If you ain't Cav, you ain't...
Steve Blair
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Cavalry in the American Army has never really been a reconnaissance asset...I'd argue that recon and scouting has often been left to either outside contractors or specialized, ad hoc units formed and disbanded as needed by field commanders (again, something like the development of the LRRP units in Vietnam).
True on both counts I believe -- with one caveat; a few commanders have been reconnaissance fans and have allowed and / or pushed their Recon elements to do their job but that has certainly been the exception rather than the rule.
At one point in the early 1960s of 12 Cav or Recon Platoons in the 82d Airpocket Division, it was generally acknowledged that only three of those -- and none of them Cav -- were into recon work as opposed to economy of force, escort and palace guard missions.
In both Brigades in which I served in Viet Nam, only one Bn used their Recon Platoon as Scouts, the other two combined them with their AT Platoons and used them as mini-rifle companies (probably on the rationale that they had six M-60s...:rolleyes:). Needless to say, the mini-Cos had high casualty rates. Dumb way to do business IMO. In my estimation, of the max of 60 plus Inf Bns in Viet Nam, an average of only about 6 to 8 did Recon work and that varied over time. All the Cav Units I saw were pure combat elements.
I'm also convinced that the LRRPs were invented to fill that shortfall in reconnaissance assets caused by most Infantry Bns converting their Recon Platoons into economy of force units with a commensurate loss of capabilities -- and skills and the Cav units doing econ of force stuff (or major combat ops in the case of the 11th ACR). The LRRPs did some heroic stuff -- they also did some really dumb stuff because few Cdrs/S2/S3 knew how to employ them...
Tanker Steve:
You're right in my experience and observation. Saw both sides as a 19D in two Cav units and an 11F Infantry Scout in a couple of more back in the day when everyone in the Infantry was not an 11B (the troops in the Inf BG / Bn Recon Platoons were 11Bs, the NCOs were 11Fs, there were, thankfully, no 11Ms). I'd say more Inf Bn platoons played fall out one as you say than did not but some units were loth to allow that desirable unit syndrome.
Having been trained as a 19D at Knox (1950s) and having much later (1970s) helped train them there and having been through the old Infantry Intel and Recon course at Benning, I think you're correct. I'll also say that I learned more about reconnaissance (and the Intel side of things) at the Benning I&R School than I did -- or saw taught -- at Knox where there was IMO, excessive emphasis on the combat missions at the expense of the Recon missions. In their defense and as Steve Blair said, that's what the Cav units do more so than any recon work...
I mentioned before that a Cav COL recently told my son when he complained about the lack of stealthy recon skills in the US Army and the Armor heavy Cavalry Troops in the BCTs that "We don't have the patience to do that. We just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have Armor."
I think there's great accuracy and acceptance of current reality in that statement. I do not think there's much merit in it -- or the philosophy that underpins it.
I've always wondered how much of the current 'Cavalry' is a grasping for more Armor Branch force structure based on historic unit designations as opposed to a real desire for reconnaissance trained units. That sounds like a smack at Armor but it is not -- it is question that occurs to me often because I don't think we've really thought through much of our force structure, it's just sort of evolved and not always logically. Nor do I think we really have an appreciation for ground reconnaissance as a force multiplier.
Grabbing for something...
Ken,
Totally agree about the 'cavalry' units being an effort by Armor branch to have a finger in the pie. Right now we are using the 'cavalry' units as economy of force maneuver units, almost exclusively. And I agree that we probably don't have any patience for real stealthy reconnaissance work.
One example that I remember - as a 2LT newly arrived in my first battalion, we were training up for NTC and I found myself as the night battle captain. The battalion commander, a great leader who commanded a brigade in OIF1, used the scout platoon as guides for the tank companies. It was much more important to get his combat forces to their AOs/LDs, rather than knowing much about the enemy. The scout platoon, call sign 'Snake', soon was nicknamed 'Sheppard'. This was despite the fact that every tank had an IVIS and GPS. And this was back in the day of a 10-truck scout platoon and a 4 line company battalion.
But why don't we get it? Is it because real recon work is not readily quantifiable, compared to a tank gunnery? It is hard to train well, or even know if we are training it well, so why bother?
All these RSTA squadrons need to be revamped as infantry/combined arms battalions, with a single, robust RSTA troop in the BSTB. However, it would take more troops than you think as a single robust troop would probably require 2/3ds of the RSTA squadron, with their tiny formations.:(
Tankersteve
I now understand from whence a lot of Sniper myths are derived...
I said in this post (LINK) I'd order Spicer's book. However, my son who lurks here occasionally, called me and said he had that one and one other by Spicer and told me he'd send them for me to read and suggested that I could buy the one Spicer book he did not have. So I ordered "Sniper: The techniques and equipment of the deadly marksman." In the event, that arrived before the other two. Since Spicer probably makes pretty much the same points in all the books, I can comment on the one I have.
Not a bad book, allowing for the differences between the British and US armies, he seems to have it all down pretty accurately and reasonably. His wording is only occasionally hyperbolic -- but then, he's writing for a mass audience so that's okay.
The real problem is that unless one is careful on can absorb myths from his approach with phrases like this:
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"The sniper has for many years been the most feared man on the battlefield...it can be understood why he is often credited with mystical powers...if this man(leader) is taken out, the morale of the group can be seriously affected, if not destroyed. (all pp 112-3)
I dispute all those comments; never seen the fear, any delusion of power or a loss of morale if a leader is taken out in US or allied forces with whom I've worked. I have seen folks get annoyed but little more. So those are myths IMO.
He then discusses the ability of Snipers to slow or even stop both helicopters and Armor and follows that with
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Many reconnaissance soldiers resent the sniper...(pg 115)
He had earlier said that Snipers were feared and looked upon as assassins by fellow soldiers. I suppose if he said that those things occurred somewhere -- but I have never seen those reactions other than jokingly or semi-derisively and I think suggesting that potential to drop helicopters and stop Armor by Snipers is possibly a dangerous idea. More myths, I believe...
He provides a Sniper's Creed., Item 2: "Respect all Soldiers and use your own knowledge to assist and aid without fostering needless elitism." The Creed is sensible, Item 2 is really good and he mostly follows it -- but he does have a book to sell...
So, good effort but I wouldn't base any war planning on the book. In his defense, he does pay adequate attention to METT-TC and he does provide numerous cautionaries throughout the book. The problem may be that folks tend to home in the sensational and not the humdrum.
Nothing in this book refutes any of my experience. In fact it generally reinforces it so he didn't change my mind on anything.
However, some of the "I'm selling Sniping as a golden bullet (or trying to sell this book)..." verbiage is dangerously misleading if taken out of context.
Further deponent sayeth not...
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Originally Posted by
jcustis
Follow-on forces benefited to some degree, but the snoop-and-poop techniques did not support the tempo that was required by CFLCC, and we spent more time dashing forward than was probably doctrinally prudent. (emphasis added /kw)
Against a reasonably competent peer enemy; yep...
There's a time and place for both types of 'recon / recce' and the good leader or commander will use the correct one -- sometimes bad staff officers who forget they are not commanders 'require' speed that the Commander isn't even aware of because they think that'll please the commander. Staff types should just do their job and stop trying to impress the Commandante.
The old saw "There's never enough time to do it right but there's always time to do it twice" sort of applies. Some times you just have to trade bodies for progress or forward movement -- usually you do not but our impatience often leads us to do it when it is ill advised and totally unnecessary.
No Substitute for Being There
The Tom Ricks blog has the following quote from Gunner Keith, USMC:
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Technology. Used appropriately, can be a force multiplier. Unfortunately, Marines look at our technology as short cut tools. If I got my trusty G-Boss aimed down that road, I don't need to patrol it or if there is a boom in the area, no reason to go and investigate as I will just track it on my handy G-Boss. No doubt these things are impressive tools and can help considerably but nothing compares to a Marine being there or seeing it with his own eyes.
To read the rest click on the link below. This is the 12th in a series of tutorials by Gunner Keith on small unit tactics in the Ricks blog--they can be found by scrolling backwards through the blog.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ce_being_there
Cogent and accurate post, Reed.
As one who has been all three -- SF, Inf Recon and Cav -- I wholeheartedly agree with what you say. The SF intrusion into the reconnaissance and surveillance business was all about funding and mission turf expansion (and it hit at a low point in the fortunes of the US Army when McNamara's project 100,000 was in full bloom and training was being dumbed down). Spaces and budget slices. :rolleyes:
The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...
The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element and due to bad equipping decisions (and the aforementioned poor training system), Armor heavy and 'Hi diddle diddle right down' the middle oriented.
Much of our problem with recon is impatience -- some staff squirrel is afraid his Boss will ask a question he cannot answer so they drive their Recon elements into dumb situations and thus the perception that Recon is (a) too slow and (b) too dangerous to employ properly is thoroughly embedded in the heads of too many.
There are some exceptions to all the above but they are far too few. :mad:
Yes. It was a restorative period so far as
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Wasn't 1980-1992 supposed to be the great period of the U.S. Army resurrection after Vietnam and pot, before the bad, bad peace dividend a.k.a. Clinton??
personnel intake was concerned. Some very sharp enlisted and officer acquisitions as opposed to the 1970s dreg problem; thus my mention of McNamara's Project 100,00 (LINK), (LINK).
Aside from the problems that fiasco caused directly in the 70s and early 80s, many of those folks stuck around for 20 or 30 years and thus screwed things up far longer than they should have, they were also the real reason for the Army electing to adopt that dumbed-down Task, Condition and Standard training system. The 20 to 30 year dwell time of the 100K (actually, the total number recruited was greater) was the main reason that flawed system was allowed to stay -- it was all many could handle and in later years, they were senior NCOs... :rolleyes:
By the late 90s, that problem was gone, the training system was flawed and everyone knew it but too much was invested to change it even though it was not only an inadequate training process, it was virtually insulting to the really sharp and well educated enlisted and officer accessions from the mid 90s on.
Clinton wasn't responsible for the 'peace dividend' problem, George H.W. Bush did that. Clinton didn't know anything about the Armed Forces so he left them pretty much alone other than to misuse them in places like Somalia (which GHWB started but Clinton screwed up) and Bosnia.
Agree with you on the vehicles, problem is that to develop and field the ideal Recon vehicle would be an extremely expensive proposition and the fear that Recon assets are 'high risk' permeates the acquisition community. Their solution to low quantities with high risk is to not buy them.
Thus we have the M3 Bradley purchased as part of a deal between the then Chief of Armor and then Chief of Infantry, so we ended up with the Bradley and the Abrams because that deal killed off the M8 armored Gun system (just as well, that was poor vehicle also...)...
There are lots of options but Recon is not considered a vital skill in the US Army today so we likely will not pursue any of them. We were sort of going to but backed off (LINK). That will be regretted as soon as we have mid size or larger war. :mad: