That's why I prefer a stationary bush.
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That's why I prefer a stationary bush.
Like this?
Monty Python's "How not to be seen"
http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?...01436807568337
"...and now something completely different."
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OhUZPBiiunI
Damn, I love BBC's sense for humour.
I need to check with my friends how to get all seasons.
I take it to be more the decision of somebody who said, "well, we need to appear to be doing something. . ."
Shifting how ever many MRAP or other vehicles to Afghanistan may not make an ounce of difference, but it plays well - all you need for proof is CNN's Pentagon correspondent glowing that the MRAPs have "played such an incredible role in drastically reducing US casualties," to know that from a political CYA perspective. . . mission accomplished! If a=b. . .
It's like McCain's speech about how he's going to "take the strategy" and apply it to Afghanistan. Never mind there's a whole host of problems with that statement; it's doing something. (I realize I'm getting way off the subject thread, and onto potentially political ground - I'll shut up soon:wry:) [/cynicism]
To try to get back ON the subject, the MRAP and vehicles like it also pose major issues that, particularly for the Marine Corps, cut to the very heart of the Corps' purpose. I recall GEN Conway lamenting last fall that the Corps was losing "its expeditionary flavor." If the Corps needs MRAPs, and MRAPs force the Corps to operate like a 2nd Army, why have the Corps? The MRAP doesn't fit well within the expeditionary concept, particularly maritime deployments; and it doesn't do much for a more deployable Army, either. Having them on hand for contingencies involving proper use - convoy, security, etc. is all well and good, but for the kind of action to be seen in Afghanistan, or in other, more expeditionary roles, forget it.
With my obvious disclaimer here being I've never been in one nor had my life saved by its armor. . .
Regards,
Matt
I always heard this credited to Bill Mauldin's Willy and Joe. Upon reflection, Willy and Joe should be required reading for Army LTs.Quote:
A friend of mine whose father was retired Gen. McNinney (USMC) told me his father told him, "a moving foxhole attracts attention".
I'm interested in seeing where the MRAP's end up, once the bulk of U.S. forces are "back home".
I do recall an interesting article by a U.S. Army officer in a Transportation battalion, which basically advocated permanently constituted security platoons for the logistics units (i.e., on the MTOE), manned by logistics soldiers that received the appropriate additional training. Basically his point was that convoy security wouldn't be such a drain on the available maneuver units, and this would ease some of the headaches...
So, a platoon of MRAPs for, say, every transportation (truck) company, for convoy security. Reminiscent of the ersatz "gun trucks" of Vietnam (I recall seeing a preserved example at the Transportation museum at Ft. Eustis).
Random thought:
I always wondered why, in the ROAD and Army of Excellence division designs, there was a mandate that combat arms MOS's make up no more than 50% of the design...
Dedicated security elements are a typical type of unit for peace-time savings.
Peace-time structures almost never have proper security forces for logistics, medical camps, HQs, harbours or airfields.
The consequence is that the proper equipment for such roles does also not exist in peacetime.
Yep, you did; you got there, no potential to it. I'd suggest that to avoid that in the future you could be equitable and say -- quite accurately -- that both candidates proposals are foolish and loaded with problems. Or perhaps an even better solution would be to not be cute and skirt the issues and just leave the politics at the door unless they're totally germane to the conversation.
That unsolicited advice from a far older and far, far more cynical dismisser of ALL politics and ALL political parties as corruption for fun and profit personified. :rolleyes:
MRAPS are far too specialized for current Iraq conflict. The exception may be the Israeli Golan which might work as an infantry vehicle. I prefer some of less specialized vehicles that still have strong mine protection like the bushmaster and dingo-2. Less expensive and nearly as well protected as a Stryker, with all the benifits and a lower intial price tag and operating costs. I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts. When I was in the 1/501st ABN in Alaska we had both hummers and SUSVs. This gives you a full spectrum force easy, and still cheaper then the complex stryker or specialized MRAP.
Reed
sorry, poor english on my part. I mean that they are specialized FOR the conflict in Iraq, not for over-all utility. They will likely lack the nessary mobility, utility, and/or firepower if the next conflict does not mirror Iraq. Of course when I was in Iraq we rode around in soft skins and I have never been in a MRAP so my opinion should be taken with a grain of salt.
Reed
Golan does not exist any more (long story) Wildcat fits the bill of what you describe
Well I'm not sure you can pick when you'll be urban and when you won't but BVS-10 is a hell of a track!Quote:
I think units should be supplanted with something like the BVS-10 Viking for non-urban conflicts.
BVS-10 is a specialty low ground pressure AFV. It's not really suitable for lots of movement. You cannot drive daily for some hours in it without horrendous maintenance effort afaik.
It's pretty much a vehicle for swamps, snow and tundra terrain.
I used to have the old SUSV in my airborne unit along with Humvees. Humvees actually had a higher time needs for maintanance and we would drive the SUSV's on base roads and downtown and on 2-4 week fieldproblems and breakdowns were very very rare. Hummers on the other hand had at least one vehicle breakdown EVERY field problem. We actually used the SUSVs more often. Now SUSV's are not armored, but I feel that the Viking maintaince issue my be based on the maintance time required by other tracks. The suggestion was for both types of vehicle to be available btw.
WilF! Just looked up the IMI Wildcat, while maybe a touch larger then I like, it looks almost perfect in any other regard. I would like to see the drivers seat and see if it drives like a car (Then it could be operated by one of the squad) or if it is more complex and should be operated by a dedicated MOS.
For those of you that do n ot know me, I feel that bradleys and other IFV's should be manned by a dedicated IFV MOS and not by the infantry squad it carriers. I feel this is a source of major drain on the mechanized infantry manpower and training in there infantry role. The exception is commercial vehicle based systems that drive like a car.
