Why people think the taliban is stronger...
Bill, first of all, I personally dont think the Taliban are stronger. I think their strength has always depended on Pakistani support (providing the skills they lacked and an international long term view) and a particular set of favorable circumstances and without that support, and in today's changed circumstances, they cannot conquer or hold afghanistan EVEN IF foriegn forces withdraw.
About why "many people" think the taliban is going to win (stronger was perhaps the wrong word), I think its as you said: people expect they will out-endure the US forces. The US has less of a permanent interest in Afghanistan and will eventually say 'f..k it" and leave after one last burst of bombing. The Jihadis in Pakistan (and they are the ones with international ambitions, the taliban themselves would be just a rural pakhtun phenomenon without their input) take a very long view of things and in their own opinion, they will always have more people willing to die than the US or any other infidel power. Once the US leaves, US agents like Zardari and the ANP will leave on the next plane (if they are lucky) and things will be back to status quo ante. I personally think they are wrong because they overestimate their own strength and unity and underestimate how much resistance there will be. Mostly, I think they overestimate their own unity. The army will not have the region back in their grip like they imagine and the jihadis will not have the army back in their grip like they used to. Instead, the US would leave behind an endless and extremely messy civil war in which Jihadi victory is by no means assured. Their extreme ruthlessness and clarity of purpose is not matched by any deep organizational unity. THEY will kill each other more efficiently than any infidel could (and the infidels will help). And their ideology has absolutely no section about how to be a modern state.....that part was a gift of the British raj and this time around it will depart with the infidels. But that is another story.
Some of the fence sitters have an idea about the mess that would result if the US leaves, but again, they are not sure the US can stick around, so mess or not, they have to place their bets on what will follow. On the other hand, if the US looks like it has a winning plan, then everyone else will start calculating differently. btw, "winning plan" does not mean plan to make a deal with the taliban and scoot. In that case, everyone knows who will be cutting heads next year in Kabul stadium and plans accordingly.
I concur, and it is a damn shame!
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The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.
The British experience in Malayia did not happen in a few years.
We are up against essentially a non-existant society in Afghanistan, weaker even than the original US Articles of Confederation that governed while the US Revolutionary War dragged on due to lack of the strongest support needed but not then possible from the original Congress in Philadelphia.
I still think a return to the monarchy for Afghainsitan, with tribal jiirgas working under same is more likely to work...although a modified weak Parliamentary system able to veto or check and balance a King might work, too?
Yon and Grey - "light and smoke"
Michael Yon has been embedded with UK troops in Sangin, for fiev weeks and has written an excellent first-hand account: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm Yon is now en route to embed with USMC.
For murky reasons his embed has ended and neither side agrees why.
Stephen Grey, a UK journalist, has written a wide ranging article on the campaigning and whether the local strategy is correct: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp...and/index.html
davidbfpo
Send me an unclass email address
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintan the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.
Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.
Bill, when you get a chance send me an email. I'd like to get your thoughts on a concept. It's just powerpoint, so there is some "reading between the lines" required, but I know you'll be able to keep the trail.
Sarah Chayes commented on this in her book
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintain the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.
Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.
If you get a chance, read Sarah's "Punishment of Virtue," there are some great insights there from a non-military perspective of someone who spent a great deal of time within the populace and working the problem; in fact as I listened to the CD during my commute I was struck that this is a perspective that our SF guys should be bringing as well.
But, with growing frustration with the Karzai government's failure to deal with those aspects of governance that they found the most intolerable (i.e., poor governance) that they had no recourse to address through the men he allowed to stay in official positions, which the exploited for their own gain; many were beginning to yearn for the "good old days" of when the Taliban were in power. For all their faults, there was much that was good as well.
Few want the Taliban in power; but most want things to be better than they are now. It provides a crack in the social will for the Taliban to pry on. And remember, in a Taliban ran state there will be no more foreign military presence; and we cannot underestimate how powerful of a message that must be given the history of these people.
