Man that is just low rent:wry:
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In all fairness, it has not been that long since drinking with the guys was not only acceptable. it was required. That did not change until the early 80s.Quote:
Check the rest of the story. COL Yeager was being a fighter jock, drinking with LTs and CPTs and generally setting a bad example for his subordinates. He was a hero so he couldn't be busted out or passed over for it. So the AF promoted him.
I can tell you that a Prop Blast at Fort Bragg or a Friday afternoon happy hour on the Yadkin Road O Club annex was a different world.
Tom
OTOH, I can remember being in the O Club in Germany circa 1978-79 and having the Community ADCO (Alcohol and Drug Control Officer) come into the bar at 9:00 PM on a Friday evening and write down the names of everyone still sitting there for a later reporting to the MILCOM commander.
The fact that he did a good job didn't hurt. As for the drinking with LTs and CPTs -- we can philosophically strongly disagree on that.And we can disagree on that. Most of the current AF foibles trace to post 1947, indeed, most to post Viet Nam -- they forgot much of what they learned in WW II.;Quote:
Ahhh... The legacy of the WW II AAF, where a screwed up pilot was still a valuable commodity and would probably die on the next mission anyways...
Yes, the AF has issues, but never forget that most of them trace back to Army practices during WWII and the interwar period.
Not to disagree, but if the AF issues of today are based on the doctrine of strategic bombing, then why are most of the senior AF leaders fighter jocks?
Seems to me that the real issues started back about 1914. They were significantly enhanced in 1917 by the fact that AEF pilots were trained in combat tactics by the French. BTW, I think I would extend my thesis to the entire US military--we learned a lot of bad habits from our training by the French in WWI and have never really unlearned them. But, that is fodder for a lot of different threads I suspect.
I didn't say they were based on strategic bombardment...I said that at the end of World War 2 the AF was mainly interested in reinforcing that doctrine. The flip from bomber generals to fighter generals took place in the aftermath of Vietnam...say the mid 1970s or so. That had more to do with the revitalization of TAC during the war than any real conscious change.
Most of our quick training habits actually predate the French and 1914...some have argued that we're still suffering from Root's Industrial-age personnel reforms in the early 1900s. The fact is that the US military has only just recently (as in within the last 50 years or so) started stressing training in a major way. Prior to that the assumption was that training (if there was any) would take place at the assigned unit, not in a centralized location. Odd...but that's how it worked in practice.
There is top AF leadership change in motion.
Air Force's top leaders are fired
General Norton Schwartz has a C-130 tactical airlift and special opertions C-130 rated pilot and command and staff of special operations background.Quote:
Shades of Blue:
..Gates has recommended Michael Donley and Gen. Norton Schwartz to replace Wynne and Moseley,
Regarding other post WWII Air Force missions.
There is one in the public domain event in history that is the basis for the novel and movie Ice Station Zebra. Now you know one of the reasons why ARRS C-130s were configured with the Fulton Recovery System. ;)
Reference--To catch a falling star- satellite recovery operations: Film recovery
Spy sat Down
CORONA capsule catcher reminisces
I think we are confusing doctrine and culture. Most of my comments have been about the culture of the Air Force, not the doctrine. The Air Force makes an interesting case study, as I have never personally observed, or even heard of an organization whose culture has been so far divorced from its stated doctrine. To add to the fun, there is a huge generational gap between the Cold Warrior senior leadership and the GWOT up-and-coming folks.
The culture of the Air Force was forged in the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell AFB between WWI and WWII, the lessons of WWII, and tempered by SAC through the 1950s and 60s.
The doctrine of the Air Force has been an unending game of catch-up with technological change, and driven by competition for congressional support. Just as the slickest fighter on the planet comes on line (and yes, the F-22 is a very capable weapons system, especially in the air superiority role), most folks are acknowledging that it and the F-35 will probably be the last manned fighters. The Air Force leaderships' rebuttals to the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency manual reflect the competition piece of their doctrine.
