Portugal tried to play the same game with its colonies. Can't work when the people living there are second class citizens.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
So then it could be classed as a war of succession.
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Portugal tried to play the same game with its colonies. Can't work when the people living there are second class citizens.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
So then it could be classed as a war of succession.
I agree, but ignoring all the personal commentary, and cheap shots aside, that is NOT WHAT I SAY!Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Sorry, but you are very deliberately putting words in my mouth in the most simplistic form possible, and I have explained this to you before.
a.) Killing is instrumental to warfare. Yes/No?
b.) You kill only as many as it takes to set forth the policy. If the other side gives up when you've killed 2 pet hamsters, then you stop.
War is a human activity. Central to that is the breaking of will. I am only interested in killing,wounding,capturing enough to break the will of those remaining, - in the service of policy.
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Wilf, all cheap shots aside,
I think every body agrees that warfare roots are found in killing the adversary in the service of a policy. So let's look at the "kill, kill, kill" issue in terms of efficiency.
There must be a reason why you prefer neutralising the opponent by "killing" him rather than arresting and detaining him. There must be a benefit that capturing does not provide. Otherwise, you just need to capture and detain in high security the maximum of opponents.
Also, in low intensity wars/liberation wars, it is also proven somehow that killing the opponent does reinforce the adversary will. Just as JMA said, in a societal system where you have second class citizens, killing them does reinforce the feeling they have to be abused and then reinforce the opponent support. It does makes it more dangerous but also reinforce the conviction that the loyalist army and police are "racistes". That's what happenend in Algeria and France (Taking apart Mr Papon whom case is pretty clear).
Bigeard, Trinquier and Massu were hardcore anticommunists but they have been also perceived as the arm of a racist administration enforcing racist policies (and it was the case in fact, at least for the policies).
It is not what I "prefer". It's context dependant. There is usually a need to kill enough to make the rest give up - break their will to continue.Quote:
Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange
Sometimes, especially in irregular warfare, I want to capture people to help exploit the intelligence benefits, - or serve the policy of using the criminal justice system.
Killing is not the policy. Killing is an instrument of policy.
I am really pushed to make it simpler than that.
I never said or implied "Kill, kill kill." That is a gross, and possibly deliberate misrepresentation of what I have long suggested.
It is not proven. It is an observation devoid of the context of policy. Kill the wrong folks, for the wrong reason and you will not break will of those you seek to set forth the policy to.Quote:
Also, in low intensity wars/liberation wars, it is also proven somehow that killing the opponent does reinforce the adversary will. Just as JMA said, in a societal system where you have second class citizens, killing them does reinforce the feeling they have to be abused and then reinforce the opponent support.
When faced with a revolt, or rebellion, by your own population, you have to stop them gaining political advantage via violence. If you do not, then you fail as a Government, and simply cease to exist. - Unacceptable to most political entities.
Again, read what I write: Use Armed Force, against Armed Force - not against those whose death would undermine your policy.
In the early stages of an insurgency that is the time when (legal issues permitting ;) the leaders of the insurgency need to be 'neutralised'. By the time the army have to get involved the shooting has either begun or is inevitable. At this stage it can only get worse when incidents like Bloody Sunday in NI happen. So any "kill, kill, kill" policy must be narrowly focussed on the insurgents. Collateral damage is inevitable but may be unavoidable if the insurgents are to be separated from the people.Quote:
Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange
Killing is just one of many means of disarming the enemy leadership (and thereby reduce its repretoire and prospects to the point at which they give up).
Any focus on killing and neglect of more refined options is detrimental because the "kill" option has already earned a lot of attention thanks to its obviousness.
Wilf; look at the island hopping strategy. An Admiral Nimitz who followed your approach would not have hadthe idea to bypass Truk, but would have considered it to be a target full of killable soldiers.
Another example is Kurland 1945; Stalin would have had his Red Army attemptto eliminate this pocket at great cost if he had followed you. That was entirely unnecessary, for it took less troops to keep the army cut off in the Kurland pocket than it would have incurred losses to attempt an elimination. The approach with greater finesse (keep 'em cut off) was clearly superior to a kill frenzy.
Strange, why do you always write about killing only?Quote:
I am only interested in killing,wounding,capturing (...)
