Syria: a civil war (closed)

... I'm not necessarily averse to action. I'm not even necessarily and at all time averse to a bit of meddling. Before we contemplate action, commitment, and involvement,though, we need to get some things straight, especially when meddling is proposed.

We need to know our goal: what exactly do we want to achieve, and why?

We need to know and realistically assess the proposed method of achieving that goal, in detail.

We need to assess our commitment: what resources are we actually willing to commit, and do we have a realistic probability of success within those constraints? Is this goal something we want, or something we need? Do we have the political will to chew what we bite off? If we don't, better not bite it, because we'll likely end up choking on it.

We need to realistically assess the leverage we can and are willing to bring to bear, and its ability to achieve the desired goal.

We need to anticipate, to the best of our ability, the actions of those whose interests diverge from ours, and assess the leverage they can bring against us.

We need to assess the potential for unintended adverse consequences.

If those assessments come up unfavorably, or if we can only make them come up favorably by exaggerating our own capacity and will and underestimating those of our rivals, action may not be the smartest thing. Doing nothing, or very limited involvement, may not always be the most viscerally appealing course, but it's better than sticking your dick in a rat trap, diving into quicksand in an impulsive attempt to rescue someone, or sending forces out to achieve tasks that they are not equipped or trained to accomplish and that we are not willing to support to the extent needed for any level of success.

"Influence" isn't an abstract thing: either it's based on tangible carrots and sticks or it doesn't exist. If we don't know what the carrots and sticks are, the other guy won't know either, and he'll decline to be influenced. Any proposal based on the use of influence has to describe and assess exactly what carrots and sticks are to be used and how, just as a plan for military action has to be built around the capacities and constraints of the available forces.

Ken,

I actually agree with most of your responses, and I'm not sure when that personal transition took place. It started when I wondered I why I was in countries in helping dictators strengthen their militaries to oppress their own people in the name of fighting communism to free the oppressed. I joined the military, specifically Special Forces to fight communism, to save the world from this evil ideology and I really believed in the cause. I still believe in the anti-communist crusade, but in hindsight realize we made some stupid deals with the devil to achieve a temporary strategic advantage over the communists. There is no doubt in my mind that communism was evil, it resulted in the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed socieities and economies, etc., but shouldn't have given us license to be stupid. In some regards we lost our moral compass during the Cold War.

Fast shift forward to the 90s when we no longer had a boogy man to fight, we shifted to what some called global reconstruction efforts post Cold War, where we focused on peace operations, fighting the drug trade, still fighting terrorism (it wasn't new in the 90s, and it sure as hell wasn't new on 9/11), humanitarian assistance etc. We pushed multinational operations, trying to get other nations to "share" the burden of reconstruction. We enabled regional responses to security challenges, most which of course were largely funded by and led by the U.S.. I think our intentions for the most part were good, but were they really in the national interest? The people shaping popular thinking in the beltway then were pushing the importance of globalism, the End of History, integrating the disconnected economies (read developing world) into the larger global economic system, etc. It was very much about aggressive meddling diplomacy backed by military action.

9/11 gave reason to some of the opinion shapers to (such as CNAS) to accelerate our meddling, while others (more level headed in my view) wanted to limit GWOT to finding and killing terrorists that were a threat to us (not the rest of the world), not reforming global society in hopes of some permanet cure for terrorism by addressing underlying issues. We were naive enough to call this Smart Power, though little has changed. Sadly little of what we're doing can actually be tied to national defense (outside of the CIA and Special Operations), but instead it can be tied to supporting the idealism of a few (such as the great minds in CNAS) who promote that it is "our" responsibility to meddle and transform these poor countries, to fix their economies, to transform their incorrect political views, etc. Eventually they'll catch on that these are hostile acts and we're actually developing tomorrow's enemies who actually will be a threat to our Nation.

I'm actually beginning to think as a nation we have going collectively mad, and that this budget crisis may actually save us from ourselves in the long run. I'm still an idealist in many respects, but have learned the importance of moderation, listening to those who we want to help (who may not want the help we want to push on them), and the importance of keeping real threats to our nation as top priority, which doesn't mean during on the lights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is a great job for the UN, State Department and USAID.

That and a few HAH landings to jiggle the vertebra... :D

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

There is no doubt in my mind that communism was evil, it resulted in the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed socieities and economies, etc., but shouldn't have given us license to be stupid. In some regards we lost our moral compass during the Cold War.

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Yes to all that! In our defense, the whole world sort of lost it during the 60s; the world was changing, too few realized it, even fewer realized the extreme breadth and depth of the changes. We had a generation of moral and ethical floundering coupled with uncertainty on how to react and all that overlaid by the world's governing elites and many in Academe futilely trying to keep things from changing. I see hopeful glimmers that maybe we collectively are finally realizing we've been in a very different world for over 20 year and have not adapted well to that -- and that failure to adapt needs to be rectified. Things are looking up, only slightly but any up is better than more down...

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Fast shift forward to the 90s when we no longer had a boogy man to fight...It was very much about aggressive meddling diplomacy backed by military action.

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Yep. Bad news is that the system almost seemed to require a boogy man. It didn't, really but those who benefited from threats invented some to justify their existence -- or improve their lot.

The CoComs ended up with way too much power by default, not by design, the US government got redesigned by several Presidents who had inherited the WW II induced 'do something even if it's wrong' mantra and who were concerned more about their 'legacy' and their political party than they were about the nation -- in that they were ably assisted by a Congress that redesigned some programs to buy votes, pamper the middle class and insure long encumbency for them and success for their party. None of those folks were totally bad, most meant well -- but those factors had far too much influence on everything they did...

The result is a system that seems to require crises and meddling. :mad:

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Sadly little of what we're doing can actually be tied to national defense (outside of the CIA and Special Operations), but instead it can be tied to supporting the idealism of a few (such as the great minds in CNAS) who promote that it is "our" responsibility to meddle and transform these poor countries, to fix their economies, to transform their incorrect political views, etc. Eventually they'll catch on that these are hostile acts and we're actually developing tomorrow's enemies who actually will be a threat to our Nation.

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True dat. The 'Think Tanks' are a significant part of the problem as they, too must have crises of one sort or another to justify their existence.

I agree that some in the CIA and SOF are doing productive stuff -- but as you know, I also believe some are being badly misused. Losing the bubble is not restricted to inside the beltway...

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I'm actually beginning to think as a nation we have going collectively mad, and that this budget crisis may actually save us from ourselves in the long run. I'm still an idealist in many respects, but have learned the importance of moderation, listening to those who we want to help (who may not want the help we want to push on them), and the importance of keeping real threats to our nation as top priority, which doesn't mean during on the lights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is a great job for the UN, State Department and USAID.

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Not mad, we've just managed to dumb ourselves down to a significant degree and the so-called governing elite crowd who think they have all the answers are a part of that -- they do not want an educated, informed populace. Those kind of folks are way too much trouble to govern...:mad:

We might continue to slide until an existential threat appears and I don't think a mere budget crisis is enough to slow that slide significantly. Still, as I said, I see small but hopeful signs and I know we generally rally pretty well. Let's hope we do not continue to slide down too rapidly or too much to rally when that threat eventually appears. And it will. The kids'll handle it. They always have...

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If those assessments come up unfavorably, or if we can only make them come up favorably by exaggerating our own capacity and will and underestimating those of our rivals, action may not be the smartest thing.

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This, sadly, is where we and other states selfishly, myopically, and stubbornly, get it wrong all the time, even when we do a fair to good job at all the other stuff.

It appears that Russia and Turkey will not follow the joint call for Assad to step down:

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“We do not share the point of view of the United States and Europe in regard to President Bashar al-Assad,” the foreign ministry spokesman, Alexander Lukashevich, said. The Interfax news agency quoted ministry sources as saying that Mr Assad had done “quite a lot” on promised reforms, and that the pledge to stop military operations was an “important move”.

In a serious blow, Turkey also refused to join the calls for Mr Assad to go, saying the opposition was not yet united. Turkey, once a key ally of Mr Assad, had previously suggested it might be on the verge of turning against him definitively.

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Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...d-to-quit.html

Just a thought. Why not increase Western broadcasting to the region? The UK is stupidly reducing public funding to the BBC World Service, which IIRC uses transmitters in Cyprus.

I noted remarks yesterday that no decision has been made by the EU on stopping purchases of Syrian oil & gas (I didn't realise they had their own exports).

Is it possible to have a 'Boycott Syria' campaign? A ban on allowing Syrian Airlines flights into the EU, reducing diplomatic representation and a slowdown in international financial institutions.

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

It appears that Russia and Turkey will not follow the joint call for Assad to step down:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...d-to-quit.html

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I have to side with Russia and Turkey on this one. My fear is that those who work in the bubble of the White House are coming to believe that because they proclaimed that Mubarak and Qaddafi must step down, that that is why those leaders made or will make their decision on that topic. So that now they need merely utter those magic words and Assad will also "obey."

This is the same kind of thinking that got the senior leadership at DoD to believe that it was our surge of troops, or Clear-Hold-Build operations in Iraq that led to the that country turning the corner on stability a couple years ago.

Cause and effect. We are getting into a bad habit of drinking our own Kool-Aid.

Yes influence is a mix of tangible and intangible things. This is what the conversation must be about between our leadership and Mr. Assad if we indeed decide we have vital national interests at stake in how the situation in Syria develops. The goal for the US should be as simple as greater stability and enhanced US influence in a region/populace where we have not made many friends over the past 60 years. We should see the opportunity to make small, but important gains.

Whether or not Mr. Assad stays or goes is a matter between him and the people of Syria. Period. We need to STFU on that topic, in private or public. It makes us look like A-holes and cheapens our image, and thus influence, as a nation when we take such extreme positions that are so far outside our lane, and our interests to promote.

Call for each side to adopt less violent tactics? Sure.

Recommend focusing discussions between reps of the populace and the government on broad areas that historically the major drivers of such unrest?
(Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, Hope per my published model as a start point, but other areas as well). Sure.

Assad can no more kill or buy his way out of trouble than the US can order the problem to go away from afar. There are actions we can and should encourage; similarly there are actions we can and should discourage.

To go in with a starting position that "Assad must go" is no way to get to that discussion, and only serves to make Russia and Turkey look like the reasonable ones (And if no thinks that Turkey does not think that they deserve, and ultimately will, reestablish control over Syria they are missing the big picture. Anything either of those two countries promotes will definitely be crafted to advance their interests as they define them. We could learn a thing or two from old empires who have both risen and fallen in recent history).

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Yes influence is a mix of tangible and intangible things.

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I'm curious about this construct of "intangible influence". How exactly does that work? If it isn't tangible, how does it influence anyone?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

This is what the conversation must be about between our leadership and Mr. Assad if we indeed decide we have vital national interests at stake in how the situation in Syria develops. The goal for the US should be as simple as greater stability and enhanced US influence in a region/populace where we have not made many friends over the past 60 years. We should see the opportunity to make small, but important gains.

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So what's the proposed conversation going to be about? Certainly not about our goals, about which Mr Assad doesn't give a damn. What would you want to say to him, and why do you think he'd listen? Not as if he likes us, trusts us, or would believe anything we say...

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Whether or not Mr. Assad stays or goes is a matter between him and the people of Syria.

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Certainly so, but if we urge reform or try to promote reform under the existing government, we are taking sides on that issue just as surely as if we demand that he step down. If we do that we communicate clearly that we are content with the current government and that we believe it can change and that it should stay in place. Either way, we're involved and taking sides.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Call for each side to adopt less violent tactics? Sure.

Recommend focusing discussions between reps of the populace and the government on broad areas that historically the major drivers of such unrest?
(Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, Hope per my published model as a start point, but other areas as well). Sure.

Assad can no more kill or buy his way out of trouble than the US can order the problem to go away from afar. There are actions we can and should encourage; similarly there are actions we can and should discourage.

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I see much talk of calling and recommending and encouraging and discouraging here, but very little about what we can actually do to support the calls, recommendations, encouragement and discouragement. Without supporting action it's just words. Those words will not have any influence on Mr Assad unless they are backed up by credible carrots and sticks, and they won't win us points with the populaces of Syria or the Middle East either: they can recognize hollow talk as well as anyone.

At this point I don't see external pressure having any real influence on what's happening in Syria. Sanctions are not going to pull Assad off his road; he's committed to it and he's not going to reverse course. The only things I can see really changing the game would be internal. If the armed forces or a significant portion of them dump Assad and switch sides, that would be a game-changer, but there's little public evidence to suggest that's imminent.

The "we think Assad should step down" statement might be a message in open code to anyone thinking of staging a coup... but us outsiders wouldn't know about that.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

My fear is that those who work in the bubble of the White House are coming to believe that because they proclaimed that Mubarak and Qaddafi must step down, that that is why those leaders made or will make their decision on that topic. So that now they need merely utter those magic words and Assad will also "obey."

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You're kidding, right? Do you really think that State and CIA sit at their desks playing video games all day, and don't brief seniors? That's odd, because I certainly know folks who get dragged over the White House first thing in the morning to do precisely that.

There are no illusions that calling on Assad to go will change the situation in and of itself. However, calling on him to go:

1) strengthens the momentum of the protests
2) more generally helps position the US in the region vis-a-vis democratization/the Arab Spring/etc
3) reinforces the earlier move made Saudi Arabia

We can debate whether that is the right call--I think it was. However, there's no evidence that it was taken in a bubble (and if so, it was a pretty large bubble, since the entire EU did the same thing).

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1) strengthens the momentum of the protests
2) more generally helps position the US in the region vis-a-vis democratization/the Arab Spring/etc
3) reinforces the earlier move made Saudi Arabia

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Rex, this appears to be logical at the superficial level, but dig just a little deeper and these positions lose cool points quickly.

1) Our public statements convince the activists we'll help, so the protests do gain momentum, and while we haplessly watch several more get killed. Over time the relatives/friends of victims blame the U.S. for sending signals and then failing to act. Much like the Shi'a and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq after Desert Storm. Rise up and throw Saddam out, and we'll sit here and watch you get slaughtered.

2) If my 1) happends, then your point 2) is dead in the water.