The intersection of culture and doctrine produces statements like Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.. I'm not gonna get drawn into the argument over the assertion. But if I were to look an AF general in the eye and say "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers", I'd get blown through the door. Any discussion of how ground forces command, logistics, operational art, and tactics has been changed by modern communications and weapons systems would be ignored for the apparent arrogance of the assertion.
Re: the Cold Warrior vs COIN Warrior generation gap; I've seen it personally. The young folk 'get' Joint. Mostly, (there are exceptions, but they are not vocal enough) the older guys don't get Joint. You've got a generation of Captains getting promoted who have never served during peacetime. Northern Watch was certainly combat operations, but just too few of the Air Force were directly involved to really effect the culture. What was important, what got you promoted, and what merited confidence and respect prior to 9/11 is not the same as for the post-9/11 crowd. This isn't just the Air Force, but the gap does appear more pronounced in the AF than in the Army.
I'll go out on a limb and say that the AF future looks pretty bright because of their young warfighters. It's just going to be a little painful getting there.
Unless they continue to slash force structure in order to pay for more expensive operating and procurement costs. Down 40K by 2012 IIRC - to 340K or so overall IIRC.
johca wrote:
Does this mean that there is a chance that the AF will be able to ditch the Airline uniforms and go back to real Air Force Blues?;)Quote:
There is top AF leadership change in motion.
Air Force's top leaders are fired
General Norton Schwartz has a C-130 tactical airlift and special opertions C-130 rated pilot and command and staff of special operations background.
Ski wrote:
And with a total planned buy of only some 180 or so F-22s (and maybe 1,200 F-35s for both the attack role and air defence role), it makes you wonder how long even the AF can continue to rationalize such a small Top-Tier Air Superiority force, given the self-cannabilization that necessarily goes with it.Quote:
Unless they continue to slash force structure in order to pay for more expensive operating and procurement costs. Down 40K by 2012 IIRC - to 340K or so overall IIRC.
If the follow-on to the F-22/F-35 begins development in 30 years, maybe. I personally think we'll see unmanned tanks before we see unmanned aircraft personally. There are significant technical challenges in unmanned fighters - a UAV in a permissive environment is one thing, multiple aircraft in a complex, high-speed 3 dimensional air-to-air battle is quite another.
I doubt very much you'd get blown through the door. Do you really think the Air Force believes land forces should be commanded by anyone but an Army or Marine Commander? I think to most in the AF the statement that "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers" is perfectly reasonable and so obvious that it needs no elucidation.Quote:
The intersection of culture and doctrine produces statements like Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.. I'm not gonna get drawn into the argument over the assertion. But if I were to look an AF general in the eye and say "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers", I'd get blown through the door.
On the contrary. The AF is a technology-based service. It understands the advantages of technology perfectly well and has adopted a lot of technology the ground force uses like BFT and COP.Quote:
Any discussion of how ground forces command, logistics, operational art, and tactics has been changed by modern communications and weapons systems would be ignored for the apparent arrogance of the assertion.
I disagree that the gap is more pronounced in the AF. I'm not sure how many AF personnel served in OSW and ONW doing limited combat ops, but I'm sure it was more than the Army. Those rotations were the impetus for the Air Force move to an expeditionary deployment model similar to the Navy/Marine corps.Quote:
Re: the Cold Warrior vs COIN Warrior generation gap; I've seen it personally. The young folk 'get' Joint. Mostly, (there are exceptions, but they are not vocal enough) the older guys don't get Joint. You've got a generation of Captains getting promoted who have never served during peacetime. Northern Watch was certainly combat operations, but just too few of the Air Force were directly involved to really effect the culture. What was important, what got you promoted, and what merited confidence and respect prior to 9/11 is not the same as for the post-9/11 crowd. This isn't just the Air Force, but the gap does appear more pronounced in the AF than in the Army.
I was in the Navy in the 1990's and I remember many in the AF b!tching loudly about "grueling" three month rotations - all the while I was doing 6 month rotations about every 18 months. Us Navy guys got a laugh out of that. Sometime in the late 1990's the AF finally got over that garrison mentality and is now a fully expeditionary force.
An interesting paper for me as one just leaving the rescue community after five years. I agree about the limitations of the HH-60G, having deployed with them to Afghanistan. I'd be interested in your take on which airframe you prefer for the next PRV. FWIW, most in my former unit prefer the 101 to both the 47 and 92.
I'm not sure I agree with some of your conclusions though. For instance, I'm not sure what airframes PJ's should employ from beyond the ones they currently do. Also, while there is stress on the HH-60 fleet, we do have enough aircraft to perform CSAR for the CFACC in both theaters as well as ILO Medevac for the land component in both theaters (and it's important to note the CFACC birds do medevac too, but only when the land component, for whatever reason, isn't able to accomplish the mission).
Certainly the aircraft are wearing out much faster than anticipated which only heightens the need for a replacement, which is the AF's #2 acquisition priority behind tankers.
Well, I’m not a fan of the V-22 or the HH-60. I’ve got mission aircrew hours on UH-1, H-3, H-53, C-47 and H-60 helicopters. I was awarded an air medal flying a mission on an Army CH-47 and although I have concerns when it's described as a medium lift helicopter and that perhaps its too large, it is very acceptable and suitable in my opinion to replace the HH-60. On the other hand I don’t believe the other two helicopters got fair consideration, so I’m in the wait and see mode.
The PJs should be able to employ from tactical airlift C-130s. I have mission time to include RSOLL and SOLL I/II missions flying HC-130s, tactical airlift C-130s and C-141s. My opinion is driven in regards to helicopters by the lack of numbers in the inventory and pertinent to the HC-130 in that a flying gas stations primary purpose to air refuel helicopters out weighs risking the limited numbers and high cost of replacing a tanker used to insert a PJ team in a combat threat area. The tactical C-130 or other types of smaller fixed wings make better sense from a risk management and any cost of replacement assessment. Rapid manuever of fuel laden HC-130 tanker puts a lot of stress on wings and other airframe stress points. The numbers in the fleet are such that loss significantly impairs air refueling capability. Putting one at risk to employ a PJ team by parachute into a combat threat location is silly in my opinion.
Prior to 1989 Air Rescue units were called upon to do many special missions. One such mission becoming more openly disclosed in the public internet domain--but not in the paper I wrote and posted--is a event in history that is the basis for the novel and movie Ice Station Zebra. Now you know one of the reasons why ARRS C-130s were configured with the Fulton Recovery System. ;) BTW--the gain of HH-53 in-air-fuelable helicopters in the inventory is what took the Fulton system out of being a first choice recovery method. Also the organizational name change from Air Rescue Service to Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service. ;)
Reference--To catch a falling star- satellite recovery operations: Film recovery
Spy sat Down
CORONA capsule catcher reminisces
Here is part of the USAF Pararescue enlisted speciality classification description from the 2008 AFECD.
Quote:
PARARESCUE
(Changed 1 Jul 06)
1. Specialty Summary. Performs, plans, leads, supervises, instructs, and evaluates pararescue activities. Performs as the essential surface, air link in Personnel Recovery (PR) and materiel recovery by functioning as the rescue and recovery specialist on flying status as mission crew or as surface elements. Provides rapid response capability and operates in the six geographic disciplines: mountain, desert, arctic, urban, jungle and water, day or night, to include friendly, denied, hostile, or sensitive areas. Provides assistance in and performs survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE). Provides emergency trauma and field medical care, and security. Moves recovered personnel and materiel to safety or friendly control when recovery by aircraft is not possible. Related DoD Occupational Subgroup: 105000.
Entropy, I'm not buying it. I do not believe that the AF folks who populate ACC and the AOCs would tolerate the arrogant tone of the statement, and I tried it out on an AF officer last night, and was dismissed out of hand. After ten minutes of discussion, it was allowed that perhaps the ground fight, especially in urban environments is as complex as the aerospace fight. And it was the arrogance of the tone of the assertion rather than the content that was the issue.Quote:
I think to most in the AF the statement that "Ground power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by soldiers" is perfectly reasonable and so obvious that it needs no elucidation.