And again; I already gave a list of additional options beyond that triad, less obvious options that require more thought and are often near-perfect substitutes of KIA because they have the same "disarming" effect against the enemy leadership.
Again: CvC mentioned that the enemy leadership should be disarmed in pursuit of breaking its will. The key here is that their options need to be minimized (and we all know that killing insurgents does not minimize the options of insurgent politicians for long). According to Clausewitz, taking away the hope for a successful military (organized violence) effort compels them to accept your terms.
That isn't about KIA/WIA/POW only at all.
Maybe the influence of Leonhard on you can help to explain another shortcoming of your approach; underestimation of countermeasures.
An insurgent that's being hunted, hunted, hunted will become more elusiuve, more elusive, more elusive - and expose himself only to incompetent opponents, such as civilians. Or he adopts tactics that don't expose him much (mines). That's where the conflict in Afghanistan has been for a while. The "kill kill kill" approach has already reached its dead end there.
Your approach overemphasizes the obvious and clouds the view for tactical/operational/strategic approaches that require more finesse.
That's why I put of opposition to your views here. I don't argue for a war without killing. Instead, I point out that the potential for further advances isn't to be found in such obvious things as the effect of killing enemies.
It takes much more intelligent approaches to add improvements on ~5,000 years art of war.
Huh? Sorry you are talking drivel. I would have isolated Kurland just as Stalin did. What do you not get?Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Ever read the paper I wrote on isolation, as part of suppression? No?
I don't. Yes I mention killing a lot, but always in the context of the use of armed force against armed force. - Kill, capture, destroy - aimed at the breaking of will. Kill so as the rest give up!Quote:
Strange, why do you always write about killing only?
Hurrah. You get it...and this can be achieved with no killing, capturing or destruction?Quote:
According to Clausewitz, taking away the hope for a successful military (organized violence) effort compels them to accept your terms.
I have repeatedly and consistently stated my position on this, and nothing had changed.
Sorry Sven, you are plainly having some issues here with me personally. If you do not get it, then I do not know what more I can do.
Maybe you're just not aware what impression you leave with your writing?
I have issues with approaches to warfare that let me expect unnecessary hardships in the next war. To win by killing as many opponents as possible is among the bloodiest imaginable approaches to warfare.
You should be well aware that you do usually emphasize the "kill" aspect in threads enough to justify being paraphrased with "kill! kill! kill!". You didn't do that to the same extent here, and I do strongly suspect that this was done purposefully to reduce the vulnerability of your position to my critique.
And yes, will can be broken even without kill, capture & destroy having provided any meaningful contribution to it (although that was a strawman argument of yours because I did not argue about their absence, but about the low promise of your approach).
Strategic level example; make diplomatic (and military) progress that mobilizes several neighbours of your enemy as your soon-to-be-allies. They all become potential adversaries of your enemy, he will fear a multi-front war against terrible odds and may give up in a limited conflict (to seek a quick peace by negotiations would at least be a rational choice, and thus be well in the realm of the possible).
Operational level example; deception operations suggest that the enemy won't be able to hold his line, additional offensive preparations motivate him to leave his positions in favour of better defensive positions to the rear.
Tactical level example: Again deception, visual and acoustic impressions - even the mere threat can break the will of a tactical commander. Some (especially limited) wars (such as border conflicts) can indeed be won by simply routing a single regiment or brigade.
Killing is not a particularly promising approach for forcing the enemy to give up in any but the strictly tactical level. Killing fanatizes both sides. It makes it harder to negotiate a moderate peace (because even the own people become more extreme), raising the amount of effort that you need to succeed. It does also activate a lot of resistance will on the upper levels of war (strategic, political, national moral).
A smarter approach would be to keep the flame of war small, for most things are easier then. Think of the French; their morale didn't fully break during WWI even though there were mass desertions in 1917. Their morale was extremely brittle after only about nine months of drôle de guerre, though. A lot of killing during those months would have fired them up, motivated them to invest more into their army's training and improved their overall resistance readiness.
And then there's the example of bombing campaigns. The typical idea is that more bombing increases the likeliness that the enemy gives up.
Yet, a rational analysis shows that the more you destroy, the less he's got left to lose. The threat shrinks.
The credible threat of destruction is actually a greater political lever (at the peace negotiations table) than actual destruction. The sunk costs fallacy can even reinforce this effect; some people want to fight on simply because they cannot accept that such great suffering was for no good.
