You seem to forget the Philippine insurrection and the Indian wars. The other services weren't saints either.
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You seem to forget the Philippine insurrection and the Indian wars. The other services weren't saints either.
I think Cliff and I are still having problems with our implicit assumptions and world views - the 'real problem' typically in airpower theory debates ;)
I think the better criticism in respond to this is that the Air Force is the only service that argue that the other services are "theoretically" unnecessary.Quote:
This may sound unfair, and please correct me if I appear woefully misinformed, but out of the services mentioned, the USAAF/USAF is possibly the only one to have systematically engaged itself in the purposeful mass slaughter of civilians; yet it seems eager to cloak its existence in an aura of inerrant and pious purity somehow removed from the world 'red in tooth and claw'.
To be fair, the other service argue precious little at all at the strategic level regarding their " xxxx-power"...
That is debatable because less than 50% of Warden's original plan survived the cut list. Yes there is one I am personally familiar with the Alabama Marine Police a total water LE agency(they do have trailers and SUv's) to haul their boats to the launch but that is about it.
I'll offer the following as some background reading on some of the arguments I've made and where my world view comes from (interestingly many from the AWC strategic links page:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...strategymodels
On issues with Bayesian statisitics:
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman...dbayesmain.pdf
On issues with systems theory applied to warfare:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...go_systems.pdf
Vego is the closest thing to a broad strategic seapower thinker that we currently have - though we have a number of "niche" innovators.
On use of metaphor:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/..._metaphors.pdf
Addressing the "so what else is there" argument:
Colin S. Grey one of the best on strategic thought (has written a great book on seapower so I like him ;) )
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/0910.pdf
and
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/1434.pdf
An Army view:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...ew/forsyth.pdf
Kilcullen (interestingly calls for a different sort of "new lexicon" than Warden)
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...lict_may07.pdf
On the difference between a "choose the end state I want" (Warden) approach and the "be best prepared to deal with a range of possible futures (our predominant current model):
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...unio-protz.pdf
On moving from a strategy based on "compel the adversary to do what I want" to "convince my adversary to share my interests":
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...eatkingdom.htm
On vocabulary:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/faber.htm
On the decisiveness of force (book review and critical analysis):
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/2213.pdf
And for gluttons for punishment...On philosohical influences:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/pellegrp.pdf
Hopefully some interesting Sunday afternoon reading ;)
Yep!
That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter. Look at the Army ASCOPE analysis system which is basically the same thing (6 rings analysis). If Warden's uniform was a different color we could be looking at creating common ground between the two (basically the same ideas) for better overall understanding of the Enemy.....but no we are going to do that, we are going to play the "not invented here (service oriented)game". So the country and the services as a whole will suffer.Quote:
I think it is funny... as I have mentioned before, the USAF is the one service that it is "cool" to bash. You don't see the USMC, USN, or USA bashing each other to the same extent (especially here), but just mention airpower and watch the spears fly. I think a lot of this stems from the bad blood from the 50s when the USAF took msot of the money due to the decision to rely on the few nukes we had to allow a smaller budget... I understand that folks can't get accept the fact that maybe an article has validity even though it was written by an airpower advocate for the USAF's professional journal.
Gray also wrote a paper saying Americas ONLY true future is Airpower:eek: You may not know this but Warden thinks and has written that we should consider ourselves an Air-Maritime nation. Air-Naval Startegy is good but he want like the idea of Air-Naval Battle. Battle is for suckers:wry:
It could, but it doesn't ;)Quote:
The navy could easily claim to be a full military with its naval + marine air and marine ground force...
And as you say the only reason it could is because it has an integrated force of air-, land- and sea- power capabilities. It could not argue the dominance of seapower the way airpower theorists do (if it did I would criticize it as vociferously as I do airpower dominance advocacy).
And there is the pre-airpower sea-power vs landpower debaets - but that was not about putting the other out of business, but in essence who was "supported and supporting".
If you'd follow along carefully, there is much of the THEORY side of Warden I have no problem with. Its what he claims the implications of the theory are where I cease willing suspension of disbelief...Quote:
That is the real problem if his uniform was different color none of this would matter.
Gray gets it - Airpower is an INDISPENSIBLE, NECESSARY part of America's future fighting force and without it as an enabler, the rest of the services are unable to play their role. I'm all over that!
That is a far different thing from saying that airpower will is SUFFICIENT to achieve our strategic goals.
This statement is exemplary of the 'implication' problem. Even the 5-rings theory enabled the fog and friction of war to be lifted, there is nothing in the theory that justifies the leap from "what is good about the theory" to enabling the owners of airpower to use force ina "Dramatically different way" and bypass the need for "battle".Quote:
Failure to do so will con#demn airpower to suboptimization and deprive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve
national objectives quickly and at minimum cost.
Please - I'm all ears. I WISH I COULD BELIEVE. I am just a poor seapower sinner yearning for his soul to be saved :DQuote:
That is a good idea on how to learn the process. Don't want to be critical but you were a little off as to how you would actually do one. Want to do Qaddafi as a system so you can see what I mean?
If you have ever seen any business versions of the 5 rings I would be whats called an evangelist:) so ok, I still have chores to do today so I will start tomorrow. So until then it's time for some music. So here is Jewelle and "Who Will Save Your Soul"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LukEq643Mk
I disagree, the 5 (or 6) ring analysis simply is not useful in many cases. It has already been mentioned that the model does not apply to law enforcement, counterinsurgencies and stabilization operations. However, many strategists have a tendency to discard these types of operations as military anomalies.
So let's do a relevant reality check: a blog wargame. How would Warden's theory work against Iran if the Iranian leadership chooses to apply a 2006 Hezbollah-style "Mosaic Defense"?
