British Army Chief of Staff plus
Two rather laudatory articles as General Sir David Richards tours Afghanistan: a general report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ve-turned.html and an article around an interview:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html
On the strategic front very different opinions see the "round up" thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9718
I note the speculation on how many Taliban commanders were thinking of reconciliation.
Only if you are out to 'fix' Marjah
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
jcustis:
I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.
Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.
That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.
It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.
The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.
As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.
It's a very sad situation.
I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.
But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...
The plan and action has to match the circumstances.
Marjah doesn't need "fixed" though. We need to resist the urge make things more effective, make things more like us (ok, that's a bit of an oxymoron, but you know what I mean).
All we need to do is enable local solutions. Enable the development of governance that enjoys populace-based legitimacy. To impose "effective Westerners" would be, IMO, a disaster of the highest order. In fact, if I were a Taliban commander I would PRAY that the coalition attempted such a tact, as it would ensure I had a steady supply of rank and file fighters for my unit.
We need some things we are not too good at:
1. Patience
2. Willingness to cede control of outcomes
3. Astuteness to avoid being overly manipulated by the current government.
4. Ability to overcome our fears of what would happen if the current challengers to that government made inroads.
Even flying Karzai appointees in in USMC aircraft makes me cringe...the strategic communications of that are so hard to overcome. Far better to wait until the man could drive in in a small convoy of white hilux's with an ANA or ANP escort. Even better wait until the local siystem of Shuras could apoint their own governor.
General Nick is pushing hard to do the right things in the right ways, but we have the iniertia of good intentions that we must overcome first.
A canoe is great for going down stream...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
OfTheTroops
I am only in the early chapters but he uses examples of hushpuppy shoes, syphillis, "white flight" and Yawning and how they infect and spread their "success"? So they did not have to be value positive. It seems a Republic/democracy should spread as easily as Communism or religious fascism. You just have to infect the right people with it. It seems this type of reasoning led to our cautious optimism for establishing beacons of Democracy.
but not so much for going against the flow.
Ideology is like that canoe, that enable one to go with the flow of where the populace naturally wants to go. But to attemp to employ an "ideology canoe" to go against the natural flow of the populace is not so easy.
So the insurgent (or the UW actor) can simply provide conoes. Offer an ideology that is mere promises. The government/counterinsurgent (or the FID actor) must actually perform. Promises must be matched with action.
You see the same effect in politics. (oops, insurgency IS politics) If times are good, bad leaders get re-elected. If times are bad, good leaders often get voted out in favor of a leader who may not be as good, but who offers the people what they want to hear.
Battle of "Fill in the Blank"
Every 6 months you will see the next great offensive to win in Afghanistan.
In a complete coincidence, every 6 months a new marine force rolls in with a new commander convinced his regiment is going to have the battle that joins ranks with Iwo Jima and Guadacanal.
I remember the battle of Garmshir.
Then the Battle of Nad Ali.
And now the battle of Marjah.
Lots of press, lots of prep, more reporters than taliban. A few casualties and 6 dead Taliban.
6 months later we will have the next great battle.
Yawn.
Regimental offensives are a waste of resources and time
But platoon level patrols and the daily shura with the babas doesn't make for headlines, and certainly doesn't make marine colonels into generals.
Call me jaded.
Three years later, reporter returns to Musa Qala
With a sub-title:
Quote:
Three years after he first travelled to Musa Qala, Nick Meo returns to Afghanistan and finds a town fearful that Nato's war is not going well, and dreading what may happen when they leave.
A lengthy article and some key phrases:
Quote:
Insurgent control begins just a few miles from the town centre...Many of the attacks are thought to be paid for by drugs barons who flourish in the opium-rich region. Their business thrives when it is lawless and they want the foreign soldiers out.
Corporal Vincent Song, who is based next to the governor's compound, was appalled at the semi-secret meetings taking place there, as ex-Taliban fighters drink tea with the governor. "I don't agree with it at all. These are people who are trying to kill me," said Cpl Song, 21, from Washington, who joined up two years ago to fight terrorism. "So many of my brothers have died here. I hate the thought that the governor is meeting the Taliban."
A man identified to The Sunday Telegraph as a Taliban sympathiser, a mullah who attends meetings called shuras to find out what the marines are saying to the Afghans, insisted that the war would get worse before it got better.
"The police arrest the wrong men when bombs go off, and the foreigners kill innocent civilians," he said. "Then their cousins and friends want revenge and join the insurgency. "More clashes create more war, and the Taliban will not do deals to end the war. They want power again in all of Afghanistan. They have tasted its delights before and they want them again."
Says it all IMHO.:wry:
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...war-again.html