And where is the line? More than half of the time, airpower will eventually end up under a non-pilot at some echelon. So all air combat operations should be controlled by ACC at Langley AFB, or can the AF live with the soldier commanding MNC-I controlling a slice of air power?
I understand the need for a central ATO, I understand but loathe the reasons behind the limits on the timeliness and flexibility of the ATO process, but this all goes back to underlying issues of culture versus doctrine (and I am well aware of many of the flaws in Army culture and doctrine - most seem to go back to the inherent [and somewhat justifiable] conservatism of ground troops).
Actually, from what I've seen, the 'expeditionary' element of the AF is still pretty much the same high demand, low density units that have always been hit hard by these things (A-10s, AWACS, certain support segments, and transport aircraft). Sure there's been a great deal of talk about the AEF concept, but it still doesn't work right. And they still bitch about 6 month deployments like it's something they never expected to do. Having worked around the Army, it's a thing about the AF that I still haven't re-adjusted to. I guess, to borrow one of Jill's lines from another thread, I haven't drunk the Kool-Aid yet.
The biggest issue I've seen with the AF culture is that to make it past a certain point you really need to swill down the Kool-Aid and say things like "airpower can win a counterinsurgency on its own." Even though I'm tired of having to say it, I'll say it again: there is some amazing thinking and questioning going on at the lower and middle ranks of the AF. But it seems that if you want to make it to (and past) O-6 you have to drink that air supremacy Kool-Aid. I'm hopeful that will change as the combat and joint experience of the AF becomes broader, but even one of their own (who most likely has been banished to Thule by now) came out and said in a letter to editor in Air Force Magazine that the AF wasn't doing near enough to prepare its general officers for higher command positions because they weren't doing enough joint assignments (it's in the June 08 issue...by a colonel at Maxwell in response to an article here that claimed there was a shadowy conspiracy to keep AF generals out of senior positions...don't have an online link at this time). In the same issue, of course, there's an editorial slamming SecDef Gates....:wry:
It will be interesting to see how things pan out with the change at the top. My friend the SOF MC-130 jock told me at Leavenworth when we were students how the AF was divided. He is now a 2 star; who knows how high he will go now...
Tom
All the military departments have the problem of commissioned officers jockeying for promotion to the above O-6 grades by gaining political advantage and popularity rather than through extraordinary leading and competent supervising and management. Promotion to these grades has become too much a game of self aggrandizing and conforming to what got the current generals and admirals promoted. The problem is such has in the Air Force at least become the disease of enlisted promotions where EPRs, awards and decorations have become dependant on external off or out of doing primary military duties of getting higher education and participating in community volunteerism. It has become believed wanting to pursue and enlisted career and obtaining NCO authority and status is for those who can’t become a commissioned officer.
However, back to inability of or lack of top combatant command positions being filled by Air Force Generals. In this regard I do I have to give Retired General McPeak some credit although he was not well thought of while he was in charge. McPeak at least recognized being a rated officer and specifically a single seat fighter pilot divorced the commissioned leaders from actually having to provide immediate management, supervision and leading to any group of followers or workers. His initiative to get pilots more involved in other duties other than being in the cockpit never truly got any understanding or support within the AF commission ranks and grades.
Beginning in 1986 the wave of future promotion opportunity was realized to be doing joint operations type duties, but doing Joint Duties became get into a position to fill the square and back out for improving self-promotion potential rather than developing experience and understanding of all ground, air, and water strategies and tactics. The problem with the Air Force is the fighter pilot warrior is a lone knight or the lone gunman who gets very little being in command of leading tactical elements. Their specialty is flying and in most cases that’s all they had interest in until they got promoted out of the cockpit. No matter how you cut, slice, and deice, the Air Force does a poor job of providing its commissioned officer of being more than on-paper leaders, especially now that the transformation to the Expeditionary wing pushed Wing command up above the O-6 pay grade.
