Congratulations on the 100th Post, Rifleman!
If this thread was a TV series, there'd be a big do and probably syndication. And as the creator of this long-running piece, you'd probably be up for some sort of award.:D
But this is Small Wars Council, where we have to think small (and dream big).
Before I say what should be done with the existing 9-man Rifle Squad in the US Army, I'll just say that there's only so much you can do with what you actually have. If you're not given more to work with, then past a certain point, there's nothing more that you can do to improve what you can do. Quality can only take you so far; sufficient quantity is necessary too.
As far as the existing 9-man Squad goes, I say get rid of the Fire Teams and maybe even drop Battle Drill altogether.
First, the Fire Teams. Since the 9-man Squad isn't going to get any bigger, go the German way and put both LMGs under the Squad Leader's control,
and give both him and the Assistant Squad Leader the Underslung Grenade Launchers. In the attack, the Squad Leader will decide on the spot whether it's better to mass both LMGs under his control and let the ASL lead most of the riflemen, or give one LMG to the ASL and split the squad into two balanced teams, or however the SL sees fit.
With only 9 men, don't tie his hands behind his back with doctrine that may not fit the tactical situtation he's facing. Even when he sees fit to use two balanced teams in the attack, it may only be to get the Squad close enough to get proper suppressive fires down on the enemy, and then he releases the ASL and the riflemen to get to the assault position while he and the machine gunners keep the enenmy's heads down.
Second, the two-Fire Team organization coupled with Battle Drill can lead to problems. On the one hand, taken together, they can provide basic TTP's for the conduct of infantry minor unit actions, making it easier for Squad Leader and Squaddie alike to figure out what should be done and what their personal role in that is. On the other hand, rote memorization and indoctrination in Battle Drill coupled to a rigid two-Fire Team organization institutionalizes mediocrity in general and predictable, unimaginative, and not necessarily fully responsive actions or reactions in tactical situations.
In other words, the plodders who otherwise wouldn't be able to figure out what to do can just follow a checklist so to speak, a generic prescription for a generic siutation, and thus can appear to be tactically effective (until the shooting really starts). Conversely, truly effective, thinking, and capable persons find themselves not helped but hindered by doctrine that in practice unnecessarily constrains their options and compells them to take actions that may not be genuinely appropriate to the situation.
When the British Army introduced Battle Drill early in WWII, the same Field Service Regulations that described them also carried the warning that they were not intended to be a substitute for the tactical judgement of battlefield leaders and soldiers; they were simply intended to be training aids from which soldiers and leaders would have weaned themselves off of towards the end of their basic trade training. Of course, what has in fact occurred in practice is the replacement of tactical judgement by rote drill. The US Army formally adopted Battle Drill in the mid-1950's, and at the same time it formally adopted the Fire Team, with two per Rifle Squad.
Thus all the funny business ever since. The Commonwealth Armies only began to adopt the two-Fire Team Rifle Section starting in the late 1970's, and by the 1980's it was the standard. The German Army has recently adopted the two Fire-Team Rifle Squad as well, with 10 men per squad and 1 MG-4 5.56mm LMG per Fire Team. I haven't heard so far, but I suspect that may adopt Battle Drill now too.
The aforementioned is one of the reasons the offensive tactics of the present-day Rifle Squad are so fixated on the Frontal Attack; it requires a minimum of brainpower and a maximum of firepower to undertake. That said, there are a lot of reasons that the Frontal Attack is more often than not necessary: the ground doesn't provide enough cover and concealment; you're conducting mechanized ops and it's pretty obvious to both you and the enemy that you're coming and they're just waiting for you to pile out of your tracks; there's just not the time to perform a slower but less costly other-than-Frontal attack and you have to attack now, otherwise the enemy will have reinforced his position making it harder to attack a little later; etc.
But in those cases when the Frontal Attack can be foregone, the two-Fire Team Squad and Battle Drill shouldn't be allowed to conspire against alternatives to the Frontal Attack. The German Army in WWII, as I have already mentioned before in this thread, never adopted Battle Drill and never formally adopted Fire Teams; if a Squad at any time split into two balanced teams, it was only because the tactical situation at that place and time made it appropriate to do so. The Squad Leader was free to develop and use his best tactical judgment to fight the Squad as best as he saw fit.
The Fire Team concept and Battle Drill have become crutches with which to prop up weak leaders and weak soldiers who otherwise would be clearly seen to be unable to adapt to the tactical situation at hand; at the same time, by tying capable leader's and soldier's hands with doctrine that has morphed into rigid practice, it serves to obscure those whose tactical judgement is otherwise sound.
And so, I say that, given all this and the small size of the 9-man Rifle Squad, get rid of fixed Fire Teams, retain the general rule of thumb that the Squad Leader controls the machine gun fires and the Assistant Squad Leader controls the riflemen, kit out both the SL and ASL with the Grenade Launchers so that they can mark targets and use them against point and area targets as they see fit, and make sure that everyone is trained to think and act two levels above their own and have plenty of field training and practice in realistic conditions so that they all can properly develop and apply their best tactical judgement.
As far as the Rifle Platoon goes, I think the Army should adopt the Marine way of handling heavy weapons, and bring back the Rifle Company Weapons Platoons. The only time Platoons should have MMGs, light mortars, and light ATGMs is when the tactical situation (usually close terrain or very limited visibility in such cases) render Company control of heavy weapons more or less useless; then such weapons may be attached out directly to Platoons, and very rarely to Squads, IMO. Otherwise a good deal of the combined suppressive effects of the heavy weapons are lost or reduced. I'm not in favour of permanent organic heavy weapons at Platoon, let alone attached out to Squads.
I still don't see any substitute for 13-14 man Squads though, with 3 per Platoon.
Heh. Occasionally, a Company may be able
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jcustis
An officer whom I consider relatively wise once told me that "at the company level and below, everything is really just a damn frontal attack!" He was making the remark during the garrison years pre-9/11, but his comment still sticks with me to this day.
to maneuver, rarely will a Platoon be able to do so and a Squad will almost never be able to do so; so he was a wise man.
That could be changed with better training -- and it is changing to a degree. Without even better training and more trusting of subordinates it'll be a while before we really get there. Possible, though... :cool: