Once-Secret Iraqi Documents Offer Lesson for Libya
Once-Secret Iraqi Documents Offer Lesson for Libya
Entry Excerpt:
Once-Secret Iraqi Documents Offer Lesson for Libya by Yochi J. Dreazen, National Journal. BLUF: "An analysis of the documents by the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center found that Libya sent more fighters to Iraq on a per-capita basis than any other Muslim country, including Saudi Arabia. Perhaps more alarmingly for Western policymakers, most of the fighters came from eastern Libya, the center of the current uprising against Muammar el-Qaddafi."
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The more 'democracy' you live under, the harder you have to work...
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Originally Posted by
JMA
A political unwillingness translates into a military inability IMHO. How are soldiers supposed to do they job if they are not given the tools or not allowed to use them to maximum effect?
It's a bit more complex than that. The political problems are quite significant but there's also a purely military reluctance to do some things on two counts; marginal training has reduced trust and confidence making commanders, in some cases, reluctant to push out; there is a sensing that the political constraint will bring this to no good end therefor commanders are reluctant to risk people on adequately aggressive patrolling and missions. Add in the societally induced risk aversion inherent most everywhere in today's world and you have a recipe for unwillingness.
That unwillingness, BTW is not so much a decision, unconscious or otherwise, to avoid casualties as it is a desire to avoid waste -- not precisely the same thing.
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Yes, if you mean that a politically induced military failure leads an observer to question the military rather than the politicians.
Yes.
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Sorry, but I believe my analogy (using the Boer wars and Afghanistan) holds good. In both cases it took too long to figure out how to conduct those wars.
That's true as we both have said with respect to Afghanistan, I assume based on what I've read that it is also true for the British - Boer wars.
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The bad news in Afghanistan is that there will be no final battle or peace treaty to decide the end of the war, only another ignoble withdrawal which will go down in history as another war loss for the US.
Possibly true. We'll see.
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Tell me more... what did the Brits do?
This is an excellent summary:
""The Boer Wars are a reminder of how a relatively small force with solid local support were able to run circles around a large conventional army which was too slow to adapt to the conditions on the ground and the tactics of the enemy. It took a policy of scorched earth to finally break the back of the rebellion (a policy which the Brits would rather not talk about even today).""
Insurgents and the like will always be more flexible and innovative while displaying more decentralized initiative than any big Army -- size is an impediment all its own... :(
My point was that by attempting these incursions, we are playing to the opponents strengths and while some such interventions may be inevitable, most can be avoided by producing far better trained forces that do not have to undergo a learning curve in each new endeavor; by having better (just halfway decent... :rolleyes:) intel and more competent diplomacy. Militarily, we need to be more competent in the basics and to add the capability to conduct strategic raids with flexible forces as opposed to relying on mass and opponent attrition. The Pentagon has constrained the Politicians by having a too limited menu of capabilities. It also needs to get out of the diplomatic business and force State to do their job. We can't cure the domestic focus or electoral cycle problem but can fix those Pentagon related things...
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Not enough soldiers reject the politicians strategy while still serving (which is sad but pensions are important and al that).
Regrettably true -- also true is the fact that some stick around in spite of political tribulations to attempt to alleviate some of the damage as they know the Pols will always be able to keep digging down until they reach someone who will do even more harm...
Life, as they say, is just not fair...:wry:
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Yes as long as some precocious kid from some Ivy League university believes that when he is appointed to some position in government as a thank you for helping with a campaign he immediately is an expert in that field then the slope is still steep and the way down is still potentially far. Add to that the "smart guy" presidents and veeps (yes Obama and Biden) who don't don't know it from Shinola yet are framing military policy. The mind boggles. Its all very sad.
Cheer up, things could be worse.
So I cheered up and sure enough things got worse... :D
The Foreign Service Officers were long ago diverse and specialized.
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
Then in the late 40s they adopted many USN personnel rules -- including up or out -- and reduced the number of specialties and created the Specialist and Security subsets but Pete was referring to the 1980 Act that tried to produce 'generalists.' FSOs used to have more specialties IIRC but that changed with the 80 act -- which, if you'll recall is about the time the Army started playing with MOSC, ASIs and specialties in general.
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On the reserve-side of things; In Civil Affairs-land officers have the basic 38 training/classification plus Additional Skills Indicators...The Army is recently starting to think about ASI's again...but it's still very much a work in progress. :wry:
Agreed. I have noticed the recent addition of a slew of ASIs...
The effort to reduce the number MOSs and such, the number of specialties and specialists starts anew after every war and the resultant post war drawdown in end strength. It happened after WWII, after Korea, After Viet Nam, after DS/DS. As I see no attempt to improve our 1917 system, I suspect such a reduction will again occur in the not too distant future...
Anyway, postwar the number of variations is reduced and what then happens is another war with concomitant expansion occurs and the specialties naturally proliferate (but slightly different -- new watch in charge...). So the cycle -- and it is a cyclical thing -- repeats...
The CA field MOS / ASI aren't messed with by the Hoffman Building because the (quite necessary ) number of specialties doesn't impact their workload -- the USARC worries about them and doesn't trifle with 'em. :cool:
The brilliant 41s (or whatever they are today...) in that building do smart things to lessen their AC oriented daily workload. Like eliminate the 11M MOSC for enlisted people because in their view, all Infantrymen are illiterate, grubby and marginally useful -- so as it's easier to 'manage' just 11Bs instead of all those 11Fs, 11Hs and 11Ms. I'm sure the same thing occurred with Officer specialties but I haven't tracked 'em.
They produce a system that allows them to place small square pegs in large round and triangular holes. Then we wonder why some marginally competent people get some jobs -- people who'd be ideal in other jobs but are, regrettably, 'here.' :mad:
In the case of some issues, I'll tepidly defend the Per folks because many of their inane and non-supportive of the force rules are foisted on them by a Congress who values apparent 'fairness' above pure merit and competence. In the case of the skill numbers drawdowns, that barely applies -- that's pretty much a workload reducer. Well rationalized by claiming 'good personnel management practices, of course...' :rolleyes:
Don't forget about Black Swan Demand Side Events....
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
The immediate concern is that one or more major producers could suffer major production impairments at the same time due to sustained domestic conflict, and not be able to sell oil to anyone. That would result in a major price spike that would negatively impact us, and the Chinese, and the Europeans, and the Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Indians, etc. It wouldn't be US-specific and it wouldn't be caused by hostile governments refusing to sell to us, it would be a matter of conflict reducing available supply and forcing prices up.
OIL FUTURES:Nymex Crude Tumbles As Massive Quake Hits Japan, By Jerry A. DiColo and Sarah Kent Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, MARCH 11, 2011, 9:24 A.M. ET, at WSJ
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Crude futures fell sharply Friday after a massive earthquake in Japan, the world's third-largest oil consumer, though traders kept watch for any news of spreading unrest in the Middle East and North Africa.
Light, sweet crude for April delivery recently traded $2.92, or 2.8%, lower at $99.78 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Brent crude on the ICE futures exchange traded $2.40 lower at $113.03 a barrel.
Oil prices weakened as markets assessed the damage to Japan's refinery capacity and the impact on overall crude demand, as aftershocks from an 8.9-magnitude earthquake that hit earlier this morning continued to rock the country.
Japan does the most with least oil, By James Brooke, Published: Monday, June 6, 2005, NY Times
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But Japan is where energy consciousness probably reaches the highest levels. The second-largest economy produces virtually no fossil fuels, importing 96 percent of its energy needs - a dependence that has led to tremendous achievements in improved efficiency. France and Germany, where governments crusade against global warming, expend almost 50 percent more energy to produce the equivalent of $1 in economic activity. Britain's energy use, by the same measure, is nearly double; that of the United States, nearly triple; and China's almost eight times as high.
Tokyo Electric Tries to Cool Unstable Reactors, Avert `Three Mile Island', By Yuji Okada, Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuriy Humber - Mar 12, 2011 6:51 PM MT, Bloomberg
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The utility began injecting sea water and boric acid to cool its Fukushima Dai-Ichi No. 1 reactor, according to a statement today. The plant’s No. 3 reactor has been vented to release pressurized gas after its cooling system failed, said spokesman Akitsuka Kobayashi. The station lost power needed to keep the reactor core cool after an earthquake two days ago, the largest ever recorded in Japan.
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Radioactive cesium, a product of atomic fission, was detected near the site yesterday, indicating a meltdown may have begun, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency spokesman Yuji Kakizaki said yesterday.
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There are six reactors at the Dai-Ichi site. The unit being flooded, No. 1, is a General Electric Co. boiling-water reactor model that is capable of generating 439 megawatts of power and began commercial operation in 1971, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The Army MOS is 42 (personnel) these days....
...not that it matters, the job is still the same, and we still have our issues.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Then in the late 40s they adopted many USN personnel rules -- including up or out -- and reduced the number of specialties and created the Specialist and Security subsets
This was well before my time :wry: and I have no reason to doubt you.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
...but Pete was referring to the 1980 Act that tried to produce 'generalists.' FSOs used to have more specialties IIRC but that changed with the 80 act -- which, if you'll recall is about the time the Army started playing with MOSC...
My observations from on the ground are that FSO cones are for the most part staffed by folks highly skilled in their particular specialty. 'Observe and report', analysis, negotiation, and communication skills as well as a certain gravitas appear to be highly valued across the board.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
The effort to reduce the number MOSs and such, the number of specialties and specialists starts anew after every war and the resultant post war drawdown in end strength. It happened after WWII, after Korea, After Viet Nam, after DS/DS. As I see no attempt to improve our 1917 system, I suspect such a reduction will again occur in the not too distant future...
Agreed. Saw it after DS/DS-Fall of the Berlin Wall and am also seeing it now.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
.... all Infantrymen are illiterate, grubby and marginally useful -- so as it's easier to 'manage' just 11Bs instead of all those 11Fs, 11Hs and 11Ms. I'm sure the same thing occurred with Officer specialties but I haven't tracked 'em.
Agree with your implied point that out in most parts of the world brains, common sense, and capabilities are not limited to rank or 'specialties' and Commanders have say for a multitude of good reasons....:wry:
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
They produce a system that allows them to place small square pegs in large round and triangular holes. Then we wonder why some marginally competent people get some jobs -- people who'd be ideal in other jobs but are, regrettably, 'here.' :mad:
So Ken,...how do we fix this given that soldiering is a young man's job and DoD has a very bad case of mission creep when it comes to DoS and USAID personnel functions?
Should the specialties formerly known as CS and CSS be completely contracted out?
On the DoS and USAID side of things the exclusive pale, male, and Yale (DoS) and earth muffin (USAID) staffing pattern stereotypes who are afforded limited management/leadership training opportunities are not the answer that America needs either.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
In the case of some issues, I'll tepidly defend the Per folks because many of their inane and non-supportive of the force rules are foisted on them by a Congress who values apparent 'fairness' above pure merit and competence....
...out in the field we are always open to ideas.
Formal study, self study, coaching, and the encouragement of other career paths are the TTP's that I am familiar with and use...:wry:
All things that apply to Libya (potentially) and any other place we may have to operate...