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...#ixzz1GZlSR02ZQuote:
In 2005, the IRGC announced that it was incorporating a flexible, layered defense -- referred to as a mosaic defense -- into its doctrine. The lead author of this plan was General Mohammad Jafari, then director of the IRGC's Center for Strategy, who was later appointed commander of the IRGC.
As part of the mosaic defense, the IRGC has restructured its command and control architecture into a system of 31 separate commands -- one for the city of Tehran and 30 for each of Iran's provinces. The primary goal of restructuring has been to strengthen unit cohesion at the local level and give commanders more latitude to respond to potential threats -- both foreign and domestic. But the new structure would also make it difficult for hostile forces to degrade Iranian command and control, a lesson the Iranian military has learned by analyzing U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans.
The mosaic defense plan allows Iran to take advantage of its strategic depth and formidable geography to mount an insurgency against invading forces. Most of Iran's population centers and major lines of communication are spread out within the interior of the country. Iran's borders are ringed by rugged mountain ranges that serve as natural barriers to invasion. As enemy supply lines stretched into Iran's interior, they would be vulnerable to interdiction by special stay-behind cells, which the IRGC has formed to harass enemy rear operations.
The Artesh, a mix of armored, infantry and mechanized units, would constitute Iran's initial line of defense against invading forces. IRGC troops would support this effort, but they would also form the core of popular resistance, the bulk of which would be supplied by the Basij, the IRGC's paramilitary volunteer force. The IRGC has developed a wartime mobilization plan for the Basij, called the Mo'in Plan, according to which Basij personnel would augment regular IRGC units in an invasion scenario.
IRGC and Basij exercises have featured simulated ambushes on enemy armored columns and helicopters. Much of this training has been conducted in an urban environment, suggesting that Iran intends to lure enemy forces into cities where they would be deprived of mobility and close air support. Iran has emphasized passive defense measures -- techniques used to enhance the battlefield survivability -- including camouflage, concealment and deception.
pvebber,sorry for the late start but here we go. Go to the link below and then go to chapter 3 for a good 5 rings analysis of how these systems are organized. Since Qudaffi is not much more than a Terorist leader IMO this is a pretty good template to start with.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf
Also bear in mind this paper was written in 1997, very far sighted as the capabilities that we are and will need in the future IMO, which is one of the key points in Warden's article.
Funding-Manpower-Laws! Many people think LE organizations are funded like the military which is hardly the case. We often fight major crime organizations that have the funding capabilities of small countries or major corporations. And finally we have to do it within a very restrictive legal framework, criminals don't care what the law is,they don't have to worry about due process or collateral damage. So considering all that we do very well.
Then we come to my original point (and BTW, Warden included it in his original article): "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment."
It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy. It's the strategist's job to come up with an effective strategy within the limits set by funding, manpower and laws.
I would argue that being the head of a nation, there is more to the "system" he is part of than what the paper describes for each of the five rings for a terrorist organization.Quote:
Since Qudaffi is not much more than a Terorist leader IMO this is a pretty good template to start with.
Libya has considerably more infrastructure and fielded forces, and most importatnly a population not of "bad guys" but of innocents that one would hope would be spared suffering to the extent possible.
Is it your intent to treat Libya itlself as the "state sponsor" in the context of Chap 3 Table 1?
I thought the big thing with Wardens new article is the need to picture the desired end state to start off. Before we start looking at systems shouldn't we define our desired end state?
Qudaffi = Dead is a "degenerate case".
1-No, as you point out Libya is NOT the system you want to attack but you need to make a systems map of the country in order to see what you should avoid attacking. From there you need to map the Qudaffi Mafia(using table1 as an example) and all it's elements and then decide what to Strike.
2-Yes, you should start with the desired end state, the political objective but that is usually something that is given to the military not something which they get to create.
3-If you notice the model is slightly different because it is older. The second ring is called the "Systems Essentials" ring as opposed to the "Processes" ring. I wished he(Warden) had never changed it myself. Systems Essentials gets right to heart of the concept of COG's or critical targets IMO. Essentials are physical inputs or/and physical production/conversion facilities. It is literally and physically something the System must have or it cannot operate. It is a good way to focus your thinking on what you should attack or not attack because of the resulting side effects. In fact once you map the System your final target list should be nothing but a list of the Essential COG's that the Sytem needs. From 5 rings to 1 so to speak:wry:
You (emphasis mine)should read more carefully. I asked a question about what he(Marc) thinks a politicians job is? Where I live Politicians change funding and laws all the time because they are temporally elected officials they may not have an accurate understanding of the true nature and magnitude of the problem until it is explained to them in detail, at which time they may and often do make changes to funding and manpower and laws.
Right, but doesn't Wardens desire to "start with strategy" imply that the military strategist should get to be the one to "picture the desired endstate"?Quote:
2-Yes, you should start with the desired end state, the political objective but that is usually something that is given to the military not something which they get to create.
Aren't we doing what Warden cautions against in presupposing that our means will be to strike something? Or are you using "strike" in a generic sense of "to affect"?Quote:
1-No, as you point out Libya is NOT the system you want to attack but you need to make a systems map of the country in order to see what you should avoid attacking. From there you need to map the Qudaffi Mafia(using table1 as an example) and all it's elements and then decide what to Strike.
SO lets say our strategic objective is to remove "the Qudaffi Mafia" from power along with their ability to adversely impact the oppsition regime's assumption of power.
Where do we get the information we need to understand how deeply the Qudaffi Mafia is insuinuated throughout the country? If all the COGs live in Ring 2 of systems essentials where do we get the "map" of these things? What happens if the map is a really complicated thing like the one Cliff linked to regarding Af/Pak?
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/wo...oint.html?_r=1
pvebber, really, really good questions. But I gotta go for now. I will respond as soon as I can, so keep thinking cause that is some really good stuff you bring up.