The Air Force commissioned duty position is a paradox as it has become focused on control of technology that is limited to doing flight and being the supposed moral oversight preventing misuse of weapon systems rather than leading troops into battle. The resulting dilemma is the Air Force officer lacks the leading tools and strategies to conduct asymmetric battle which requires boots on the ground to seek out, find, and engage low technology ground fighters that maintain very little hard target infrastructure to bomb and interdict.
In my opinion the Amateur Combat Command has become to focused on subordinating, manipulating, and influencing what combatant command do with its air component and has lost focus on its obligation to be ready and prepared to fight.
ACC has become focused on gaining and sustaining influence of Forces command and manipulating organizational transformation within the Air Force so that it controls all air component command positions in the combatant commands by functionally aligning every thing into deployable expeditionary wings sitting on ACC bases as an ACC administratively controlled AEF until its deployed to fight. Its called organizational incest and it strengthens promotion opportunity for those who blindly conform and seldom offer a dissenting opinion. The Air Force needs to wake up to fulfilling it military obligations as a independent military department, or it needs to assimilated back into the Department of the Army. :eek:
A part of the Airpower Versus Groundpower debate also includes conducting special operations. Although not written for arguing air power pertinent to what special operations missions air power can contribute to, Distinctive Beret Uniform History of the U.S Armed Forces gives indication Air Force had developed some unique capability, but then sort of didn’t know what it had once it put such capability in-place to be used.
Here’s some information about function fitness, Functional Fitness as it Pertains to Obtaining and Sustaining Pararescue Qualification.
The co-author of this article Major Gregg Brown was at the SMART Wars SMART Strategies workshop I went to last year. He told me he was going to write this and it has finally been published. He is an aid to General David Deptula of EBO fame. He had some interesting ideas about what the Air Force should become and how they could better serve the Joint Community. Also had some good ideas about the Army he likes tanks. So flame away about his article.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...8/deptula.html
Tanks have terrain limitations and UAVs have telemetry limitations caused by weather, terrain, solar activity, bandwidth, and potential jamming issues. The more UAVs operating in a confined area the more difficulty there is pertinent to sustaining separation and preventing midair in the heat of maneuvering to avoid a threat. There still remains the logistics of refueling, rearming and repairing/maintaining. Certainly great for asymmetric warfare against a low tech enemy or battle against a low density in number threat. My confidence diminishes when considering employing UAV capability toe-to-toe in a conventional fight against a nation having significant emerging technology capability such as China. Also Rusia may be less of a imminent threat, but who can predict the future with any certainty?
I never am comfortable with eggs all in one basket. The article reminds me a lot of persuasion and convincing I was reading during the late 1980s and early 1990s when it was being considered to do away with the A-10 because F-16s and other advanced new technology fighters were considered equal if not superior to the A-10 in participating in and contributing to providing effective close air support. Perhaps my lack of confidence results in not knowing what current technology is capable of, but technology has to be paid for and kept up with new developments to counter new attack threat to or defense from the UAV capability. Telemetry depends on EMF and disrupting EMF and analog sensors (no such thing as a digital sensor) is cheap and easy to do. (Digital imaging depends on anlog devices doing the measurement and the digital communication still requires wave form and frequency to carry it).
Hmm. Isn't it Joint Doctrine to have a COCOM, who is in charge of a CFLCC, CFACC, and CFMCC? I don't think that you'd get much arguement about the ground forces being centrally controlled... it kind of makes sense - that whole Unity of Command thing...
I completely disagree with the ONW/OSW having few of the AF... the whole reason the Air Expeditionary Force structure was invented was to share the load... the entire Combat Air Forces went to combat with our USMC and USN brothers and sisters every 12-18 months. We got shot at, shot back, and our young folks learned what combat is like. Was it super-high intensity? No. But there's a certain something to having flown over someone else's country, having them shooting at you, and having to protect your own folks. The problem with the AF now is that we are almost LESS involved... or at least, different folks are involved. Intel, ALOs, TACPs, Spec Ops are more involved now or involved at similar levels. The CAF forces are less involved....
On jointness, the USAF has been working with the USN and USMC's forces for a long time now - ONW/OSW was a major driver behind that, since we fought daily with our fellow aviators. The result has been the services specializing... the Navy has left air superiority, tanking, and most of the SEAD mission to the USAF, with EA left to the Navy and everyone doing strike/CAS. We are now to a point where the services can't go to war without each other, and we all know it. Trust me, at the warfighter level, we work joint ops every day even in training.
I agree. Most of the comments on the AF folks make on this forum are so far from the reality of what our young folks are doing, it is crazy... If you honestly think that the culture of the AF is determined solely by the top few folks, then maybe you can say there's a cultural problem. If you think the culture is the traditions/moral fiber/ways of doing things held by the majority, then I think the USAF is better off than folks say.
I think you need to understand that it's that senior leadership that is doing the talking for the AF. That's what people see and read. They don't hear from your young warfighters...they hear folks like Dunlap saying that airpower can win a COIN scenario on its own. Cultural perception is often controlled by those at the top.
The other thing that makes me cynical about this is that we've seen it happen before. A whole generation of AF officers came out of Vietnam intent on changing things...and for the most part they were either co-opted with the existing power structure or eased out. I honestly do hope that it's different this time around.
But I also feel that this is one of those issues that we'll have to agree to disagree on....:)
This is part of why Gen Mosely was re-aligning maintenance under operations - give folks a chance to lead more than just other pilots.
I don't think we really should expect AF officers to lead boots on the ground against an insurgency... maybe train the host nation AF, or support the Army or USMC, but leading troops on the ground? They do need to lead from the air, since you can't ask anyone to do something you can't do yourself...
Johca, not sure where you're getting this. The re-alignment under ACC is due to the fact that the DoD and Congress have mandated pulling back to the US (ACC is the MAJCOM for CONUS bases) from Europe and the Pacific... hence ACC had no choice in this or input.
Also, when forces are deployed to an AOR, even if they are part of an AEF, they no longer fall under ACC but instead OPCON is chopped to the appropriate COCOM and ADCON is chopped to the appropriate AF Component Commander... so ACC is out of the loop - just as it was in ONW/OSW, OAF, OEF, and OIF.... just like TAC was largely ignored in Desert Storm.
The consolidation under ACC is a fact of life... there's not much we can do about it given manpower and budget limitations along with the forced pullback to CONUS that BRAC and its ilk resulted in...
USAF Counterinsurgency Issues and Trends
Access to all three parts plus an analysis piece are at the SWJ link.Quote:
With a hat tip to Daniel Troy of the Consortium for Complex Operations - United Press International recently ran a three part series titled Emerging Threats: USAF Counterinsurgency authored by Shaun Watterman....
An alternative Air Force view on Dunlap's critique of the new Army/USMC COIN manual. Go to the link below and scroll down to the section called-IN My Humble Opinion-then look for Short Changing The Joint Fight-An Alternative View by LTC. Buck Eaton USAF.
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/
Dunlap revisited, more like. While he offers a slightly different approach, the message is essentially the same.
Not that I totally disagree with what either he or Dunlap have to say; just that I think in both cases they unfortunately come across as a little whiney and "Hey, you left us out..."
Anyone know when JP 3-24 is due? It will be interesting to see how the joint vision of COIN ends up.
You know, it is nice to have the capabilities that the Air Force offers however when you get down to brass tacks you have to have boots on the ground to accomplish the mission effectively.
In one of the LIC books commissioned by the USAF in the late 80s early 90s I read recently it said something to the effect "It is as imperative to mission success that the Air Force have infantry as the Army have Air Power" I about fell out of my chair.