3) Saudi doesn't defend human rights, it defends it interests and its interests are limiting Iranian influence in the region.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Saudi doesn't defend human rights, it defends it interests and its interests are limiting Iranian influence in the region.

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They lack our altruism, sir.

Such a call cuddles the domestic sense of importance, relevance and power - that's already almost all about it.

A comment on the Open Democracy website, which concludes:

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In the final analysis, sanctions are unlikely to produce the desired effect in time. Assad’s killing machine will continue to target civilians, but sanctions will suck the economic and political oxygen out of the regime.

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And ends with:

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Most important of all, sanctions will demonstrate that western countries are serious about ending the brutal crackdown on the protests.

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It also adds in some detail on Syrian oil and its impact.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/islam-q...t-syria-option

Just to tack onto Bill's point regarding the Saudis and interests. Those are the interests of a few men, a ruling family; not the interests of the populace or nation of Saudi Arabia. The larger interests are subjugated to the self-serving ones.

Rex, yes the White House receives briefs; and then colors that information in the context of the group-think within the bubble they live in (Just as we all do here on SWJ, btw, ;) ) . I suspect it is the same intel people who briefed Bush have been briefing Obama. You can see where that pulled the President off some aspects of the ideological platform he ran on (perhaps we should give all the candidates the "real brief" at a certain point in the process earlier than we currently do only after one has won). But the Obama White House has a reputation for being particularly singular in ideological focus and perspective. I couldn't confirm that, but the nature of decisions, messages, and approaches to all manner of problems tend to validate that perspective.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Rex, yes the White House receives briefs; and then colors that information in the context of the group-think within the bubble they live in (Just as we all do here on SWJ, btw, ;) ) .

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Hey, speak for yourself.

I still pretend that I'm almost immune to group pressure and group think! :D

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

1) Our public statements convince the activists we'll help, so the protests do gain momentum, and while we haplessly watch several more get killed. Over time the relatives/friends of victims blame the U.S. for sending signals and then failing to act. Much like the Shi'a and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq after Desert Storm. Rise up and throw Saddam out, and we'll sit here and watch you get slaughtered.

2) If my 1) happends, then your point 2) is dead in the water.

3) Saudi doesn't defend human rights, it defends it interests and its interests are limiting Iranian influence in the region.

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Syrian activists are well aware of the likely limits of US action, yet strongly supported (and indeed called for) both the call for Bashar to go, and the intensification of sanctions. Syrians certainly don't think the US will "act" in an interventionist sense.

As to the Saudis, no one in Syria thinks they're acting in the name of human rights (although the Sunni sectarian component to their Syria policy is, at present, not insignificant--and many Saudis few that as "human rights"). However, that in no way lessens the impact of increasingly strong GCC support for the Syrian protests. Saudi motives are relevant--Saudi actions are.

Two weeks ago I posted:

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I noted remarks yesterday that no decision has been made by the EU on stopping purchases of Syrian oil & gas (I didn't realise they had their own exports).

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Well now it is indicated at an EU meeting something has been achieved, according to our Foreign Minister, sanctions that are:

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Very significant..No new deals can be agreed on that (oil sales) after today into the European Union and that is 95 percent of their crude oil.

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Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ns-agreed.html

(Added) The Independent has some more detail:

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the detail of the agreement however, which includes an Italian amendment that allows companies to continue to trade with Syria under existing contracts until 15 November. Because oil industry agreements usually allow for 30- or 60-day payment periods, European oil firms could well be funding the Assad administration into 2012. The EU buys as much 95 per cent of Syria's oil. France, Germany and Italy are the biggest buyers.

The EU also banned European banks from opening credit lines for oil sales, and prohibited insurance companies from insuring the cargoes.

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Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...e-2348391.html



My reading is that means no new contracts, hardly 'significant'. The EU has agreed to the lowest impact possible policy.

A NYT story, which is based on some IMHO very thin evidence:

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Regional nations can assist the Syrian people and government in the implementation of essential reforms and the resolution of their problems

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Mr. Ahmadinejad said in an interview in Tehran, according to his official Web site. Other press accounts of the interview with a Portuguese television station quoted him as also saying:

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A military solution is never the right solution..

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Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/wo..._r=1&ref=world

A bleak assessment by IISS, in a Strategic Comment, which ends with:

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Reports suggested that the Assad regime initially reacted to Gadhafi's death by stepping up its brutal repression of protests. So the country could be in for a period of increasing violence. While the opposition may feel that too much blood has been shed for it to back down, its activists have failed so far to gather the momentum or cross-class consensus that would be required to challenge the government’s unity. The prospects of Syria emerging from conflict appear bleak.

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Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...-war-in-syria/

Some of the recent footage appears to show artillery and tanks firing on buildings, but still the opposition protest, invariably after Friday prayers. As before I rely on this website for updates:http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/...detention.html

Assad is clinging to a dream of a past that no longer exists. The populace dreams of a future that does not yet exist. In the middle there can only be compromise and evolution, or suppression and revolution.

Whatever the US does, or does not do, sends a message to the leaders and populaces of the region that are all in some stage of similar instability.

Certainly Western manipulations, over the past 100 years in particular, have served to disrupt and supplant the natural evolutionary processes of governance across this region in ways that we will perhaps never fully appreciate, but that contribute significantly, if not primarily, to the pent up popular energy exploding across the region this year, and to the surge of terrorism against Western targets since the waning days of the Cold War.

Does this role, this responsibility, somehow create a duty? Perhaps a moral one, but such duties are unenforceable and easily ignored in the world of flexible situational morality that surrounds such policy decisions.

If we selfishly put our own interests first (and that is what wise states do, but hopefully with a growing appreciation that now more than ever how the affected populaces feel about those actions matters), we will understand these events in Syria and elsewhere across the region for what they are and understand that there is a tremendous opportunity for the US to reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US if we act appropriately. This is an opportunity that never existed in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and certainly the nature of our engagement in either of those two countries has never been designed "appropriately" to maximize such effects either. In fact, they have in large part done the opposite. Can we learn from those experiences?

Like the US, Assad is don't what his instincts tell him he must do to survive, and like the US he is acting out boldly, violently, and inappropriately. He too misjudges the nature and the depth of this problem. He too rationalizes away his causal responsibility for getting into the mess he finds himself in today. But it is not too late for him in his country, or the US in her foreign policy, to turn this around. And the Saudis, government and populace, watch to see which way this falls as they plot their respective moves....

Step one is to recognize a problem for what it is and to take responsibility. In many ways that is the hardest step of all. Assad and Obama as individuals could both fall for making that proper step, but both of their nations would move forward in significant ways. Syria will be around for another 1000 years, Assad forgets he is just playing a critical, yet short role in the history of his country. He has an opportunity to either be the leader who forced old ways to drag on another decade or two, to be the leader who's vision and leadership lifted Syria into that new millennium. So far he is failing the test of history.

These events are a cross roads for the US as well, and decisions made will determine if we are as successful in the emerging era as we were in the era leading up to this period of transition. Certainly we have every opportunity to achieve even greater success in the future, but that will require us to be able to release ourselves from our own understanding of the nature and effects of our Cold War actions, both prior too, and subsequent to the Soviet collapse.

