Taking responsibility is the first step toward getting healthy...:)Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
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Taking responsibility is the first step toward getting healthy...:)Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
Well, the How to Win thread was a bit of nostalgia - deja vu all over again. ;)
I chimed in with post #34 A Failure to Communicate Here ?, shortly before Bob came on board, which started:
And soon, I responded directly in posts ## 48 & 49, Hi, Bob's World - Governance & Ideology & Formal & Informal Governance:Quote:
I've had difficulties with COL Jones' articles, which mix legal and military language and concepts in something of a pot-purri. That accords with his background.
Without doubt, his is a brave attempt to create a needed interface between communities that use different terms (for the same or similar things), all derived from different cultures.Quote:
E.g., Juris Doctorate from Willamette University (1995); Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College (2006); also a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon (2001).
At least both of us have had some consistency in our respective positions.Quote:
Ending up with Ideology, you and I would have some differences as to what is the "American Ideology" - even in (or perhaps because of) the stripped-down version you present. However, there is little point to two lawyers yammering on about Con Law and the Foundations of our Republic.
To me, there is a more basic issue which goes to the heart of the question - should we be marketing "American Ideology" at all (assuming arguendo that we could agree on what that is); and, if so, to what extent and to what purpose ?
If our focus is on the population of a foreign land, it seems more logical to me to learn the ideologies which are native to that land - and market the indigenous ideology that is most likely to aid us in reaching our endgoal (assuming that we know what that is). E.g., in a given country, communism might be the best answer, simply because the other ideologies are not going to be helpful (even if some of them are closer to "American Ideology").
Note that I have no objection to presenting the "American Ideology" (assuming arguendo as above) to explain where we are coming from - to inform others. Perhaps that is what you are saying; but you seemed to be propounding a broader agitprop agenda than that.
I'd say both Slap & you should be "blamed" for making the last several years more interesting. :)
Regards
Mike
There are a few aspects of ideology that trigger a "cringe" factor in me:
1. When the US does not act consistently with the principles we hold out to the world in our three principle founding documents (Dec of Ind, Const, & Bill of Rights).
2. When the US publicly calls out foreign leaders for not standing for the same current values that the US gives those principles (A value being a principle with a judgment applied to it) in cultures that are in a very different place in their background and development than we are; and where leaders to not respond well to public condemnations of their character and abilities.
3. When "experts" blame insurgency and acts of terrorism as being "caused" by ideology or leaders who employ ideological operations.
All three of those factors weave directly into the events going on across the Middle East currently. The US has formed relationships that have gotten us at cross purposes with our own ideological principles; Our leaders go to these countries (or deliver from the comfort of the oval office) stump speeches that serve to embarrass these leaders and cause them to entrench even more, while at the same time making the US look ineffective at causing true change; and lastly exposed now is the firm bedrock of discontent across these nations that AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood and others have been building their influence upon. Take away that bedrock, and their ideological houses of cards will tumble.
Bob
Nice graph from Bloomberg News, via the IMF. Though it certainly doesn't explain Tunisia:
From Bob's World.
With my standard quibble on the ideological aspect -- you discount that too readily. It is not pervasive, does not drive drive the bus. However it is an enabler; a fuel source. I note you're getting more cagey on that aspect, simply stating it is not generally causative. Generally, I agree... :wry:
I do particularly agree with your second item. I cringe whenever the press secretary of the day appears, whoever he or she is appears during these sorts of flaps. I firmly believe Senators should keep their noses out of foreign policy and most Representatives should be seen and seldom heard. :rolleyes:
Some compare current events to 1979. Not a good match. 1986 is a better correlation. ;)
1. High level - ideology & policy
2. Middle level - opportunism (advancement of self and included others)
3. Low level - basic interests (primarily different forms of personal and group security, and insecurity).
Unique to specific population group - general principles often lead down blind alleys.
Less and less people are involved as you climb the ladder. He who aspires to the highest level must kinow the lower levels well.
Nothing new - with respect to the political struggle and less conventional aspects of the military struggle, Mao, Giap and the other PAVN folks all point in this direction. So also, Jack McCuen (from 1966) and Tim Lomperis (from 1996) - the next key reference (a joint effort by Ken and JMM) will appear in 2026 (;)).
Regards
Mike
February 1986 when 2LT Jones reported for duty with the 8th Infantry Division in West Germany? :confused:
I agree with those who say that cultures are different, but I am very enthusiastic about the current revolution nonetheless. I think that there are indeed chasms between the values of this or that set of people, but they are still people and tend to converge (sometimes in surprising ways) when similar inputs and constraints come into play. Egypt, for all the Islamic pretensions of 80% of its population, is actually not living life using some peculiarly Islamic economics, or Islamic politics or Islamic sociology (not to speak of nonsense like “Islamic science” and “Islamic technology”).
Their Islamic history and its good and bad elements have a role in all these things, but still, a man’s got to eat. With many detours and disasters along the way, they will still converge towards some similar notions of individual autonomy, personal property, democratic governance, rule of law…the whole shebang. They will enjoy even more of the same philosophers, the same novelists, the same poets, the same musicians, the same artists…I know some deep seated Marxism is leaking through my brain right now, but I think we are heading for one world, just more slowly and tortuously than most one-worlders realize (one world does not mean totally homogenous on all scales, just one interconnected whole with many similar features endlessly repeated…fractally weird, so to speak)..
I dont deny that vast gulfs still exist. Just that there IS convergence and an increasing interdependence and intermixing..one step at a time.
The future is already here, its just not evenly distributed (William Gibson)
To the extent that the US has any influence, it has done what it has done in Egypt because of Israel, period. Everything else pales into insignificance. If there were no Israeli occupation and no Israeli lobby pushing the US to support/bribe people on its behalf, I cannot see how or why the US would spend 3 billion a year on bribes to Mubarak.
And I think what the US does or does not do is not necessarily decisive. So the US should take a chill pill in most cases. Stop worrying. The world will go on more or less the same. Even Israel will probably survive without the herculean exertions the US does on its behalf. It will just have to adjust its aims a little and treat some people with a little more respect.
Oil? What will they do with all that oil? drink it? I have never figured out why the US has to spend billions to ensure access to oil that everyone else can apparently just buy in the market. Again, if its doing so as part of some planetary level law-enforcement function (worldcop), then the planet should be taxed for it and the planet should get to have a say in how the cop does his job. No taxation without representation. Otherwise, it seems to me that the cost of maintaining order exceeds the benefits the american taxpayer derives from any such exercise.
What similar things happened during 1986? Does it have anything to do with Kurt Waldheim's military service?Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Since it is all my fault:D here is what I think is happening. In fact President Obama spoke briefly on this in his State of the Union Address when he said "Somebody changed the rules on you in the middle of the game":eek: That was a rather Cryptic but very accurate and telling statement.
Link to the 5 part series narrated by Orson Welles based on the book by Alvin Toffler.......Future Shock!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Ghzomm15yE
However, that was not quite what I had in mind. That would be this: LINK.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
There will be those who say no comparison. True to an extent, each nation and each situation will differ. However there's more commonality with that event and today than with the Iranian fiasco. The most noticeable difference is then there was early warning that was heeded (I know you don't like the Intel folks but they get a lot right... :wry:) and that was followed by 'distancing,' in turn followed by prompt decisive action at the peak of protests instead of dithering.
We dither a lot nowadays... :o.
I can't argue with this:
since I would be arguing against myself.Quote:
from O
Oil? What will they do with all that oil? drink it? I have never figured out why the US has to spend billions to ensure access to oil that everyone else can apparently just buy in the market. Again, if its doing so as part of some planetary level law-enforcement function (worldcop), then the planet should be taxed for it and the planet should get to have a say in how the cop does his job. No taxation without representation. Otherwise, it seems to me that the cost of maintaining order exceeds the benefits the american taxpayer derives from any such exercise.
Cheers
Mike
Tequila-Quote:
Originally Posted by tequila
Great find! I think that Egypt (much more than Tunisia) is driven by economics almost as much as politics.
V/R,
Cliff
I was puzzled by those graphs because they contrasted with other things I thought I heard. Was curious so while not an economist, went searching for understandable explanations and contrasting viewpoints. Got this Gallup poll.Quote:
Originally Posted by Cliff
http://www.gallup.com/poll/145883/Eg...GDP-Gains.aspx
The graphs show GDP climbing rather dramatically in the last few years, yet the "thriving" rating declined. The turning point appears to be around 2008...when the worldwide recession was at its worst. Do folks vacation in Egypt during a recession? Compare the thriving ratings a few years earlier at 29 which was more comparable to other Arab countries...those with oil. People still must buy oil in a recession.
So my theory is that rising oil prices helped other Arab economies while declining travel hurt Egypt more than the others due to its lack of oil and extensive reliance on tourism. In addition, Egypt grew from around 52 million folks in 1990 to 85 million today...that would tend to put a damper on your economy and ability to feed folks and get them jobs.
Admit that it was surprising to learn from one network that the Mubarak family may be worth $40 billion plus due to fingers in many government contracts. That's kind of alarming in a nation with a $500 billion GDP.
As you probably know, tourists ride horses/camels at nearby Giza where the Pyramids are. I did. My wife has a horse. I don't ride it because anytime I tried, I went plop...plus it hurts other areas. An untrained thug would not ride like that.Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
Yeah, saw some pretty big boys being treated for injuries. When folks are concerned about losing their jobs as interior ministry and other police, that does not automatically mean that Mubarak's orders are behind it.Quote:
ordinary people staging "spontaneous" demonstrations do not challenge their opponents for a violent confrontation, grab one or two and then beat them, shot them and then drop their bodies in some alley...they do not loot and then burn down one of largest shopping mals (happened 3 days back in Alexandria), and I also do not know of ordinary people who shot at the others with a sniper rifle from the roof of the nearby building.