I'd also like to point out that Germany lost WW2 despite being militarily better equipped and about as well manned a few months before its final defeat than at the outbreak of hostilities. WW2 battles saw much killing, but the local (tactical), regional (operational) and strategic overpowering was the key to success.
The killing, capture and destruction part merely aided the overpowerering effort, and the overpowering would also have worked in a drôle de guerre because the allies would still have had many times as many aircraft, tanks and men by 1945 after six years drôle de guerre - even if no side fired a shot.
Overpowering does therefore earn at least as much attention as the destructive activity of warfare.
Overpowering does fit into CvC's "disarm" if you keep in mind that at excessive force ratios your inferior forces become useless and you're therefore in such a situation de facto disarmed, incapable of expecting success by further military resistance.
War among states is a continuation of (dumb) policy. I believe we also agree that war does not put policy to a rest till its end. Policy goes on, and becomes a part of the war. The artificial separation of combatant and political actions in war that was introduced after the age of kings leading armies makes little sense.
Political actions can substitute for military actions (kill, capture, destroy) and can be extremely powerful.
Some wars in history were won (or prevented) by cutting the enemy's connection to a creditor!
There's so much more than kill, capture & destroy. These three obvious activities are understood even by Third World Colonel-dictators. We should seek the potential for improvement of the art of war in aspects of warfare that have (by comparison) been neglected in military theory because they were less easily accessible.
Sorry, but my position on this, is utterly consistent. I am not aware of being vulnerable to anything other than invention. You cannot capture unless you kill or threaten to kill. That which destroys also kills, etc etc.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Yes, I do emphasise killing (kinetic effects). I do not and have never said pursue it to the exclusion of all else. Killing is only instrumental. You will never get the enemy to surrender, until you have done him some collective harm.
The reason I feel it necessary to emphasise something this obvious is because people here get confused as to the aims of applying armed force, within the context of politics. Armed force means killing - and the things that flow from it. - Capture, breaking of will. IF you are not using armed force, you are using politics and diplomacy.
Strategy uses all instruments of power. Thanks for the lesson.Quote:
Strategic level example; make diplomatic (and military) progress that mobilizes several neighbours of your enemy as your soon-to-be-allies. They all become potential adversaries of your enemy....
Well I do no believe there is an "Operational level," but OK. Deception Operations? And... Deception operations are predicated on fear of harm/death. Deception is aimed at surprise. Surprise aims to make him unprepared for the harm you will do him.Quote:
Operational level example; deception operations suggest that the enemy won't be able to hold his line, additional offensive preparations motivate him to leave his positions in favour of better defensive positions to the rear.
Again, all nice in a perfect world of poor enemies, and stupid people.Quote:
Tactical level example: Again deception, visual and acoustic impressions - even the mere threat can break the will of a tactical commander....
So Japan surrendered because it wasn't really worried about the next bomb?Quote:
Killing is not a particularly promising approach for forcing the enemy to give up in any but the strictly tactical level.
The US withdrew from Vietnam because they could risk another 60,000 KIA?
So what you are telling me is that killing is not the best way to break will?
Seriously? After 3,500 years of organised violence, you want some "better way?"Quote:
Killing fanatizes both sides. It makes it harder to negotiate a moderate peace (because even the own people become more extreme), raising the amount of effort that you need to succeed.
Give men specifics relevant to the use of force, that can break the collective will. I am of the opinion that Psychological parlour tricks do not work.Quote:
There's so much more than kill, capture & destroy. .
As both Foch and Clausewitz warned, I have little patience for the idea that wars can be won without killing. - and I think it can be done better.
a)Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Cut his lines of communications. The amount of required killing/capturing/destruction is almost marginal in comparison to the effect; the enemy will likely withdraw (= broke his will to hold the line or advance).
b)
Please do not repeat that strawman argument yet again. I did not advocate warfare without killing. I advocate improvements of the art of war with smarter approaches than to simply increase the intensity of violence.
A 10 y.o. kid can tell you that killing, capturing and destruction is successful in its computer game. The worthwhile military theory advances need to be pursued in other areas than the primitive & obvious.
Besides; wars can occasionally be won without much killing. That's a niche solution that's not universally applicable, though.