Meanwhile the drama continues to play out and the stakes are high, and whatever the US does or does not do in Syria, it will have much larger impact for the US on what it will be faced with everywhere else. This is not about foolish concepts of "responsibility to protect populaces" or duties to preserve existing governments; this is about having a vision for who we are and who we want to be, and an honest perception of who we are, and acting accordingly. There is no risk free option on the table, it really just comes down to understanding the situation and ourselves, and acting accordingly.

Like Assad, we must shift from seeking to defeat threats to one of seeking to resolve problems. We'll see.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

If we selfishly put our own interests first (and that is what wise states do, but hopefully with a growing appreciation that now more than ever how the affected populaces feel about those actions matters), we will understand these events in Syria and elsewhere across the region for what they are and understand that there is a tremendous opportunity for the US to reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US if we act appropriately.

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I'm curious... what action, exactly, would you consider "appropriate", and how would you expect it to "reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US"?

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I'm curious... what action, exactly, would you consider "appropriate", and how would you expect it to "reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US"?

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In general terms the US must come to grips with the fact that how others in general, and certainly those who live in the Middle East, perceive the US and US foreign policy far differently than the US government and US citizens view the same. That is not to say that either perception is accurate, or that one is better than the other, just to say that they are different. In this business, perceptions matter far more than facts. We need to understand that delta in perception. Agree or disagree, we need to understand and take it serious.

Next the US must shape, project, and nurture the perception that we are not for radical change, nor are we for the blind approval and sustainment of any particular government that we perceive as the best champion of US interests in that particular country. We similarly must not be for the promotion of US values and perceptions on democratic government that we have grown so fond of preaching as "universal" and the only "right" way to do things. Instead the US must simply go on record that we hold no corner on the market for good ideas on how to govern, but that for our own interests we believe that stability in the Middle East is important, and that the artificial stability of strongman regimes is proving to be an obsolete and failing model in the Middle East.

We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns; while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent.

Air strikes and public condemnations are not the best way to move these issues forward in a manner that also repairs public perceptions of the US in the process. Neither are invasions to change regimes, or train and equip programs that turn governmental thugs into more effective governmental thugs. We cling to the status quo for fear of the future. It is time for the US to rely less on the boldness of our military, and to seek instead bold efforts at private diplomacy.

The keys for the US are stability in the region and a repaired reputation. Any effort dedicated equally to both is better than any effort that ignores one for the other.

Dayuhan,

You asked Bob a question:

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I'm curious... what action, exactly, would you consider "appropriate", and how would you expect it to "reduce the likelihood of Muslim terrorist attacks against the US"?

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Bob has given his strategic viewpoint, much of which is dependent on perceptions in the Middle East IMHO.

Jumping into the discussion, can I answer the second part first? The hard core Jihadist is not the target here. It is those who adapting Bob's words far back are angry about US / Western / national policy and the currently seen future and doing our best to stop them becoming motivated too. IIRC we touched upon this in the thread after OBL's demise - the possibility that the Jihad's external legitimacy was reducing and so fewer would join up. If more people say 'No' that will have little impact, if more people say 'No and I will oppose you' that is significant. Opposition may include street protests against outrages, as seen in Spain over ETA after individuals were murdered.

Such an overt public stance and a covert stance by the public, say within the family will reduce in my opinion the likelihood of attacks.

It is interesting to note, the victor's media hype allowed for, the gratitude shown in Libya for NATO's help in national liberation. As Libya enters a new period it will be interesting to see if any Libyans go join the AQ Jihad.

Small things matter; such as issuing visas, as those stories spread and rarely with any explanation why there is a delay or refusal.

I wonder if some of those SA-24s that went walkabout from Libya might not show up in Syria. There probably isn't a group with greater immediate need than the Syrian protesters/rebels who want to fight it out.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns

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Non-violent approaches succeed because they typically emerge and grow when despotic governments no longer have the capacity or will to use coercive force against them. What happens when you encourage non-violent resistance against governments that still have the capacity and will to violently suppress resistance, and the people doing the resisting start getting shot, as in Syria? If you don't back them up, that's the last time anyone will ever listen to your encouragement. But does our populace have the will to get involved in other people's rebellions?

If we're going to "encourage" non-violent resistance, are we going to take responsibility for the consequences if people do what we're encouraging them to do?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent.

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What sort of "small changes", exactly, do you have in mind?

I don't see any point in "encouraging" actions if we haven't got tangible carrot-and-stick influence to back up the encouragement. Without that it's just words and it accomplishes nothing.

It all sounds very good when portrayed in the most general sense, but I can't see how you propose to translate it into specific policies and specific actions.

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Non-violent approaches succeed because they typically emerge and grow when despotic governments no longer have the capacity or will to use coercive force against them. What happens when you encourage non-violent resistance against governments that still have the capacity and will to violently suppress resistance, and the people doing the resisting start getting shot, as in Syria? If you don't back them up, that's the last time anyone will ever listen to your encouragement. But does our populace have the will to get involved in other people's rebellions?

If we're going to "encourage" non-violent resistance, are we going to take responsibility for the consequences if people do what we're encouraging them to do?



What sort of "small changes", exactly, do you have in mind?

I don't see any point in "encouraging" actions if we haven't got tangible carrot-and-stick influence to back up the encouragement. Without that it's just words and it accomplishes nothing.

It all sounds very good when portrayed in the most general sense, but I can't see how you propose to translate it into specific policies and specific actions.

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As I recall, the US had plenty of capacity when Dr. King applied non-Violence in the US; same as to the Brits in India and the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Your facts are either flawed, or you are allowing yourself to be confined by definitions of insurgency that only focus on the violent guerrilla warfare phase/tactics.

Even violent insurgencies often have their greatest success when they shift to non-violent tactics.

As to US influence, reports of our demise are greatly exaggerated. The US has TONS of influence. Granted, we'd have more if we squandered less, but to keep posting that we have no influence and that none of these leaders in the Middle East care what we think or do is simply groundless opinion. Now, as I say, we do need to change our approaches and apply our influence in more productive ways. Silly sanctions like we levied against Iraq, and now against Iran serve more to alienate populaces and strengthen despots than to produce the effects we hope for. Shouting at despots to step down from a bully pulpit in DC surely does more to steel their resolve. Sitting on our hands as Assad slaughters his populace and threatens to slaughter more if anyone interferes (can't help picturing the scene in Blazing Saddles where the Sheriff takes himself hostage...) sure offers great hope to the Saudis that they will have free license to come down hard when their populace attempts to take actions to the next level as well. Do not judge our influence by our poor application of it in recent years.

As to "taking responsibility for the consequences" of encouraging peaceful tactics, are you serious? It is not like we are calling for them to storm the Bastille and promising fire support and then not providing it at the last minute. We need make no such promises of direct support at all, even a promise of moral support and a willingness to work with whatever government might emerge is better than our our current course of "wait and see."

You make a couple of dangerous underestimations:

1. That of the power, will and influence of the U.S.;

2. That of the power, will and influence of an oppressed populace.

Others have made these same flawed assessments, and have not faired well for doing so.

Mr. Jones:

Aren't you buttressing Dayuhan's argument when you use examples such as the US gov, the British Gov and the Soviets of the late 80s? Citing the actions of two liberal democracies and a tired out, broke tyranny don't make your case very well. Your formula applied to a really tough place like North Korea is a recipe for mass suicide.