Allegations. Can you prove there were not Hezbollah agents or Muslim brotherhood instigators? I read that many folks with closely cropped beards (supposedly characteristic of that group) were up front throwing rocks.Quote:
If this is not enough, ordinary people involved in protest of whatever kind also do not launch decisive attacks on offices of two major human-rights associations, beat and then take away around a dozen of people in "some civilian bus", escorted by the Central Security Forces car...- and this while explaining to the crowd around them that these are Iranian-paid, Hezbollah agents.
Not sure $20 bucks is much motivation to get beat up...unless your job is at risk and you are broke because the banks are closed, and you feel like kicking troublemaker booty anyway. Just can't picture guys paying tens of thousands of thugs and nobody saw it.Quote:
Nobody does that unless he's paid and ordered to do it and promised to be backed up and protected later.
Or a series of overzealous officials screwed up trying to please the boss (or hang onto their job) and now find themselves under house arrest.Quote:
And at that point this all turns into a SOP for a dictator clinging to power - against all odds, and regardless the cost.
There are a fair number of common factors. One that gets insufficient attention is that both leaders were aging and rapidly losing their grip, and that in both cases the plans for succession were shaky and involved family members widely seen as inadequate. We tend to focus on the reasons for growing discontent within a populace, without realizing that these events are often driven less by discontent rising to a tipping point than by the leader's control declining to a tipping point. Peaceful rebellions succeed so often because they don't usually happen until it's clear that the leader no longer has control. Of course in the Philippines the leader's incapacity was evident far before the tipping point was reached, allowing more preparation.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
At the risk of diverting the thread, though... the US role in resolving the events in Manila in '86 is substantially overstated. There was a great deal of dithering, and the US action was not decisive, nor was it at the peak of protest: by the time the US acted the matter had already been resolved on the streets. This is not entirely a criticism of the US - it's not always a bad idea to see who's going to win before committing to a side - but it would be inaccurate to refer to the US action as "decisive". It did avoid a very unpleasant end for both the rebellion and the Marcos family, but it did not affect the outcome one way or the other.
Having been right in the middle of that particular affair from beginning to end, I'm often struck by the extent to which the official records (there are a number of varying ones about, mainly arranged to serve the interests of their sponsors) get it wrong, despite the heavy media coverage. Not that I ever fully trusted the official record of anything, but it did place the deficiencies in stark relief.
True -- and Bob's World will agree wholeheartedly... ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
Also true and a contributor to the rather rapid DC decision to provide air transport at no cost. Therein lay the decisiveness of which I spake; albeit not clearly...:oQuote:
Of course in the Philippines the leader's incapacity was evident far before the tipping point was reached, allowing more preparation.
Not to my knowledge, really and I did not mean to imply that it was significant or game changing though I did through careless wording. Can't even claim laziness there, just sloppily careless.Quote:
the US role in resolving the events in Manila in '86 is substantially overstated.
All true however, the amount of dithering for about two years culminated in a rapid two days of meetings in the basement of the WH. That's what I meant by 'decisive' -- unusually rapid decision by the US to aid and abet what had indeed already been decided when the HKPP refused to fire on the protesters IIRC.Quote:
There was a great deal of dithering, and the US action was not decisive, nor was it at the peak of protest: by the time the US acted the matter had already been resolved on the streets.
Again true -- but still a 'decisive' action by the then Administration who were noted ditherers. Witness Lebanon.Quote:
This is not entirely a criticism of the US - it's not always a bad idea to see who's going to win before committing to a side - but it would be inaccurate to refer to the US action as "decisive". It did avoid a very unpleasant end for both the rebellion and the Marcos family, but it did not affect the outcome one way or the other.
I have long ( going on 31 years...) contended that Carter's abysmal handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure, Reagan's foolish foray into Lebanon and the mishandling of that whole episode, Bush 41s failure to topple Saddam in 91 and Clinton's tail wagging (that's a celebrity buzz - pop culture reference not a veiled innuendo) led to the attacks in the US in 2001 (and others worldwide before that time). So I'm not a Reagan fan. However, while he didn't topple Marcos, he did take surprisingly and unusually (for the US outside a war) decisive action when many were urging him to not take the action he did -- that was my poorly stated point.That's always a wise course... :wry:Quote:
Not that I ever fully trusted the official record of anything...
A very interesting analysis that I originally read on AJE's website:
Why Mubarak is out - Paul Amar
Quite a lengthy article but well worth the read for its analysis of the various social groups in competition both on the pro-Mubarak wing and the protesters in the square. Gets a bit idealistic towards the end, but the social analysis is quite interesting.
Going way OT... I'm not convinced that anything the US did was a decisive factor leading to the attacks in 2001. I suspect that the ultimate push coming to shove there was AQ's need for a foreign intervention in Muslim land to justify - and indeed to continue - its own existence.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
My impression was that Reagan was pretty much the last holdout on the Marcos issue. Of course I watched it from this side rather than that, so there may be things I didn't see. I do know, though, that from the time of the disastrous (for Marcos) snap election and the blatantly obvious cheat, both State and CIA were desperately urging Washington to back away from Marcos, and I know for sure that the embassy people here were absolutely livid (not for the first or last time) over some of the pro-Marcos comments coming out of Washington. Seemed from here that by the time Reagan came 'round almost everyone else had already figured out that it was done.
One of the big differences between Manila '86 and Egypt '11, IMO, is that Manila '86 was triggered by local events, while events in Tunisia seem to have provided the spark for Cairo. Manila was the culmination of a chain of local events that allowed foreign observers to be better prepared and local players to be a bit better organized than they might have been in a more spontaneous outburst. The response to a failed election left a rival candidate and political apparatus in the picture, however tenuously, and created a possibility for rapid transition that is less evident in Egypt. In that sense, the Cairo spark may have been slightly premature.
It's often forgotten, of course, that the showdown in Manila was sparked not by Cory Aquino's supporters but by an opportunistic attempt at a military coup, which had it succeeded would not have led to a democratic transition.
Again straying OT, but it's not entirely off (at least in my imagination) to look at key balance points in analogous situations...Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
It's often said that the tipping point in Manila was the refusal of the Philippine Marine contingent to fire on protesters at the EDSA/Ortigas junction on the afternoon of day 2. That was a dicey moment, and if they'd put a hundred PSG thugs in front of the Marines it would have been very different: there weren't more than 20 or 30 of us on the spot when it came right down to it... but it wasn't the tipping point, in my view. (And if anyone wonders, the story that "the nuns stopped the tanks" is a load of bollocks. There was not a nun in sight.)
I've also heard it said that the defection of most of the air force's helicopter assets early the next morning was the critical point, but again I disagree. It was a huge relief to those on the street who saw their arrival on the scene as a pretty major "this is gonna suck" moment, but it wasn't the tipping point.
The key, to me: a few hours after the helicopters landed in the opposition camp it was broadcast over radio and TV that Marcos had left the country. Often forgotten fact: up to that point, the crowds on the street weren't really all that big. Once the news of departure came out, within an hour the crowd multiplied exponentially. Pretty much all of Manila hit the street. The funny thing was... it wasn't true. I don't think it was an accident, either: it was inspired disinformation. By the time everyone realized that it wasn't true there were a million or so people on the street, and they just stayed. It was too obvious by that time that there was no way back for Marcos. That to me was the tipping point. Most of that crowd would never have committed if they thought Marcos was still there... but once they were out the outcome was just too obvious for anyone not to see it. There might be a lesson there somewhere about the utility of the barefaced lie at just the right moment.
I still wonder whose idea that was; never been able to find out.
Although the author won't bet on a specific outcome, here are the three scenarios posited in Three Possible Scenarios for Egypt, February 3, 2011 · By Islam Qasem (Institute for Policy Studies - which has a "progressive" slant):
Logically, the third scenario should have variants; but I'm too ignorant of Egyptian political groups to suggest specifics. The Muslim Brotherhood gathered about 20% of the vote when it was allowed to present candidates; but that leaves a large slice for others.Quote:
Hosni Mubarak is on his way out, but when and how remain open questions.
....
Scenario one: Mubarak and his lieutenants will try to ride out the unrest. They hope to wear out the crowds using the carrot-and-stick approach. They will promise to address political reforms, improve employment conditions, and allow freedom of speech. At the same time, they will display a show of power with the military scattered throughout the country and fighter jets sweeping low over the crowds. Come September, an election will be held in which Suleiman will do whatever it takes to get to the top. Suleiman and the rest of the military establishment believe that time is on their side as they take every necessary step to avoid a second uprising. Mubarak will step down as a great president who has served his country in an honorable way for 30 years. Meanwhile, the promises made of political reforms are unlikely to be kept. In sum, the status quo will be restored under the leadership of Suleiman.
Scenario two: Mubarak steps down, but the regime does not. If the crowds remain on the streets, Mubarak will be forced to leave office to give the regime a chance of survival. The average Egyptian abhors Mubarak more than anything else. He has come to exemplify all of Egypt’s current failings. By dumping Mubarak, the military regime will not only attempt to avoid clashes with the people but also to win their support. At this moment, the most important thing for the military regime is to keep the reins of power in its own hands. Under this scenario, there will be no radical changes in Egypt’s domestic or foreign policy. Egypt will remain on the same path as in the first scenario.
