, artillery, and limited special forces instead of large numbers of troops on the ground where it counts.
The Pak-Afghan border is huge and rugged as the devil, I have been primarily in the Khyber Pass area myself.
As the Taliban are by blood Pakthuns they rely, successfully, on the Pakhtun unwritten code or constitution to seek sustainment and cover from being found out.
My sopa box again here: Huge Voice of America radio and TV broadcasts to demean and show how unIslamic the Taliban, and AQ, actually are...then there is some hope to stopper parts of the rugged border, provided the tribesmen there seek Pak military long term, not in and out, military support for permanent security.
Lack of trust in the GoP is a huge problem, but doing their duty, long term, could at least start to restore future trust in the GoP.
My two cents.
"...doing their duty, long term, could at least start to restore future trust in the GoP."
George,
"...doing their duty, long term,..." would win the damned war, IMHO. Again, this insurgency has no traction in the absence of sanctuaries. If mutual trust is the by-product of that action I'm all for it.
I don't see it though. Pakistan's army is wired for India. Sustaining their modest success in Buner and SWAT will challenge their stamina in ways they've heretofore not needed to face- policing their own.
Already the slain bodies are showing up in the streets of Mingora and its effect on the military (i.e. down at the squad/section level) shall be morally corrosive.
Further, every troop west is one less troop in the east. I'm convinced this grates on their leadership and each reinforcement sent west is done so with the most grudging acknowledgement.
There's a long P.R. investment in fighting the Indian bogey-man. That stuff pays the bills and then some. They'd like to keep it that way in my view.
No profit in fighting themselves from the army's POV.
To "do their duty", nearly all of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan and most of eastern Baluchistan await their army. That includes the "good" taliban were they to carry through fully.
There's easily a decade's work there. Maybe they realize it. Maybe not. I don't know. I only wonder if I'll see them start in my lifetime.
I'm 53...
I posted this comment on "land of 10,000 wars": http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...of-10000-wars/ and was wondering where I would post such a query on this discussion board?
"I am curious to know if most people here agree with boatspace? What "accomodation" would allow the US to leave?
In my personal opinion (based on zero inside information), the real issue is not Afghanistan, its Pakistan. Lets imagine that the US leaves Afghanistan in disarray, right down to the iconic helicopter takeoff from the Kabul embassy roof (maybe with Karzai hanging on to the rope ladder); even in that scenario, the real loss is loss of face. There is no oil in Afghanistan and no easy way to have a functional modern country in the foreseeable future. Taliban ruled Afghanistan would become a haven for the world's adventure seeking jihadis, but the taliban would not have peace. The Northern alliance has been revitalized and will continue to get Indian and Iranian (and probably Russian and American) support and will hold the North. The rest will be one big mess, Somalia X 10, occasionally bombed and cruise-missiled as the need arises. How many international terrorist plots have been launched from Somalia? probably zero. Without Pakistan, the jihadis have nothing except endless brutal war in the world's poorest country.
The real prize is Pakistan.
My question to you is this: do you think the US has finally flipped the Pakistani army or can the Pakistani army go back to training and arming jihadis?
If they dont go back to being jihad central, isnt the job in that region pretty much done? (And I will admit I am trying to start a conversation and learn, these are not necessarily my final views). The Pakistani army could be fighting the jihadis for decades, but as long as they hold the major cities and control the ports and airports, how is that any worse than what is happening now?
It will probably be very bad for the Afghans if the US leaves soon, but is it really that bad for the US?
Omerali
No, my opinion is that the Pakistani Army has not been flipped by the USA, who have tried repeatedly to achieve a change in policy and implementation. There are other threads that indicate a number of internal factors led to the Pakistani Army to fight the internal Taliban i.e. Swat Valley and less dramatically in the FATA. Take a peek at these recent threads: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5023 and http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7222Quote:
My question to you is this: do you think the US has finally flipped the Pakistani army or can the Pakistani army go back to training and arming jihadis?
For a variety of reasons parts of the Army and ISI may still pursue supporting militant factions. Hopefully this desire and perceived national interests at stake will change.
Remember Pakistan has had hundred of soldiers, let alone civilians killed by militants and Jihadis - before 2009.
davidbfpo
Having served long ago in Pakistan (then West Pakistan) with side trips to the old US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, mixing in events since 911 I do not favor walking away from Afghanistan when a new plan and policy for there takes one to two years to complete forming and testing.
