Mosul campaign Day 141.
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Mosul campaign Day 141.
Day 142 of Mosul Campaign.
Mosul campaign Day 143 and weekly security report in Iraq for March 1-7, 2017.
Day 144 of Mosul campaign.
Mosul campaign Day 145.
Day 146 of Mosul campaign.
Day 147 of Mosul Campaign.
Day 148 of Mosul Campaign.
Just to give some perspective the WW2 Siege of Sevastopol (then in the USSR) lasted 199 days.
From:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_...41%E2%80%9342)
Day 149 of Mosul campaign.
Day 150 of Mosul Campaign.
Day 151 in Mosul Campaign.
Day 152 in Mosul Campaign.
Security report for 2nd week of March in Iraq.
Day 153-54 in Mosul Campaign.
Day 155 of Mosul Campaign.
Day 156 of Mosul Campaign.
Day 157 of Mosul Campaign.
Day 158 of Mosul campaign.
Day 159 of Mosul campaign.
Day 162 of Mosul Campaign.
Mosul campaign Day 163
Weekly security report for Iraq. The only comprehensive casualty report left.
Day 164-65 of Mosul Campaign.
Security report for Iraq March 22-28.
Mosul Campaign Day 166-167
Day 168 of Mosul Campaign.
Day 169 of Mosul campaign.
Taken from an IISS Strategic Comment (behind a pay wall), with my emphasis:Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/...s-in-iraq-59bfQuote:
The Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) arose in response to a fatwa by Sistani prompted by the fall of Mosul to ISIS in 2014. Sistani declared that 'whoever of you sacrifices himself to defend his country and his family and their honour will be a martyr'. PMU fighters number between 60,000 and 100,000 and are contributing 35,000 of the 90,000 fighters involved in the Iraqi government's current effort to retake Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, from ISIS. In November 2016, the Iraqi government accorded them official status as part of Iraq's security forces. Sunni Arab politicians characterised this development as evidence of Shia 'dictatorship' in Iraq that could increase extrajudicial killings and military brutality, weaken the Iraqi military establishment and deepen national sectarian divisions. In February, video footage emerged of Shia militiamen and Iraqi soldiers beating and executing civilians in east Mosul, and Amnesty International documented PMU atrocities in Fallujah in 2016. While the PMU consider themselves a religious movement of Iraqi national liberation, the Western media tend to describe them more calmly as an Iran-backed coalition of Shia militias. Officials and media of Gulf Sunni Arab countries regard them as an Iran-backed terrorist organisation. None of these three characterisations is altogether accurate, mainly because the PMU are heterogeneous. About half of the PMU are pre-existing militias, and about half are new outfits mustered by Sistani or other Iraqi politicians. Iran funds, supports and operationally supervises four of the largest groups in the PMU: Kata’ib Hizbullah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and the Badr Organisation. The PMU also include the Peace Brigades, a group aligned behind firebrand Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Muqtada al-Sadr. Iraq’s holy shrines, controlled by Sistani, established three of the best-trained and equipped groups of the PMU: the Imam Ali Brigade, Ali al-Akhbar Brigade and Abbas Division. Their officers are nationalists aligned with the Iraqi government, and the Abbas Division was actually trained by Iraqi special forces. But Sistani’s religious authority gives him countervailing authority over these units, which, when he decides to exercise it, could have significant political consequences. Sistani’s disenchantment with former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki forced him from office. The PMU also now nominally include some Sunni tribal fighters and Christian militias.
Some PMU groups also receive money and military support from Iran's Quds Force, the covert expeditionary element of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Many Iranians see Quds Force commander General Qassem Suleimani as a protector of Iran against the influence of ISIS and encroachment from Iraq and Syria. In mainstream Iranian political discourse, Iranian involvement in regional conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen is justified as the forward engagement of ISIS and al-Qaeda before they reach Iranian territory.
I interviewed Amnesty International's Donatella Rovera about the civilian toll in the fighting in Mosul.
Day 170-171 in Mosul campaign.
Day 172-173 of Mosul Campaign.
Monthly casualty report for March 2017 in Iraq. 6,732 dead and wounded reported. Highest figure since December 2016.
According to U.S. military sources, CJTF-OIR has killed 45,000 to 60,000 Daesh fighters to date and roughly 300 Al Qaeda fighters.
According to Airwars.org, CJTF-OIR has killed 3,000 to 4,800 civilians in Iraq and Syria to date.
Therefore, the 4.70% to 9.60% of the fatalities inflicted by the Coalition would be civilian.
Russia seems to be providing inflated numbers of the Daesh and Nusra killed since September 2015. What do you estimate to be the number of combatants and civilians killed by Russia?
Don't track Syria so have no idea about civilian casualties caused by Russia.
Mosul campaign day 174-175.
Day 176 of Mosul campaign.
Day 177 of Mosul Campaign.
Mosul Campaign Day 178.
Day 179 of Mosul campaign.
Great report in CTC Sentinel about IS defenses in Mosul.
Day 180 Mosul Campaign.
Security report for Iraq 1st week of April.
Day 181-182 of Mosul Campaign.
Day 183 of Mosul Campaign.
Mosul campaign Day 184.
Day 185 of Mosul campaign.
Mosul campaign day 186.
Day 187 of Mosul campaign.
Day 188 of Mosul campaign.