Again, read more carefully. I'll narrow down the emphasis from his quote:
"to fit the strategy"
Of course pols are supposed to set budgets (that's trivial), but not so "to fit the strategy".
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Politicians change every 4-6 years. That's a "duration of world war" interval. Any officer who thinks that he cannot adapt to their changes of effective restrictions in time should resign.
I expect a military to adapt in few weeks to at most a year. Everything in excess of a year is a too long reaction lag and testament of incompetence and/or organisational failure.
Obviously, this is a common illness of modern militaries. No military rises above "not good enough yet". They're all misguided, wasteful, ill-conceived and largely incompetent bureaucracies instead of the smart and agile warfare organisations the taxpayers deserve.
Funding and laws can come from a variety of sources. Democracies fund their wars with taxes. Autocracies fund their wars with proceeds from raw materials (oil, gas, copper,...). Non-state actors fund their wars with drug trafficking, blood diamonds, racqueteering, religious fundraising or state sponsors. Laws can come from congress, the Qur'an, the barrel of a gun, or the politburo. All sources of funding and laws have their limitations. There are only so many taxes you can raise. There are only so many drugs you can sell. There is only so much oil you can pump up. The legislative process is equally restrictive. If you want to get a majority together to vote a health care reform, you cannot distract members of Congress with increased war burdens in Afghanistan. If you want to impose your idea of legislation on your population by terrorizing them, you cannot count on your army to prevent an invading army from conquering Baghdad.
A good strategy takes all these limitations into account in stead of lamenting that politicians fail to overcome them. Did Mao ever complain that his strategy was underresourced? No. He had nothing. He did some hard thinking to figure out a strategy to win a war with nothing and he won. Did Vo Nguyen Giap ever complain that Ho Chi Minh's funding and laws did not fit his strategy. No, he developed a strategy to beat the Americans with what the Vietnamese economy, communist state sponsors and his own people's ingenuity and stamina could provide.
Again, like Warden said himself: "All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment." It's not the politicians' job to provide funding, manpower and laws to fit the strategy. It's the strategist's job to come up with an effective strategy within the limits set by funding, manpower and laws.
Fuchs offers:
Unfortunatley we kind of get the worst of both worlds the way the system ends up working.Quote:
Of course pols are supposed to set budgets (that's trivial), but not so "to fit the strategy".
The President puts out a "National Security Strategy".
The military chiefs then creates supporting military strategies of various sorts (regional, service, roles and misions, etc.)
DoD civilians then provide an input to the President as to what they think it will cost to implement what they think address the Presidents objectives.
The President then tweaks it and sends it to Congress where a whole bag of worms is opened.
The President has a set of political objectives in establishing the NSS. The Military chiefs have a bunch of institutional objectives in its response. DoD can be a focusing, or diffusing lens on the uniformed input.
Congress has a entirely different set of objectives based on sending money to their various constituencies. They add and remove elements at will totally independant of any notions of "Strategy".
This lack of an overall source of "strategy" and a coherent "ways and means" approach to acomplishing it has been argued about going back to G. Washington.
The current climate is perfect example. We are still strategically adrift without a "picture of a desired end-state". The desire for a US militarily dominant into the far future is still out there, but now competes with the notion of a US that "leads the strategic consensus" rather than is simply dominant. That is good becasue we can't afford to be "militarily dominant" everywhere we might want.
We (and the world) is entering a period of fiscal austerity. We have over-promised and underdelievered for too long and over the next 10 years will pay the piper. (which is great for me becasue I want to retire in about 15 years which means my golden years will likely be on the upside the next positive wave ;) )
In how to deal with the inevitable budget reductions of the near future, the President, the Serivices, the DoD, and Congress are seperated by their varying objectives, so its not question of "Strategy driving funding" vs "Strategy constrained by funding" - we have neither effective strategy, nor an effective means of funding. So we will muddle along as we always have - with strategy and resources chasing each others tails like the gingham dog and the calico cat.
At least as pertains to democracies, there is little prospect for change barring an existential war. I suspect that is to be tolerated and perhaps even admired a bit but it sure is frustrating, mostly because the politicians who literally force their militaries to that marginal state do not realize the limitations (and hidden costs) they impose upon themselves...
Because some want to attribute probabilities and science to warfare and budget allocations, lets look at some possible figures.
The first assumption balances probabilities for war over the next 20 years in various parts of the world. If the US chose option A with more air and seapower and showed no willingness to deploy ground forces to fight or deter terror, I would submit based on the abandonment of land troops in Lebanon, Somalia, and the cruise missile attacks of Afghanistan, failed no-fly zone over Iraq, and failure to act in Libya all increase likelihood of a terrorist attack to .95 over the next 20 years versus only .85 if the U.S. continues terror deterrent efforts in places like Afghanistan, etc.
A similar hypothesis is that if we withdrew U.S. ground forces in South Korea, the loss of the tripwire effect would increase probability of war there. One could make a claim that a subsequent rush to Korea would involve greater ground losses than if we had forces there already. But I kept the losses the same but the probability of war higher with no forces there.
Finally, I acknowledge that increased spending on air and seapower would decrease an already extremely low probability of war with China. If a minor nuclear exchange occurred, it would be the same death toll regardless of which option we chose. Of course if no minor nuclear exchange occurred, losses would be far lower in both scenarios.
The last point is a primary one. The very high probability of another terrorist attack and subsequent war over the next 20 years must be balanced against the extremely low probability of war with China or Russia due to economic interdependency and MAD making it a lose-lose proposition. With MAD, even if we had limited conflict with either quasi-superpower, the probability is still pretty good that no nuclear exchange would occur.