For the US we should remember that we did not go to AFG to wage war on the Taliban, if they would have agreed to deny AQ sanctuary we would probably be working with them right now, with very little presence in this country. Mission Creep is a dangerous thing. There is enduring value in Colin Powell's principles for these types of expeditions.
Our problem is that we assess Taliban governance from OUR perspective. The simple fact is that as the information age continues to bring light to the darkest corners of the globe, the harsh, dark age policies of the pre 9/11 Taliban are unsustainable. Either they would evolve or become quickly obsolete.
I look at American history and we idolize the image of the Pilgrims that settled New England. Harsh, men in black, who were uncompromising, intolerant religious extremists that held a fringe ideology of Christianity. They tortured their women and exiled any who dared to hold different religious beliefs to their own. (Thank God for the liberal Dutch colony in New York, which attracted people from all walks, nations, and ideologies; and which was the birthplace of many of the concepts that ultimately came to be thought of as "American.") But the Pilgrims evolved.
The Taliban, if successful, will evolve as well; and it will be on a far more compressed timeline than what the Pilgrims ran on. We just need to go back to our going in position. Deny sanctuary to AQ and groups like them, allow civilian aid organizations access and security, and don't violate international law.
I may not like the way my neighbor talks to his wife, or treats his kids. But if he isn't violating the law I have no legal right to confront him. Certainly there are moral imperatives, but "imperative" is the operative word, and "not like" does not raise to that level.
BL, we in the US do not need to fear the Taliban, lets focus on the real issue. We get off track and make the problem worse when we keep expending the "threat" list and attacking more and more of these organizations. We conflate them in our minds; and then unite them against us by our actions.
If Brittain thought they had their national interests at stake here...
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Originally Posted by
bigdukesix101
The UK can barely maintain 8,900. Don't look for any more they are not resourced to do it.
They would take 8,900 KIA and spit in the enemy's eyes; and have a million men on the ground.
Again, while the metrics guys are looking for indicators, we should apply a couple of metrics to the approach of our NATO allies to this sticky mess.
They come primarly to service the national interest of maintaining good relations with the US; not for any national interests they feel are at stake in Afghanistan. I suspect, that many, like the Pakistanis, realize that supporting the American approach to this problem to date too fully is far more likely to create instability at home, rather than the opposite.
Sometimes your friends are the last ones to tell you when you're being a jackass.
We have met the enemy and he is us!!
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
:)
Those who are the busiest telling others what to do and how to do it are rarely the best listeners as well. Particularly when they are so damn certain in their "rightness."
We should all heed those wise words especially here on the SW Council!!!
I think it would be a great graduate student project for someone to analyze the national security debate since about 2006 to the present and try to assess the major protagonists (and antagonists)and their actual contributions to the debate and discern whether their outspoken positions on everything from the success or lack of success of the "Surge" to the American Way of COIN to the so-called "lily pad" "strategy" has really contributed to our ability to protect US national security. Or are they just peddling their own pet ideas and projects?
Debate is healthy and important but so is the ability to listen, learn, and discern, so that we can prevent the three major failures of all military operations - failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate (Cohen and Gooch in Military Misfortune)
Can't have silent Lawyers, it just isn't done...
Not being a Lawyer but able to use two fingers on the keyboard and being always willing to share my opinions, I'll take a shot at it.
General Krulak is as usual, pretty well on the money -- though I think he missed one critical issue. By the numbers:
1. He's right, of course -- that does not change the fact that we should be able to get DoD and DoS on the same page and it would behoove us to do so to preclude or at least diminish future stupidity on this scale. Depart too soon and the impetus to fix that disconnect will be diligently allowed to dissipate with the connivance of both Departments.
2. True, no question -- we do not have the troops to do the COIN trick. So any idea of 'fixing' Afghanistan before we depart should be DOA. We can leave it better than we found it and we can do as best we can what we said we would do and not just abandon them as we had before. Pakistan would appreciate that. So would Russia. So will the Afghans. So will we in the long term -- one of those pay now or pay more later things...