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Originally Posted by carl

Mr. Jones:

Aren't you buttressing Dayuhan's argument when you use examples such as the US gov, the British Gov and the Soviets of the late 80s? Citing the actions of two liberal democracies and a tired out, broke tyranny don't make your case very well. Your formula applied to a really tough place like North Korea is a recipe for mass suicide.

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No, his comment as I understood it was that non-violent approaches to insurgency only work where the government lacks the capacity to counter effectively with violence to force their will. The reality is that governments with tremendous physical capacity to counter insurgency have and will react to non-violent approaches.

For one, it is much easier to justify the use of state violence against the populace when the populace employs violence against the state first. Violent insurgents do not garner much support at home or abroad compared to non-violent insurgents.

Another important factor is that when faced with non-violence the government finds it easier to compromise without losing face. There is not "we lost the war so must submit"; but rather the ability to simply concede that they were wrong, make adjustments and move forward.

The Soviets had all the capacity in the world to turn Eastern Europe into a slaughterhouse, yet thankfully made the decision not to resist. That was not the most likely decision by a long shot. Presumably Mr Gorbachev determined that the costs (of all types) were not worth the benefits of maintaining the status quo. Certainly when I talk to Brits it was very much a cost/benefit analysis that drove their decision process in compressing the Empire and creating the Common Wealth.

Bottom line is that the employment of violent tactics by either the state or the populace is a choice, and does not define insurgency. Once one side goes violent it is hard for the other to avoid, but certainly for the populace it lends a credibility to their agenda that creates far greater challenges to most states than acts of violence do.

But didn't Dayuhan's comment talk about no longer having the capacity OR the will? If the despotic government doesn't have the will to shoot people down in the street, their physical capability doesn't matter. The Soviets didn't have the will in the late 80s but they had it in the decades prior. Liberal democracies in the 20th century never showed much will to shoot down people in the streets. The Kim family in North Korea has the will and any resistance there of any kind will get you killed.

We like to throw that "Lack the will" phrase around lately when others don't act that the way we'd like them to. Kind of like playground taunting, questioning one's courage to act. Fact is that most state are fairly pragmatic and do what they think will be best for them in the long run if they can get away with it. Simple Cost/Benefit analysis. Violence is only one way to raise the "costs" for a state. Populaces have options, and smart populaces employ those options. Perhaps they convince the state of additional future benefits of changing, or they leverage other types of costs in form of reputation, productivity, etc.

Most of us go through our daily business and rarely consider "resort to violence" as our go to move when confronted with a problem. Some states fall into that role, and many insurgent movements do as well. There are usually options, and violence is usually a choice. Not always, but usually. The facts are there for those who care to do 5 minutes of research, but those populaces who ultimately adopt non-violent tactics are the ones who have been the most successful in attaining their goals in getting a government to evolve that has shut off all legal options for evoking such change.

I don't understand. Are you dismissing the importance of "will", i.e. the willingness of a regime to violently kill people when confronted with resistance as a factor in determining whether non-violent attempts by the populace to change the regime or policies of the regime will work? I don't think you can do that. What most people or regimes will do is not important when trying to determine what a particular regime will do. If a particular regime is quite willing to cut 'em all down and not give a fig about what the world thinks, that makes a real difference as to whether a non-violent approach will work.

You are too casual when saying things like "Populaces have options...". Some have no options at all. That is why I keep bringing up North Korea. What are their options, other than conform or die?

Not dismissing will, merely noting that it is an overplayed concept in recent years.

For example, GIRoA does not lack the will to deal with the Taliban, they just do not see it as being in their interest to do so. Or in other words, they see greater benefit in maintaining the status quo than they do in effectively seeking resoultion of the disagreement. We blind ourselves to appreciating interests from their perspective, so we chalk it up as "lack of will." We do that a lot, and we are typically wrong.

have a pretty good track record across the spectrum of strong democracies, weak democracies and even weak autocracies - e.g., thread Threat or Opportunity: non-violent protest? (links to Gene Sharp and Albert Einstein Institute publications, here & here).

However, bring a strong autocracy (such as Stalinist USSR) into the equation and non-violent protest becomes a self-inflicted death sentence. The strong state security apparatus of a strong autocracy will simply kill you.

The only state in a position to do anything about Syria is Turkey - if the Syrian Freedom Army were more than an illusion, Turkish "volunteers", etc.

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Not dismissing will, merely noting that it is an overplayed concept in recent years...We blind ourselves to appreciating interests from their perspective, so we chalk it up as "lack of will." We do that a lot, and we are typically wrong.

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in others -- and ourselves, on occasion. Lack of interest does not equate to lack of will and it generally is predicated on a more realistic cost:benefit ratio...

Mr. Jones:

However you call it-will, choice, cost-to-benefit calculation etc., if a regime is going to kill people if they resist non-violently and have the ability to do it and don't care what the rest of the world thinks, non-violence is a "self-inflicted death sentence."

I ask you a question about a specific country. Your position as I understand it is outlined by the following quote of yours.

"We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns; while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent."

Now, would that work if applied to North Korea?

Regimes fall to insurrection when they're ripe to fall - no matter armed or unarmed insurrection.

A regime that has a very elaborate and effective surveillance and police state such as North Korea and is backed up by ideology is very, very difficult to dislodge because it's very, very entrenched.

The East German and Polish way of shaking such a regime off was to use the institutions of what Germans call Zivilgesellschaft (civil society?). Namely, they relied on churches.
The Poles were greatly reinforced by knowing that the Pope was one of them and the Eastern Germans used churches as rallying point for their weekly Monday demonstrations for a reason.

On top of that their oppression was founded on the reinsurance that the Soviet Red Army would assist in crushing insurrections - but that guarantee went away in the Gorbachev era and the people knew it. From that point it wasn't such a great leap towards shaking off the fear and break the state organ's morale any more.

North Korea is different in many ways. Their regime appears to be stable, not ripe for collapse.
Neither armed nor peaceful insurrection appears to have promise there right now.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

As I recall, the US had plenty of capacity when Dr. King applied non-Violence in the US; same as to the Brits in India and the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Your facts are either flawed, or you are allowing yourself to be confined by definitions of insurgency that only focus on the violent guerrilla warfare phase/tactics.

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I think you'll find that in each case where non-violent resistance succeeds, one of two things happens. Either the regime decides that it won't use unrestricted violence against the resistance (call it lack of will, lack of desire, whatever) or the regime tries to use unrestricted violence but the armed forces refuse to carry out the order.

If the regime is willing to use unrestricted violence and its armed forces are willing to do it, the resistance is either wiped out or goes underground and takes up arms. Look at Syria, in a vain and transient attempt to get back to the thread topic. Unless Assad's armed forces turn against him, non-violence is simply not going to work.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

As to US influence, reports of our demise are greatly exaggerated. The US has TONS of influence. Granted, we'd have more if we squandered less, but to keep posting that we have no influence and that none of these leaders in the Middle East care what we think or do is simply groundless opinion.

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Over whom, exactly, do we have influence, and what form does this influence take?