Potential U.S. Deaths over next 20 years from warfare and/or terrorist attack
..Middle East .. Korea China
Option A: [.95 x 8,000] + [.2 x 12,000] + [.02 x 100,000] = ?
Option A: 7,600 +2,400 + 2,000 = 12,000 dead
Option B: [.85 x 8,000] + [.1 x 12,000] + [.04 x 100,000] =?
Option B: 6,800 + 1,200 + 4,000 = 12,000 dead
Next since COL (R) Warden and other USAF proponents and sellers of AirSea Battle would argue for greater defense budgets for Air and Seapower, lets look at what the above option A (higher air and seapower spending) compares to an option B with the more traditional equal spending between all the services.
For starters, air and seapower procurement is far costlier as are O&S costs than Army procurement and O&S expense. Army Manpower expense is admittedly higher. But because of the disproportionate costs of air and seapower, you can see how the U.S. could easily spend $2.5 trillion more than in a balanced approach over the next 20 years.
Service Defense Budgets over next 20 years in todays dollars
Air Force ..Navy/Marines ..Army
Option A: $5 trillion + $6 trillion +$2.5 trillion = $13.5 trillion
Option B: $3.5 trillion +$4 trillion +$3.5 trillion = $11 trillion
Finally, as the war winds down, it is somewhat startling to see how rapidly some are talking about reducing Army size. The already highly disproportionate deployment rate of Army versus other services is unlikely to improve if Army manpower is seen as a billpayer to increase air and seapower spending.
The below figures are based on one 6 month deployment by the Air Force, Navy, and Marines every 30 months with the Army deploying for 12 months out of every 30 months in Option A (smaller Army, more spent on air and seapower) and for 12 months out of every 40 months in Option B (traditional near equal spending for all services) where the Army stays nearly as large as it currently is. Note that the Army still gets the raw end of the deal either way.
Deployed months over the next 20 years: Air Force (6 mths) Navy/Marines (6 mths) Army (12 mths)
Option A: .48 months ..48 months .96 months
(Decrease Army and slightly fewer AF/Navy/Marines)
Option B: ..48 months .48 months .72 months
(Keep Army ranks higher and slightly fewer AF/Navy/Marines)
If the US desires to be a major continental power, build a large army. If the US desires to be a major global power, build a large Navy, and control the air and space above it.
The role of armies in peacetime is pretty narrow, and regardless of all the hype and current conflicts in 3-4 places, we are a nation at peace. The vast majority of those conflicts are elective; in that if they were medical procedures, our insurance wouldn't cover them.
Having sat at the big table (and banged my head on the same) in the QDR process; and worked the halls of the Pentagon vainly attempting to get each of the services to give two flying monkeys of concern over their statutory responsibility to fund all service-common aspects of Special Operations Forces, I understand the inter-service rivalry. All of the services are insanely biased and self-serving. None of them want to "lose" to a sister service in the grand priority and budget competition.
The Army (and the Marines, though this actually fits well within their wheelhouse) have latched onto Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Security Force Assistance, and every other bottle of snake oil they could pull of the shelf in an effort to stay in the game at a wartime footing in an era of peace. Frankly, treating peace like war may be good for the Army, but it is not healthy for the rest of the nation, and someone needs to throw the switch and side rail the crazy train.
As to Warden? Like all models, there is value in any model that helps one to organize their thoughts and to consider possibilities they might otherwise have overlooked. Employ Warden for that and it is helpful. Also like all models, if one comes to see them as some sort of magic machine that one can dogmatically follow steps A through Z to get to a perfect solution, one deserves what they get. Its a framework for thinking, and that is helpful, and that is enough.
By that I think he is talking about the problem of linkage. How do military objectives link to achieving the political end state.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
Yes, strike was a poor choice of words "affect" is the proper term.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
First the real problem as I see it, would be the opposition regime, you better get that one right or it is not going to matter much in the long run. To answer your question on "Qudaffi's Mafia" the problem as I see it, like all criminal/terrorist/insurgent/gang organizations is that it is essentially a Clandestine system. They don't have traditional Tanks,Ships,Planes and Bases. They alter the civilian environment(things,and locations) that are already there to be used for criminal/war activities. They use secrecy,subversion,deception to hide what and where they are.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
Second you don't get a systems map from anywhere, you have to create it. That is why I say the model is not prescriptive(as many people say) it is descriptive. It lists the broad categories of the elements of all systems but you have to go and discover them yourself. That is generally going to be an Intelligence function. Hence the old saying Airpower is Targeting and all Targeting is Intelligence. I would change that to All Strategy is Targeting and all Targeting is Intelligence. It dosen't matter if it is doen by the Army,Air Force,or Navy.
Third the map you posted is....well just crazy IMO. How in the world would you use something like that. If you want to know what a usable map would look like there are a couple of ways to do it, but generally you are going to end up with a list of the essential people,places and things that they need to operate the system.
Both China and Vietnam had big Armies with alot of guns and a lot of ammunition. Now somebody paid for that and it wasn't cheap. I agree about the Laws, neither were concerned with laws, they had no political restrictions to worry about, all they were concerned with was wining.
Many years ago some of us told a lot of the "We need a SO service..." types to be careful what they wanted, they might get it...:D
Barbwire Bob may have persuaded Nunn and Goldwater but I'm not at all sure he did the Nation any favors...
It's hard to convince someone to give you money when you have your own pot which you don't share at all well and when you imply to the folks you want to give you money that they're lesser, pedestrian beings, isn't it... :wry:That's true and it applies to SOCOM-as-service as well. However, it's as much an effect of out pathetically poor budgeting system and a venal Congress as anything. The services are not blameless but Congress creates more problems than it solves -- not least by years of overfunding DoD.Quote:
I understand the inter-service rivalry. All of the services are insanely biased and self-serving. None of them want to "lose" to a sister service in the grand priority and budget competition.