3. He's right again. We cannot defeat their ideas in spite of eight years trying. Will we -- can we -- come up with better ideas in the near term? Perhaps, perhaps not. Long as we're there, no harm in trying.
4. Still right -- But:
Afghanistan's structure is not a vital US national interest, nor, in a sense is that of Pakistan -- however, reasonable performance by both is in the interest of the world -- and thus, ultimately, in our interest to at least some degree.
What is in our national interest is finishing the commitment we launched eight years ago. It is not a 'vital' interest in the existential category however it is a critical issue that can have long term deleterious effects on the existential bit if not properly handled -- as we have seen over the past 30 years.
Whether we should have launched and made such a commitment is irrelevant. We did and we're there. In the view of most in the West, obviously including General Krulak and George Will, that is not a pressing or non-negotiable commitment; we should be able to say "we're tired now and the Troops are being run ragged by this and we need the money spent here at home so we plan to pack up and go home." We can say that.
However, the rest of the world will know we reneged on a commitment that we freely made. Even if we elect to go into denial over the issue, others will not. They will add one more item to the "America can be worn down" list which already has too many entries.
His suggestion about Hunter Killer Teams is reasonable and can be done. Unfortunately, it will not stop the slide of Afghanistan into chaos and will get a lot of good guys killed for very little benefit. I've done what he suggests as did many in the 1st MarDiv and the Army's 5th RCT in Korea in early 1951. It is effective, it cleared out the Guerrilla remnants of the North Korean Army (who were not well trained but were very dedicated -- as are others) around Masan and Pusan in a matter of weeks. It also killed a helluva lot of civilians and created one of today's hotbeds of anti-US sentiment in South Korea, That's 58 years ago -- and they still remember. Most of the world has a far longer memory (and attention span) than Americans seem to possess. I think he and Will both forgot that as well... :D
I also strongly doubt that we have adequate forces trained in numbers to support the idea; I doubt that Congress would go along with it -- certainly not after the first couple of H-K Teams got totally wiped out by the opposition -- or a Wedding Party proven innocent is killed to the last baby.
His suggestion entails a bunch of support and airplane people in Afghanistan. Due to distances involved, at least some would have to be there; the other 'Stans can and might take a few but no one will take many Americans because the Russians don't want that -- either way, those become targets as do their resupply convoys. Of course, we could use Contractors or get the Afghan Police to provide security. In short that's one of those idea that looks great on paper but a closer look reveals problems of capability -- and will. And little real change...
In summary, lot to agree with. However, he totally ignores the non-western idea of humbling the Great Satan as an activity for fun and profit. Surprising given Beirut and a Marine plus the hard fact that the humbling bit is exactly why we are in Afghanistan and Iraq. That's the goal they have, humbling -- death by a thousand grains of sand -- and our early departure from Afghanistan would aid them in achieving it.
We may not have a clearly defined goal in the eyes of many but I submit that goal should simply be to finish what we started, get a minimalist government in place that most Afghans can and will support -- then make sure we don't get stuck on stupid and try to do stuff like this in the future -- because regardless of what many like to think, we don't have that many friends out there and there are a great many who do not wish us well. Faltering performance is seen by many as an invitation to kill the weak who cannot keep up. Or to help others do that...
No doubt. Afghansitan is Afghansitan.
My definition of 'minimalist' government is probably far more minimal than most...:wry:
I also believe that virtually anyone who ascends to the Presidency of Afghanistan is going to be tainted much like Karzai. I pointed out to a friend the other day that our politicians are not a great deal better, they just have a few more social constraints. :rolleyes:
We are not going to 'fix' Afghanistan; not least because the social constraint process there is quite different and those pertaining to good government we have developed over centuries (heh!) imply time they do not have. However, we did say we would 'fix' it. That was regrettable political hype or abysmal stupidity -- probably a bit of both. We cannot foster the establishment of a decent government there for three reasons; the Afghans don't want one; we don't have the time or money to do that; and the Afghans don't want one...