C4ISR Journal this month has some pretty good articles on detecting stealthy air craft using ultra-violet and other out of visible spectrum light techniques. Cheap, inexpensive, useable for targeting (as anybody who knows anything about missiles will tell you), light is a big handicap for stealth. High power lasers of course are the answer for AAA and SAMs. But, then who needs stealth. Somebody smarter than me likely has figured that out.
Terrorism Funds May Let Brass Fly in Style
Luxury Pods for Air Force Debated
By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, July 18, 2008; Page A01
Quote:
The Air Force's top leadership sought for three years to spend counterterrorism funds on "comfort capsules" to be installed on military planes that ferry senior officers and civilian leaders around the world, with at least four top generals involved in design details such as the color of the capsules' carpet and leather chairs, according to internal e-mails and budget documents.
Now there is an airman/leader disconnect.Quote:
A military officer familiar with the program, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak about it, likewise said that its extravagance has provoked widespread contempt among lower-ranking Air Force personnel. "This whole program is an embarrassment," the officer said, particularly because transport seating for troops en route to the battlefield is in his view generally shoddy.
And, here I was all impressed that at the cyber space symposia I saw generals riding on the bus to get to lunch or the hotel.
Link below has a picture of the thing,capsule,lounge chair,whatever you want to call it. Notice the drink holder to:eek:
http://blog.wired.com/defense/
No, that's a United Airlines first class passenger seat.. the actual capsule is shown on the WaPo article.
In any event, I'm sure the Air Force wouldn't have cup-holders. It would have Personal Liquid Replenishment Mounts (Anti-Spill), and they would cost about as much as Steve's new motorcycle.
I couldn't get the article to come at first for some reason but I see what you mean now.
And actually, the picture in the article is not the SLICC, but the SLIP, which I gather is not enclosed and is smaller (only one pallet position).
They really are getting more cost conscious in the Air Force. ;)
At least they are buying multi-pallet-sized loads to slide into more than one existing aircraft rather than buying several aircraft customized as flying VIP hotels--
But, that's like my wife saying she saved us money buying the 4 pairs of shoes she didn't need at 40% off at DSW. :confused:
Danger room has updated it's post on the subject:
Quote:
UPDATE: An Air Force spokesman sent DANGER ROOM a lengthy story today refuting details in the Washington Post's story. Here's the gist of the Air Force argument.
Actually, it's not the Air Force's response that makes me think this story is overblown (and in at least one case inaccurate), but the documents the story is based on. I've gone through the documents, posted on POGO website, and I must admit, it's weak soup. I strongly encourage everyone to check out the documents for themselves. Most of the e-mails revolve around routine fixes to things that don't work, like seatbelts that are too short, etc. As for one issue -- that the brown be swapped for blue -- the reason, according to the e-mail, was to match the interior of the rest of the plane, not to match the Air Force's color (gray was another option provided).Quote:
Reference “SLICC” specifically…good pun that it is, these travel systems actually reflect less than the industry standard for executive travel accommodations, but are of such a quality that a theater commander, a cabinet secretary, or a US Congressman can work, rest, and hold meetings (to include secure communications capability) in an environment that also appropriately represents the responsibilities, authority and requirements of senior U.S. government representatives. The SLICC is not a “comfort” capsule—it is a conference capsule, named such because it provides an environment in which senior leaders can hold private conversations, accomplish work of both timely and sensitive nature, conduct meetings with staff, and rest while the aircraft is en-route.
You know, being a Grunt was probably a mistake after all. Instead of living like an animal, hurting and exhausted, half-starved, seriously sleep-deprived, and way out in the boons, I could have joined the Air Force and eaten like a king, slept between clean sheets, and been able to head off the the pub anytime I liked during off-hours.
Guess I wasn't smart enough to be Air Force.:wry:
I remember being on exercise one typically damp BC evening, sitting in my nice warm radio truck (amply supplied with hot chocolate and "relocated" vanilla pudding cups), hearing all the net traffic from the grunts trying to sleep in the rain--and thinking much the same thing, Norfolk ;)