Scenario three: Mubarak and the regime step down. What the people demand is a complete transformation of the political landscape: the resignation of the military regime that has dominated Egypt’s politics since the Free Officers’ revolution in 1952. A successful regime change in Egypt will have a domino effect throughout the entire region, ushering in a radically different Middle East. At home, the Egyptian society will have to endure a hard period of transition, during which lessons will have to be learned in political compromise, pragmatism, and consensus. At the same time, Islamists of all strips and colors will be emboldened. On the foreign policy front, no other country will feel the pain more than Israel. After all, Egypt and Israel fought four wars. Although a peace treaty was signed between the two countries, Egyptian society has never really legitimized it, and the late president Anwar Sadat paid for it with his own life. The second loser will be the United States. After decades of supporting Mubarak and pursuing narrow-minded policies in the region, U.S. popularity is at rock-bottom.
Anyone with reasonable knowledge of Egyptian political groups ?
Regards
Mike
Actually yes. It took me a while, but I even found an online report of the same event on the website of The Guardian:Quote:
Originally Posted by Cole
Specifically:
********Quote:
8.03pm GMT: Ahdaf Soueif emails from Cairo:
A good friend just saw 8 to 12 people being dragged out of No 1 Souq el-Tawfikiyyah St and bundled into a civilian micro-bus while a military police vehicle waited nearby. The people were being beaten and the street had been told they were "Iranian and Hamas agents come to destabilise Egypt" so the street was chanting against them.
No 1 Souq el-Tawfikiyyah St is the home of the offices of The Hisham Mubarak Legal Aid Centre, The Centre for Social and Economic Rights and The 6th April Youth.
The Hisham Mubarak centre is a partner of Oxfam International, which has put out a statement:
The offices of two Egyptian human rights organisations in Cairo supported by Oxfam in Cairo have been attacked today and several staff members arrested by the Military Police.
The offices of Hisham Mubarak Law Center and the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights were raided at 14:30 and eight people were arrested including both directors, Ahmed Seif, director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center and Khaled Ali, director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights.
They have been taken to an unknown location in Cairo.
Catherine Essoyan, Oxfam Regional Manager for the Middle East and Maghreb:
"We are extremely worried about the fate of these human rights defenders who have been providing critical legal aid and support to their people over the past days of protest. We deplore this assault against Egyptian civil society organisations dedicated to promoting respect for the rule of law. We call for the safe and immediate release of those detained."
Frankly speaking: are there Islamist extremists on the streets of Egypt, participating in the protests? Yes, no doubt, there are.Quote:
I read that many folks with closely cropped beards (supposedly characteristic of that group) were up front throwing rocks.
Do they or other Islamist extremists work behind the scenes, seeking a way to take advantage of this crisis? Yes, no doubt, they do.
This is as indisputable as that the sun is going up in (what we call) the East, and down in the West.
But... how many of them are out there, how influential they really are, what are they able of really doing, what are they eventually going to do, and - first and foremost - are they going to prove capable of taking over entire Egypt once this brawl is over...?
Well, sorry, but the matter of fact is: nobody can say for sure. Means: we don't know.
The reason we don't know is that there is a brutal dictatorship in Egypt, controlling the media and feeding us "news" at its own discretion. Between these news is the idea that the Brotherhood is ah so powerful, that without this dictatorship in place we all - but Israel as first - are in jeopardy of being blown away. And, this stance of that dictatorship is supported by all the possible talkingheads between Tel Aviv and Washington DC.
So, we have a guess, but don't really know whether this is going to happen.
As a "convinced and practicing pluralist", I simply can't find this satisfactory. That's why my standpoint is: when you're in doubt and have no clue what to do, stick to the two most basic rules. The Rule No.1. says: personal freedoms, pluralism and democracy first. And the Rule No.2 says: if in doubt, see rule No.1.
Again: there is no trace of evidence for "spontaneous" pro-Mubarak demonstrations.Quote:
Not sure $20 bucks is much motivation to get beat up...unless your job is at risk and you are broke because the banks are closed, and you feel like kicking troublemaker booty anyway. Just can't picture guys paying tens of thousands of thugs and nobody saw it.
That aside, well, the Ministry of Interior pays some 390.000 of thugs of the Central Security Force alone (the black-clad Father Mubarak's "Basiji" we've seen in the first days of the unrest), plus another 60.000 of the National Guard (responsible for the protection of the royal palace, between others) - and thus there is plenty of choice. That aside, in a country where average monthly income ranges between US$ 100 and 150, 20 bucks is "plenty of money" (oh, and I do recall several inmates on deathrow in various US prisons, sitting there for murdering people for less than 20 bucks).
I doubt this. Available indications point at the fact that all that is currently undertaken by Mubarak is nothing else but his regime launching it's efforts to do "yesterday" (to paraphraze Robin Gibbs) what it planned to do in period September-November this year any way.Quote:
Or a series of overzealous officials screwed up trying to please the boss (or hang onto their job) and now find themselves under house arrest.
The current flow of Mubarak's (re)actions actually follows much of what's been anticipated already since years. The only difference is that it became easier to expose his lies. When Mubarak fired the old government and appointed Soleiman as VP, he did not do something that was "new", or "unexpected", and even less so did he do that in reaction to the protests. He did something that has been expected since years. See Egypt's Next Strongman as example.
When, in the interview with Amanpour/ABC, aired yesterday, he stated he's "fed up" with politics and power, he was lying: back in 1981, immediately after climbing to power, Mubarak explained he's going to run for only one term (sorry, no citate here; there was no internet in 1981). So, another lie.
Finally, if this report - Mubarak's Last Gasps - is to be trusted, there are no "overzealous officers", but the Mubarak's clique (including his new Minister of Interior, Gen Waqdy) acts at least in agreement with him, if not on his own orders.
Here are three more "trinitarian scenarios" - all suggesting somewhat different outcomes (on which, no one is placing bets).
Washington Post - ANALYSIS, Three possible scenarios for Egypt's future, By Glenn Kessler, Friday, February 4, 2011
Huffington Post - Egypt: Possible Scenarios, Amir Madani, Author, Le Letture Persiane, Posted: February 2, 2011:Quote:
As the Egyptian political crisis grows more violent and uncertain, analysts have begun to turn to historical parallels for answers. Will an Islamist movement or a new strongman - or both - emerge to seize control, in an eerie repeat of the 1979 Iranian revolution? Or will Egypt's secular tradition and powerful military allow for a messy transition to democracy, as happened in Indonesia in 1998? Or will it be something in between, such as the initial outcome of the Romanian revolution of 1989? ... (more in the article)
BBC News - Egypt unrest: Possible scenarios, By Tarik Kafala, BBC News, 31 January 2011:Quote:
....
There are three sets of players in the Egyptian scene right now...
The first players are the members of the ruling elite, supported by security forces and an army which, still as this article is written, has Mubarak's face as its symbol. There may be other faces symbolizing power in the future, but these too will be military ones. The military is Egypt's most powerful institution and one embedded deeply in all aspects of life. It will do its best to retain its purpose and power. In order to make sure that his regime stays in power, Mubarak resorted to a coup in which he appointed Omar Suleiman, his right-hand man and the country's intelligence chief, as vice-president.
....
The second player in this scenario are the Egyptian people: millions of men, women, youth, workers, intellectuals, writers, journalists, and ordinary citizens who demand rights and freedom and aware of the dangers of sectarianism. The best-known opposition figure is Dr. ElBaradei, a moderate diplomat who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 for his working in leading the United Nations' nuclear watchdog. A headline recently read: "El Baradei asks Obama: Take Egypt's Mubarak off life support." Other prominent figures like the jurist Ayman Nour and Osama al-Ghazali Harb have also struggled to build popular followings. But there could emerge other figures from the wider civil society and from the ranks of Kefayah (Enough) as well.
....
The Islamists are the third set of players. Egyptian Islamism (like all social phenomena) is complex and divided. It encompasses a myriad of trends, ranging from enlightened moderates to extremists who exploit the concept of jihad (originally based on catharsis) and promise a land of desolation. The Muslim Brotherhood could be expected to win a large part of the vote in any fair election as it is rooted in Islamic society and has gained a certain popularity for the work of its charities.
....
Here are some possible scenarios for how the situation could play out among these groups.
One scenario that could play out is a clash between the ruling elite (with or without Mubarak) and the elements of civil society. In this scenario, the ruling elite will promise formal security and stability by fighting the fundamentalists, and will continue to receive aid from the US, the support of Israel. It would be shock therapy, a treatment resolution that promises future explosions.
The second scenario is the emergence of a power vacuum that could lead to some form of civil war and a Lebanization of Egypt; a sort of chaos in which armed fundamentalist groups might thrive and the army would need to take over the running of the state, but without the necessary forces to defeat them. This scenario, which is the wishful thinking of the enemies of Egypt, would certainly be prevented by the Egyptians themselves. As Amr Shalakany wrote from in Tahrir Square in Cairo: "This is a sweet, sweet revolution; it is peaceful. Tell everyone we are peaceful." And the government has offered talks with protesters after the army said it will not fire on them.
A third scenario is that the army, as the key institution, indicates to Mubarak that he must resign as he is a cause of instability. In this case, the army takes charge of the country's security. In such a scenario, chaos and violence are avoided, and Mr. Mubarak could leave gradually. This would allow the necessary time to exclude President Mubarak and his closet associates, but also to let the surviving parts of the ruling system exist as warrant to prevent fundamentalist groups from flourishing. This is probably what Washington means by an "orderly transition." In this scenario, Mohamed ElBaradei (or another figure) could emerge as a compromise to oversee the transition and a free and fair election for the presidency and parliament. This could only happen if only the Egyptians decide to follow through along this path. ... (again, more in the article)
RegardsQuote:
For Egyptians, and the millions of Arabs watching closely across the Middle East, these are hugely exciting times. But for all the hope for change, there are also enormous dangers. These are three broad scenarios that could result from the events in Egypt.