So we need to acknowledge that reality. Will and Krulak are both correct on the practicalities and all the reasons to say 'we tried' and just depart except for two that neither addressed: We have not really tried thus far. We said to the world that we would not again abandon Afghanistan.
For those reasons, I'm pretty firmly convinced that we should give it a bit longer and really try to do the 'fix' thing -- my perception is that is in process with State taking ownership of many things they should've had six years ago -- and we need to depart fairly soon, couple of years or so, with the fond blessings of a nominal Afghan government much as we are departing Iraq. That means a continuing but far lower key engagement. My perception is that also is in process (couple more Fuel Tank Trailers may speed that up a bit... :( ). It'll take a bit.
The COIN view of ten years or more engagement is unlikely (and highly undesirable IMO) and departing abruptly presents many difficulties. A moderate approach between those poles with acknowledgment that Afghan government will be an Afghan construct and thus unpalatable to many in the west. :cool:
The alternative, Krulak's Hunter Killer Teams would require probably about 2-300 well trained platoon sized elements, around 10K troops plus about half that for support (X3 to allow for rotation) to decently cover the 936km Iranian border and the 2,430km Paksitani border -- both in some really bad terrain. You could provide fewer but that is really not an economy of force mission if you expect any success at all.
To leave and "go back punitively" is a pipe dream. May work in bong reality but on the ground, there is no infrastructure there to damage and no cohesive force to be punished. IOW, it would be late 2001 all over again. We could easily do it. Then what?
Hopefully we'll have learned from this to avoid such arrant stupidity in the future. We can and should assist the UN and others in nation building; we should assist internal development diplomatically and with USAid -- and even commit police trainers and SF where appropriate -- but we need to realize that commitment of a mass of US Forces will change the dynamics in generally unpredictable but most always adverse ways.
Compromise is a western concept.
In the east it's called surrendering. Really. They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy.
That's the issue -- all this is based on western perceptions and would be possibly good ideas were we but fighting other westerners. We are not.
JMM
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GEN Krulak's point 4 - decide who is US enemy for direct action. AQ - yes (take them out); Taliban - no, unless they get in the way. Krulak's HK teams (and your estimate of force requirements) would be aimed at AQ groups.
Aside from the difficulty of determining the difference between the uninvolved, the AQ type and the Talibs -- that's two out of three to be not fired up; preponderence of evidence goes to 'don't shoot' -- and, Krulak not withstanding, that will affect the ROE and, more importantly, it will affect the outlook of the teams on the ground.
I was looking at interdiction to keep the majority of the Talibs in Pakistan from whence they come to allow that government to take care of them and the Afghan government to try to insinuate itself. Others appear to see it as a HVT takeout option, an option that IMO is not nearly as successful as many seem to believe. Leaders can be and are replaced, often one takes out an ineffectual opponent only to have him replaced with a guy who knows what he's doing and is terribly effective...
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We cannot continue fighting the Pashtun nationalists unless we are willing and able to commit the 100s of 1000s of troops that GEN Krulak cited. There are more Pashtuns in Astan and Pstan (42 million) than there were Vietnamese in 1965, N & S (38 million).
We are not fighting Pashtun Nationalists. We are in conflict with less than 2% (plus the people they hire to fight for them who are not nearly so committed) of the total Pashtun demographic who want to impose a rigid Islamic code that is actually alien to the Pashtun tradition and is not really wanted by most. You forgot to mention that Afghanistan is also four times larger in area than Viet Nam and has much more difficult terrain, militarily a far greater problem than the population herring.
Bob'sWorld
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Krulak basically said what I have been saying, but I would not commit anywhere near the 2-300 platoons Ken suggests. Like the General asks "who is the enemy"? We don't want to build and sustain a string of fortified patrol bases to enforce a border that means nothing to the people of the region to kill those same people. I think more a size element with CIA and full support of both Af and Pak intel; to work from the shadows, not bases...
The term Hunter Killer teams implies mobile teams with no bases, thus the shadows are a given. However, those teams do need support so there will be bases somewhere in the vicinity. Those and the Air support that GEN Krulak suggests will be targets of intent for the bad guys, they will require security. My point was and is that there will be only a small footprint reduction with Krulak's admittedly different plan..
I'm looking forward to learning how you will obtain the unbiased and unstinting support of Afghanistan and Pakistan Intel elements...
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...to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well.
Why, Bob, you old kidder -- and I thought you wanted a change to the way we the USA do business -- you just want to continue using the Tampa approach and go for the HVTs...
How's that going for us? Not in numbers -- in actual effect?
How does that proposal by you square with this:
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...We must evolve with the times. The top dog loves the status quo, and the trail dogs embrace change. We need to embrace change as well.
:confused: :D
Seems to me you're supporting the intent and hoped for effect of a program with which I once worked long ago in an galaxy far away. That one, BTW, did not get too far in achieving the desired effect -- it also imposed a cost on us.
As an aside on the HK Teams and options to field such an effort -- I'd agree that if we did that, the Agency should have the job with local hires. That would entail Congressional approval and funding. It would entail SOCOM backing out of the picture in large measure. Good luck with that effort on either count.
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I like my concept of a lesser included form of sovereignty for the Pashtun people that grants them special rights and self-governance within an area marked by their traditional tribal homelands, but not removed from the states it exists within.
Have you spoken to the Pakistanis, the rest of Afghanistan, the Russians, the Tajiks or the Indians to get their sensing on this? Or the Chinese with their little training mission in Qal'eh e Panjeh? Or even the bulk of the Pushtuns?
I thought you were opposed to pushing our solutions off on others... ;)
Really good discussion and kinda
tough to keep up with but trying none the less
On a side note Everyone like to talk about Westphalian or western constructs as disconnect points
Am I following that reasoning if I ask myself the question how would China do what I 'm trying to do
(Especially when the answer there seems much more straightforward-
{Outbid the bad guys and not care who gets hurt doin it}):confused:
Well, I don't think I'm guilty of saying either
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."
of those things -- but I do think with respect to the application of HK teams and your "to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well." is doing the same old thing...
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...The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.
While that may be true, if you want to change it you have to have concrete and achievable methods to achieve the desired change. I do not disagree with your goal but you have yet to produce a method. To identify a problem is easy, to propose achievable solution is the trick. It is not easy...
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Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.
Myths are always preferable to reality. :wry:
Reality is harsh, however, I'm not all sure you're correct is saying that we are trying to serve as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo. I really do not see that. I think we're trying to sort out the oncoming status and it's too murky to discern so we're casting about, looking at alternatives and I believe it'll take another ten to twenty years to do that. Major change is always incremental and difficult to predict accurately. We'll work it out. Probably won't be your way or the ways I'd propose but our track record is more good than bad...
Well of course you do, I wouldn't have expected anything else.
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
I slinged "B.S." at your writing, not at your mind - and I stick with it.