Nor is it good for the Army or the Marines... :mad:Quote:
The Army (and the Marines, though this actually fits well within their wheelhouse) have latched onto Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Security Force Assistance, and every other bottle of snake oil they could pull of the shelf in an effort to stay in the game at a wartime footing in an era of peace. Frankly, treating peace like war may be good for the Army, but it is not healthy for the rest of the nation, and someone needs to throw the switch and side rail the crazy train.
In their defense, they have not so much latched onto it as been forced to grab it. And truth be told, SOCOM has not helped in that.
Turf protection is a people problem. It isn't beneficial and it's a by-product of poorly crafted laws, a poorly functioning Congress -- and poor leadership. It is in part funded by such massive amounts of money being made available which inculcates greed -- our boom and bust way with money does not help. It also would not be such a problem if it were not tolerated, even encouraged...True dat.Quote:
As to Warden? Like all models, there is value in any model that helps one to organize their thoughts...Its a framework for thinking, and that is helpful, and that is enough.
slapout9,
Mao and Ho Chi Minh did not have big Armies when they started their fight against Tsjang Kai Tsjek's nationalist regime and French colonial rule respectively. They created these army from among the peasants with agitation and propaganda. It was only much, much later that these peasant insurgencies involved into big Armies with a lot of guns and a lot of ammunition.
I disagree with you that you agree with me about laws. I think you are missing my point. I did not say that our opponents do not have political restrictions to worry about. On the contrary. ALL power systems have political restrictions to worry about.
On restrictions of democratic power systems; see Harvey Sapolsky:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4330354
On restrictions of islamist power systems; see Erik Claessen:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art017.pdf
On restrictions of autocratic power systems; see Norvell De Atkine:
http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars
Marc, thanks for the refernce points. I will read them and get back with you.
OK, given the political endstate I described, what are the associated military obectives?Quote:
By that I think he is talking about the problem of linkage. How do military objectives link to achieving the political end state.
OK, so how do we get the information we need to make one? since they "They use secrecy,subversion,deception to hide what and where they are." Is this a national intelligence function or a military intelligence function? How do we know when we have enough to start doing some o that thar 'affectin' ?Quote:
Second you don't get a systems map from anywhere, you have to create it.
Hmmmm so if we are not going to actully moel system, how is it we are using systems theory to figure out what shold be on our list? The whole thing about a systems theory approach that Warden leverages is that if you understand the system holisitcally, you can "find the flaw in the deathstar".Quote:
Third the map you posted is....well just crazy IMO. How in the world would you use something like that. If you want to know what a usable map would look like there are a couple of ways to do it, but generally you are going to end up with a list of the essential people,places and things that they need to operate the system.
However, if you don't have the plans to the deathstar how do you find the single point of failure vent to drop your photon torpedo down?
How do you know how to prioritize what goes on the list or "what they need to operate the system" without a model of this system to tell you what the CoGs are?
As far a the posted map goes, from what I've seen of these things, that is a REALLY simple one. Each of those little text boxes would have a map of similar complexity inside it, and similarly complex maps inside many of those. Wardens paper discusses a ROM of 1000 targets to affect the CoGs, out of "a whole list" that would number in the 10s if not 100s of thousands inthe case of a major power.
For Libya it would be perhaps an order of magnitude less, but you are still looking for 100s of target among perhaps 5-10 CoGs out of a potential target list of 1000s of items.
Appreciate you bearing with me trying to puzlle this out ;)
Keep going don't stop. You ask many of the questions I did. But you need to bear with me because retired LE folks have to have another job to keep paying the bills and I am the dog shift for awhile with no access to a computer. But I will answer in detail later today:)tonight. In the meantime read this from the SWJ Blog, it's a little complicated for my taste but he it is a start point. My way is better of course:D:D http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...network-desig/
Great article!
But I sense a bait and switch...The rings in figure 2 are different than the Warden rings...:p
I was talking to some folks around the ofice and it hit me that there is some touble with Warden's defintion of Airpower as:
So is an ICBM or other ballistic missile "ground power" since it is not guided and comes from a ground launcher? But then a realtively short ranged guided artillery projectile or SAM would be "airpower"?Quote:
To keep this simple, we will not talk about current service organizations. Thus, ground power is anything essentially tethered directly to the earth, including people, tanks, and artillery; sea power is anything that operates on or under water but does not include aircraft or missiles launched from ships; and airpower is anything guided that flies through the air and space, regardless of who owns it or its launch platform. If we want to avoid parochial arguments that confuse our assessment of the options, we need to stay with these definitions. After reaching conclusions, we can decide which organizations should own and operate the three types of power.
Does my ship, which is a seapower platform when it is firing ballistic rounds from its gun become an airpower platform when I load a guided round? If I put a rail gun on my ship that fires unguided rounds hundreds of miles is that rail gun seapower, but the shorter range Harpoon missile that only affects ships is "airpower"? Is a ship that only fires guided weapons an "airpower" platform?
How about a high powered laser? Is that that not airpower because its not guided, but a short range SAM is airpower becasue it is?
Can we come up with a better definition of "airpower" that perhaps uses some aspect of overall precision rather than just "guided"? And the notion that a crucial discriminator of "airpower" has to do with some function of "action at a distance"? Bt not all action at adistance? (ie the target matters?)