CUT AND RUN: MUBARAK GIVES UP PRESIDENCY
.... (explanation and analysis)
....
STICK TO HIS GUNS: MILITARY AND POLICE CRUSH PROTESTS
.... (explanation and analysis)
....
TRANSITION: PROMISE TO LEAVE, OPPOSITION JOINS GOVERNMENT
.... (explanation and analysis)
....
Mike
The current opposition tactic seems to be to
a) keep the protests going, the pressure up
b) do behind-the-scenes homework: building an opposition interim leadership
Meanwhile, Mubarak seems to
a) try to sit this out
b) discredit the opposition movement,
c) discourage it and to
d) mobilize supporters
The answer to the obvious question why the opposition doesn't storm Mubarak's palace seems to be strong and loyal defences there.
The police seems to have proven ineffective.
The intelligence service has already failed in preventing demonstrations and is now likely employed in infiltrating and discrediting them.
The army seems to be neutral, yet still willing to intervene for order and less bloodshed.
I do not recall a revolution that looked similar to this one.
This is surely more complex than any of us will ever know.
With so much at stake, why would Israel or even the Saudis sit on their hands and watch?
When I read about Operation Ajax in 1953 Iran the thing that amazed me most was how such a Keystone Cops operation could actually work to topple a government. The key was that the British had been there a long time and had a well developed UW network in place, which they then convinced the US to lead the operation and loaned us their network. (They still work us like that far more than most Americans would like to admit, btw). The US employed that British network to incite the riots that supported the events that put the Shah into power. Just as insurgents leverage the populace in insurgency, so to do state and non-state actors in unconventional warfare.
Does Israel or Saudi Arabia or Great Britain or the US, etc, etc, etc have such networks in place in Egypt?? I don't know. I do know they have a confluence of long term access and national interests, so I recognize that it is likely such networks exist. Are any of these nations either employing their own network to shape events, or loaning their network to others to employ?? Again, we may never know.
Bottom line is that these things are complicated, and where interests are high, external forces will always come and work to shape things to their own advantage. Enemies become friends, and friends become enemies, it is all about shared and conflicting interests and leveraging what one can to gain an advantage. Egypt has to deal with all of this in addition to their own factions at work.
Things are rarely what they appear to be. There are those with anti-Iran agendas that are pointing fingers at Iran. There are those from the "ideology/terrorism" community who point fingers at the Muslim Brotherhood. There are those who are pro-Israel who rail about the implications to Israeli security.
The voice getting lost is that for transitioning as peacefully as possible to a more stable Egypt under a government of their own determination, with a legitimacy recognized by their own populace, and that participates rationally within the global community.
Or Iran, or Hezbollah, or China/Russia, or Hamas.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Word of Omar Suleiman's (new V.P.) attempted assassination several days ago may cast some light on timing of the pro-government crackdown. The sabotage of a natural gas pipeline leading from Egypt to Israel is another example.
It's easy to claim we own the high ground and to bad mouth perceived despots for exploiting unseemly advantages in their own world. Then you look at appointment of former GE CEOs to the government who have supported one political side, and then see new initiatives for light bulbs, look at unions getting health care exemptions, and attempts to legitimize illegal immigration to gain votes...we start to not look a lot different than Mubarak and his cronies.Quote:
The voice getting lost is that for transitioning as peacefully as possible to a more stable Egypt under a government of their own determination, with a legitimacy recognized by their own populace, and that participates rationally within the global community.
Where we DO stand out is the example of the U.S. military in the past twenty years in showing reasonable use of force. Would Egypt's Army have shown this kind of restraint in earlier days? Doubtful.
So when folks say we should use a heavier hand in places like Afghanistan, just think of the example that would set to other militaries of the world. We should thank our lucky stars that pop-centric COIN in Afghanistan, democratization of Iraq, and suppression of genocide in the Balkans is leading by example in ways far more constructive than talking the talk on how democracy makes all the difference.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...toryId=1357781
For the US, the story of 1953 Iran is an important one to understand when looking at Egypt today.
Link to world trends and predictions for 2011. This was posted before the situation in Egypt, take a close look at trends 1,4,and 9. I am not that familiar with Gerald Celente but looks like he is off to a pretty good start.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/celente/celente59.1.html
Not sure it's OT. 'Decisiveness' is an issue in this thread. The US government is, by design, not decisive. That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME. That lack of decisive action led to knowledge (not a perception but true knowledge) that the US could not and would not respond well and thus could be slowly nibbled at and the resultant irrtiation and attrition would cause overstretch at a minimum and self flagellating destruction at best.Quote:
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
If by ultimate push you mean the aircraft flights, perhaps. However one should recall that the provocations started internationally with the attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972, accelerated over the next few years and first involved the US with the seizure of the Embassy in Tehran -- Osama was a 22 year old playboy at the time. Subsequent attacks and provocation were from the Muslim Brotherhood, a precursor to Hezbollah and various other, non AQ elements.Quote:
I suspect that the ultimate push coming to shove there was AQ's need for a foreign intervention in Muslim land to justify - and indeed to continue - its own existence.
It's a great deal bigger than AQ who are nothing much to lose sleep over. Hezbollah is more worrying and the broader outlook even more so.That is my impression also. Thus my comment that the decision was surprising and unusual.Quote:
My impression was that Reagan was pretty much the last holdout on the Marcos issue... Seemed from here that by the time Reagan came 'round almost everyone else had already figured out that it was done.
I bow to the guy who was on the ground...;)Quote:
It's often said that the tipping point in Manila was the refusal of the Philippine Marine contingent to fire on protesters at the EDSA/Ortigas junction on the afternoon of day 2. That was a dicey moment, and if they'd put a hundred PSG thugs in front of the Marines it would have been very different: there weren't more than 20 or 30 of us on the spot when it came right down to it... but it wasn't the tipping point, in my view. (And if anyone wonders, the story that "the nuns stopped the tanks" is a load of bollocks. There was not a nun in sight.)
He or she may not even realize that idea was a spark. Or they may have known precisely what it would do. Some thing can remain unknown unknowns... :DQuote:
I still wonder whose idea that was; never been able to find out.
Meanwhile, in Egypt today:
The apparent indecisiveness in Washington is a feature not a bug. It has penalties, always has -- but the benefits make those shortfalls bearable IMO. Decisive action akin to Truman and Korea, Reagan and an airplane or either Bush and Iraq are the exception rather than the rule. I personally would not opt to change that for a more decisive form of government. We muddle along but get more right than wrong...
Likely will do so in North Africa -- and the ME; it'll just take a while.
Ah, the old hawk song, where only shouts and fists supposedly work well on certain people. It's apparently a matter of attitude whether people believe this song or not.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
I don't get your "30 years", though.
I can easily identify 33 years of provocations of Arabs by the U.S. (taking the first delivery of F-4 Phantom II in 1968 as marking).
30 years of provocations of the U.S. from the region seems otherwise a bit stretched, for I don't recall an earlier significant incident than 1979 embassy crisis. That was Iran (Persians, not Arabs!), though.
2001 - 30 = 1971. What exactly did Arabs do to the U.S. around that time?
Why exactly do you believe that the U.S. was not strong enough in its responses? I recall it bombed Libya in the 1980's quite strongly.
In short: I don't call this 'They are the aggressors and we powerful and patient people didn't push them back, but appeased them.' view.
Why not the USA themselves?Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
For example, see the following cable released by WikiLeaks to The Telegraph and published on 28 January 2011: Egypt protests: America's secret backing for rebel leaders behind uprising
Here's the text of the cable: Link
Did something like "Operation Ajax II" back-fire this time?
I would start with saving al-Sauds from starvation with help of a shipload of silver Dollars, back in 1942...Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
The slang word "boondocks" meaning jungle or out in the country comes from a Philippine Tagalog dialect word for mountain. It apparently entered the American vocabulary when we were civilizing with Krag rifles.
Always possible. Would explain some of the finger pointing at Iran coming from the line up of SMEs enlisted by the media.Quote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
Speaking of attitude...:rolleyes:Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
One could suggest that the songs you believe are at least equally flawed -- if not more so... ;)
But I digress. Lemme give you a hawkish comment. If you allow people to bulldoze you or shout you down, then they will. You, Fuchs, personally typify the antithesis of that because you do not allow that to occur. Nor should you. Nor should a nation tolerate continued -- note that word, continued -- provocations from a single source. Not a single party, a single source which may involve multiple parties. The Middle East was and is such a source and it does provide multiple parties with various grudges and strategies -- it is not monolithic.
We did tolerate such provocations from a single source, partly trying to be nice and partly assuming that as the provenance of theses acts varied there were different actors, multiple sources, involved. Wrong deduction, same crowd, different players.Not surprising, it's hard to see through bias blinders. :DQuote:
I don't get your "30 years", though.
You weren't paying attention -- you weren't even born, in fact. Crowbat is closer but even he's about eight years late (Google ArAmCo and look around). Franklin D. Roosevelt started diddling around in the ME in 1942, met Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake in 1945...Quote:
I can easily identify 33 years of provocations of Arabs by the U.S. (taking the first delivery of F-4 Phantom II in 1968 as marking).
Allow me to repeat what I wrote:Quote:
30 years of provocations of the U.S. from the region seems otherwise a bit stretched, for I don't recall an earlier significant incident than 1979 embassy crisis. That was Iran (Persians, not Arabs!), though.
"in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."
