Humans are more important than hardware...
Bill,
Appreciate the response. You and I are 'active learners' and have learned in both the classroom and field that Humans are more important than hardware. We both know that all that running around on a battlefield with an equation on piece of paper is going to do is get somebody killed, instead it takes men and women who are willing to physically do what must be done. My point is this does not mean that hardware/and the math behind it should be ignored, and I will try to provide some relevant examples which show that math has and continues to help to create the conditions for success on the battlefield.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Steve, not to reopen an old debate on our opposing views of EBO, but complex adaptive systems is not about tools, it is about human behavior and the ability for humans to learn and adapt. In simple grunt terms (my language) the enemy has a vote, because they will adapt to our response and we will adapt to theirs, thus conflict co-evolution. I strongly disagree with your assertion that a tool will allow us to simplify war into a math equation. Tools may help, but I tend to trust a "good" commander's intuition much more than a tool.
I suspect that you too remember learning about John Henry way back when. Look where we are today with respect to earthmoving equipment. How about crossbows versus our 'old' standby the M-16 musket IMHO you and I stand at a similar point in history with respect to the evolution of some more aspects of warfare from art into a math based science. The computer and the internet have had huge roles in our and our enemies TTPs in this particular event and the genie will not be heading back into the bottle any time soon.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Wilf makes the point that none of these concepts are new is correct (that is only half true, our descripton of something as old as mankind is new), but again I would argue not useful. 90% of our failures in so irregular warfare are due to leadership failures to understand the nature of the problem and respond correctly. 90% of the successes are due to leadership successes. The other 10% is random or luck. You would think fixing the leadership issue would be relatively easy, but it isn't due to our deeply embedded culture for conventional warfare, thus whether new or not, the concepts of IW and hybrid warfare are useful forcing mechanisms. I suspect you'll disagree, but I don't know how you can argue the point that we didn't do very well initially fighting this type of war, and I'm not sure how the argument that war is war (even though its true) is helpful is fixing our underlying problems. Please explain your position?
Using the following definitions:
- War: struggle over life and death
- Warfare: the act of waging war or methods used for waging war
Unconventionally during the invasion of Afghanistan and conventionally during the invasion of Iraq we did very, very well. As you mentioned however, the enemy has a vote and has adapted to our style of warfare. My point is that we need to continue to adapt our methods of warfare as well and a conventional, non-asymmetric, math-free/light response will not answer the mail. Our combat trained/tested leadership at all levels NCO/WO/Officer is the glue that holds it all together; in spite of the cold war bureaucracy which works to hold us back in some important respects.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I think the main issue for our general purpose forces creating an awareness of the holistic nature of war through education and training. In addition to fixing our professional education and culture, we need to direct more funding towards Special Operations, security force assistance, and so called asymmetric capabilities such as cyber, missile defense, space dominance, etc.
I agree with you on this point, and as usual here at SWJ our path takes us right back to the importance of relevant training...
Steve
I think it's a combination of semantics and perceptions
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I don't agree with a Hybrid War concept. It falls between being an invented problem, and naming something we don't need to name. It's a another poorly defined feature of contemporary military thought.
My take also...
Quote:
If US Armed Forces are being pulled in two very different directions then someone needs to be sacked for stupidity for letting that happen.
1. I think that US tactical and operational thinking has been so severely constrained by our fetish with 'metrics' and providing 'systems' thinking that we see anything out of OUR now constrained definition of ordinary as something new when in fact it is not; thus our perception -- or rather, that of some (fortunately not all) of our 'strategic thinkers' -- is easly skewed.
2. Add to that the US governmental system that says Person C get elected to replace Person B. Person C must appoint People who will publicly refute every trick, technique, policy or statement of Person B -- just. as Person B and his or her folks did yo Person A.
... a. Until, of course, they find out there was a very good reason for their predecessor's policies and quietly reinstitute them... :D
... b. In any event, new appointees will parrot new things just cause they're different. This usually consists, in DoD, of listening to the buzz amongst the troops and emphasizing something that predecessor civilians did not. Such mention will not necessarily be either in context or involve common sense. This is an obvious problem made worse by 1. above.
