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A story I'd been waiting for: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle5721192.ece
Which raises the question of command arrangements in Afghanistan, between the USA and the UK. Secondly the apparent deployment of a large US helicopter capability to the region.
davidbfpo
A roundtable discussion on wider UK defence policy, entitled 'Force for Good', with "think tank" experts, analysts, a couple of civil servants and the current Defence Secretary: http://www.newstatesman.com/pdf/defence09.pdf
Note this appeared in the traditionally left-leaning News Statesman weekly magazine and the event's co-sponsor is a private defence contractor; how times change.
The second link: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ is an update on issues of defence equipment decision-making and waste of money. Note this useful UK commentary's author is writing a book on Iraq and the website is not being regularly updated.
davidbfpo
Without going into superfluous detail I know two of those men, extremely well, and they are good solid lads. I also know a respect another man at that meeting but it's far more telling as to who was not there, and should have been!Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
The ex-SAS major who resigned after completing a tour in Afghanistan has spoken before and was interviewed in The Daily Telegraph, the link is: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/4951...its-hands.html
I select one passage: "The operations that we are conducting are so worthless. It's just crazy to think we hold that ground or have any influence on what goes on beyond the bases."
The interview appears, with an official response, on the BBC link: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7929785.stm
Note the UK blogsite http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ is active once more and makes scathing comments on UK defence policy, notably over equipment.
davidbfpo
International Affairs, Mar 09: Blair's Wars and Brown’s Budgets: From Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in Less Than a Decade
Quote:
...The current state of Britain’s defence stands in marked contrast to the situation just a decade ago. In July 1998 George Robertson, Labour’s first Secretary of State for Defence in 18 years, presented the government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) to parliament for approval. The SDR represented 14 months of work and enjoyed widespread support within the MoD and parliament, among the various London-based think-tanks and policy research institutes, and within the defence industry and academia. The strategy was praised for bringing foreign and defence policy together in a clear, coherent and affordable fashion. For several years the SDR was regarded as a model for defence planning, so much so that current Conservative defence policy looks set unimaginatively to replicate the SDR process.
Why is it that the government’s past performance in this field, so widely regarded as admirable in principle, has nevertheless proved so difficult to sustain in practice? To put the question another way, why is it that strategy and reality have apparently parted company so dramatically? To answer these questions it must first be understood that UK defence policy—at best a complex and uncertain process, as the next section explains—has always been a compromise of sorts between three policy imperatives: declaratory policy; military strategy; and the defence budget. These imperatives, each of which we discuss in turn below, have been the three main ingredients in the UK defence policy debate particularly the last.....
A shortage of Apache pilots means nine helicopters available in Afghanistan:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...frontline.html
davidbfpo
UK National Audit Office Report, 14 May 09: Support to High Intensity Operations
Quote:
This report looks at the Ministry of Defence’s (the Department’s) arrangements for supporting high intensity operations and focuses on four key areas: equipment, logistics, pre-deployment training and support to personnel. The intention of this report is not to examine military judgement or the outcomes of operations, nor does it look at the support provided to the many smaller operations in which the Department is engaged. Following on from the National Audit Office’s previous work on operations, the aim of this report is to examine the Department’s support to high intensity operations, since it is on this kind of operation that support arrangements are most stress-tested. For each key area of support, the report sets out the Department’s generic arrangements before examining how well these arrangements have been working on Operation TELIC in Iraq and Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan, primarily over the last two years.
...you shouldn't have joined! Think of it this way..
Within 12 months there will be a General Election, and assuredly a change of government - even if not a change of party.
Within 18 months there will be a Defence Review...not least as part of a post-election Comprehensive Spending Review.
And if past form is anything to go by, we'll hold onto the ludicrously outdated legacy capital projects, that guarantee the industrial base of perhaps 700 employees in margninal constituencies, and elicit saving by cutting...more infantry battalions!