Those who don't should limit themselves to military history and should not discuss modern military theory, for it would be a waste of time.Quote:
Seriously? After 3,500 years of organised violence, you want some "better way?"
Yes, I want it to be done better, and for a reason. We had no really major conflicts for 65 years, a similar period as the ~40 years without conflict between modern European great powers before 1912. We are not prepared, and peacetime improvements of military theory can substitute for some bloody lessons the next time politicians really f+*~ it up.
As I said before, I'm a big fan of Isolation, at all levels. As concerns the conduct of operations, I'm firmly rooted in orthodox proto-modern warfare. - and you isolate to enhance destruction. Isolation cannot guarantee destruction.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
OK, that's your opinion. I think you are wrong, basically because most armies are not actually that good at warfare. Most people do not and cannot do "primitive and obvious."Quote:
The worthwhile military theory advances need to be pursued in other areas than the primitive & obvious.
- I just want to do the simplest thing that works and that can be taught in a simple way. At the end of the day you are trusting your ideas to very frightened young men who do not want fancy complicated stuff.
The you wont have to kill that many to find that out. - you cannot plan for it.Quote:
Besides; wars can occasionally be won without much killing. That's a niche solution that's not universally applicable, though.
I'd forget about the theory. I am beginning to think "Military thought" is a largely a pseudo-science. I have just read JFC Fullers 1922, "The Reformation of War." - it's garbage - like a great deal of military theory.Quote:
We are not prepared, and peacetime improvements of military theory can substitute for some bloody lessons the next time politicians really f+*~ it up.
The question I ask is "can this be taught?" If it can, then it might help.
Maybe it's time for a new signature?Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Maybe. We do need a solid theoretical grounding for strategy, tactics, operations and equipment capability.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
...the problem is most is very bad, and will always be meaningless unless it translates into, or supports practice.
I admire his service, but think he was a moral coward.Quote:
Originally Posted by M-A Lagrange
He would have cursed de Bollardiere for condeming torture during the war, and then cursed Paul Aussaresses for admitting to it....
Hero and hypocrite...
I used Netflix to watch "The Battle of Algiers" on line yesterday.
This is indeed a "must see" movie for anyone involved in any way with our current operations in the Middle East; or even for those who have no direct involvement at all but are trying to understand what is going on and why.
I was surprised by the depth of understanding of insurgency and the balanced approach to telling the story from both sides. An impressive piece of work. Put this on the shelf next to your copy of Galula; and well in front of your COIN FM.
The Algerian War was from 1954 to 1962.Quote:
Originally Posted by Seabee
Can't see the point in judging the French (torture) actions based on current sensibilities. Look past it and see that much can be learned from that war.
David Petraeus Wants This French Novel Back in Print!
Why Jean Larteguy's The Centurions appeals to our generation's most influential military strategist.
http://www.slate.com/id/2282462/Quote:
A copy of Jean Larteguy's The Centurions, an out-of-print French novel about paratroopers in Indochina and Algeria, can go for more than $1,700 on Amazon. That's reason enough for its republication this January by Amereon LTD for a list price of $59.95. But when I called the publisher, Jed Clauss, it turned out money wasn't his primary motivation: "Look, I'm an old guy," he said, "I'm at the end of my publishing career. I now only do fun projects. But David Petraeus wanted this republished. So I'm doing it."
Sounds like a great read and true dyed in the wool story of colonial soldiers fighting against all odds to suppress the flame of liberty among the oppressed populace of their colony.
"Centurions" is an accurate title. The Roman business model was "conquer and tax" and it was their Legions that made that business model work.
Which brings us to the sad accuracy and insights into our current approaches in this quote from the article Adam links to above:
So, if cause of the populace is a liberty free from the illegitimacy of some foreign intervening power, what exactly would one call that "counter-cause"? This is what happens when such operations are given to the military to resolve. It is far too easy to become intoxicated by the thrill of the hunt, to become obsessed with the accomplishment of the mission, etc. JSOC has become extremely good at what they do. What we are missing is a context that asks the question of if what they do produces any good.Quote:
In one of his last major interviews, McChrystal told the Atlantic: "We in JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] had this sense of … mission, passion … I don't know what you call it. The insurgents had a real cause, and we had a counter-cause. We had a level of unit cohesion just like in The Centurions.