Influence is carrots and sticks, the ability to withhold positive incentives or impose negative ones. Any attempt to "encourage" action that isn't backed by those real, tangible, incentives is irrelevant and does little beyond underscoring our impotence. If we urge and encourage, get ignored, and do nothing, what does that achieve?

"Intangible influence" is an oxymoron. If it isn't tangible, it isn't influence. Nobody out there cares what we say or what we want: if we don't have the will or capacity to back up the words with meaningful action, what's the point in saying the words?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Sitting on our hands as Assad slaughters his populace and threatens to slaughter more if anyone interferes (can't help picturing the scene in Blazing Saddles where the Sheriff takes himself hostage...) sure offers great hope to the Saudis that they will have free license to come down hard when their populace attempts to take actions to the next level as well. Do not judge our influence by our poor application of it in recent years.

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Ok, back to Syria: what would you have us do? What influence do toy want to wield, and how, and to what ends?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

As to "taking responsibility for the consequences" of encouraging peaceful tactics, are you serious? It is not like we are calling for them to storm the Bastille and promising fire support and then not providing it at the last minute. We need make no such promises of direct support at all, even a promise of moral support and a willingness to work with whatever government might emerge is better than our our current course of "wait and see."

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So we encourage people to resist but tell them that if they follow our advice and the merde comes down on them, they're on their own. That sounds pretty meaningless. "Moral support" means squat when you're unarmed and getting shot.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

You make a couple of dangerous underestimations:

1. That of the power, will and influence of the U.S.;

2. That of the power, will and influence of an oppressed populace.

Others have made these same flawed assessments, and have not faired well for doing so.

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I think you're underestimating some things as well... like our capacity to make a mess, especially when we stick our noses into other people's business without accurately assessing the practical influence we can bring to bear in a given situation, the potential for unintended adverse consequences, and a number of other things. We haven't always fared well when we've done that before, and I don't expect that to change.

From VOA, Arab League: Syria Accepts Plan to Curb Crackdown (2 Nov 2011 at 8:50 pm):

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The Arab League says the Syrian government has accepted a plan to curtail its nearly eight-month crackdown on dissent.

The proposal demands that Syrian authorities immediately withdraw security forces from the streets, stop violence against demonstrators and release all detainees jailed since protests began – a figure estimated to be in the tens of thousands.

Officials say that once Damascus takes these first steps, talks with the Syrian opposition can begin within two weeks. It is still unclear whether talks will occur in Cairo, as the plan stipulates, or in Damascus.

Opposition representatives based outside Syria said Wednesday that President Bashar al-Assad's government had lost all credibility. They said even if the opposition Syrian National Council accepts the Arab League plan, protesters and activists would reject it. ...

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More details from VOA here and here.

From the Wash Post Editorial Board (several hours ago), the material question: Can the Arab League and Turkey stop the slaughter in Syria?

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If there is to be such protection, a pivotal player will be Turkey, which is reportedly already sheltering leaders of a rebel Syrian army in a refugee camp. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is furious with Mr. Assad, whom he had cultivated for years, for ignoring Turkey’s pleas to stop the violence, and his government has said that it is preparing to impose sanctions. Even “targeted” Turkish economic sanctions, as promised by its foreign minister, could help peel away the support that the regime still has from the Syrian business community.

Turkey could also formally guarantee protection along the border for civilians fleeing the regime as well as for defecting soldiers. And if that is not sufficient, it could carve out a buffer zone inside Syria, protected by a no-fly zone. As a NATO member, Turkey should enjoy the alliance’s backing if Syria responds belligerently.

President Obama reportedly enjoys a good relationship with Mr. Erdogan and has already spoken to him at length about Syria. Now would be a good time to press for a robust Turkish response to Mr. Assad’s crimes — and offer assurance that the United States will support a Turkish effort to protect Syrian civilians.

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The ball seems very much in Ankara's court.

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

The East German and Polish way of shaking such a regime off was to use the institutions of what Germans call Zivilgesellschaft (civil society?). Namely, they relied on churches.

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Gemeinschaft and gesellschaft typically get glossed as ‘community’ and ‘society’ in the U.S. if glossed at all. I suspect that the relationship between the state and gesellschaften is far, far more complex in Syria than it ever was in the GDR.

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Originally Posted by carl

Mr. Jones:

However you call it-will, choice, cost-to-benefit calculation etc., if a regime is going to kill people if they resist non-violently and have the ability to do it and don't care what the rest of the world thinks, non-violence is a "self-inflicted death sentence."

I ask you a question about a specific country. Your position as I understand it is outlined by the following quote of yours.

"We should publicly encourage populaces to seek peaceful, but powerful (history shows that non-violent approaches to insurgency garner far more international support and are more successful) approaches to advance their concerns; while privately engaging governments to encourage them listen to their people's reasonable demands and to seriously consider the small changes that history shows can produce such dramatic effects in calming populaces in this stage of dissent."

Now, would that work if applied to North Korea?

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From what little I have seen of the North Korean populace, there is little indicator that they are dissatisfied (currently) with their situation. When one controls information, one can control the populace. So, I suspect in many ways your question is moot, as insurgent causation is a mix of governmental policy and action as perceived by the populace. Currently North Korean popular perceptions appear to be largely acceptive of their fate. I suspect this will change in Korea as the populace there becomes more informed, and at that point, yes, I believe that such approaches will be insturmental to thier ultimate revolution of governance as well.

Popular non-violence is often met with governmental violence. But governments do not fare well in the court of public opinion when such clashes occur. We all know of Kent State for this very reason. We all appreciate the power of a lone Chinese citizen standing and staring down a Chinese tank.

The reality is that it typically takes a mix of violent and non-violent approaches when the government clings doggedly to a status quo that is no longer relevant in the eyes of their populace, but it is the unique power of non-violent resistance that sways domestic and foreign support to that of the revolution. The revolutionary remains the illegal actor and cannot escape that status, but once he attains the moral high ground he becomes a force of emense power.

It appears such shifts may be taking place as Turkey (who began their own revolutionary journey over a century ago, while Syria was a province and not a foreign land) weighs in. European powers peeled Syria off and retarded its social and political progress for their own interests. It is moving again, and it is appropriate that Turkey reach out to help stabilize that movement.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

From what little I have seen of the North Korean populace, there is little indicator that they are dissatisfied (currently) with their situation. When one controls information, one can control the populace. So, I suspect in many ways your question is moot, as insurgent causation is a mix of governmental policy and action as perceived by the populace. Currently North Korean popular perceptions appear to be largely acceptive of their fate. I suspect this will change in Korea as the populace there becomes more informed, and at that point, yes, I believe that such approaches will be insturmental to thier ultimate revolution of governance as well.

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I think the North Korean populace is plenty dissatisfied. I also think they are very very scared, and for good reason.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Popular non-violence is often met with governmental violence. But governments do not fare well in the court of public opinion when such clashes occur. We all know of Kent State for this very reason. We all appreciate the power of a lone Chinese citizen standing and staring down a Chinese tank.

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Remember how the Tiananmen incident ended up, please. The power of the lone citizen standing in front of the tank didn't amount to much when the order to fire was given and followed. Maybe the government didn't fare will in the court of public opinion, but the government is still there and very much in power. The demonstrators are not there, and many of them are dead. That's what happens when non-violent methods are brought to bear against a government with the will and capacity to violently suppress them.