So if you think its depressing now, just WAIT to see what's coming. God bless the baby boomers (honourable exceptions of those in or have worn uniform!). Bottom line - when we were flush, we were neglected. Now the West is Broke, wait and see. It'll be like the Crimea again.
Though I have to say some of those exceptions, honorable as they may be, were / are not helpful to the forces... :(Quote:
Originally Posted by Coldstreamer
I'm old and they just disappointed me -- my Gen X kids, OTOH, can get quite livid on the topic of Baby Boomers... :eek:
Some of the recent posts here have moved onto a new thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...5347#post75347
on the UK failing strategy.
davidbfpo
An interesting comment on the UK defence crossroads, brought to the fore by a think tank report (IPPR: http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsa...ion.asp?id=676) and comments that hard choices were needed on what to spend on: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009...asting-assets/
Be interesting to see if this elite muttering will be picked up by the wider public.
davidbfpo
This time an article in the RUSI Journal, by an ex-UK Army officer: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Journal_Little.pdf (complete with photos of Kilcullen and Nagl). The last paragraph is worth reading, citing continuous re-invention, reflection and listening to outsiders.
I suspect the article may get some media coverage - as there is some attention to the issues.
RUSI is a Whitehall "think tank", traditionally conservative and in the past due to close links with the Ministry of Defence not exactly open to criticism of policies. Often used as a platform by officials and senior officers to make statements, where General Dannatt has spoken and the incoming CGS General Richards recently: http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E496B...4A4253226F582/ (Must declare an interest, I've been a RUSI member for over thirty years).
Commentary on (as ever): http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/
davidbfpo
Interesting. Mentions an article of mine!Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
This week has seen a series of developments:
a) The valedictory (final) speech by General Dannatt, the UK's top soldier: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/De...peechAsCgs.htm
I draw attention to (summarised): What leaps out though is something about which we have been vaguely aware..this comes early in the speech ....There was a belief that this could be conducted on the basis of "Go Fast, Go First, Go Home"...Having been locked into a flawed "mantra"..the armed forces geared to be able to deliver on this basis, now to find that they are faced with "long wars” for which they are neither equipped nor trained – nor fully understand. And I quoteAs ever see the commentary on: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...on-at-war.htmlQuote:
"We should be under no illusion: we are at war and if we want to succeed, which we must, we must get onto a war-like footing - and as I said to the Officer Cadets being commissioned from Sandhurst last Christmas 'you enter an Army that is at war - even if not everyone in our nation realises that'".
b) An article 'National defence in the age of austerity' by two defence academics (hat tip Kings of War): http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files...ish_dorman.pdf and an earlier paper 'Blair’s wars and Brown’s budgets, 'From Strategic Defence Review to strategic decay in less than a decade' : http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files...ish_dorman.pdf
Remembering David Kilcullen's remarks on more bandsmen in the USA than 'X' check in the first article Pg. 15 Tables One & Two for the incredible manpower structure the UK forces have.
c) The much-hyped report by the House of Commons Foriegn Affairs Committee (with a Labour chairman), that we are doing too much in Afghanistan and note released when parliament is on it's long vacation: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...e-say-MPs.html and slightly longer: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...n-1766248.html
The report is the top headline on Drudge; UK parliamentary committees have negligible power and governments can easily ignore them. By time Parliament returns who will remember this? Very few.
Other articles refer to an extra 2,000 troops going to Afghanistan, at the US's urging and allegedly vetoed by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. If they go to Helmand Province, with three extra helicopters (Merlins), this is crazy IMHO.
Previously commented upon in http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=british+army and other threads, notably in the Afghan context: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7644 and http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...hlight=british
Provided a crash program is up and running to train up Afghan soldiers and security forces (para-military and police), extra UK troops in Helmud Prov. is a sound idea and exactly where those extra soldiers are needed right now.