I sat in too many morning office calls with the Commander, where the other two "tribes" would regale the commander with tales of "HVTs" killed in the night, or truckloads of opium stopped and burned in the desert. Truly some exciting, impressive operations on a near nightly basis. But to what effect on addressing the insurgency or addressing the danger of AQ? Then to lay out the persistent, populace focused efforts of the third tribe across the vast expanses of battle space where few conventional forces venture and where the other tribes only stayed long enough to kill, burn, count and leave. To (albeit rare, and from one BG in particular) comments like "Boy, the other guys are rolling up JPELs like crazy, when are you guys going to do something?"
Some of this is ignorance, and is curable. But stupid is a life sentence.
Bob's World:
You should probably read the book. It doesn't sound like you have. The characters are motivated primarily by anti-Communism. That is how they saw themselves. They didn't see themselves as colonial oppressors. Whether their self-perceptions were accurate, who knows? But they saw themselves as holding back the Communists.
On another question, I read in so many places that night raids and numbers counting are doing us a world of hurt. Do you think that true and will they ever be stopped? From what little I know, they fell in love with these things in Iraq, where it worked; and use them enthusiastically in Afghan, where they don't.
SORO, Dec 63: Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria, 1954-1962
Quote:
The objective of this case study is to contributeto increased analytic understanding of revolutionary (internal) war. Specifically, the study analyzes the Algerian Revolution by examining two types of information in terms of their relationship to the occurrence, form, and outcome of the revolution:
(1) social, economic, and political factors in the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary situations;
(2) structural and functional factors of the revolutionary movement, such as the compositionof actors and followers, revolutionary strategy and goals, organization and techniques.
The study is not focused on the strategy and tactics of countering revolutions. On the premise that development of U.S. policies and operations for countering revolutions--where that is in the national interest--will be improved by a better understanding of what it is that is to be countered, the study concentrates on the character and the dynamics of the revolution.
Thank you.
Cheers
Mike
Book Review: Identity in Algerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule
Entry Excerpt:
Book Review: Identity in Algerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule
by J.N.C. Hill.
Published by Lynne Reinner Publishers, London, United Kingdom and Boulder, Colorado. 2009, 209 pages.
Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN
With recent and rapid changes gripping the Middle East, it is vital to go beyond the headlines and read a few books to understand nuance and context. Jonathan. N. C. Hill is a lecturer in the Defense Studies Department at King’s College in London. His most recent book is an in-depth look into the complex political history of Algeria with a focus on the impact of colonialism on this nation that has seen more than its share of political violence. Algeria is home to al-Qaida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and therefore is of special interest in America’s global counter-terrorism effort. The introduction offers an excellent essay on the betrayal of the French reason for colonizing Algeria in 1832, that the French has a civilizing mission. Yet no aspect of French liberty ever make to the Arab Algerian populace. What evolved, according to the book, are a series of laws and privileges that gave increasing civil liberties and outright power to the pied-nior (French settlers in Algeria). One ubiquitous law passed by the French, was the consideration of granting French citizenship to Muslim Algerians, only if they renounce their faith. The book does a marvelous job in laying out the imbalance of rights between the French settlers and the native Algerians. A zero-sum game developed in which any granting of rights to Algerians was perceived by French settlers of Algeria as an erosion of their privileges.
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Algeria: The Undeclared War - A Review
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From the BBC 'France's war in Algeria explored in Paris exhibition' and the opening paragraphs:An important passage IMO, citing the museum's director Gen Christian Baptiste:Quote:
On the 50th anniversary of Algerian independence, it might seem an odd choice to mount an exhibition marking 130 years of French colonial rule over the country. But at the Army Museum at the Invalides in Paris, that is exactly what they have done. Algeria 1830-1962 is a look back over France's long military presence there.
A historian adds:Quote:
There is no one truth about the Algeria war...There are many truths, and we have done our best to reflect all of them. The difficulty is that even after 50 years the suffering is still very raw. In many cases, the pain has been handed down from one generation to the next.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18343039Quote:
They say that memory divides. Only history heals. That is why it is the task of historians and politicians to tell the full story - from all sides.