I would appreciate it if we could, for the sake of accuracy, cease referring to "a populace", "the populace", "their populace" and all other constructions that treat a population as a unitary entity that acts and thinks as one. It's rarely if ever the case.

I'm still waiting for a specific recommendation for a policy response to the situation in Syria...

Yes, most Westerners "think" the North Korean populace (oops, too vague?) is "plenty dissatisfied". Certainly we would be if we were all transported to that nation and asked to live under that government. Their populace, however, was not transported there, has little awareness of how things are elsewhere, and we really have few accurate measures of how they actually feel about their situation.

You miss the point of the power of the image transmitted around the globe of the man facing the tank if you only measure it by the immediate tactical effect on Chinese reaction to reisistance. The strategic effect is what I speak of, on a global scale, and such things take time. Even revolutions are really little more than rapid periods of action within a much longer, slower process of cultural, social, political evolution. China is changing and the government there has no more ability to stop that there than governments do anywhere. Governments who persist too long in such efforts typically fall. Fear is indeed a powerful tool in keeping a populace in line, but at some point action overcomes fear. Every government knows they are little more than a lone man with a six shooter holding back the mob. This works until it doesn't work, at which point the mob wins (minus 3-6 who sacrifice for the whole).

As to what the President would focus on in his conversation with Assad? That is hardly worth speculating on here. The key is that he understand the dymanic at work and that he works to convince Assad that his Cost/Benefit equaition has changed, and that by changing his approaches from what "worked" (suppressed, not cured) for his father will he the son exceed his father as the one who leads Syria to a new future, rather than merely being one of a long line of leaders dedicated to holding Syria to an increasingly obsolete past.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

From what little I have seen of the North Korean populace, there is little indicator that they are dissatisfied (currently) with their situation.

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I don't know exactly what to think about a statement like this. It leaves me slack jawed in amazement. What it reminds me of most are the various journalists and other notables who visited the USSR in the 30s and reported back to everybody how good things were there. Please go to Human Rights Watch or the blog freekorea.us and read just a little bit.

By way of analogy, if the inmates of a super max prison were never allowed visitation or contact with anyone outside the walls, it still would be safe to say they didn't like things much.

(I wish I could have expressed myself less vigorously but I couldn't think how.)

People are not born, live and die in prison. It will always be the bad place they were sent to by "the man," who also prevents them from going back to where they want to be.

The vast majority of North Koreans were born there, and I suspect, have a very skewed perspective of what things are like elsewhere; addionally, I suspect they also are told that things that are obviously bad are the fault of others outside the state. To compare their situation to my own and judge them to be on the verge of revolt is to totally discount the critical truth about insurgency: It is not poor conditions, or lack of government services that creates an insurgent populace; it is how the popualace FEELS about their situation and who the blame that creates an insurgent populace.

It is just like the US to go by these reports you cite to launch some humanitarian relief intervention to liberate the people of North Korea from their oppression, only to soon find ourselves "slack-jawed with amazement" when we find ourselves neck deep in a resistance insurgency against our presence.

I hope things are better some day for the people of North Korea, and I suspect some day they will be. But I do not presume to translate that into an assessment that this is a populace prepared to revolt, or that they would be pleased for someone to come and save them from their plight. Both might be true, but we have no accurate assessment to base that upon.

Mr. Jones:

Nobody judged the North Koreans to be on the verge of revolt. I stated it was evident that very many of them were, to put it mildly, unhappy. You then converted that into something about whether they were on the verge of revolt, and for good measure threw in something about an expedition to liberate them from their oppression. Where did that come from?!

You missed the point of the analogy. I used super max prisons for a reason. Life in a super max is so terrible that how the inmate ended up there is immaterial, or it is for the purposes of the analogy.

I may seem to be belaboring a minor point (I can just see somebody using that quote now...), but this isn't a minor point. It is hard to take seriously an argument by somebody who can make such astounding statements about North Korea. Please, take a little time to read the North Korea reporting by Human Rights Watch or just about anybody else who covers that hellish place.

To get back to my original question, let's say for the sake of argument that many of the North Korean people were dissatisfied with things and wanted their gov to change. If that were the case, would your formula work?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Yes, most Westerners "think" the North Korean populace (oops, too vague?) is "plenty dissatisfied". Certainly we would be if we were all transported to that nation and asked to live under that government. Their populace, however, was not transported there, has little awareness of how things are elsewhere, and we really have few accurate measures of how they actually feel about their situation.

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How about this measure:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...soners-amnesty

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North Korea holds 200,000 political prisoners, says Amnesty

Report by human rights group cites ex-inmates and defectors' accounts of torture and executions in series of camps

North Korea's political prison camps have expanded substantially over the last decade and hold 200,000 people...

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Weren't you telling me, not so long ago, that Saudi arrests of dissidents (on a far smaller scale) were evidence that "the Saudi populace" was in a state of insurgency? I'm sure there's a portion of the North Korean populace that really believes the State line and is content with their daily cockroach and 4 grains of rice. There's probably a portion that vigorously supports the state (probably those that are getting a rat and a half-cup of rice as the daily ration, and thus feeling immensely privileged). There's also apparently a few hundred thousand that are troublesome enough to lock up, and that suggests that there are a whole bunch more who are a long way from happy but are understandably reluctant to be locked up. Life in North Korea outside the camps is bad enough that I wouldn't want to speculate on what it's like inside.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

You miss the point of the power of the image transmitted around the globe of the man facing the tank if you only measure it by the immediate tactical effect on Chinese reaction to reisistance. The strategic effect is what I speak of, on a global scale, and such things take time. Even revolutions are really little more than rapid periods of action within a much longer, slower process of cultural, social, political evolution. China is changing and the government there has no more ability to stop that there than governments do anywhere. Governments who persist too long in such efforts typically fall. Fear is indeed a powerful tool in keeping a populace in line, but at some point action overcomes fear. Every government knows they are little more than a lone man with a six shooter holding back the mob. This works until it doesn't work, at which point the mob wins (minus 3-6 who sacrifice for the whole).

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Sooner or later you have to back off from the grand global scale and deal with the specific conditions that prevail in specific situations... if we don't, there's really very little to discuss. The fact is that non-violent resistance failed at Tiananmen, and it's failing in Syria today. Unless a substantial portion of Assad's armed forces switches sides - and there's very little sign that it's likely - this is unlikely to be resolved on the side of the portion of the populace that's protesting.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

As to what the President would focus on in his conversation with Assad? That is hardly worth speculating on here.

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That's not what I asked about. I asked about policy options re Syria under current conditions, not about our conversation with Assad.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

The key is that he understand the dymanic at work and that he works to convince Assad that his Cost/Benefit equaition has changed, and that by changing his approaches from what "worked" (suppressed, not cured) for his father will he the son exceed his father as the one who leads Syria to a new future, rather than merely being one of a long line of leaders dedicated to holding Syria to an increasingly obsolete past.

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What good does it do to "understand the dynamic at work" if that understanding doesn't lead to practical, viable policy options? You say you understand the dynamic, so what policy options does that understanding lead to?