Do they have any personnel to spare though?Quote:
Originally Posted by George L. Singleton
From an outsider's "armchair" yes there is capacity, in manpower, whether there are the right people for a training and mentoring role is a moot point. As others within have commented somethings are broken. I fear the UK has not thought about sending 2,000 trainers, which is clearly indicated elsewhere as necessary.Quote:
Originally Posted by Teen_Virtuoso
davidbfpo
Bill Rammell, Armed Forces Minister, spoke at RUSI on the role of defence in CT; a very broad brush and nothing startling. There is a part about HMG explaining policy on Afghanistan better: http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4A6F3C9D55E2D/
The speech was picked up by the main media, but I missed it. A speech at RUSI is hardly public engagement, although the Q&A session featured critical, polite questions (mainly from the press).
davidbfpo
Quote from BBC article: "Among the concerns raised by the 9,000 servicemen and women surveyed were the frequency of tours, levels of pay and the quality of equipment and housing."Quote:
Originally Posted by Stan
I suggest that one needs to separate these factors into two groups. One is for those who appear to resist doing what they were employed to do in the first place and that is to act as a soldier on a op 'tour'. Sooner these go the better.
One would then be left with addressing the other major concerns which unless addressed could denude the military of those with the necessary military skills and who are willing and able to use those skills.
Increased and more dangerous 'tours' should not be ruled out as a cause of the drop off in recruiting.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
JMA,
The cited post above is quite dated - it was from August 2008. After a recent encounter I was told the Army is finding recruitment far easier, so much so there are waiting lists and the ability to recruit has enabled units to get rid of those they no longer need. Secondly, there appear to be a waiting list for entry to parts of the RN; a friend's son has been waiting for two years and still no date in sight. I accept the 'waiting' maybe impacted by an expectation of further manpower reductions.
In my limited encounters with the Army the refrain is that Afghanistan is a positive factor in recruitment; I suspect it is retention that is affected far more, especially for those who are married, with children and a trade that will get a job outside.
Ok, lets keen the eyes on that trend then. I too have heard that the married members are also more likely to want to move on due to domestic pressure. I recently met a major who had left the service because the 6 months every two years 'tours' were getting to be a bit much. You go figure.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
I would concur. The problem is retention. Guys join, "fight their war," and depart. Been there, done it, got the t-shirt.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Clearly A'Stan is not critical to the security of the UK, so the wife usually has a point to make, especially if the man that went is not quite the same man that came back, in some cases.
The economic downturn may have also played a part in the upturn in recruitment in the last year or two.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Currently we are as near to full manning as we are ever likely to get. The problem is that full manning is not necessarily 'right' manning as current ops demand more of some trades (MOS) then others and it takes time to grow specialists, adjust manning structures etc.
Afghanistan is recruitment positive and the current economic downturn is retention positive. What we find difficult to quantify is how many joined us because of the downturn and are staying on purely because of the downturn. We expect that once the business sector picks up we will see a sharp uptake across the rank spectrum of people getting out.
Within the officer corps I have detected an increasing degree of cynicism and disillusionment with our senior leadership as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (more so); an echoing of Coldstreamer's comments on toxic leadership. This may just be the jaundiced and cynical company that I keep ;) - or it may point to an increasing number of career officers leaving in the future.
And of course the whispers of cutbacks (probable) and redundancies (wishful) have already started!
RR
Thanks for that. Of the specialists surely the training which takes months rather than years is not really that much of a problem? What % of these specialists need training which would last more than a year?Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Rat
Then of course the liberal rotation system (6 months : 18 months) places a higher demand for such people. The problem to some extent at least is self inflicted?
I suppose there is little or no chance that the Brits would consider raising a Brigade specially for Afghan ops which can be disbanded once the war is over?
Here then is an opportunity to get a couple of thousand soldiers for a specially raised Afghan regiment or two?Quote:
Originally Posted by baboon6
KEY POINTS:
• The UK Government today, 18 October 2010, published Britain's National Security Strategy (NSS). Together with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) it sets out the UK's strategic choices on how to ensure the security of the UK.