3. This governmental process also requires 'new' thinking every four to eight years. Sometimes, that appears, usually it's just the old wine with a new set of buzzwords.
The benefits of the term Hybrid Warfare...
Wilf,
Enjoyed the Gray link, he is well written and presents some points to reflect upon:
Quote:
The domain of uncertainty can be distressingly large, however. If you are not blessed, or cursed, with a dominant enemy, the path of prudence is to cover all major possibilities as well as possible, without becoming overcommitted to one particular category of danger. The temptation is to assert that flexibility and adaptability are not policies, certainly not strategies. Nonetheless, they are often the basis for defense planning when the time, place, and identity of enemies are unknown, or at least uncertain.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
This is the easiest military environment we have faced since 1914. We need to realise that, and stop panicking about complexity, hybrids and networks.
I have had the good fortune to spend some time on several trips at the WWI battlefield in Asiago, Italy. As I wandered through the tunnels and trenches and across that battlefield I too gained a deep appreciation of what our brother soldiers endured in WWI, however I was not in the least impressed by the constrained/channeled/narrow/bungled thinking that led to trench warfare and its variants.
Rather than panic many, myself included, welcome the thinking and philosophy behind complexity, hybrids and networks. It seems to me that detractors of the various descriptive terms of warfare limit constrain themselves and and in so doing limit their ability to respond on the battlefield. This both contradicts the dictum 'A good commander maximizes his options' and seems contradict what Professor/Soldier Gray is presenting in his paper.
Regards,
Steve
Generally been sitting this one out
Because you all are so much more experienced at this type of thing.
Just two questions
Are these phrases being used by and for military or public wallet holder/decision makers consumption?
Does that make a difference?
In Relation to the concerns with Tech answers
How do you provide recognition of the tools which are meant to enable commanders to have better visibility of those in their subordinate commands in order to learn from and listen to them(awareness) without also providing the opportunity for micro-management?
Seems like I've heard some of our leaders say that answer is found in leaders who recognize both possibilities yet choose through wisdom not to do the latter.
Hybrid or Hijacked (our doctrine, that is...)
Wilf said:
Quote:
"Thirdly, and using the "Year Zero" model, we need to recover military thought from the nose dive it has been in for the last 10-15 years. The quality of military writing and especially that which is getting published in professional journals is at an all time low.
He's charitable. It's pretty pathetic IMO overall, there is an occasional bright spot in the journals but they're rare. Most articles tend to be too scholarly for practical use. Footnote and references are helpful, a term paper not so much so. Wilf also said FM 3-24 was 200 pages too long. I agree, however, I'm pleased to inform you, Wilf, that the even newer FM 3-24.2, designed, believe it or not for Bde and below, is 25 pages longer...
Selil said:
Quote:
"Technology makes a good sign post to the underpinnings of an organization. The more you push resources into tools the more likely you don't trust your people."
Exactly. Can't trust 'em because they're only half trained. That can be fixed and, slowly, we may be starting to do that. However, as Ron Humphrey said:
Quote:
"Seems like I've heard some of our leaders say that answer is found in leaders who recognize both possibilities yet choose through wisdom not to do the latter (micromanage).
Yep. Totally true -- we do not yet put emphasis on that trait; willingness to trust -- in the selection process.
Not all off thread as it seems -- Hybrid mess is the Thread topic and all those things I cite are indicative of such a mess. Hybrid warfare, OTOH, is older than recorded history; nothing new there...
It's QDR and New Administration time...
Thus the spate of SOCOM articles touting the troops. :cool:
That article's long on attaboys and short on specifics. Shaping, Shaping the battlefield..
Shaping the battlefield ...
Oh Ken, you old cynic - what, a flag officer being influenced by a mere QDR ?
One might find a more hands-on shaping process here. Perhaps, one answer to the Southern Border problem. The pertinent issue to this thread is whether they are military, civilian or a fusion - "balanced warfare", so to speak.