Note the ME, for Middle East, which includes Iran. The Iraniha , some of them at any rate, were upset with us for moving in to their country, uninvited and supporting the old Shah in 1943. The fact that the main intent was to force the then present USSR to back off and leave Iran often gets lost in all the ill informed left wing rhetorical flourishes. That long predates Bob's World's Operation Ajax in 1953 which placed that Shah's son on the throne. Regardless of motivation -- and erroneous assumptions, the Persians led the ME -- again, as they had for centuries. They broke the ice, so to speak in attacking the Great Satan -a and getting away with it. The Arabs then piled on -- ME way of warfare...:wry:
If you doubt that, you should spend some time there and get out on the street and talk to people. Not Academics, the elites -- the people.Just plotted. As a result of the Munich attack, Nixon directed a study (LINK) which got rolling (at the Deputy level, really) and produced a report which was remarkably prescient. So we've been interested since the early 70s (LINK), over 30 years -- and so was the opposition...Quote:
2001 - 30 = 1971. What exactly did Arabs do to the U.S. around that time?
Not at all strongly; better than nothing perhaps -- maybe not. Sometimes minor efforts like that do more harm than good and make one look rather ineffectual. All of our ME responses were like that, ineffectual -- until Iraq (and that wasn't as good as it should have been because DoD and the US Armed Forces did not do a good job)Quote:
Why exactly do you believe that the U.S. was not strong enough in its responses? I recall it bombed Libya in the 1980's quite strongly.
The US is always more concerned with domestic politics than it is with the broader world. Nixon's effort produce some good results which were ignored. Carter totally mishandled the hostage crisis by actually sending the Ayatollah Ruhollah K. a letter saying he would not use force. Khomeini had been about to direct the Students (note that world, ponder Taliban and look at Tunisia and Egypt today...) at the Embassy to release the hostages but upon receipt of Carter's letter, told then to continue the march. Reagan Failed utterly in first sending troops to Lebanon in 1983, second in allowing State to tie their hands and thirdly in doing little to nothing about the Embassy and troop billet bombings and latterly by withdrawing -- that merely encouraged everyone to believe the US had no staying power. In his defense, he learned from that and thus the Libyan attack in 1986, though it was really not much of an effort. Follow him with Bush 41 failing to topple Saddam -- some moderately good reasons not to but in the ME a very different message was received. Then Somalia and Clinton's feeble effort, all of which failed to impress anyone.We can differ on that.Quote:
In short: I don't call this 'They are the aggressors and we powerful and patient people didn't push them back, but appeased them.' view.
All of which is off thread. So if you want to continue this, let's do it by PM.
I took your "ME" as "Arabs" because it makes no sense to discuss 9/11 and Iran together.
The Munich assassinations were about Arabs and Israel, not about the U.S. - this cannot seriously be counted as ME-born provocation against the U.S..
You still did not explain which Arab/ME actions of around '71 pointed the beginning of provocations against the U.S..
This is central to your earlier idea that the U.S. did not respond appropriately to provocations for three decades. No provocations = no lacking response.
Even worse, the whole idea that the U.S. was too soft/dovish towards ME powers/extremists/whatever seems to be clearly unhistorical to me.
------
About Egypt: Foreign agents may play a great role, but considering the possibility that a dictator might use rumours about this for his political survival, I'm for skipping unproven theories and for not adding rumours to the mix.
Most if not all intelligence services are apparently (see 20th century history) rather ineffective at inciting popular revolts anyway. They have much "better" track records with sponsoring extremists or military coups.
If one does not realize the linkage and pervasive influence of the Persian Empires (plural) throughout the area on mores and attitudes, I can understand that. OTOH, if one is aware of that, the linkage is obvious. As I said, the Persians have been out in front of the Arabs for centuries...:wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
They had as much if not more influence on the ME and eastern North Africa than did Islam and far more than did the Ottomans.In order; Of course they were, True - I didn't say it was.Quote:
The Munich assassinations were about Arabs and Israel, not about the U.S. - this cannot seriously be counted as ME-born provocation against the U.S.
However, it was the first big transnational terrorist attack against the West and emanating from the ME. It was a harbinger of things to come and it was extremely important because the west got a wakeup call and except for the formation of GSG 9, mostly ignored it...
That is true of the US, Nixon wisely said let's take a look, we did, saw what was going to happen -- and did nothing. Mostly because of domestic politics (It seems de rigueur in the US for a new Administration to disavow ANYTHING the previous Admin did...). We sat on our hands and let a problem develop when we could have taken diplomatic and economic steps to forestall or defuse the problem. Contrary to what you seem to believe, every comment that inadequate action was taken does not entail attack or a military response -- those are usually, IMO, ill advised. However, I do believe that if they are necessary, as they occasionally are, they should be effective. I'd even go a step further and say that if such measures are employed, necessary or not, they should be effective and not just futile swats. Those can result in doing more harm than good (witness most of the past 30 years...[from today]).Sorry, thought it would be obvious. Apparently not. This is 2011, just barely. Thirty years ago would make it 1981 and Reagan would have been recently inaugurated and the Hostages released. I should have been more precise and instead of saying 30 years (meaning a not stated 'from today' and as a rough or approximate figure) should have written "since 4 November 1979..."Quote:
You still did not explain which Arab/ME actions of around '71 pointed the beginning of provocations against the U.S.
Try recomputing with that 1979 start date, see if that works, don't forget to count the Embassy bombings (all of them), attacks on the World Trade Center (all of them), the Barracks bombings (all of them), the aircraft hijackings and bombings (all of them) and I think you'll come up with a fair total over the first 22 of that 30 plus years. Not quite one major attack a year but not far off, either. ;)Quote:
This is central to your earlier idea that the U.S. did not respond appropriately to provocations for three decades. No provocations = no lacking response.
Throw in the ship attacks plus Viet Nam and Somalia -- which you may not deem important in this context but of which many in the ME and Asia are well aware and often cite, not least including Bin Laden and Zawahiri, the Egyptian and Abu Yahya al-Libi -- the Libyan AQ strategist. ;).
As an aside, you seem to accord the 2001 attacks far more importance than I do. While extracting a higher body count and having great symbolic effect, it was just another attack IMO, just one more (or three or four more, depending upon how one counts) atop all the others over the [from 2001] previous 22 years (and that's a figure I've used often on this board...).If one paid attention -- and few outside the US had or have any reason to do so -- one might come to a different conclusion. I did, do and have...Quote:
Even worse, the whole idea that the U.S. was too soft/dovish towards ME powers/extremists/whatever seems to be clearly unhistorical to me.
True. So we can agree on that. ;)Quote:
Most if not all intelligence services are apparently (see 20th century history) rather ineffective at inciting popular revolts anyway. They have much "better" track records with sponsoring extremists or military coups.
Also on Egypt -- that first comment of mine above -- "linkage and pervasive influence of the Persian Empires (plural) throughout the area on mores and attitudes" -- applies to Egypt as well...
Come on, if you argue with the Persian empire, I can argue with the Roman Empire, Alexander's successor states (Greek), the Byzantine (effectively Greek again) Empire and - this blows a 2,300 y.o. empire to pieces - the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the region for centuries well into the 20th century (Turks).
You overstate the influence of Persians/Iran in the Arab world badly.
They're a different crowd and the actions of some people in Tehran in '79 had as much to do with later AQ-style terrorism as did the attack on the Embassy in Saigon.
Moreover, you're moving goalposts. You CANNOT have meant 1979 with your 30 years statement without having written nonsense.
You were clearly writing about 30 years with only halfhearted measures. This could impossibly include the last nine years. It would at most have been 22 years (79-01) of half-hearted measures, not 30.Quote:
(...)That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME;(...)
Furthermore, the bombardment of Libya in 1986 with 60 dead cannot seriously be considered half-hearted. A full war would have been disproportionate and unnecessary.
I still don't buy this revisionist view that the U.S. was overly passive and Arabs/ME/Muslims/whatever were the provoking party.
At most, the history of the post-WW2 relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world could be called troublesome and full of minor offenses/skirmishing from both sides (with the biggest offenses being the invasion of Iraq, decades of support for Israel and 9/11 - in this order).
Foreign Affairs Coverage of the Crisis in Egypt and the Middle East - Summary: A collection of continuing Foreign Affairs coverage of the crisis in Egypt and the Middle East (most recent posted this week):
CheersQuote:
The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak: What the Brotherhood Is and How it Will Shape the Future
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham
February 3, 2011
Portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as eager and able to seize power and impose its version of sharia on an unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features of the Brotherhood and underestimates the extent to which the group has changed over time.
The U.S.-Egyptian Breakup: Washington's Options in Cairo
Steven A. Cook
February 2, 2011
With the political era of Hosni Mubarak coming to an end, is the strategic relationship between Cairo and Washington similarly finished? The Obama administration must scale back its ambitions to affect change in Cairo.
Israel's Neighborhood Watch: Egypt's Upheaval Means that Palestine Must Wait
Yossi Klein Halevi
February 1, 2011
With Hezbollah calling the shots in Lebanon and Islamists poised to gain power in Egypt, Israel sees itself as almost completely encircled by Iranian allies or proxies. Where does this leave the future of a sovereign Palestine state?
Letter From Cairo: The People's Military in Egypt?
Eric Trager
January 30, 2011
As protests continue in Egypt, both sides -- the protesters in the streets and the Mubarak regime -- are wondering exactly which side the Egyptian military is supporting. Does the army hold the key to the country's political endgame?
The Psychology of Food Riots: When Do Price Spikes Lead to Unrest?