• The National Security Strategy and SDSR together provide direction for national security policy, capabilities and resources for the next 5 years. The NSS allows UK Government Departments to prioritise their resources according to the risks set out in the document published today.
• The NSS sets out two high-level objectives which will guide the UK's strategic approach overall:
- To ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting its people, economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks that can affect it directly; and
- To shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests overseas, and applying its instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.
• The NSS decides the UK's priorities for action, and identifies 15 priority security risks to the UK. The following Tier 1 risks are judged to be the UK's highest priorities for UK national security:
- Terrorism
- Cyber attack
- Major natural hazards and accidents
- International Military Crisis
• Afghanistan will remain the UK's top priority while British troops are deployed there.
• The details of the capability and resource decisions, the 'ways' and 'means' of achieving the National Security priorities are in the SDSR which will be published on 19 Oct 10. The National Security Strategy has informed the policy, resource and capability choices that will be set out in the SDSR.
DETAIL:
Context and Foreign Policy Baseline
1. Through a globalised 'networked' world the risk picture is likely to become increasingly diverse with no single risk dominating. This means achieving security will become more complex.
2. The UK's ability to remain adaptable for the future will be essential, as will be the ability to identify risks and opportunities at the earliest possible stage and maintaining highly capable and flexible armed forces.
3. Through NATO, the EU and other alliances the UK will share its security needs and gain collective benefits. As a result, the UK faces no major state threat at present.
4. We will continue to play a major role in shaping the international architecture - reinforcing the UN, NATO, G20 and EU and building bilateral ties with rising economic powers such as China and India.
The National Interest and British Values
5. The National Security Strategy explains that the UK's national interest comprises its security, prosperity and freedom and that these are interconnected and mutually supportive.
6. National Security is about protecting the UK's people, including their rights and liberties.
7. Promoting civil liberties and upholding the rule of law are fundamental principles which underpin the UK's approach to national security.
8. Security and Liberty are complementary and mutually supportive. The UK needs security to protect the liberties it holds dear.
National Security Priorities (Risk Management – Tiers 1, 2 and 3)
9. For the first time, the UK Government has assessed and prioritised all the major national security risks that the UK faces to ensure that it has the right means to address them.
10. The 15 priority risks to UK national security, split into three tiers are:
Tier 1 Priorities (the most pressing risks to the UK over the next five years)
• Terrorism
• Cyber attack
• Major natural hazards and accidents
• International Military Crisis
Tier 2 Priorities (the next highest priorities)
• State-led Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks
• Instability And Conflict Overseas
• Organised Crime
• Space security
Tier 3 Priorities (The next highest priorities after Tier 1 & 2)
• Conventional military attack on UK
• Significant increase in flows of terrorsits, organised criminals, illegal migrants etc across our border
• Energy Security and Resources
• Accidental Release Radioactive Material
• Article 5 - Attack by a State on another NATO or EU Member
• An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider regional conflict.
• Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (for example, food, water) essential to the UK
Terrorism
11. The risk to the UK from terrorism continues to be one of the highest priority national security risks.
12. The UK has therefore decided to give a high priority to counter terrorism compared to other areas of national security.
Cyber Attack
13. Cyberspace is now vital for the UK's prosperity and way of life.
14. The rapid growth of cyberspace means that the UK must act now to ensure its cyber security.
15. Some states continue to try to gain advantage over the UK through hostile intelligence activity and cyber attack, and the UK must do all that it can to protect the valuable government and commercial information we possess.
Hazards and Accidents
16. Certain civil emergencies are among the most severe of all threats to UK national security.
17. In a more resource constrained environment, the UK will act in a more targeted way in the future, which means, among other things, focusing relatively more on the highest priority civil emergency risks;
18. The top three civil emergency risks to the UK for continued action to improve preparedness: (i) terrorist attacks using unconventional materials (ii) major tidal or coastal flooding; (iii) severe influenza pandemic.
International Military Crises and Instability
19. An international military crisis involving multiple states in a region which drew in the UK or its Allies would have a major impact on global stability.