I do not believe that we are going to "convince" Assad of anything. Why would he listen to us? We're pursuing our interests, he's pursuing his. They are very different. He also doesn't like or trust us, and he's well aware that we are not going to back up our words with action.

Declaring that we want to keep Assad in power and persuade him to pursue enlightened reform is not going to win friends among the rebellious Syrians, who want him gone and don't believe (justifiably) that he will ever produce more than nominal reform.

Saudi despotism vs. North Korean despotism, and the impacts upon their respective populaces. Probably should be a separate thread that people spend some time thinking about.

Saudis are our allies, so that is good despotism, North Koreans are our enemies, so that is bad despotism. (I bang my head on my desk thinking that many actually believe this to be a sensible position to take)

Both governments have a pretty free hand at making thousands of arrests of those who dare to dissent with the official state position (even though both define "the state" as the views of a single, self-annointed family). Arrests without warrant showing probable cause; held without charge or habeus corpus. Most simply disappear.

Here is a critical difference. It is one of knowledge and control.

1. A populace drifts into conditions of insurgency (the fire is set, but not necessarily lit) when they come to perceive that they have lost control of the government (rather than the more widely held governmental view that insurgency is due to the government losing control of the populace...)

2. A government that can control information among their populace can control their populace, a government that cannot must acutally evolve to become responsive to their populace and employ influence and provide value.

The simple fact is that the Saudis can no longer control information to their populace, while my understanding is that the North Korean government remains fairly effective in that regard. So, when North Koreans are treated harshly or unfairly by their government there is no relative scale to judge that against. It just is what it is. This is increasingly not the case in countries like Saudi Arabia, and as our good friend Mr. Assad is learning, in Syria either. Again, it is not necessarily how the government treats the populace, it is how the populace feels about how the government treats them that matters most.

Assad is learning that even in his father's day one could get away with far more than one can today. The world is evolving rapidly in regards to information technology, and this is having a powerful effect on empowering populaces and in turn, changing the conditions within which governments must govern.

As countries such as North Korea become more connected, they will in turn become less stable. Likewise, already connected countries that cling to outmoded despotic models of governance (as assessed by their own popualces, our US and Western metrics are interesting, but not the ones that matter) are finding their rule faced with ever-growing internal dissent and popular challenge.

One can look at this in terms of "insurgency," or for those who see that as too military of a lens, one can look at this in terms of "sovereignty." From a recent product of mine:

"Sovereignty is a concept that varies by culture and over time. Sovereignty always exists within the populace, but to varying degrees it is delegated to the state to exercise and preserve. What the populace perceives is de facto (reality, or in fact), what the state officially proclaims is de jure (legal, or as defined by law). Where the two are in synch there is greater chance for stability, where the two diverge there is greater chance for instability."

There is a growing divergence of de facto perceptions and de jure definitions of sovereignty in many places, but particularly in the Middle East. No amount of increased security is apt to bridge those gaps, it will require the governments to evolve in terms of how they define their soverign duties as delegated to them by the populace to exercise on their behalf. From that same product:

"Perhaps one has a right (rather than duty) to control what is within their borders, but not a duty to control the border or what happens within it. The real duty is to protect the populace within that border from what comes across it. Efforts that become increasingly expansive, expensive and obtrusive in efforts to control are often counterproductive to the PRIMARY duty to the populace."

Governments must reassess what is their duty, and what is their right; what is it that their populace expects from them, and most importantly what it is they must control, and what it is they must merely influence to best serve their primary function of protecting the populace.

For governments such as the United States, with vast foreign interests, it is also critical to better appreciate where our sovereign rights and duties END, and where those of others BEGIN. Crossing those lines on occasion is necessary. Crossing them as a matter of course is dangerous and ultimately counterproductive.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Saudis are our allies, so that is good despotism, North Koreans are our enemies, so that is bad despotism. (I bang my head on my desk thinking that many actually believe this to be a sensible position to take)

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Who has said the Saudis are "good despots? It's a nation with which we have active trade relations. Their purchases of arms are very useful to our defense industry. It would be very inconvenient to us if they were to cease producing oil or produce a reduced amount. It would be very very inconvenient if the oil they control were to fall into the hands of a directly hostile power. How does "good" or "bad" enter into any of that?

It's not as if the Saudis are a client state, or a dependent, or as if we can control or affect the way they deal with the various factions of their populace.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

The simple fact is that the Saudis can no longer control information to their populace, while my understanding is that the North Korean government remains fairly effective in that regard. So, when North Koreans are treated harshly or unfairly by their government there is no relative scale to judge that against. It just is what it is. This is increasingly not the case in countries like Saudi Arabia, and as our good friend Mr. Assad is learning, in Syria either. Again, it is not necessarily how the government treats the populace, it is how the populace feels about how the government treats them that matters most.

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Here we go again with "the populace". Whether we're talking about Saudi Arabia or North Korea or Syria, there is no "the populace". There are people who oppose the regime. There are people who support the regime. There are people who oppose the regime with deeply varied and often incompatible interests, desires, and objectives. there are lots of people who are neither supportive nor opposed.

200,000 in prison camps suggests that the North Korean control of information is not as complete or as effective as you suggest. The lack of active opposition (not that we'd know if it was there) suggests that efforts to scare the people into submission have been successful. The Saudis do a good bit of scaring themselves, though they have the added advantage of having produced enough prosperity that a large slice of the populace is more afraid of disorder, and possibly losing what they've got, than they are of tyranny.

When was Assad ever "our good friend"?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Assad is learning that even in his father's day one could get away with far more than one can today. The world is evolving rapidly in regards to information technology, and this is having a powerful effect on empowering populaces and in turn, changing the conditions within which governments must govern.

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As I've said before, I think the impact of information technology on these situations is largely speculative and undemonstrated, and way overrated. Revolutions occurred before these technologies existed: people find ways to get information, and to communicate.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Governments must reassess what is their duty, and what is their right; what is it that their populace expects from them, and most importantly what it is they must control, and what it is they must merely influence to best serve their primary function of protecting the populace.

For governments such as the United States, with vast foreign interests, it is also critical to better appreciate where our sovereign rights and duties END, and where those of others BEGIN. Crossing those lines on occasion is necessary. Crossing them as a matter of course is dangerous and ultimately counterproductive.

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As I've said before, this all sounds lovely in the abstract, but where does it get us in terms of actual, practical policy... in Syria, or anywhere else?

I asked this question before, trying to get back to Syria... an answer might be edifying:

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What good does it do to "understand the dynamic at work" if that understanding doesn't lead to practical, viable policy options? You say you understand the dynamic, so what policy options does that understanding lead to?

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Dayuhan,

You worry about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. I for one, have little interest in such debates. The more important insights are not found in the immaterial details of such arguments.

Cheers!

Bob

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

You worry about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. I for one, have little interest in such debates. The more important insights are not found in the immaterial details of such arguments

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I worry about translating deep abstract ideas into actual practical implementable policy because until you get a policy out of it the deep thinking really isn't doing you any good. If it doesn't pay off where the rubber hits the road, how is it helping you?

I have to wonder if the disinterest in discussing the practical application of these ideas stems partially from the sense that the ideas might not hold up so well when practically applied.