Amongst the three linked BBC stories is one on the film Battle of Algiers and it is almost as SWJ / SWC readers had been to see:Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13728540Quote:
Yacef Saadi, the Algerian guerrilla leader whose memoirs of the independence war formed the basis of the film, La Bataille d'Algers (The Battle of Algiers), which remains one of the most compelling studies of insurrection and counter-insurgency ever recorded.
As SWC readers will know that film has a special place in America's desire to learn and IIRC features in several threads.
Moderator's Note
I have re-titled this thread and merged a small number of threads to this one, after adding the post above on the current French exhibition. More merging done, four threads moved in.
These are linked threads which are not suitable for merging:
French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=858
Restrepo and The Battle of Algiers: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11004
Ambush, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5585
Obviously simply searching for Algeria will bring back nearly 200 threads and not all refer to the historical contest.
A short article in the e-journal Perspectives on Terrorism:Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/.../view/229/htmlQuote:
explores a less well-known episode in the history of terrorism: The Red Hand (La Main Rouge). During the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962) it emerged as an obscure counter-terrorist organisation on the French side. Between 1956 and 1961, the Red Hand targeted the network of arms suppliers for the Algerian Front de Libration Nationale (FLN) and executed hits against rebel emissaries both in Western Europe and in North Africa. Today, there is consensus among scholars that the Red Hand had been set up by the French foreign intelligence service in order to strike at the subversive enemy. This makes the Red Hand a telling example of state terrorism and its capacity for unrestricted violence in emergency situations. Since the Red Hands counter-terrorist acts ultimately proved to be futile and due to the repercussions caused in France as well, the case study also highlights the limits of this type of counter-terrorism.
Hat tip to Bill Moore for sending a link to a US e-journal CTX; within is a review of this book 'The Harkis: The Wound that Never Heals' by Vincent Crapanzano.
Using locally recruited troops in contemporary COIN is a frequent subject on SWC, the story of the Harkis remains relevant today, obviously in Afghanistan and other places where an exit is likely.
Link: to the e-journal November 2012 issue:https://globalecco.org/ctx-vol.-2-no...26C364DB59786C the review is on pgs.74-76 'The Written Word' https://globalecco.org/the-written-wordQuote:
Based on a combination of archival research and face-to-face interviews, Crapazano’s results are riveting.
During the French-Algerian War, the Muslim community was faced with a choice: join either the FLN insurgency, or the French Army as an auxiliary. As all students of insurgencies know, the only neutrals are dead ones. Indeed, Muslims often joined the French Army only after being forced to witness the slaughter of their family members en masse. All told, approximately 260,000
Algerians of Arab or Berber descent served in various capacities in the French Army as Harkis.
Crapanzano has chronicled the story of the Harkis with a well-researched and heartfelt, deeply disturbing personal journey. He illuminates not only the immediate costs of the Algerian rearguard action, but the less known collateral damage visited upon those forced to make choices that meant only preserving one’s life for the moment. Insightfully written, this work skillfully shifts our focus in one of the great geopolitical conflicts of the twentieth century to the most elemental level, that of the individual.
Amazon.com link, no reviews alas:http://www.amazon.com/Harkis-Wound-T...ent+Crapanzano
I see torture was discussed already. The Algerian war has some good other topics, although I'm unsure if there is good english documentation on the subject:
- The "Bleuite" as it is now remembered, a quite successful intoxication campaign by French intelligence, which fed the ALN groups with false info about double agents in its ranks, leading to sometime heavy purges. It was used as a prelude to major operations. However such a manipulation was maybe only made possible in the context of a quasi-civil war where the potential allegiance to the French was very common.
- Apparently some Indochina vets, who had the misfortunes of having been taken prisoners by the Good Uncle Ho, were so impressed by the political "brainwashing" they were subjected to that they tried to implement equivalent methods in French camps within the broader "Psy-ops" experiment. With little success. For this I have a link to an article from an historian working for the Armée de l'Air, but french only (obviously)... http://www.cairn.info/revue-guerres-...-4-page-45.htm
The controversial film 'Battle of Algiers' appears in may threads on SWC, but the linked article is about the actor who portrayed Colonel Mathieu and is worth reading. Some of the pithy comments will resonate on the dilemmas of fighting an internal war, as France saw Algeria and other 'small wars'.
Maybe the Colonel was a man for his times, not today?