20. The UK will continue to work internationally to address such risks before they develop, but must ensure that it is prepared to act should diplomatic solutions fail.
Alliance and Partnerships
21. The UK will intensify its bilateral defence and security relationships with a wide range of partners, working more effectively together to tackle threats and exploit opportunities where interests coincide.
22. The UK will be active in the multilateral organisations central to its national security: committed to a reformed UN Security Council, a robust and credible NATO, and an EU that uses its collective weight to promote shared interests and values.
Full details can be found at: UK Cabinet Office
IISS has quickly published a viewpoint:Link:http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-voices/?blogpost=69Quote:
Like many such documents from NATO members over the past decade, it tries to set a framework for dealing with an 'age of uncertainty' – a world in which there is a wide range of possible threats to security and a lack of clarity about which might be the most serious....
Several points are noteworthy about this ranking: first, the threat from cyber attacks has been upgraded, in line with the remarks made by Iain Lobban, head of the government listening post GCHQ, at the IISS last week. Secondly, there is relatively little emphasis in the document on two elements which have tended to loom large in such threat assessments: nuclear proliferation and the dangers from fragile and failing states. Iran's possible acquisition of nuclear weapons is included in a paragraph that also mentions organised crime, and is not mentioned again. Thirdly, by referring specifically to a military crisis 'between states', the strategy appears to downgrade the risks from the kind of regional instability that has prompted UK military action on several occasions since the mid-1990s.
This is a document explicitly predicated on the need to deal with a fiscal deficit, with defence cuts to be announced tomorrow.....
A scathing, indirect comment on the UK decision-making:Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...arry-jets.htmlQuote:
One of the Navy’s new £3 billion aircraft carriers will never carry aircraft and will sail for only three years before being mothballed and possibly sold, ministers will announce on Tuesday....(much later)
Scrapping the Harriers will create a “capability gap” of nine years, with Britain unable to fly fast jets from an aircraft carrier until 2020, when the new JSF enters service.
Now to another London "think tank" RUSI:Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...4CBC6D8637AB7/Quote:
The problem with it, as it presently exists, is that it is not really a strategy as such, but a methodology for a strategy. It does not make hard choices between real things - which is what strategists have to do. It creates all the right boxes and describes how we should fit them together - who should lead in this or that area, who else should be involved, and so on - but it doesn't put anything specific enough into the boxes.
(Near the end)But it is hard to avoid the feeling that the reason the story and the numbers are being kept apart is that they don't fit together as well as ministers and officials hoped they would.
Now my own viewpoint. The carrier aircraft "gap" has been clear for months and we must realise UK policy today is now far more dictated by public / state financial position. We have been through this before, notably with the East of Suez withdrawal, IIRC in 1968, after a "run" on the UK Pound.
This is "spin" and "smoke" creating a structure to show decisions are strategic and fit together. Remaining with the example of the two aircraft carriers, where do they fit in the priorities of the national security strategy?
Moderator's Note
This thread until today (30th April 2013) was entitled 'UK Army 2020' and was merged with a smaller thread on Sir David Richards 2010 speech (below). It was re-titled 'UK Defence Policy' (catch all) to enable wider use (ends).
On Monday General Sir David Richards, now the UK Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), gave the annual Colin Cramphorn Lecture, in London, organised by the "think tank" Policy Exchange and last year it was a General Petraeus.
Link to website, with very short bio:http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/eve...ent.cgi?id=278
The talk is on Youtube and included. It is just over an hour, with a lengthy Q&A session; most of the questions were by journalists and listen carefully for one. A couple of interesting points made, notably on cyber warfare, the purchase of two aircraft carriers and of course Afghanistan.
It was well reported, but many other more newsworthy items pushed it to the "inside pages".
Listened to it. Picked up nothing earth shattering did you?Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8548...n-warfare.htmlQuote:
A critical assessment of the Army’s readiness for the next decade of military operations also found that its frontline units lack the right vehicles and precision weapons that will be needed.