Kill Qaddafi and his inner circle,destroy or seize his personal assets and those of his inner circle. Do not attack the public in general or damage public assets.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
Yes, National,Military and any other Intelligence source you can find.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
Depends on the final effect you want to achieve.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
Just like the movie...remember somebody (intelligence source) gave them the blueprint for the deathstar.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
I would suggest you start with yourself. Make a list of what you need to operate, a five rings model of yourself. Now what would happen if one or more of the inputs were eliminated. For prioritizing I like C.A.R.V.E.R. myself. How Critical,Accessible,Recognizable,Vulnerable,Effect on people,Recuperable is the the target.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
Warden would call that a fractal analysis.....going from a broad concept to the perceptual concrete level of a physical target to affect. You can do that with the same 5rings model, you don't need to use the spaghetti map.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
I think you would be surprised just how much of that spade work has already been done.Quote:
Originally Posted by pvebber
pvebber, don't no why I didn't think of it earlier but for training/teaching purposes click on the link below for FM3-24.2 Tactics in COIN. Go to Fig. 1-2 for an example ASCOPE model..... you will like it:) then go to Fig. 6.2 to see an example of CARVER-P this is how to use it defensively but it can and should be used offensively, that is why it was originally created.
Hope this clears things up. Anymore questions or concerns just ask away.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/coin/repository/fm3242.pdf
Combining a rereading of the COIN pub withthe latest in the series on "To design or not to design"
To design or not to design
A number of things come to mind.
The COIN manual (and Design constructs) look at systems theory as a means to identifying and understanding problems, not a way to implement specific solutions. This is a totally different construct than Warden's theory, which sees systems theory as an avenue to "reverse engineer" the "transfer function" that gets you from the current system state to the desired system state.
The COIN manual seems "list-centric" rather than "relationship-centric". Identifying components of the system is a necessary, but insufficient step in understanding the system. The more important piece (as far a influencing the system"is the relationships between components (and since they are not static, how they chang over time). This reinforces the role of sysems theory as part of IPB where you are trying to identify components, but the importance of components is a function of realtionships that are in general only incompletely know. The COIN methodolgy hhas no construct for building understanding of realtionships (the matrices are "anecdotal" in nature, not exhaustive).
The COIN manual is "battle-centric" it emplys an interative process of interactions with the adversary system (the 7 lines of operations) in a fundamentally linear way. It recognizes, at least implicitly, the broader issues I have with the Warden theory by reinforcing the long timeframes, the need for heuristic (trial and error) rather than algorithmic (pre-planned) solutions and the dangers of decoming too enamored with "strategic CoGs" at the expense of "tactical" ones (ie local problems can have strategic effect and soving strategic problems do not always "trickle down" to local effects).
The COIN manual is written from the point of view of the MDMP being sufficient to deal with the problem. What in the COIN manaul justifies Warden's calim of the need for a 'redo' of the planning process?
I am left feeling that we are very much in agreement about the role of systems theory and its limitations. I am not entirely satified withthe COIN manual and share Major Zweibelson's critcism of the Army interpretation of design. Bht my feeling is they are "on the right track" and understand the limitations and caveats.
Which unfortunatly doesn't answer the criticisms of Warden, namely:
Removing "the control circuit" is not a substitute for convincing those in control to change their behavior. Removing the "control circuit" (as we saw in Iraq) can open a Pandora's box.
The problem of understanding a complex system completely enough to "find the flaw in the deathstar" and get the easy win. The still more complex notion of the single pulse of power that shocks the system from an undesirable state to a desirable one is even more questionable given the problems we have found in trying to "tweak the system over time" to get to a desired state. If we can't incrementally move the system to a desired state, what makes us think a single set of effects performed quickly will do it?
The notion that airpower (badly-defined) has a property that allows this transfer functin to be instantiated more easily than ground power or sea power is justified how?
So thats where I am. Still an evil, parochial, "Warden Basher" I guess.
I'm off on travel next week with limited internet connectivity. (My Kindle)
Greate discussion, Thanks!
Couple of points before you go.
There is much more to Warden than just the rings.
Step 1 of Warden's Prometheus Process(thats what he calls now) is called DESIGN ;)the future, but nobody ever brings that up.
Step 2 is TARGET for success. The Rings analysis or mapping the system(s).
Step 3 is CAMPAIGN to win. Much of your concerns about relationships happens in this step. Additionally you will learn about Phases not a single pulse, also you will learn not to depend on single points of failure, that is the whole point of attacking multiple targets in parallel. You also will encounter the "Red Team" process.
Step 4 is FINISH with finesse. About achieving the end state which is the whole reason to do this in the first place.
But you have to look at how someone uses the words and not what words they use. He also says not to rely on prediction, but then implies that you can create a plan to achieve a future desired state. The Prometheus process claims to allow you to control your destiny. The design concepts in military terms are all about balancing that which you can control with that which you can't. That is why it is as much art as science.Quote:
called DESIGN the future, but nobody ever brings that up.
To create a set of specific actions that result in a specific future requires that the result of those actions is PREDICTABLE. If it is not, then you have no reason to believe that taking the action will result in a specific end-state.
Many of Wardens process laws are just plain wrong. Source:
Every action affects the future TRUE, however what that effect is, more often than not, is not measurable and is part of causal nexus that is not decomposable.Quote:
The Prometheus Process is built on a group of natural laws of strategy as follows:
Specific actions create a specific future FALSE There is no 1 to 1 correspondence in complex systems between individual actions and outcomes. An action may have no discernible impact on a system until a "tipping point" of accumulated actions occurs.
Every thing and every action happens in a system TRUE The universe is a very large system. Isolating sub-systems within the universe can lead to problems however...
All systems have inertia and resist change FALSE violates the laws of thermodynamics. All open, dissipative, systems are constantly trying to change to lower energy states. One definition of 'life' is a system that exhibits self-organization to higher degrees of complexity by expending energy.
All systems have Centers of Gravity TRUE in the practical sense of components whose high degree of interrelatedness make them more important than other components. FALSE in the absolute sense, a system can be composed of identical nodes with symmetric relationships and therefore none are more important than others.