Premature and very questionable judgement to even suggest such, implying a pro-Taliban and al Qaida bias on the part of the writer of this question in my mind.
I am the farthest thing from an alqaeda or taliban sympathizer, so lets not jump to conclusions here!
I will say that from several years experience on other email groups, I do expect massive misunderstanding in the first few exchanges. We all use heuristics that are generally useful but may be totally wrong in particular cases. Patience is the only real solution since no single email can present all the assumptions that underlie a particular position. Things will get clearer with time.
In any case, as I said upfront, the main purpose was to start a discussion and try to get a clearer sense of what people think the US is doing in afghanistan and what may or may not be its essential interests in that region. If the conversation continues, we will get there.....
Far from being a biased question, its actually a very good one, identifying the policy alternative that rarely gets properly aired (even, I might add, in Ex's excellent week-long AfPak blogfest at Abu Muqawama): can the threat of a resurgent Taliban and al-Qa'ida be contained in other ways than thousands of US and NATO boots on the ground?
Omarali50 identifies one way this might be done: pulling back, supporting local proxies, and throwing some occasional drones/cruise missiles/airpower/SF/covert operations into the fray of what would likely become a full-scale civil war. It is a horrible thing to condemn the Afghan people to, and might generate massive refugee flows anew (that alone possibly destabilizing for Pakistan). However, it is a strategy which kind-of-works in Somalia: the place is a tragic, bloody, and sad morass, but it hasn't proven to be a place from which AQ has been able to build a particularly productive or effective sanctuary in recent years (despite past efforts to do so)
I don't favour the approach myself. It is odd, however, that it receives so little airing in polite company (although I imagine things are a little different in less polite company, or even at "The Company").
Interestingly, the specter of this sort of Plan B is one way to nudge the Pakistanis into more robust action against the Taliban, since they certainly don't want to see Washington to switch to Somalia-like containment on their doorstep.
I guess its time for me to add that I dont favor it myself either. Mostly because it would be hell for the Afghans and probably for ordinary Pakistanis and Indians (I am guessing a Pakistani military deprived of its American subsidy would turn around and reactivate the jihadi option against India). But I think its good to know what the options are to get a clearer picture of what we should or should not do. In actual fact, I am modestly optimistic that the US WILL succeed in some recognizable shape or form.
Quote:
I guess its time for me to add that I dont favor it myself either. Mostly because it would be hell for the Afghans and probably for ordinary Pakistanis and Indians (I am guessing a Pakistani military deprived of its American subsidy would turn around and reactivate the jihadi option against India). But I think its good to know what the options are to get a clearer picture of what we should or should not do. In actual fact, I am modestly optimistic that the US WILL succeed in some recognizable shape or form.
We certainly hope so!
I was just sent this article (
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...6/917tltdv.asp) and I think it gets the background right and correctly points out that the biggest reason for staying and winning in Afghanistan is Pakistan. Such a victory would force a complete overhaul of "national security thinking" in Pakistan, while US defeat in Afghanistan would confirm to the generals that their assessment was correct and having beaten their second superpower, they can go back to plan A (you would be surprised at the speed with which the supposed "revenge to the tenth generation" business evaporates and corps commanders are again hugging taliban commanders on TV).
Some of the other suggestions are weak tea. They are also (in my opinion) misdirected. The US (or any superpower) with interests in the region is not going to win hearts and minds by doing good deeds and paying journalists to highlight them. They should still DO good deeds, but the expectation that you can spend X dollars on some hospitals and "everyone" will love you in return is not correct. They will love you in return IF their perceived national interest is aligned with yours OR if they have NO "strategic issues" to do with you. Thus, its easy for, say, Cuba to buy goodwill. Its operating on neutral ground and 8 doctors and a mobile hospital earned it tons of goodwill in 2005. But India cannot earn similar goodwill with 800 doctors. ..and so on.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...6/917tltdv.asp
I'd like to know what everyone thinks about Sec Clinton's remarks in Pakistan. Personally, I think it is a good thing. She is being direct about the (or lack of) responsibility and accountability of the Pakistanis to secure areas of their nation-state and hunt down al Qaeda.
Highlights include:
BestQuote:
“I find it hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they are, and couldn’t get to them if they really wanted to,” she said to a group of Pakistani journalists on her second day here. “Maybe that’s the case; maybe they’re not gettable. I don’t know.”