The Army’s current shortcomings are highlighted in a report drawn up following an eight-month planning and assessment exercise named Agile Warrior.
The exercise was carried out by the Force Development and Training Command, a team of senior officers that attempts to prepare the Army for the operations it is likely to face in the years ahead.
Oh, 2nd half of 90's all over again.
I wonder why quantity isn't the primary concern for such environments because of the short lines of sight and fire.
You'd think someone in Whitehall would have watched The Children of Men. :confused:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vQAJ1q4z4A
The British Army is currently a one trick pony. Resources are devoted almost entirely to training for Afghanistan leaving little to devote elsewhere.
Some of the TTPs from Afghanistan will be transferrable and there is still some residual knowledge from Basra (Iraq). However operations in large urban areas will prove challenging on many fronts. Use of PGMs will probably broadly follow Afghanistan TTPs, as will use of ISTAR. We have very limited main battle tank currency currently and developing expertise in use of armoured vehicles in urban environments could stretch our limited training resources.
Already (and rightly) general's efforts are looking ahead to the armed forces post-Afghanistan; structures and capabilities. Fuchs raises a good point in that the UK Army is envisaged as being so small (6 deployable brigades but not 6 at the same time) that the fact that mass has a quality all of its own and is essential for some operational environments appears to have been downplayed.
Sad too to note that with the air effort committed to Afghanistan the Brits were hard pressed to cobble together 12 aircraft for ops in Libya. Then there were of those that were grounded due to lack of spares and then a reported shortage of munitions. What a long way down for a nation which was once able to put hundreds of bombers into action on raids.Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Rat
Its takes a lot of resources to fight many fronts....
The Future of the British Army
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
The MOD came out with the official release of the UK Army restructuring called Army 2020. Below is a link to the brochure - it's worth a look:
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/gen...0_brochure.pdf
I will let another speak as to the effectiveness of these changes:Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...rmy-chief.htmlQuote:
Lord Dannatt, former head of the Army, says 20 per cent defence cuts mean Britain will not be able to fight wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time in future.
More commentary today, some good, some expected, you decide which they are.
Ex-Para officer, now a Labour MP:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/ju...-cheap-britain
An ex-brigadier, now at IISS:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...ighting-future
More a strategic comment by an academic:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/07/no-...-vital-organs/
Finally try this cartoon:http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/car...l-defence-cuts
Apologies my IT skills are not enough to cut & paste this into a post.
This may have flown under the radar but I have seen that the British army has adopted a completely different future organisation than that which has been announced previously. Army 2020 remedies a number of problems I have personally had with the Bde based army (notably permanent Div HQ). It also innovates by providing three different organisations inc. a specialised logistics (or force troops) entity. It maintains a "heavy" div for high intensity ops well as keeping the stabilisation ops option with a several Bde div. My main issue is the reduction of armour from 5 reg/Bns under the previous proposal to just three in the current one (I would have thought that the adaptable forces would have at least two independentt Armoured reg/bn). But alas that is not so. I think, personally, that its a much better structure than the previous proposal of five Bdes with a hodge-podge of capabilites and units. The creation of permanet div HQ also facilitates so called stabilisation ops esp. when one considers that in Afghanistan Bdes were largely left to their own divices in theatre with regards COIN ops. Now a permanet Div can help smooth the transition during roulement and allow startegic objectives to be translated into tactial missions without distrupting operations because of redeployments (however, the LACK of a strategy was probably the real problem in Afghanistan).
What do the honourable members of this here council think? Your comments and observations would be much appreciated.
Germany did split its army (and to some degree also its air force) into crisis reaction and other forces. It sucked.
Budget was tight, so crisis reaction forces got adequate personnel and almost adequate material funds, but the rest was neglected and atrophied.
NEVER establish a two-class military under the umbrella of the same GHQ. Separate active and reserve forces, united only at the level of ministry - acceptable. Divided army - not acceptable.