Seriously, I'd like to hear BW's comment on the admiral's article, which I did not read as pure fluff - I'd also tout my command.
Not fluff and a good article overall,
however, my cynicism is based on more years watching the circus than I probably had a right to -- certainly more than I ever expected. ;)
He's just playing the game and being smart about while giving his troops some deserved praise, synergies... :cool:
Pulled out the old photo album...
...from my younger days...I had grabbed three photos of headstones from a cemetery in the treeline a ways further back up the hill from the war monument in Asiago. The cemeteries were full of Italians and Austrians but these three white marble headstones in particular piqued my interest:
311505 Sapper, H. Harris, Royal Engineers, 13th July 1918, age 23.
Second Lieutenant Lawrence Tindill, Duke of Wellingtons Regi, 21st June 19...
The third photo is going and I can't find my magnifying glass...but I can still see faintly, Lance Corporal H. Kirk and what looks to be Fusilier...
Found this link on Sapper Harris, this one on Fusilier Kirk and this one on LT Tindill. Wow...
Somebody needs to reflect a little more.....
Quote:
Theirs just two kind of soldiers who are going to stay here on this blog and argue about it. Those who are irrelevant, and those who are going to be irrelevant.
This statement is out in left field, so hopefully it is simply a expression of frustration with the traditionalists. There is absolutely no requirement to buy into this concept to be relevant. You may not be part of the IW QDR good ole boy club if you don't, but relevance will be determined over time. If we have a major conventional war in the next 10 years, then the good ole boy club in with Congress will change. The fact is we don't know if this concept will work. I suspect it will make us better, and it does address the threats we face "today", so yes it is important to get on with it.
JFK told the military to prepare for this type of warfare in the early 1960s, and the only organization in DoD that adjusted was SOF, sound familiar? It isn't that any of this is new, the technology is new, the social-political environment is new, but all the aspects we address in hybrid warfare and IW have been around for years. I don't think anyone working on these concepts denies that (maybe some of the younger officers and contractors with an agenda). The issue is getting DoD to adapt, adjust, evolve, or quite simply get out of their conventional warfighting box.
I have a spurious comment and serious question.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
At some point a good soldier having made his case comes to attention, salutes, and says "All the way, sir!" Then he goes out and makes it happen way more effectively than his boss could have ever imagined.
This brought to mind the fact that everyone doesn't say that; some, for example say "Treat 'em rough." and there are a host of other mandatory unit greetings, each as valid as the other. I have said that 'All the way' bit literally thousands of times and I always thought it was sort of silly. I used to recommend the junior guy say 'Airborne' and the response should be the same as that given to the question "Are you a turtle?" Never could get my various chains of command to accept that... :D
Enough stupidity -- I have a serious comment. I generally agree with your post but I do have a reservation about an excessively large number of Bosses -- IMO, one is too many -- who will not give their subordinates the freedom and flexibility to exceed the Bosses sometimes regrettably limited imagination.
My solution was generally to ignore them and do what was right and that always worked for me other than a little spluttering (hard to get too upset at success). However, I've noticed relatively few subordinates would or will consistently do that...
That's a problem that adversely affects our combat capability. How do we fix that? :confused:
America Does Hybrid Warfare?
First off, I'm not really sure where to put this. If its in the wrong forum please move this. Thanks.
The question I have is this: Many smart people are saying that in the future America's enemies will use "hybrid warfare." Is there anyone thinking/writing about how America could use "hybrid warfare" against it's enemies? (our equivalent of Unrestricted Warfare)
Is it a matter of sending SF behind enemy lines, or is it something much different? Morally would America fight a "hybrid war?" Is it it possible to use "hybrid war" as a defensive strategy? etc etc
Just something I'm thinking about...
A simple question although I really do understand your concern
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Why don't we just say "Irregular" - that dates from about 1770 or before, or we could say "Guerilla," and that dates from about 1809.
We do NOT need new words. All the "new" words are the problem, and no help in resolving the problem. Warfare has always evolved. War has not.