“Slowly, but insidiously, you were losing territory,” Mrs. Clinton said. “If you want to see your territory shrink, that’s your choice. But I don’t think that’s the right choice.”
“I am more than willing to hear every complaint about the United States.” But she said the relationship had to be a “two-way street.”
Mike
Pretty good article Mike thanks for posting. She did the best she could I suspect, she had a lot guts to keep to her schedule no matter what was happening and I like guts.:wry:
Mike F refers to Mrs Clinton's remarksFirst big mistake is the wording; it should have read: She is being direct about the lack of Pakistani military and state responsibility and accountability to all Pakistani. To secure areas of their nation-state and hunt down our common enemies (al Qaeda, Pakistani Taleban and 'foriegn militants).Quote:
She is being direct about the (or lack of) responsibility and accountability of the Pakistanis to secure areas of their nation-state and hunt down al Qaeda.
Was this really the advice of the State Dept. to make such remarks in Pakistan? Given the common public view that the USA is the enemy, her remarks are rude, even critics of the Pakistani state and military will be bewildered - and silent.
Then add: We share a common enemy and that is why we offer our help. Not for hi-tech weapons, simple things for the police and others in the fight.Our help is for non-military change too.
davidbfpo
David,
I disagree. When I receive my monthly bills in the mail, I don't consider that it is rude for the bank to demand in such an informal tone that I pay the required amount.
We've given billions to Pakistan (avg $50 Billion/yr I think) since 9/11. They squandered most of it on building a conventional army to defend against Pakistan. This is not an equal partnership. Regardless of how xenophobic or anti-American some of the Paks may be, they still absorb our money. That's not an equal partnership.
v/r
Mike
$50 billion a year? Not that much ... more like $11 billion total from 9/11 to 2008, I think.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issu...d_numbers.html
The vast majority of it is to the military. Most Pakistanis, of course, never see any American aid.
The Kerry-Lugar bill, which sought to rebalance some of this, caused the Pakistani military to throw a massive bitch fit, supposedly because this impinged on Pakistani national sovereignty.
It's emotionally satisfying for me to hear Sec. Clinton give the Pakistanis a little bit of honesty given the military's duplicity, but I'm a bit afraid that this will only feed the Pakistani political sphere's basic anti-Americanism.
Additional figures from the Congressional Research Service via FAS:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf
From 2002 - 2008, this adds up to 12.087 billion.
The FY 2009 request is for 3.352 billion.
Well, you gotta figure the vast majority of money we spend in Afghanistan is spent on combat operations and our own forces. Plus we don't have to build a state or an army or a police force from nothing in Pakistan, only assist what's already been there for decades. Yes, none of those institutions are in spectacular shape, but they're decades ahead of what's in Afghanistan.
Here's an interview where she explains her actions.
I did this on a very micro-level (just one village). I'd acknowledge the US failures during the initial years of the Iraq war, but I would follow it up quickly that our missteps did not give the villagers the right to:
- Behead/murder/displace their neighbors.
- Steal from each other.
- Blow up their roads.
- Refuse to vote and then complain that they were not represented in the government.
It was a different tactic, but it worked.
Here's what the Sec had to say:
Quote:
She referred to the experience of former President Bill Clinton. "I watched in the '90s as my husband just kept pushing and pushing and pushing, and good things happened. There wasn't a final agreement, but fewer people died, there were more opportunities for economic development, for trade, for exchanges. It had positive effects, even though it didn't cross the finish line. So I think that being involved at the highest levels sends a message of our seriousness of purpose."
Clinton said it's time to "clear the air" with a key U.S. ally. She added, "I don't think the way you deal with negative feelings is to pretend they're not there."
"I think it's important, if we are going to have the kind of cooperative partnership, that I think is in the best interest of both of our countries, for me to express some of the questions that are on the minds of the American people,"
"No, no," she said. "What I was responding to is what I have been really doing on this trip, which is there exists a trust deficit, certainly on the part of Pakistanis toward the United States, toward our intentions and our actions. And yet we have so much in common, we face a common threat. We certainly have a common enemy in extremism and terrorism, and so part of what I have been doing is answering every single charge, every question."