Systems Change when their Centers of Gravity change TRUE, given the definition of CoG, but there can be components that exhibit "tipping point" behaviors that will become CoGs when they tip, but are discernible as such beforehand.
The extent and probability of system change is proportional to the number of Centers of Gravity affected, and the speed at which they are affected ABSOLUTIVELY POSILUTELY FALSE. Proportionality means linear, and the vast majority of systems are non-linear and DO NOT exhibit proportional responses. ONLY linear systems do.
All known systems and things have a beginning and an end
TRUE from a practical standpoint, but not absolutely true (The jury is still out on the nature of cosmogony - the origin of the universe)
FALSE - a variation on the first law and suffers the same flaw. It also is not time reversible. A specific end is not the result of specific actions. It can also be the result of internal interactions within the system.Quote:
Specific actions produce specific ends
To be able to choose specific targets, the "mapping" of the system needs to be detailed enough to enable prediction of the outcome of affecting the targets. I have yet to see an implementation of that gets beyond "target list making". Making a list of targets, with at least having a "theory of action" fro WHY the elements of that list are important gets you the sort of ad hoc metric-chasing that has befuddled our efforts in Iraq and AfPak.Quote:
Step 2 is TARGET for success. The Rings analysis or mapping the system(s).
Either our best and brightest are incompetent, or an engineering design metaphor to creating a desired end-state JUST DOESN'T WORK IN ALL CASES.
The "rings of importance" construct (how ever many there are, and what you call the) is a useful framework for UNDERSTANDING the categories of components in a system and some general relationships between categories - but is WOEFULLY INSUFFICIENT for creating a desired endstate in a system of any real complexity.
How can you plan the campaign if you don't learn about the relationships between components until to start taking action? This is what distinguishes the "realistic" applications of systems theory to military operations (iterative, continuing and evolving) with the "engineered" episodic" application Warden claims in his theory.Quote:
Step 3 is CAMPAIGN to win. Much of your concerns about relationships happens in this step. Additionally you will learn about Phases not a single pulse, also you will learn not to depend on single points of failure, that is the whole point of attacking multiple targets in parallel. You also will encounter the "Red Team" process.
You attack multiple targets in parallel, and then what? how long do you wait to asses if your end state is achieved? I assume that if you don't then you plan and execute another episode of parallel attacks. We are eliminating "battle" remember so there is no "steady state" engagement with the adversary (that would be to "do battle" with him).
Sorry, but I can't help but recall Buzz Lightyear "falling, with style". From the "military Warden" and not the business guru this meant being magnanimous in victory and not imposing demeaning conditions on the defeated adversary that will fester into resentments and a rekindling of hostilities. That is just common sense, not systems theory.Quote:
Step 4 is FINISH with finesse. About achieving the end state which is the whole reason to do this in the first place.
This is a different strategic framework than the COIN or operational design frameworks.
It is also not in harmony with actual systems theory (for reasons given in the above discussion of warden's "laws".
I agree with you Slap on the usefulness of systems theory, again, I don't think the Warden theory is good systems theory, or good military art.
Well looks like I can't change your mind but maybe Walt can. Walt Disney Movie explaining the theory of Ring Warfare and how to win using Airpower.
Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"
Part 7,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Zxof...eature=related
Part 8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zlr_H...eature=related
Part 9
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfaFk...eature=related
Part 10
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuVkY...eature=related
Enjoy your trip.
This thread is difficult. the conversation about the validity and applicability of a strategy keeps evolving into a sterile discussion between believers and non-believers. To improve the exchange of ideas, I propose a mental war game.
- We fast-forward the American Revolution War into the future. The thirteen colonies are under British rule in 2011.
- Everything on the ground (weapons, tactics, vehicles,...) remains the same.
- The British Crown receives five aircraft carriers, a manual on the application of the Five-Ring Strategy and John Ashley Warden III himself to lead the British forces at Her Majesty's service.
- The use of the aircraft carriers would double the monthly burden of the war effort, but only for the duration of the war.
My question is the following: under these circumstances, would the British forces win the War of American Revolution and keep the thirteen colonies under British rule?
Not a legitimate scenario because views of what is acceptable vary depending on who employs the air/seapower.
If the colonists hugged populations, hid in the woods, used anti-ship ballistic missiles and diesel electric subs that waited for carriers to come to them, and hidden mobile radar air defense systems that engaged carrier aircraft and then shut down radars and repositioned...game on for the colonists. Plus, a more evolved colonist would simply move more inland with his leaders, processes, populations, infrastructure, and land-based aircraft and TBM...thus outdistancing carrier attacks.
Don't forget jamming GPS, attack of satellites, and an EMP attack of Hawaii, Guam, and Alaska...err I mean Britain and Canada. Lots of inflatable decoys out in the open will be sure to waste multiple bombs, followed up by air defense ambushes.
If the air/seapower didn't care about the population and bombed cities, infrastructure, and processes into oblivion, and bombed houses of perceived leaders killing their families (but not the leaders)...the British probably win. But the U.S. would never do that today, or would they per Warden's methodology? Russia appears to have leveled much of Chechnya to suppress that revolution. Gulbuddin Hekmatyr shelled Kabul and Russian bombers killed 24,000 in Herat early in the war. Did any of these methods solve the undlerlying problem and is the leader and his colonist lead followers still in power?
Would the colonists become meek, passive zombies following this slaughter...or increase their resolve and guerilla activities, not to mention terror attacks in Britain?
The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland."
Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.
OK, so now a hard core attrition strategy is based on the Five Rings!?! This is the antithesis of Warden argument! If it can be all things to all people its just meaningless.Quote:
Links to the Disney Classic from 1942 "Victory Through Airpower"
We are seemingly at a basic philosophical impasse about how the world works, and what the purpose of models of it are and when they are useful.
First is the desired endstate. DO the British just want to keep the Americans in the Empire, or do they want to return to the status quo ante? If you just want to keep them in the Empire then you negotiate out the grievances (with your carriers big sticks reminding the colonists of the stakes) and come to a compromise that increases American representation and tempers taxation without killing the golden goose. If you want to compel a return to the status quo ante, you have a problem that pretty much requires a use of force to compel.Quote:
My question is the following: under these circumstances, would the British forces win the War of American Revolution and keep the thirteen colonies under British rule?
Then you get WHAT do you try to affect?
The Five Rings strategy starts with leadership. Assuming the latter desired endstate, Warden would focus on trying to identify the revolutions leadership.
Problem 1: Applicability of Mao's Peoples war theory - do we believe that the American Revolution was the product of the Founding Father's actions, thus their elimination would decapitate the revolution and end it? Or was the emergence of the Founding Fathers the product of an idea that enjoyed significant enough grassroots support, that, like we see with Al Qeada - crunch all the leaders you want, more will step up?
I'll give Warden credit for not cutting off his nose to spite his face and he would employ lots of SOF ground forces and Intelligence assets to learn the identities and locations of the Leadership.
Problem 2: How do come up with the set of parallel operations when the system you are affecting is in a constant dynamic state?
This is the problem with "hold at Risk" strategies. You can typically only determine the identity and location of a small subset of a mobile target set. You might be able to attack Franklin, Washington and Hamilton one day, and then Adams, Jay and Madison the next. And once you strike a subset you tip your hand and may burn some of your intel assets and drive the leadership to a new operating pattern.
It becomes a sequential operation , not a parallel one.
And if the Americans are smart they will make sure any strikes cause a significant collateral damage to loyalists.
Problem 3 of the whole strategy - The enemy gets a vote. Warden assumes that you can observe and affect the adversary system in a detached way. The Red Team effort in his is what we call "Blue red team" which is looking for flaws in the Blue plan. He does not address "Red red Team" Which is an independent team PLAYING RED and coming up with how Red may play the game, not just what the flaws in the Blue plan are. How to deal with a sophisticated Red that gives you the information they know you desire - but use the fact they know how you will respond to it against you (ie the leadership turns out not to be at the "big meeting" but its "take your child to work day" or "model Government day"? The strategy assumes that you in essence know what the enemy is thinking.
Problem 4 of the strategy is related to the above - The Media gets a vote. Warden doens't include this at all in his theory and assumes that you can conduct your application of effects in a vacuuum of broader scrutiny and political context. The Colonists will play the "underdog card" and ensure that the British are portrayed in the media as evil, jackbooted nazis because they are DELIBERATELY ignoring your military forces and conducting political assassination and brutal destruction of your civil infrastructure. Buy the PLO playbook and add Christien Amonpur and Anderson Cooper to speed dial. Play up that "good guys" use their military to attack the other guys military ONLY and that means there can be on other characterization of the British other than EVIL.
This is the essence of the "theory meets practice" problem that I made WAY to philosoical :(. 5 Rings-like frameworks are importatn to understanding the problem, but the information you need to make them actionable is tremendous, fleeting and subject to contamination by an a sophisticated adversary.Quote:
The bottom line Warden seems to miss, is it is virtually impossible to understand the ASCOPE and PMESII (whatever it is) operational environment without troops on the ground to report and attempt to understand those conditions. In addition, following the precision attacks, the underlying tensions remain and are aggravated by the need to rebuild...not a condition likely to endear colonists to the "homeland."
This is the essence of the "you don't get to eliminate battle from the vocabulary if the enemy chooses to fight them" problem. Interestingly the potential problem in the future China scenario that has everybody crying "AirSea Battle" is that - by wardens definition - Lanpower now out ranges airpower and can hodl it at bay. SInce unguided ballistic missiles are not "airpower" but land power by Wardens definition, the abilty to take out airbases at it nearly intercontinental ranges with ballistic missiles (and potentially even carrier at sea) you are left having to fight battles of access to even get your air power in play en mass.Quote:
Plus cannot believe that any CoG analysis would ignore the intrinsic value of attacking key targets of the adversary's military! In a China scenario, for instance, air-to-air becomes largely irrelevant if you succeed in repeatedly attacking runways and airbases killing the enemy's aircraft and related logistics on the ground rather than in the air. Isn't that a 5 rings approach, largely ignored in the emotional desire to fight the white scarf war? Plus those attacks of airfields do not have to occur using fighters or manned aircraft. The enemy obviously can use the same methodology to destroy our few land-based airfields for fighters in a place like the Pacific where they are far and few between and well within range of TBM and ASBM.
The bottom is that you are hard pressed to come up with a success scenario "with little unplanned destruction or spilling of blood" that achieves your objectives using the actual 5 Rings strategy.
As Warden points out in his article, this would be a war you would not choose to wage because the strategy can't win with a high probability.
So just what types of "end-states" can the 5 rings strategy compel an adversary to choose? Like Walt Disney points out, ones where the desired endstate is "surrender". That construct is simply not useful in the real world any more.
Over to the Warden-istas. How do you address the problems?
pvebber,
Good discussion so far, but both from non-Warden-istas. Like you, I look forward to the first comment by a Warden-ista. To paraphrase Warden:
"If we see the American revolutionaries as a system, we first determine what the system needs to look like so that we can realize our future picture for it. London envisiones to keep the thirteen colonies under British rule and benefit from its wealth by raising taxes. With this choice of the desired overall system effect, the next step is to find the centers of gravity whose alteration will create the desired system change as directly (strategically) as possible. We start with the center ring and work from the inside to the outside to find the right centers of gravity. This is how we, Warden-istas solve this problem:" PLEASE STATE YOUR COURSE OF ACTION HERE.