That would be 'slung,' the past tense of sling in that sense. As long as I'm giving free English pointers -- not lessons, you're English is really good -- another relates to use of the term B.S. The usual meaning in English (as I recall the German equivalent is less pejorative but still not for polite company) is that the originator of the statement is deliberately lying or that the issue itself is totally illegitimate. It is generally considered to be insulting -- and low grade insulting at that. Since you say you're attacking what I wrote and not my mind, then you are saying that, in your opinion, that statement I made was wrong but instead of simply saying that or inquiring about it, you decided to render a low grade or cheap insult. :eek:
As I agreed that it was wrong, incorrect or whatever but that is was so worded as a deliberate overstatement to make a nonetheless very valid point -- which I note you do not deign to address or attempt to refute -- then for you to reiterate using the phrase with no discussion can only be construed as a deliberate insult -- which as previously stated "I wouldn't have expected anything else." That out of the way, are you just going to growl for your daily confrontation with the scheiße Amis or do you have anything to contribute to the thread? :D
No worries, didn't take it personal
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
of those things -- but I do think with respect to the application of HK teams and your "to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well." is doing the same old thing...While that may be true, if you want to change it you have to have concrete and achievable methods to achieve the desired change. I do not disagree with your goal but you have yet to produce a method. To identify a problem is easy, to propose achievable solution is the trick. It is not easy...Myths are always preferable to reality. :wry:
Reality is harsh, however, I'm not all sure you're correct is saying that we are trying to serve as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo. I really do not see that. I think we're trying to sort out the oncoming status and it's too murky to discern so we're casting about, looking at alternatives and I believe it'll take another ten to twenty years to do that. Major change is always incremental and difficult to predict accurately. We'll work it out. Probably won't be your way or the ways I'd propose but our track record is more good than bad...
Always best to have your thick skin on if you are going to be throwing out any new ideas...and as such I have developed a bit of a Rhino hide over the years. :)
But as to hunting and same ol', same ol', you know it is all in HOW one does things, not so much what they do. As a kid growing up I would see the occasional story in the news where some long forgotten Nazi got himself rolled up by a relentless, low drama, low visibility effort attributed to Israel. I think that makes a good model for rightsizing our man-hunting efforts. I would like to explore that idea; but we'll never get there if we keep expanding the target list and declaring war on every disgruntled dissident/insurgent organization in the world. Put away the circus tent stake driving mallet and get out the scalpel.
Good that you didn't cause it wasn't...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Put away the circus tent stake driving mallet and get out the scalpel.
I totally agree and have been saying that for years but I've never been able figure out how to convince the US Congress to do that; they -- not the elected and appointed Executive branch types, not the Army, not SOCOM, not budget and space battles all of which have minor impacts -- are the big pole in that tent...
Yea and two Nays. The Nays have it...
Re: the 'your.' Good one. Got me cold. So that's a Yea. :cool: However...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
See, to me this point is utter nonsense, wrong, misleading and almost indicative of prejudices, hypocritical tunnel vision and over-generalization.
To you, perhaps. You seem to have a distressing tendency to see such errors in a good many things and then attempt to refute them with statements like this:
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The West is the cultural sphere that unduly emphasizes extreme war goals (since Napoleon) as opposed to limited war goals. (Exceptions as Imperial Japan existed, of course.)Accordingly, the notion that accepting an outcome short of the annihilation of unconditional surrender of the enemy would be a surrender itself is quite specific Western right-wing B.S.
Which while true have little to do with the point at hand. That point is that those from the Middle East and South Asia do not look at compromise in the same way we in the west consider it; they of course accept compromise but the view of what has occurred can and usually will differ. It has nothing to do with limited objectives. So that's a big Nay.
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Some people may emphasize the fact that accepting limited objectives is a sign that one lacks omnipotence, but that's not the same as the assertion that such a behaviour is "surrender" in "the East".
Not to one who is overly literal, that's for sure...:wry:
OTOH, if one accepts that the follow on to that word was "They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy." the intent of the statement is thus modified and nuanced and not as clearcut as was your interpretation but you seem to have missed that .
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Your "exaggeration" remark is just an excuse to me, for I consider your statement as factually very wrong. It was also very, very misleading - those who believe your statement would be on a completely wrong track in my opinion, and that justifies the term "B.S.".
We disagree. You can home in on the on statement that you fired at and then aimed toward but missed however, it's sheer opinion; Neither of us has one that's any better than the other. Anyone who believed my statement would be better served than would those who got all wrapped up in your "limited objective" and "right wing" foolishness which has nothing to do with what I said. So that's another Nay.As for what a difference of opinion justifies, we can differ on that as well.
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I feel compelled to intervene before it gets too ugly.
I've noticed. Ugly is also an opinion thing, isn't it? Compulsions are terrible things... ;)