Trust "is a two-way street," she added. While Pakistan's military operation has been "extremely courageous in both Swat and now in South Waziristan, success there is not sufficient," she said. "... I just want to keep putting on the table that we have some concerns as well. And I think ... that's the kind of relationship I'm looking to build here."
Mike F,
Many of the issues and the dismay you showed earlier have been seen in previous threads on Pakistan.
I simply don't think her words helped, hence my suggested phrasing. It would be interesting to know how direct, robust other envoys have been in private, Richard Holbrooke and Admiral Mullen to name two.
Funding the Pakistani conventional military has hardly helped Pakistani national security, but then such a concept is not embedded in the civilian part of Pakistan. Others elsewhere, including David Kilcullen have advocated switching funds to the national and provincial police.
Just thought, out of all these US$ how much has ended in the ISI budget? I am sure some of the support has been in cash. That would be weird.
davidbfpo
DAWN is about as pro-Western a publication as one can find in Pakistan, and a leading voice against militancy.
Here is an article about Secretary Clinton's outreach in Pakistan.
Quote:
During an interview broadcast live in Pakistan with several prominent female TV anchors, before a predominantly female audience of several hundred, one member of the audience said the Predator attacks amount to 'executions without trial' for those killed.
Another asked Clinton how she would define terrorism.
'Is it the killing of people in drone attacks?' she asked. That woman then asked if Clinton considers drone attacks and bombings like the one that killed more than 100 civilians in the city of Peshawar earlier this week to both be acts of terrorism.
'No, I do not,' Clinton replied.
Earlier, in a give-and-take with about a dozen residents of the tribal region, one man alluded obliquely to the drone attacks, saying he had heard that in the United States, aircraft are not allowed to take off after 11 pm, to avoid irritating the population.
'That is the sort of peace we want for our people,' he said through an interpreter.
The same man told Clinton that the Obama administration should rely more on wisdom and less on firepower to achieve its aims in Pakistan.
'Your presence in the region is not good for peace,' he said, referring to the US military, 'because it gives rise to frustration and irritation among the people of this region.'
At another point he told Clinton, 'Please forgive me, but I would like to say we've been fighting your war.'
A similar point was made by Sana Bucha of Geo TV during the live broadcast interview.
'It is not our war,' she told Clinton. 'It is your war.' She drew a burst of applause when she added, 'You had one 9/11. We are having daily 9/11s in Pakistan.'
The NYT has a comment:From: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/wo...html?ref=worldQuote:
It is extremely rare for an official of Mrs. Clinton’s rank to say publicly what American politicians and intelligence officials have said in more guarded ways for years. The remarks upset her hosts, who have seen hundreds of soldiers and civilians killed as Pakistan has taken on a widening campaign against militant groups that have threatened the country from its tribal areas. But her skeptical comments also gave voice to the longtime frustration of American officials with what they see as the Pakistani government’s lack of resolve in rooting out not only Al Qaeda, but also the Taliban leadership based in Quetta, and a host of militant groups that use the border region to stage attacks on American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
There's also the NYT editorial: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/op...jP2r9LoM3GUMBg
davidbfpo
NBR, 13 Nov 09 Pakistani Partnerships with the United States: An Assessment
Quote:
This essay assesses the relationships between the U.S. and different elements within Pakistan's political and military leadership in the context of ongoing regional counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts....
Jedburgh,
Good catch, with some good points: on making US civil aid more visible; aid to the police (qualified by their corruption); better info ops (pointing at the success of the BBC World Service) and the standard better COIN kit and training for the army.
Nothing exceptional, except the description of Pakistan's political parties and their stance on shared issues - that is excellent.
From a new analysis on Pakistan, from a Reuters summary:The actual report summary says:Quote:
Pakistani society is likely to become more Islamist and increasingly anti-American in the coming years, complicating U.S. efforts to win its support against militant groups, a report released on Tuesday said.
The report, which looks at Pakistan over a one-to-three year time horizon, rules out the possibility of a Taliban takeover or of it becoming the world's first nuclear-armed failed state.
"Rather than an Islamist takeover, you should look at a subtle power shift from a secular pro-Western society to an Islamist anti-American one," said Jonathan Paris, who produced the report for the Legatum Institute, a London-based think tank.
Paris forecasts that Pakistan is most likely to "muddle through," with its army continuing to play a powerful role behind the scenes in setting foreign and security policy.