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/martin-...mbodied-franceQuote:
Mathieu is the key to the central scene of the film: the moment when he is cross-examined by international journalists about torture. Accused by journalists of being evasive about the methods of victory, he rounds on them. He reminds them of the consequences of blind terrorism:
"Is it legal to set off bombs in public places?... No, gentlemen, believe me. It is a vicious circle. We could talk for hours to no avail because that is not the problem. The problem is this: the FLN want to throw us out of Algeria and we want to stay".
He underlines that there was a political consensus, from right to left, in support of destroying the FLN rebellion.
"We are here for that reason alone. We are neither madmen nor sadists. Those who call us fascists forget the role many of us played in the Resistance. Those who call us Nazis don’t know that some of us survived Dachau and Buchenwald. We are soldiers. Our duty is to win".
At which point Mathieu throws the question back at the journalists:
"Therefore to be precise, it is my turn to ask a question. Should France stay in Algeria? If your answer is still yes, then you must accept all the consequences".
French Failure in Algeria: A Public Relations Disaster
Entry Excerpt:
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A coup by WoTR to republish part of Alistair Horne's book 'A Savage War of Peace', to contribute to the current public debate over torture:http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/tor.../?singlepage=1
The WoTR Editor's introduction explains:Quote:
Editor’s Note: Nearly 40 years ago, Alistair Horne wrote a magnificent book, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. It tells the story of the French-Algerian War, which ended with the victory of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and an independent Algeria, a land that France had considered an integral part of metropolitan France itself. This book has often been revisited in the decades since its publication, most recently during the Iraq War, when – in 2007 – President George W. Bush invited Horne to speak with him at the White House.
One of the most powerful lessons from the book is on the issue of torture. Torture was used, arguably to great tactical effect, by the French during the war, particularly during the Battle of Algiers. Once the extent of the use of torture became public knowledge, however, it changed the debate about the war, in both France and the rest of the world. Given the ongoing debate about torture in America’s war against jihadists, reignited by the recent report on the CIA’s interrogation practices by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, we could do much worse than to revisit what Horne wrote about the use and impact of torture during this savage war of peace. We are proud to re-print a portion of this book with the permission of New York Review Books. We hope that this elegant and haunting passage will illuminate America’s national debate on an issue that is inextricably linked to both America’s counterterrorism strategy and its core values. Our choice to re-print this passage is not an attempt to claim or even comment on any moral equivalence between France’s torture scandal and our own, but to draw attention to the common shape and form that these debates tend to take, within military and intelligence organizations and in society as a whole. This passage, from Chapter 9, begins with the death of Larbi Ben M’hidi, one of the six original leaders of the FLN. – RE
Reading Alistair Horne in the knowledge that the US military included the film 'Battle for Algiers' in its training syllabus, makes it rather poignant. It is not an easy read even today.
Citing the French prefect of Algiers, himself a torture victim in Dachau:Quote:
All right, Massu won the Battle of Algiers; but that meant losing the war
A short blog article on Strife, a Kings War Studies blog, 'Lessons from Algeria: counter-insurgency, commitment and cruelty'. It opens with:Link:http://strifeblog.org/2015/02/20/les...t-and-cruelty/Quote:
In the Algerian War of 1954-62, the belligerents tore apart a society that had coexisted for a century. The wounds they left were too deep to heal. But the continuation of theviolence after the war and the spiraling civilian-targeted terror campaigns conducted by both French colonists and Algerian independence fighters was not inevitable. Avoiding this type of outcome is the point of counter-insurgency operations today. More than sixty years later, we can see that no counter-insurgency campaign can succeed with aggressive ‘search and destroy’ tactics against embedded insurgentsif the ultimate aim is peaceful coexistence in a divided society. The United States failed to take this lesson to Iraq and as a result had to adapt during its operations.
Any country considering a counter-insurgency operation in the future must weigh up the extra costs of attempting it without this tool. France’s experience in Algeria shows that restraint and long-term commitment are vital if conflicts are to be resolved without the kind of fallout seen in Algeria in the 1960s and Iraq since 2011.
For reference this incident is seen by Algerians as the "beginning of the end" in 1945:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A...uelma_massacre
Incredibly there is contemporary newsreel of the French response, IIRC with unarmed men being shot down.
Strife blog has a new article 'Imagining War in Film: The Algerian War in The Umbrellas of Cherbourg and Winds of the Aures'.