How well did Irregular or regular help us think about and address such things in the past as
-When you airdrop behind enemy lines the German's might flood it
or
-They might build dummies and put something hot in them
or
-If you change the grease for the rifles the Indian's military will use it might be a good idea to make sure it's not made with pig
or
-Well you get the point.
Yes all these things should have been recognized as probable but for whatever reason they still happened
So do we need new words? Probably not but does it hurt to have them if they at least lead someone to look for what they don't know rather than what they think they do?
`I can't explain MYSELF, I'm afraid,' said Alice, `because I'm not myself, you see'
Quote:
We do NOT need new words. All the "new" words are the problem, and no help in resolving the problem. Warfare has always evolved. War has not.
I don't think we need new words - what we need are people willing to study and think about how warfare is evolving (or when we get to the point where we say it has evolved during this time period).
For example, its a disservice to say that the internet is just a different battlefield for guerilla or irregular warfare, therefore everything that could be said already has; we're just waiting for it to fall into our preconstructed schemas that have held for hundreds of years. Maybe the thought process behind cyber warfare in totality looks more like siege craft. Or biological warfare. Or building the Great Wall of China. We may not need a new word, but we don't know that the RIGHT words to use are unless we put some research and thought behind it.
What we don’t know is how many false starts and dead ends lead up to the formulation of a concept that has held for centuries. Through that process - as you mentioned - every once in a few hundred years we DO come up with something new.
I guess that's where I'm not exactly sure we can be so certain
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
When you clearly have a new phenomena, you should name it. Example would be "Tank" "Paratrooper" or "Deep battle." There is very very little new (actually I think none) that we need to describe currently.
The Internet cannot(emphasis Ron Humphrey) be a "battle field." It's a source of information, and very much less successful at crafting opinion that TV, Radio, or newspapers. It's a form of media. Personally it fails my "so what test" as being something in need to worry about.
That seems to dismiss many of the very aspects of warfare that definitely can and will happen there. I would give examples but I'm quite confident Selil could do so much better than I.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Now, please do not misunderstand me. I am all for the true, practical and useful study of warfare, and education about war, but the vast majority of what is being done is being done to justify the US buying new toys.
While true enough how many toys you could have bought at Toys R Us just in smaller sizes are currently doing some pretty important stuff both in killing enemies and protecting soldiers right now. Toy's aren't a bad thing just need to be used appropriately and for the right reasons.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
All the current writing about COIN, since 2001, has not identified ANYTHING new, except to reinforce the error that "COIN" is somehow a distinct and separate form of something that ..um ...errr... might not really be warfare. - which is rubbish.
Can't say yah or nay to that since I haven't got nearly the experience you do I would only hope its at least a good thing that they are at least writing about it rather than ignoring it since "we don't do nation-building".
(PS not meant to be a jibe at you just paraphrasing the perceived reason this stuff got thrown in the dustbins for so long)
Actually the Brits are in no position to throw stones...or COINs
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Simple. Because such knowledge wasn't valued by the institution as a whole (and by that I refer mainly to "Big Army" and the AF). The history behind this statement is deep, going all the way back to the earliest days of the Army. Hopefully at least some of the hard lessons will be retained this time....
And I agree that the term "irregular warfare" is as good as any, and possibly more useful than "hybrid" (are we going to be arming a fleet of Priuses now?).
Just because the Brits gained a great deal of experience in suppressing colonial uprisings, in no means makes them experts at true "COIN." Similarly, just because the US has gone to the school of hard knocks on "Post-regime change FID," does not make us experts on COIN either.
I was in a conversation with some Flags a few weeks ago and one of them says: "The Brits are no longer the experts on COIN." The other retorts "and they never were!" Both laugh.
Well, my take is that neither of us are, as we both base our COIN expertise on our experience gained from being unwelcome guests in other people's countries.
None of this has anything to do with Hybrid warfare of course, but then again, there is no such thing as hybrid warfare (or more accurately, all warfare is "hybrid" so to add the word adds nothing), so no harm in getting off topic to poke the COIN "experts" a little... :)