Link to report (as yet un-read):http://www.legatum.com/newsdisplay.aspx?id=2926Quote:
Pakistan today faces five main challenges:
1. Threat of fragmentation and the loss of state control over various territories that undermine the integrity, sovereignty and solidarity of the country;
2. Security and terrorism throughout the country;
3. Economy;
4. Governance issues including corruption; and
5. Rebuilding the Pakistan Brand.
The Pakistani state has shown itself to be both the source and recipient of instability, but it has also been remarkably resilient. This Report analyses the prospects for Pakistan over a one to three year time horizon. It looks at economic, political, security, and bilateral issues. There are three possible scenarios for Pakistan over this relatively short time horizon; Pakistan probably will avoid becoming a “failed state” and is unlikely to find a “pathway to success” but, as Pakistan confronts a myriad of vexing challenges, the most likely scenario is that it will “muddle through”.
In a recent book launch for 'Pakistan; eye of the storm' (3rd edition) in London, Owen Bennett Jones, a former BBC World Service correspondent in Pakistan, commented that - in summary:As regards who is in control of ISI, he replied - in summary:Quote:
The US$20 billion in aid had very little appreciation or understanding amongst Pakistanis. Public opinion which supported the military action in the Swat Valley could just as rapidly rebound and the military simply thought for fifty years the FATA was uncontrollable. Public support for the military campaign would last three to four years. Finally he'd never met a Pakistani Army officer who was not convinced the Afghan Taliban would win.
Quote:
that it was under military control, citing the reversal inside a day of placing them under Interior Ministry control. Secondly the ISI-administered Kashmir policy of helping nationalist groups attack Indian forces was government policy and clearly had been "turned off & on" when required.
Moderators Note
Clearly this thread is closely related to threads on Afghanistan and the spillover effect. See recent post on one thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=7128&page=32
This is a hypothetical question. Purely hypothetical (because I am afraid of what disaster may lie in store for the poor people of the region if this line of thought advances and unexpected reactions and responses run amuck).
I have always wondered what would happen if the US were to turn around, and instead of trying to cajole Pakistan's unhappy army into doing them massive favors, tell them to take care of things as they see fit and wash their hands of the matter? Reserving, of course, the right to bomb or rocket any characters who may be shooting at US troops and taking refuge in Pakistan? how would that unhappy situation differ from the current one?
As an accompaniment to this koan, I will proffer Wittgenstein's quip: Walking through Oxford or something, W asked a colleague why human beings had spend so many thousand years believing the sun went around the earth? his companion said: "because it looks that way". To which W replied "how would it look if the earth went around the sun while spinning on its axis??".
Sometimes it may be useful to rethink our model. In the case of astronomers, what a difference it made in the next few hundred years....
The Indian role in the region and in Afghanistan has appeared before on SWC, with para-military troops being deployed to guard road construction (in 2007): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3166 and the feuding IIRC between Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies.
Clearly Pakistani national strategy is predicated on the No.1 threat being India and another thread looks at the changing US policy towards Pakistan
:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2313
These new items deserve their own thread which I found today, via a Kashmiri website:
a) Britain and US consider asking India to train Afghan National Police, in The Times:Link:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6992984.eceQuote:
Now, however, India appears to want to play a more active role in Afghanistan largely because it fears that Pakistan will engineer a Taleban takeover when foreign troops leave.
b)India’s Military Intelligence Chief conducts covert visit to Afghanistan
From a Pakistani newspaper :http://dailymailnews.com/0110/18/Fro...FrontPage1.htmQuote:
—General Loomba held furtive, yet detailed meetings with Afghan, US and NATO officials
—Delhi plans Afghan military takeover after US/ ISAF pullout
—Indian Military spy master’s stealth Afghan trip conducted ahead of top US defence officials’ India visit
—Holbrook kept Pakistanis busy in futile talks as per Pentagon, Langley plan
—Indian MI boss visited covert Indian troopers’ positions in Afghanistan, met Indian Army instructors of ANA
—Indian government, army resort to cohesive hostile approach towards Pakistan after Loomba’s Afghan trip
—Analysts smell some secret US development in Afghanistan through Indian army
Not sure what is going on here, 'The Great Game' is appropriate. Just before a London conference on Afghanistan too (as per SWJ press review).
Pressure on Pakistan to "stay aboard" the "train"? High risk in my view.