Evan Fraser and Andrew Rimas
January 30, 2011
The connection among rising prices, hunger, and violent civic unrest seems intuitively logical. But there was more to Tunisia's food protests than the logic of the pocketbook. The psychological element -- a sense of injustice that arises between seeing food prices rise and pouring a Molotov cocktail -- is more important.
Letter From Beirut: Crime and Punishment in the Levant: Lebanon’s False Choice Between Stability and Justice
Michael Young
January 26, 2011
In bringing down its government last week, did Lebanon just witness a coup d’etat or did it narrowly dodge civil war? Either way, Damascus, Tehran, and Washington are all watching.
Morning in Tunisia: The Frustrations of the Arab World Boil Over
Michele Penner Angrist
January 16, 2011
Last week's mass protests in Tunisia were less a symptom of economic malaise than of a society fed up with its broken dictatorship. Should the other autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa be afraid?
Is El Baradei Egypt's Hero? Mohamed El Baradei and the Chance for Reform (broken link)
Steven A. Cook
March 26, 2010
The return of Mohamed El Baradei to Egypt has raised questions about the country's political system and the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. Is reform possible, and if so, is El Baradei the man to lead it?
Back to the Bazaar
Martin Indyk
January/February 2002
The United States has an opportunity to set new terms for its alliances in the Middle East. The bargain struck with Egypt and Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War seemed successful for a decade, but now the United States is facing the consequences: Washington backed Cairo's and Riyadh's authoritarian regimes, and they begat al Qaeda. The Bush administration should heed the lesson.
Mike
The Iranian Embassy hostage siege in London in May 1980 happened shortly after the seizure of U.S. embassy personnel in Tehran in 1979.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/...ge_240x320.jpg
All those had an effect, I just think the Persians had more and a more enduring effect. The length of time since the Persian Empires -- there was more than the one shown on that map -- made the total effect more pervasive; they were around far longer than any of the others you cite. (LINK).Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
My having lived there and seen Ta'arof at work in most of the ME nations and Afghanistan says you're far from correct. ;)Quote:
You overstate the influence of Persians/Iran in the Arab world badly.
I beg your pardon?Quote:
Moreover, you're moving goalposts. You CANNOT have meant 1979 with your 30 years statement without having written nonsense.
Go back and read the thread. Note these:
My Post 105: "Some compare current events to 1979. Not a good match. 1986 is a better correlation."
My Post 117: "I have long ( going on 31 years...) contended that Carter's abysmal handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure, Reagan's foolish foray into Lebanon and the mishandling of that whole episode, Bush 41s failure to topple Saddam in 91 and Clinton's tail wagging (that's a celebrity buzz - pop culture reference not a veiled innuendo) led to the attacks in the US in 2001 (and others worldwide before that time)..."
My Post 128: "That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."
That last is the one to which you responded.That is correct and is pretty much what I wrote in My Post 135 just above. So what are we arguing about? More correctly, what are you arguing about? :DQuote:
You were clearly writing about 30 years with only halfhearted measures. This could impossibly include the last nine years. It would at most have been 22 years (79-01) of half-hearted measures, not 30.
As for the last nine years, whether there have been provocations or attempted attacks from the ME or not is not fully known, certainly there have been no big or very successful such. That's really academic -- it's the thought that counts...You may not consider it half hearted, I certainly do. I've been in units that lost more people killed in less time. :rolleyes:Quote:
Furthermore, the bombardment of Libya in 1986 with 60 dead cannot seriously be considered half-hearted.
Agreed, IMO the bombing operation was not necessary but Reagan didn't ask me... :(Quote:
A full war would have been disproportionate and unnecessary.
Not a problem, I'm not selling.Quote:
I still don't buy this revisionist view that the U.S. was overly passive and Arabs/ME/Muslims/whatever were the provoking party.
You can call it revisionist but its a view I've held for almost all that 30 years, certainly for the last 27 years, since the second Beirut Embassy bombing. As I said, I've been paying attention, you had no need to do so.I agree and nothing I've said implies otherwise.Quote:
At most, the history of the post-WW2 relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world could be called troublesome and full of minor offenses/skirmishing from both sides...
I do not agree with either of those but I can understand that you and many in the world would think that. Both IMO have a basis in fact but both are biased -- as is my view, just in a different direction. Iraq was an over reaction to rectify the false impression given by 22 years of placatory response, premature departure, inaction and halfway measures. It worked fairly well even though the execution was flawed.Quote:
... (with the biggest offenses being the invasion of Iraq, decades of support for Israel and 9/11 - in this order).
The real truth is probably somewhere between your view and mine. In any event, this is way off the thread to which I once again suggest we return and take this off thread discussion into PMs if you have more to say. I really do not. We should be able to differ without boring others...
Interesting reading. The contrast between the piece on the Muslim Brotherhood and the rather hysterical "Israel's neighborhood Watch" piece is particularly interesting. Overall the chorus of panic and recrimination emanating from Israel is getting pretty deafening, example here...Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/...70U53720110131
One has to wonder what exactly they want the US to do to preserve the hollow shell of Mubarak's rule. There seems to be a general reluctance to admit that Mubarak is probably going down no matter what the US does. Rats may leave sinking ships, but who in his right mind stays on a sinking ship?Quote:
Israel shocked by Obama's "betrayal" of Mubarak
If Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak is toppled, Israel will lose one of its very few friends in a hostile neighborhood and President Barack Obama will bear a large share of the blame, Israeli pundits said on Monday.
Political commentators expressed shock at how the United States as well as its major European allies appeared to be ready to dump a staunch strategic ally of three decades, simply to conform to the current ideology of political correctness...
...To win popular Arab opinion, Obama was risking America's status as a superpower and reliable ally.
"Throughout Asia, Africa and South America, leaders are now looking at what is going on between Washington and Cairo. Everyone grasps the message: "America's word is worthless ... America has lost it."
Seems to me an excellent opportunity for the US to demonstrate that we do not necessarily hold our interests to be identical to those of Israel.
It may be even more important to understand that story when looking at Egypt tomorrow, or in the near future, as a new Egyptian government emerges. There will doubtless be all manner of panic over presumed Islamist influence, and all manner of calls for the CIA to do the dirty and bring back a tidy reliable dictatorship. This temptation will, I think, be best avoided.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
The message the US needs to deliver, IMO, lies not in what we do to resolve Egypt's current crisis but in how we deal with what emerges after. Time for us to show, not say, that we are able and willing to deal with a government that puts Egypt's interests ahead of ours. Certainly there will be friction, but the way we choose to manage that friction will speak volumes, and have a lasting impact.
Yes, "boondocks" comes from the Tagalog (it's a language, not a dialect) bundok, meaning mountain or highlands.Quote:
Originally Posted by Pete
A portion and a half of greasy adobo to whoever knows the other Tagalog word adopted into English during the "civilize 'em with a Krag" days... (there's only one other that I know of, and if someone has a third I'm seriously impressed).
My bet is bolo. Google was my friend.Quote:
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
Also liked the more modern slang terms CIA (certified Imelda admirer) and "forgets" for old person. I resemble that latter term...but at least at nearly 56 I can still chest press and fly 255 a dozen times and elliptical for half an hour at resistance level 13.
I know, you're not impressed. You just go out and climb a boondocks:rolleyes:
My 47 year old bro did that recently climbing Mt Whitney (14.505') with his wife!
Quote:
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
Ever hear the old joke about two men coming upon a Grizzly bear and the one says, "Run," and takes off to which the other says "you can't outrun a bear." The first replies, "That maybe true but I only gotta out run you." In this case Iran is the bear. Wouldn't you prefer both the U.S. and Israel to have a better hunting rifle and Israel to be the first target of the bear?:(Quote:
Seems to me an excellent opportunity for the US to demonstrate that we do not necessarily hold our interests to be identical to those of Israel.
Second analogy: If your ship is sinking in water that will cause hypothermia and death in 10 minutes and a rescue ship (election) is 15 minutes away and you have nothing resembling a life raft now, do you jump now?
And you certainly don't need someone from the rescue ship telling you over the radio to jump now...or your young sailors who have no clue what hypothermia (or running a country) involves.
I don't see a bear on the horizon, and our ship isn't sinking. Mubarak's is, but it doesn't have to be ours, in fact it had better not be ours, because it's already below the surface and I don't see it coming back up. Our wise rats need to hop off his ship and back onto ours, where they belong. The elections may be coming and they may be a rescue, but the choice of waiting or not ain't ours to make. Let the crowd toss Mubarak, let a caretaker handle the intervening time, the rescue arrives anyway. Last thing we want to do is be seen trying to keep him in power.Quote:
Originally Posted by Cole
First necessary realization: Mubarak is done. The US couldn't resurrect him if we tried, and trying would just be hitching ourselves to a fallen star. There's no debate over whether to try to keep Mubarak in power; we cannot reanimate a corpse. The only reasonable debate is over whether and to what extent we can or should try to influence the transition.
Second necessary realization: a post-Mubarak Egypt does not have to be an Islamist nightmare or an Iranian clone. Of course the Israelis, and a few others, will wave that threat at us in an effort to persuade us to try to shape the new Egypt to their liking, but that would be an effort well worth resisting. I think the Islamists will miss Mubarak more than we do, and that we'll discover that the notion of Mubarak as the last bulwark against Egyptian Islamic radicalism is as completely invalid as the notion of Marcos as the last bulwark against Philippine Communism was.
Mubarak is history, and history is a one way street. We need to deal with it and deal with what comes after. It will be complicated, but it always is. He wasn't ever gonna last forever.
And on the aside...