2nd; why bother with a single Div HQ if so many brigades are in the army? The would all be deployed in a big war, so simply call it a Corps HQ and design it as such.
3rd; looks like only three tank battalions for the entire UK army to me - that's approx. 200 Chally2 including driving training tanks and tanks in major repairs etc. That is hardly enough; the UK army would not be capable of mobile warfare against a real, capable army.
4th; helicopters overrated, as usual.
A lot of the detail about how this structure will be resourced and trained is still to appear, in particular how the Reserve element will be integrated.
What is very apparent is that the UK will almost certainly never deploy a division in the field again. Despite UK protestations to the contrary this capability is paper thin - literally.
The structure makes the best of a bad deal. The structures were entirely driven by the requirement to reduce the UK military size due to financial imperatives. That is a reasonable enough course of action, but there was no corresponding change in UK national security ambitions so effectively the structural changes have happened in something of a strategic vacuum. I am also lead to understand that the initial reforms presented by the 'Carter team' which led the process for the army were viewed as too radical and rejected by the government.
When the UK stated it could put a division in the field it struggled to put a brigade. By stating that it will aim to put a Bde in the field I suspect that increasingly even this level will be hollowed out.
The loss of heavy armour is not for me as much of an issue as the lack of RAF capability. The bdes are Armoured Infantry and not Armoured brigades. The role of armour is increasingly seen as enabling decisive infantry ops. This is predicated on the fact that it is regarded as highly unlikely that we will fight a parity or near parity opponent in the near to medium future. But this assumption is based on the assumption that the UK and it's Allies will retain technological dominance resulting in air and PGM dominance. I think this is a dangerous assumption based on both the shift in economic power away from the West and the increasing rate of technological diffusion.
My personal view is that the UK defence review should have reduced the UK army much more significantly in order to maintain viable Air and Maritime capabilities.
The fact that UK bdes operated in effect autonomously for too long in Afghanistan is a failure of the ISAF and UK chain of commands. In theory the structures were in place to enable operational oversight. The lack of strategy didn't help either...:rolleyes:Quote:
Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii
The problem with the A2020 structures is that there are two divisional HQs, but no divisional enablers (arty, sigs, ISTAR, logistics).
Good points all round. Personally I would have liked to see the expansion of the Royal Marines to two bdes with associated naval assets and the army reduced to three large(ish) bdes (each about three inf, one-two tank and two arty bns) but I doubt the regimental ethos and traditions of our armies would permit it (and let's not even get started with the Scots regts!). What really galled me was that the SDSR mentions UK commitments to allies yet our commitments to pacific nations doesnt even get a mention. To boot the SDSR outlines a REDUCTION in royal marine strength by 1,800! Definitely a document written by a committee if ever I saw one.Quote:
Originally Posted by Red Rat
The Royal Marines have somewhat elevated quality ambitions, comparable to the army's paras. It is often advisable to keep the authorised personnel of such quality units few in order to
(1) maintain the quality and
(2) not leech very many promising men from the regular combat troops.
This could be the future for the U.S. but about 5x bigger. I don't have inside information nor a crystal ball - just the winds of change.
Frank Ledwidge's latest offering puts his finger on where (he believes) the real problem lies:
Punching Below Our Weight: How Inter-Service Rivalry has Damaged the British Armed Forces
The blurb is:
Ledwidge's first offering was:Quote:
In this 5,000-word e-book, the author of the bestselling Losing Small Wars looks at the problem of rivalry between the top ranks of the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. He argues that senior generals, admirals and air marshals have focused more on empire-building within their own services rather than on the needs of the UK armed forces as a whole, with enormously damaging results. In particular, the UK involvement in Libya was hampered by a total lack of aircraft carriers - sacrificed to preserve the Typhoon, a fighter jet designed for Cold War combat that never happened.
Written with Ledwidge's trademark insight and panache, this is an incisive condemnation of the British armed forces at the very top, and ending with some pertinent suggestions for how the UK could reorient its military priorities.
Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan