The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion...blast from the past
I thought this might provie interesting. In the late 80s, beofre the SU collpased, they were ehading toward brigade based formations. Their first task was the Sov style CAB (see attached jpeg). Time, resources and the collapse of the USSR prevented this. It's still a desire, however, with the Russian Army.
From Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s (sorry, I don't have a more accessable link).
1 Attachment(s)
Who's the idiot who forgot to attach the jpeg....?
Outline of planned, but never completed, Soviet combined arms battalion (c.1989) courtesy of SASO (now FMSO) and Lester Grau...
Cavalry Squadron versus Reconnaissance Battalion
BLUF
In addition to conducting the full range of Combat (attack, defend, delay) and Security (Screen, guard cover) missions, Cavalry units are capable of conducting effective all three reconnaissance missions (Route, aone, area).
Our current Recon Sqdrons are only effective in conducting surveillance (watching and listening) and very limited "active recon" (most often limited to screening) against weak or passive opponents. With augmentation is the phase that is often thrown about to allow/enable the ARS to do other things/tasks/missions. Read, Rob Peter to pay Paul.
What makes the current set of Recon Squadrons so bad is their lack of organic capablity to develope the situation while in contact (read fight for information). Against a determined opponent, they will bump up against the front edge of his security force/zone and call for the commitment of the Main Body. Fine if that call does not come too early.
This is situation is made worse because both the division and corps are "out of the Cav business". No division or corps level units (other then a BCT) to fight for information and develop the situation prior to commiting the main body. No unit (other then a BCT) available for economy-of-force or deception missions. Taking any unit away from a BCT to preform these tasks/missions "breaks" that BCT.
BCTs need Fully Mission cabable Cavalry Squadrons to enable them to develop situations while the rest of the BCT is out of contact and commit the BCT at the time/place of the CDR's choosing vice the enemy's.
I take that a step further
Quote:
Originally Posted by
TAH
BCTs need Fully Mission cabable Cavalry Squadrons to enable them to develop situations while the rest of the BCT is out of contact and commit the BCT at the time/place of the CDR's choosing vice the enemy's.
Armored (Heavy), Infantry (Light) and Airborne Infantry (Light) Bdes need a Cav Sqn plus a third maneuver Bn. What's also needed are true Armored Cavalry Regiments (NOT Stryker units).
If we're going to have a total of an arbitrary (on affordability grounds) 60 Bdes, AC/RC, the IMO we should aim for:
10/20 Armored or Heavy
10/5 Infantry or Light
5/5 ACR
5/0 Abn Inf (aka Light)
The design of the Bns that comprise those Brigades is largely totally immaterial as long as they are anywhere near current or historic US norms and allow Commanders to rapidly tailor AND constantly adjust their force for METT-TC parameters *. Forcing them to do so would be even better until we improve our training...
If we temporarily have more Bdes, plus up the Infantry and ACRs only on a 1/1 ratio. For the Stryker fans, three to five of the Armored or Heavy Bdes could be Strykerized if one insists. While the stryker has merit, it is not adequately survivable of maneuverable for MCO. The 'medium ' role should be filled by the TRACK vehicle mounted ACRs, one of the best economy of force designs yet to appear. I'd personally go for more ACRs but the Inf / Armor communities would then squabble. :wry:
The Cav Sqn and ACR -- particularly the 1945-70 variants were the only organizations that offered true combined arms training to all members and young Cav LTs were versatile and flexible Dudes who could and would delegate...
For those who say Airborne units are unnecessary and obsolete, I totally agree BUT we have not developed, deliberately or inadvertently, the capability of otherwise moving and inserting a Bn or larger sized force 10,000 or so miles and getting it on the ground, a useful strategic capability. Until we do, that capability is better maintained than discarded. I'm aware of the traffic bump jokes. I'm equally aware of the damage LGOP (LINK) can wreak on Armor. The last three lines of the Rules are particularly to be noted. With perhaps emphasis on lines 5 and 8... ;)
I'm also aware of the capabilities and limitation of Armor units in the Guard. METT-TC... :cool:
* As the Actress said to the Bishop, it's not really what you have, it's how you use it... :D
When you commit military force to things you should not you have to compromise...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
B.Smitty
At the time, what would've been better? It was supposed to be an "interim", medium-weight vehicle. Everything would've been a compromise. Anything much heavier would push it into Bradley territory. FCS was supposed to be the objective system.
IMO, nothing would've been better. Literally.
What is the war fighting rationale for the Stryker and its cousins?
Essentially that they are cheaper, cheaper to operate (that old "you get what you pay for" thing again...) and are lighter, thus more transportable by air. Well maybe...
Quote:
The C-130 restriction was misplaced. But, IMHO, Stryker is a reasonable balance. Better than an armored HMMWV, but not a Bradley.
Most anything is better than an Armored HMMWV and I'm not a Bradley fan either -- it too was and is a compromise. All compromises are just that, effectiveness compromised for something else. We make too many politically oriented and acceptable purchases and both those vehicles -- and MRAPs -- are examples of that.
The basic problem with the Stryker and most wheeled combat vehicles (those that are truly agile being the exceptions) is that they cannot operate in the face of a reasonably competent, moderately well armed opponent. They are a peace time, look tough piece of equipment. They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.
Stryker's have fans, as do ASLAVs, Coyotes and similar vehicles. All are compromise vehicles; none are really survivable in heavy combat. Many say that's not a problem, we are unlikely to have such combat in the near term. I agree we are unlikely to have to do that, I do not agree that adopting lightly armored, marginally cross country mobile vehicles is acceptable in the interim. That for a variety of reasons including training (of all concerned...). Add in the procurement cycle and yet again we could -- hopefully won't but could -- enter another major war with an inadequate vehicle like the M2/M3 tanks in WW II or the M4A3E8s in Korea. Not really good planning. Not that anyone at DA is concerned with my opinion -- and I know that many disagree with me and that's okay. ;)
Stratgetic versus Intra-theater
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Pete
I thought the main impetus for the Stryker was the strategic deployability thing, it had to be transportable by the C-130. When I was doing Army Medical Department consulting work around 2001 medics got into this thing as well, the surgical ward in an expandable ISO shelter had to fit inside a C-130. Then 9/11 happened and our attention became focused on more urgent things.
The same thing happened years ago in '83 when my old unit the 7th Infantry Division went to the light TO&E. The division had to be transportable by a certain number of C-141 sorties, 600 if I recall correctly. That's all well and good, but what happens to them once they get there and start fighting? What we need is the ability to plus-up these austere TO&Es with attached units. During WW II straight-leg triangular infantry divisions had attached armor battalions. My first TO&E assignment was in a Corps artillery unit, 175mm SPs.
The C-130 issue was a fallacy, but was picked as the most numerous Intra-theater lift A/C.
Lots of techincal issues getting 15-18 tons of stuff inside a C-130, getting the A/C off the ground, flying a reasonable distance, landing with that much weight and then taking-off.
MOG (Maximum on Ground) is what feeling kicks butt. MOG is the total number of A/C that can be on the ground at the same local. Its a space to move around, taxi etc thing.
Built up time was measured in days not hours.
Do not Stagger into a Sagger; avoid the clarion call of the Kornet...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
SJPONeill
...indications seem to be that the nature of those 'current fights' may be more common in the near future than it was pre-2000 so there is probably a useful role for these vehicles and their units...
I agree that the indications are that. However, I strongly believe those indications should be changed and I believe they will be. The question is whether that change will be forced on the west after considerable waste or will be made early by not playing the opponents game on his pitch...
Western Armed forces who desire or at least do not object to such operations are making a bad mistake. Equipment influences policy; if you have a certain piece of kit, there is pressure to use it. Ponder that for a bit...
Quote:
Out of the US model, Stryker/LAVIII is a better choice for those smaller nations that do have to 'pick one' than either LAV-25, Armoured Humvee, or an MBT that they probably couldn't afford to run enough to meeting training needs...
I agree and said as much.
Quote:
the whole C-130 thing was a big red herring as the C-130 didn't have the legs to transport Stryker between theatres.
True. It was a politically oriented purchase and not a particularly smart one.
Infanteer:
Quote:
What are we supposed to use in combat than?
METT-TC. As I said it works in the current kind of combat. My counter question is why would you want to engage in this kind of combat? There are other options.
Quote:
Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won.
At what cost in those lesser vehicles? Also, many of those lesser vehicles weren't really lesser, most were smaller and far more agile -- most also were 'successfully' used in Northwest Europe. You guys had a lot of problems with the Staghound in Italy with a far poorer road net...
None were used in the Jungles and their success in Mountainous terrain was marginal. METT-TC...;)
Quote:
We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.
How many hit with even a Sagger, a Kornet, a 76mm, much less a 120mm or 125mm...
Quote:
It may be a compromise, but it's only a compromise between getting something like a Namer. I don't think all heavy combat involves driving into the teeth of tanks and dug in AT missile systems. In fact, I'd argue that doing that (while necessary at times) is foolish.
I doubt anyone would advocate that. I certainly don't.
The Piranha class of vehicles has uses, no question. It's a good, even great, vehicle for Paramilitary use. My dislike of the vehicle revolves around it's lack of capability for major combat -- and the fact that, as I remarked to SJPO'Neill above; if you have a piece of equipment, the pressure to use it is significant.
Thus I ask if we're engaging in wars of choice because we have a capability or do we need the capability because we must engage in wars of choice? I suggest the answer is the former and that it is unwise -- and I fully realize that such engagement is effectively a political and not a military decision. An LAV type vehicle is a policy decision, not an equipment decision. It may be driven by economic factors in less wealthy nations -- but neither the US or Canada have to buy it...
TAH:
Quote:
Styker = bad
Bradley = bad
HMMWV = bad
MRAP = bad
Jeeps = Good
In order:
Yes, period -- as a COMBAT vehicle against any reasonably well armed and trained opponent.
Yes in the sense that was a poor political compromise between the the then Chiefs of Armor and Infantry and really satisfied neither branches requirements; too small for the Inf, too large for Armor -- and the "Light Tank" issue.
The HMMWV is excessively large and heavy for most of its roles and is too small for others; it resulted from the Army's fetish for GP items, trying to make one size fit all instead of buying purpose designed equipment that's truly fit for the job it's supposed to do.
Yes, absolutely; it cocoons Joe nad he's reluctant to get out of it; it is big has low mobility and guys currently in Afghanistan tell me that the 'MRAP mentality' is definitely impeding operational success.
Jeeps are good for what they were designed to do -- be a small, light, unarmored utility car. They are not good trucks. The HMMWV was designed to be part car and part truck and it does neither job well. It was armored due to plitical pressure. I mentioned the jeep as a Scout Vehicle. Actually, we really need and have long needed a purpose designed light, agile scout vehicle -- I prefer unarmored because that keeps your Scouts honest; they don't begin to think they're immortal but Armored is okay as long as it's small and agile.
Quote:
As a serving member of the RC, we have made the shift as an institution from Strategic Reserve to Operational Force (on a rotating basis). There are issues, but they are not tactical or technical, they are administrative.
I think they're more than administrative but that's another thread. The question I ask is: Is that current policy wise and was it necessary? My answer is No to both; YMMV.
Quote:
A 50/50 spilt is possible but Make the Math work for you.
Whether it works for me is immaterial; what's best for the Nation -- not the Guard or the AC or any State(s) but the Nation -- is the point.
Quote:
AC rotates on a 1 by 3 cycle. RC is using 1 by 5. So each sides number should be divisible by those numbers.
That's designing a military force to cope with a domestic political problem. You may think that is necessary and / or wise and / or necessary or unavoidable. I think it is none of those, it's just taking the easy route. We can do better.
Policies can be changed easily and quickly -- sometimes by unforeseen events (think 25 June 1950 or 11 Sep 2001) -- Force structure changes are far more difficult, expensive and time consuming. I say again, do not design a force for here and now; ideally we'd design for five to ten years out but we're so bureaucratically sclerotic that we need to look almost 20 years out...
Quote:
If heavy combat means lost of heavy ATGMs and tanks, then any light or medium vehicle loses.
Umm. yes, that was my point. I'd add that agility can decrease losses and that in some othercases, losses must be accepted. I would like to keep that latter number low by using the best vehicle for the job.
Quote:
Our infantry carrier needs to be reasonably protected against man-portable RPG-type weapons (but RPG-29 can kill tanks) and mendium ATGMs.