Never really though "bolo" got adopted into English. The word is "cooties", from the Tagalog "kuto", for head lice.Quote:
Originally Posted by Cole
Did anyone ever admire Imelda, other than Fabian Ver? A joke from the old days...Quote:
Originally Posted by Cole
The Marcos family were in their jet flying back from the US. They flew over a barangay, and little Irene looked down and saw the poor people, and ran to her father and said" "Tatay, I want to make a thousand Filipinos happy, can I have 100,000 pesos?". So Ferdinand pulled 100,000 out of his pocket, the plane flew over the barangay, they threw the money out and everyone was happy.
Then they flew over a poblacion, and little Imee looked down and saw the poor people, and ran to her father and said" "Tatay, I want to make ten thousand Filipinos happy, can I have a million pesos?". So Ferdinand pulled a million out of his suitcase, the plane flew over the poblacion, they threw the money out and everyone was happy.
Then they came to Manila, and little Bongbong looked down and saw the poor people, and ran to his father and said" "Tatay, I want to make 15 million Filipinos happy, can I have a billion pesos?"
Ferdinand thought about that for a moment and replied...
"Just fetch your mother."
I'm sure there are some great Mubarak jokes flying around Cairo right now; somebody should collect them.
And yeah, I mostly just run around the bundoks. We use what we've got, and I'm in the middle of them...
Aramco's original involvement in exploring oil in Saudi Arabia was "business" (and not particularly successful at first); nothing special as such. It turned a "provocation" when the US upheld al-Sauds on the throne and practically turned the country into a military protectorate, in the 1940s and 1950s.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
So, I must admit, I'm as confused at this analogy as Fuchs appears to be.
They couldn't get more upset over what the USA were doing in 1943 than they already were over what the British and the Soviets did in 1941. Then, note that the Shah's son - Reza Pahlavi II - was placed on the throne instead of his father by the British, and already in 1941-1942: what the Americans did in 1953 was "just" to return the same Shah Reza Pahlavi II to the power - and this with help of the same clergy that later stole the revolution of 1978. As such, that was also no "ME provocation", but an US intervention and a provocation. The "payback" bill was delivered in 1978-1979...Quote:
"in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."
Note the ME, for Middle East, which includes Iran. The Iraniha , some of them at any rate, were upset with us for moving in to their country, uninvited and supporting the old Shah in 1943.
I'm sorry, but you're really mixing two entirely different things here. If the "Persians" lead the way, then certainly not with their example of "attacking the Great Satan". Then, their biggest "attack" on the USA before 1979 was the Shah's drive to increas oil prices, in the early 1970s.Quote:
Regardless of motivation -- and erroneous assumptions, the Persians led the ME -- again, as they had for centuries. They broke the ice, so to speak in attacking the Great Satan -a and getting away with it. The Arabs then piled on -- ME way of warfare...:wry:
Quite on the contrary. What created the modern-day antagonism against the USA was a) Johson admin's decision to abandon the policy of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, after the 1967 War, and b) the Israeli victory during that War. This brought the al-Sauds and Wahhabists to the idea that a religiously motivated fighter can win wars, and from that moment onwards they began promoting and financing Islamist extremism all around the world. It's easy to follow this development on the basis of activity of various resistance/terrorist groups, (Palestinian as well as others): originally, they had nothing to do with religion at all (on the contrary, many were centrists or even leftists), nor were active against the USA. This began to change after the 1967 War.
And now watch the US reaction to this development: Al-Sauds became the "best friends", and their financing of the development of a major terrorist base in Pakistan was supported as well - with argumentation of the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Zia ul-Haq, who was instrumental in turning Pakistan into the Islamist quagmire as we know it today (with extensive Saudi financing), became Reagan's favourite and Pakistan was left to make its own nuke...
I'm sorry to interrupt here, but Nixon did not wait for the Munich attack: Kissinger began his tenure with ignoring Sadat's peace-proposal from 1970. That aside, the US intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict was already going on since at least 1969 (see deliveries of F-4s, which started in 1969 and prompted the Soviet intervention in Egypt, in 1970). It was continued through 1970 (see Kissinger's development of the politics of "ignoring" the Israeli nuclear weapons, and his ignoring of Sadat's peace proposal) and later on, all well ahead of Munich.Quote:
As a result of the Munich attack, Nixon directed...
One could draw similar parallels - once more related to Egypt - to Reagan's reaction to Sadat's assassination, in October 1981. That was the moment Egypt (plus Sudan at the time) was granted US$1 billion + in military aid for the first time, and the USA launched a host of military and intelligence operations against Libya (does "Early Call" ring any bells here?), which eventually lead to knocking out of that country, in the 1990s. Simultaneously, through all of this time, absolutely nothing has been undertaken to decrease the spread of Wahhabism by the Saudis.
Sorry, but this sounds very much like a misinterpretation to me. Khomeini was surprised by the take-over himself, at first, though he certainly did not wait for any letters from Carter before, only two days later, sending his own thugs to take over from the students. So, he did not escalate the situation because of Carter's (undisputable) "weakness", but for his own reasons.Quote:
The US is always more concerned with domestic politics than it is with the broader world. Nixon's effort produce some good results which were ignored. Carter totally mishandled the hostage crisis by actually sending the Ayatollah Ruhollah K. a letter saying he would not use force. Khomeini had been about to direct the Students (note that world, ponder Taliban and look at Tunisia and Egypt today...) at the Embassy to release the hostages but upon receipt of Carter's letter, told then to continue the march.
I never heard any Arab or Islamist complaining about this. I do recall, though, bitter complaints about the defeat of the "Arab issue" by the Israelis in Lebanon, and the Libyan deafeat (at the hand of a CIA-supported "liberation movement") in Tchad, in 1982. That's why I still find this analogy....well, without foundation.Quote:
Reagan Failed utterly in first sending troops to Lebanon in 1983, second in allowing State to tie their hands and thirdly in doing little to nothing about the Embassy and troop billet bombings and latterly by withdrawing -- that merely encouraged everyone to believe the US had no staying power.
Some of this is crucial for this thread. Particularly Reagan's "installation" of Mubarak and opening of the US military aid program for Egypt: without these two actions, who knows what would Egypt look alike nowadays...?Quote:
All of which is off thread. So if you want to continue this, let's do it by PM.
Continuing my attempt to understand Ken's flow of thoughts....
I think I understand your standpoint now, but have a strong feeling you're throwing quite a lot of unrelated events on the same pile, while ignoring the US involvement in many of them. At least you blame wrong people for attacks on the USA. I also don't agree with the premise of the US - generally - acting "lamely", or being provoked.Quote:
Try recomputing with that 1979 start date, see if that works, don't forget to count the Embassy bombings (all of them), attacks on the World Trade Center (all of them), the Barracks bombings (all of them), the aircraft hijackings and bombings (all of them) and I think you'll come up with a fair total over the first 22 of that 30 plus years. Not quite one major attack a year but not far off, either.
Throw in the ship attacks plus Viet Nam and Somalia -- which you may not deem important in this context but of which many in the ME and Asia are well aware and often cite, not least including Bin Laden and Zawahiri, the Egyptian and Abu Yahya al-Libi -- the Libyan AQ strategist.
<snip>
....its a view I've held for almost all that 30 years, certainly for the last 27 years, since the second Beirut Embassy bombing. As I said, I've been paying attention, you had no need to do so.
If you like, consider me a "Devil's advocate". I don't mind, since it happens often and I got used to that. My point is: as much as I can understand your standpoint, so I can understand the standpoint of those you say "provoke" the USA.
For example: the Iranians see themselves as provoked by the USA, time and again, and again, and again. Op Ajax in 1953 and installation of the Shah was just the start, some of them "insist" on it, others don't even care about these events, but some much newer ones. See; Israeli invasion of Lebanon which (as they see it) and the resulting oppression of the Shi'a in the south of that country - couldn't have been undertaken without US support; assassination of their charge d'affairs in Lebanon by (what they see as) an US ally (Lebanese Christians), and which was a signal for the onset of an "undeclared war" against the IRI; US support for Iraq that brutally invaded them and actually enabled Khomeini to firmly entrench himself in power in Tehran - but also led to the development of the IRGC as the major military, political and economic power in the IRI -; wholehearted support of Wahhabism on at least two sides of the IRI (in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) since the 1980s (I'll not involved various "Stans" to this consideration now); US treachery after Iranians supported them so much in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, and then in Iraq, in 2003; clandestine US operations to steer troubles between ethnic minorities etc. As you can see, their list appears even longer than the one you could offer as argumentation that the Persians are "provoking" the Great Satan...
Now, you are relating various terrorist attacks against the USA with the IRI, and see these are a result of "soft" actions of various US admins. But, why don't you "connect the dots"? Who are the crucial theoreticians of the AQ, and who were not only the 19 idiots from 9/11, but also those who bombed embassies in places like Nairobi? Who are the MBs the Israelis are so in panic about? Persians - or Egyptians and Saudis?
In what way are - for example - Islamists from Egypt that turned so extreme they are not accepted even by their own "brothers" (from the Brotherhood), related to the Persians?
Sorry, not the least.
Furthermore, if you continue connecting these dots...and to bring us back to the actual topic of this thread: don't you find it at least "curious" that the people that run the AQ and became involved in actions against the US, emerged after Mubarak came to power, and since the USA began delivering extensive military aid to Egypt? Prior to that the MBs did not care the least about Washington. If you study them more closely, you find out that their motivation has nothing to do with the Iranian Shi'a, but with the Saudi Wahhabists. They turned against the USA after the US troops "violated the holy soil" of Saudi Arabia, in 1990. They were trained by the ISI in Pakistan in projects financed 50:50 by the USA and the Saudis, and ignored by the US while spreading their ideas from Marocco and Nigeria, via India to the Philippines.
You also mentioned Somalia: as of 1981-1983, Somalia was a recipient of the US military aid, as a counter to the "reactionary and pro-Soviet government" in another former US ally - Ethiopia: I strongly doubt anybody in the DC ever came to the idea to study how comes Mengistu "turned" Marxist-Leninist (literaly) over the night. At the same, the US at least ignored provision of military aid provided by various Arab regimes to the Islamists in Eritrea...only to, 20 years later, find itself having to support Ethiopia against Islamists in Eritrea and in Somalia... Now, do you think Ethiopia or Somalia ever "provoked" the USA, or any US admin to have been "soft" to them too?
Shortly after writing this:
I browse around and note Sarah Palin saying this:Quote:
a post-Mubarak Egypt does not have to be an Islamist nightmare or an Iranian clone. Of course the Israelis, and a few others, will wave that threat at us in an effort to persuade us to try to shape the new Egypt to their liking, but that would be an effort well worth resisting.
Somebody really ought to remind her, and perhaps a few other people, that the US does not have veto power over who rules Egypt.Quote:
...information needs to be gathered and understood as to who it will be that fills now the void in the government. Is it going to be the Muslim Brotherhood? We should not stand for that...
Keyfaya is Arab for enough! this is a link to the RAND corporation study on the usage of social media and youth groups to cause regime change. Still reading the paper but there are some very strong parallels as to what is happening in Egypt......coincendence?????:eek:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG778.pdf
Americans will always have more in common with Persians than with Arabs, thus the irony of where we find ourselves today where Iran is cast in the role of "enemy" and so many Arab governments are cast in the role of "friend."
As CrowBat points out, we are attacked by the populaces of our allies, not the populaces of our enemies. That alone is metric enough to point out how out of balance the current state of governmental relations have grown to become over the years. Arab and Persian populaces both yearn for greater liberty and self-determination; greater infusion of democratic principles into the governments they design for themselves; and greater respect from the West than they have been shown over the past couple hundred years. But Persians don't attack us becuase they don't blame us for their current government. That issue is resolved. This, however is an unresolved issue in many Arab states where the people do blame the US for the state of their governance, and do attack us. None of these states have the wherewithal to attack us, even if they formed an alliance and called it a "Caliphate." Weak states are not threats to strong states. Populaces of weak states, however, can launch us into 10 years of GWOT tail-chasing. The game has indeed changed, but we liked to old rules better so ignored that little fact.
Egypt is important. Culturally and physically, it sits at the fulcrum point between Mediterranean Arabs and Arabian Peninsula Arabs; between West and East. It is an ancient culture and a true nation; as is Iran. As Anwar Sadat once said the others are largely "tribes with flags." There was a certain balance in place, but it was an artificial one, with far too many fingers on either side of the scale.
Because Egypt is so important there are a wide range of stake holders who are working a wide range of angles to push for status quo or change as they see best suits their respective cause. Some speak directly to advocate their cause, most take indirect approaches. They leak "intel" to someone who they know can and will leap to get in front of a camera and scoop the story; or they play on the biases of people like Ms. Palin to get her to stir up her base (as is Glenn Beck, Rush, etc). Similarly there are agents on the ground working agendas as well.
The irony is that the people are the ones who started this, the people are the ones who hold the true power to decide this, but it is the people who are the last consideration of most who are working hardest to steer events one way or another. As the world continues to evolve, it will be in finding balance points that the people buy into that will be the most powerful and enduring.
Amb. Bolton has said one thing that I agree with, and that is that the US needs to stop sending powerful and mixed message out into the airwaves, and needs to exercise a cogent plan of diplomacy behind the scenes and across the region. There is great opportunity here, but great risk as well.
So let me add to the confusion. :DQuote:
Originally Posted by CrowBat
ArAmCo was the nose of the Camel. No more, no less. A Camel that had FDR's full knowledge and support. Quite full. Devious old dude, he. Wanted to see British and French Colonies disappear the better for American companies to sell in those 'former' colonies and spheres of influence...
Re: The British and Soviets in Iran. True. Both those folks are soundly detested, the US is merely mildly disliked by most Iraniha. That is obviously a generalization but I believe it to be fairly accurate as such.
On Reza and Reza II the perception in Iran was, some years ago, that the US had lobbied for the old man and then been persuaded by the British to support the son and that the US did so. The 1953 coup was as you note supported by the same Clergy that did indeed steal the 1978 Revolution.
The Shah drove to increase oil prices in the 1969-71 period in an effort to convince the US to support his demand for more and better weapons which were being denied him by the then US Administration (my pet strory being the denial of sale of a dozen O-2s which the IIAF got around by ordering them from Reims Aviation...). It worked. The tale of how the Phantoms came to be sold is a cautionary tale in itself and I do not know all the details but do know US domestic politics were heavily involved and Kissinger just pushed the opportunity...
On the Johnson decision to increase support for Israel, you are of course correct and there is no question the results were much as you say and as the common knowledge hold. I did not address the US errors and shortfalls, errors and just plain stupid actions that in many cases led, quite understandably and correctly IMO, to the hostility toward us because, while germane to that hostility, I presumed they were all common knowledge and should be understood. They are of course important in context and in fairness but not important to my point of a pattern of US flawed responses. There have been many errors on both sides of this equation and they are not going to be easily forgiven. The good news is that the US attention span is so short, we'll get over it. For the ME, that is not likely to be the case -- and for the US, that should but may not be a cautionary.
Nixon waited for the Munich attack to get interested in international terrorism as a weapon. That was the point. The political maneuverings you cite were indeed provocative to the ME -- again, I did not mention US provocations that caused the, uh, rather intense dislike and resultant action that emanated from the ME. My point was that 30 years (from 2010-11 :D) of the not mentioned US provocations led to 30 years of ME provocations in an effort at retaliation (deserved, perhaps) and that the US failure to properly respond to those puts us pretty much where we are today. Let me emphasize that my idea of proper response was not and is not all military.
I think this:is not correct. Khomeini was indeed surprised (as to an extent were the Students themselves...) but he had very early notice from Brzezinski that no force would be used. Exactly what happened and his thinking, neither of us could know.Quote:
Sorry, but this sounds very much like a misinterpretation to me. Khomeini was surprised by the take-over himself, at first, though he certainly did not wait for any letters from Carter before, only two days later, sending his own thugs to take over from the students. So, he did not escalate the situation because of Carter's (undisputable) "weakness", but for his own reasons.
This is a valid complaint:to a great extent, particularly in that the posts you've read on this thread do not address US stupidity in many areas (though I have mentioned them in other threads). They were omitted for brevity (heh...) not to deny or obfuscate.Quote:
...but have a strong feeling you're throwing quite a lot of unrelated events on the same pile, while ignoring the US involvement in many of them. At least you blame wrong people for attacks on the USA. I also don't agree with the premise of the US - generally - acting "lamely", or being provoked.
The events are in fact unconnected -- but they are also a pattern. That pattern gets ignored by too many and can -- will -- lead to more US errors...
For example:I think you made my point...Quote:
In what way are - for example - Islamists from Egypt that turned so extreme they are not accepted even by their own "brothers" (from the Brotherhood), related to the Persians?
Sorry, not the least.
Furthermore, if you continue connecting these dots...and to bring us back to the actual topic of this thread: don't you find it at least "curious" that the people that run the AQ and became involved in actions against the US, emerged after Mubarak came to power, and since the USA began delivering extensive military aid to Egypt? Prior to that the MBs did not care the least about Washington. If you study them more closely, you find out that their motivation has nothing to do with the Iranian Shi'a, but with the Saudi Wahhabists. They turned against the USA after the US troops "violated the holy soil" of Saudi Arabia, in 1990. They were trained by the ISI in Pakistan in projects financed 50:50 by the USA and the Saudis, and ignored by the US while spreading their ideas from Marocco and Nigeria, via India to the Philippines.
A series of unrelated but flawed policies and perceptions on both sides; the ME as an entity and its multi varied polity and the US, equally multi varied; has put us where we are today. The US as the nominally more rich and seemingly powerful has an obligation IMO to be much smarter about what it does and how it does it -- but that does not remove the actions of varied actors from the ME over a period of years in a pattern that have led to yet more stupid actions.
The issue of this sub thread to me is that flawed US reactions to events trigger more events and thus the self replicating pattern becomes embedded. That cycle need to be broken.Not at all. What many in the world fail to realize is that the US government reinvents itself at 2, 4, 6 and /or 8 year intervals due to our political process. That is no excuse for blundering in policy and international relations but it is the reason for a good bit of it. Those elected on the cycles mentioned do not react to the international community -- they react to US domestic politics, period. Perhaps they should be more internationally aware (certainly many of us think so) and they are getting better due to enhanced communication (if only our news media were better -- but that's another thread) but US domestic politics drive much of our 'diplomacy.'Quote:
You also mentioned Somalia: as of 1981-1983, Somalia was a recipient of the US military aid, as a counter... Now, do you think Ethiopia or Somalia ever "provoked" the USA, or any US admin to have been "soft" to them too?
All the things you cite with respect to the horn of Africa are true -- but the point I was making was that Bush 41's effort to send US Troops to Somalis was flawed because we just sent targets (as did Regan in 1983...). That was exacerbated by Clinton's stupid directive to "get Aideed" and that in turn was not helped by the badly flawed tactics of JSOC and the Rangers; the upshot was that Clinton ordered a withdrawal and that withdrawal was seen by the would be desert raiders of much of the ME as a weakness. It was a weakness but it got misconstrued...
This sub thread is about misconstrueing :wry:
That said, Bob's World has some good points with which I agree also.