It looks at two films, both post-independence, one French, the other Algerian and concludes - in academic words:Quote:
The analysis of these two movies reveals that the memory of trauma and conflict can be shaped by nationalist narratives. This constitution and disciplining of memory is primarily exercised by state-controlled or state-censored cinema serving specific narratives regarding the nature, subjects, and motives of the Algerian war. In the end, we observe how both representations of the conflict divert attention from the realities of post-war nation-building. This helps recognise the (re)productive power of visual media in framing and constituting meaning and identity. The struggle for narrative eminence between Algerian and French filmmakers is a testament to the fact that artistic expression is yet another site for political struggles over power and identity.
Thanks to WoTR, once more, for a review of 'Inside the Battle of Algiers' by Zohra Drif, which was published in French in 2016 and in September 2017 in English.
Her importance to many here will be from the film 'Battle for Algiers':Link:https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/ro...female-bomber/Quote:
Late on a September afternoon in 1956 a young woman entered the Milk Bar, an Algiers cafe popular with European youth. She looked like an average well-to-do French-Algerian, who had stopped off after a day at the beach. In reality, however, she was an Algerian Muslim, her appearance altered to blend in with café’s clientele. After eating ice cream, she departed. No one noticed that she had left behind a beach bag at the foot of the stool she had occupied. Minutes later, a bomb in the bag exploded.
From Amazon:Link to Amazon.com with five * reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Inside-Battle.../dp/1682570754 and Amazon UK:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Inside-Battle-Algiers-Zohra-Drif/dp/1682570754/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1520537043&sr=1-1&keywords=zohra+drifQuote:
This gripping insider's account chronicles how and why a young woman in 1950s Algiers joined the armed wing of Algeria's national liberation movement to combat her country's French occupiers. When the movement's leaders turned to Drif and her female colleagues to conduct attacks in retaliation for French aggression against the local population, they leapt at the chance. Their actions were later portrayed in Gillo Pontecorvo's famed film The Battle of Algiers. When first published in French in 2013, this intimate memoir was met with great acclaim and no small amount of controversy. It is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not only the anti-colonial struggles of the 20th century and their relevance today, but also the specific challenges that women often confronted (and overcame) in those movements.
The actual title for this article is: France may have apologised for atrocities in Algeria, but the war still casts a long shadow.
It starts with:Link:https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/201...r-still-casts/ and yesterday on the BBC (slightly different e.g. Harki's mentioned):https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45513842Quote:
Emmanuel Macron, the French president, wrestled with the demons of his country's colonial past this week by acknowledging that the country carried out systematic torture during the Algerian war of independence. After six decades of secrecy and denials, it was a historic first for a country that long refused to even admit that the brutal conflict - in which Algeria says 1.5 million died - was indeed a “war”.
Professor Andrew Hussey, a UK historian resident in Paris, adds his commentary:https://www.theguardian.com/commenti...onial-history?
Hat tip to an excellent War on The Rocks article, which fits here well and has a wider application to fighting 'small wars'. Notably over working with local allies and whether a conflict can be won. I'd never heard of this soldier.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/th...odern-warfare/
Back to the past and distant past, an interesting commentary on the film 'the Battle of Algiers': https://newlinesmag.com/review/a-mov...oss-the-globe/
A summary of the film by a British commentator after a group watched the film:Quote:
Pontecorvo's famous, harrowing, and still horribly relevant, "Battle of Algiers" (1966). The speaker contextualised the moral dilemmas and human damage in a major mechanism of modern history: successful and unsuccessful insurgencies , repeatedly unleashed since the mid 20th century. Protracted strategies of provocative escalation have all too clearly succeeded, in a list extending from Palestine, Indochina, Algeria… to, last year, Afghanistan. They certainly do not always win, but confronting them is invariably painful and demanding of resources, patience and organisational restraint. Long lasting ethnic traumas and religious hatreds are quite consciously detonated or exacerbated. Insurgencies learn from each other and so do counter insurgents. Conclusions are not often gentle. There is no reassuring end in sight to these often very deliberately agonising human crises. But moral as well as operational lessons can be learned about how to avoid and mitigate them. The intellectually and emotionally intense discussion, linked to some participants' personal experiences of real life choices in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, made the previously viewing of the film even more instructively memorable in a way that no other medium could have achieved.