I'd go heavier, Namer-like -- and fewer.
Quote:
IEDs are probably here to stay but for combat vehicle with good x-country mobility, get off the road and you avoind most/all IEDs. So naybe the V-shaped hulls and added belly armor are not really as important.
So called IEDs have been a feature of most combat since the late 19th century, they are the poor mans artillery. So I agree with you, get off the roads, use unexpected routes -- and do NOT fight poor people on their turf...
Quote:
Good study out years ago about x-country mobility. Up to about 12 tons wheels with 3 or 4 axels have comparable capabilty to tracks in most terrain sets. Deep sand, snow and heavy mud tracks still do better but cab still get stuck.
Anything can get stuck if you don't use it right and go dumb places -- that's a training issue and we do not do that well. I'm aware of a number of such studies. I'm also aware that the GM XM1 outperformed the Chrysler XM1 on all counts but that we bought Chrysler to help them avoid their first impending bankruptcy...
Good, specially selected and trained or experienced drivers can put wheels most places one can put a track -- problem is that new, poorly trained or just poor drivers can put tracks many places poor drivers cannot put wheels...
Quote:
Maybe part of this discussion should include a timeframe...10+ years allows us to start with a clean slate...All my comments are focused short term and seek to solve the issue within current limits. I want to do better with the same.
Understood but, no slam intended, you're in effect putting Bandaids ® on the problem. That's the Army way -- and that's why we are we are. My point is that is probably not where we should, could or can be. There's never enough time or money to fix it right -- but there's always enough to do it over. And over...
We aren't going to agree and that's okay.
However, anyone who really thinks decently trained Infantry is a speed bump is in for a rude awakening. There's a reason knowledgeable Tanker insist on Infantry accompaniment. So too is thinking three Javelins for a Platoon can always trump two likely to be dangerous...
I'm aware of the Stryker procurement rationales (there were several, which in itself is a clue to sloppy thinking at DA), I just do not agree with it / them. Don't have to, nor, obviously does anyone have to agree with me. I think it is a decent vehicle that has it uses. I do not think the US Army has any real use for it that would not be better met by other means. I also think the LAV 25 makes sense for the Marines. Ponder that...
My belief is that the IFV concept was a non-starter and should never have been pursued (as it was for the Bradley initially, yet another of its compromises *). APCs make sense and two flavors are needed. A heavy to accompany armor and a light for utility -- and not in direct MIC/HIC but for police/FID and similar action -- uses. IOW, had it been me making the decision, I'd have upgraded all the 113s to A3 Plus and six roadwheels with Soucy Tracks. It wasn't my decision, so that's that.
It's all about METT-TC and today's fight may not be tomorrows. The Bandaids ® are applied to the immediate wound and thus may not prepare one for other, perhaps far larger wounds that may require an air impermeable pad, lots of adhesive tape, a Large Battle Dressing and a bunch of Quik Clot. Nothing wrong with Bandaids ®, they have their uses -- and as I said, that's the Army way because substantive change is hard -- not impossible, just hard. I've watched those things applied all over the Army corpus for about 70 years and most have worked. They also, as I said, have put us where we are. So, yeah, they can work -- they can also obscure more dangerous conditions or lead to a false diagnosis.
I question if where we are is where we want to be or, more importantly, should be. IMO, so should everyone else be asking questions instead of defending the status quo or rearranging deck chairs...
* A reminder that designing future structure or equipment based on current fads may not be a good idea. IFVs were a fad; wheeled combat vehicles are a fad...
Agreed, but it looks like we're stuck with the fads we have for some time...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
I question if where we are is where we want to be or, more importantly, should be. IMO, so should everyone else be asking questions instead of defending the status quo or rearranging deck chairs...
* A reminder that designing future structure or equipment based on current fads may not be a good idea. IFVs were a fad; wheeled combat vehicles are a fad...
...so will re-arranging some deck chairs enable us to get more out of our fads? If neither the Bradley or Stryker is a good option for intented role would combining them at lower levels enable the strengths of one to make up for the weaknesses of the other until we have something better? That was my point when asking if considering something like a TRICAP brigade or cavalry regiment was worthwhile.