Wired.com's Danger Room correspondent Noah Shactman reports today that the U.S. Army Materiel Command has issued a request for information for regarding industrial capabilities to produce a "lighter more agile, maneuverable, mobile vehicle with MRAP protection level capabilities." This effort is apparently unrelated to the current(?) Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, according to Shactman.
Thought this news might be of interest in this SWJ.com thread, at least for archival purposes.
Excerpt follows:
Quote:
So the Army and Marines are looking for a next-gen MRAP, that combines the "agility, maneuverability and mobility" of a Humvee, with the protection of the brawny new vehicles.
Such a vehicle should not only be able to stop militants' most advanced bombs and rocket-propelled grenades, the services noted in a request for information, issued late last week. It should also to climb a "60% forward slope," beat a maximum speed of 65 miles per hour, and be able to "maneuver off-road and on narrow roads in rural mountainous terrain and desert sand."
The 10-ton vehicle must be transportable on a C-130 cargo plane. It should have a minimum range of 300 miles, and a turning diameter of 49 feet, And the crew has to be able to get out quickly, in case of a rollover.
MRAPs in Afghanistan will add little to improve our situation. It’s been a couple years, but we did mostly air mobile and ground pounding for two weeks. Second time over was less air b/c Iraq sucked up some of the assets. Basically, to slow the flow at the border, a Hilux is a about the most one can rely on. Really need to be dismounted and have a couple choppers move you around. The problem all along has been that we carry too much weight and do not move fast enough. MRAPs don’t solve that when we are talking that type of terrain. The M1114’s couldn’t get in there in ‘06, and we broke the few M998’s we took out in ’02-’03.
Another thing about this vehicle platform. I never learned to fight from a vehicle, so maybe it occurs to me more than others, but we are becoming so platform centric that our dismounted maneuver is stymied. I mean to say that our being tied to the vehicle has reduced our aggressiveness when we are actually in contact. This is similar to getting so wrapped up in IED defeat that the best we can do is put a glow plug in front of our vehicle. We need to realign our thinking entirely here, not fashion new trinkets. The IEDs of today are simply a nuisance minefield. Our current M21 mine with a SFF device could, I am nearly sure, penetrate the MRAP, Stryker, M1, what have you. That mine has been around a while. A well built EFP goes through all the above as well.
Point is, did we totally redesign the M1 because shape charges evolved? Or did we adapt our tactics to defeat the minefield? Our vulnerability to IEDs is a sign that we are being out-maneuvered and a new vehicle is not the answer to that.
I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.
I agree. Dismounted operations is the core of the infantry. However, you still require operational mobility.
OK, so around what parameters are you going to have that discussion. It may well be one worth having, but as Simpkin showed, there are conditions and circumstances were road moves are quicker and more effective than airmobile moves, so the context of the debate has to be very carefully framed.Quote:
I think that money we are spending on MRAPs is better spent on new CH-47's.
Excellent observation SF, and similar ones that i have kicked around with some compadres.
I got to enjoy a ride in and MRAP, on a paved (but not to US Hwy standards) road the other day. They are not good for much beyond either terribly low speeds on unimproved roads, or being restricted to paved roads.
It is, in my mind now, clearly not a fighting vehicle, but a force protection vehicle. I'd rather not adapt my tactics to fit the gear.
I offer the CH-47 line more as a throw away than anything else.
I suppose that I am worried we are travelling down a dangerous garden path when we start making force protection the primary or even a qualifying characteristic of our vehicle selection.
I am aware of a movement in the doctrine writing community of a push to have force protection seen in a more holistic light which focuses much more the arrival of the force on the objective in such a manner that it is able to accomplish its mission and perhaps be readily prepared for a follow-on than as a litmus for vehicle protection against specific threats (blast/direct fire etc.).
When we start comparing center of gravity and hull angle, I wonder if we are missing the forest for the trees. The Stryker concept goes far beyond the vehicle itself, and would not be nearly as impressive or capable if the vehicle were simply offered as a replacement for the M113/Bradley.
With the MRAP/Cougar/M1151/what-have-you, we are readily accepting a substantially different platform that does in fact change how we execute our tactics without really giving much regard to that fact. Again, I was born and raised outside a vehicle so I may be super-sensitive to this, and probably the mech side of the house is adapting a great deal better.
Short response, in your list of pros/cons, perhaps we should include "significantly alters the method of employment and will require retraining (and so is not suitable for first time use while in theatre)" or "method of employment similar enough to current platforms that no particular retraining/reorganization is needed."
I agree. There is a very valid argument to be had about vehicle design versus doctrine and training. IMO, the M2 is an example of failure. No one vehicle can address all needs, but we need a structure in which to discuss the compromises. Personally I would see that as a balance between security operations and combat operations.
Think in a tactical sense. I am a cell leader or want to make a name for myself who or what would I hit?
A: The unit traveling down the road all buttoned up, with only passive security measures.
B: The unit traveling down the road with guns pointed in all directions, people actively looking and searching for me or my devices.
Just my perspective on the debate. Uparmored vehicles have there place as do GMVs and everything in between. What we are losing is our flexiblity and allowing those Monday morning quarterbacks and disenfranchised to dictate what we do and what we use to do it.
I absolutely hated to see the trucks with the remote control turrets on them when I was in Iraq. Many times even on the trucks with manned turrets the gunners would be sitting so far down in the turret that all he could see would be through the the gap between the chicken plate and the sides of the turret. Great for force protection, not so great for situational awareness. One of our resident tankers correct me if I am wrong, but don't they teach that the TC should be heads up until they are actually in the fight? I know that that is how we operate. The gunner is never still. He is up and he is constantly moving, both the turret and his head. There's nothing wrong with force protection but at a certain point it becomes counter-productive.
SFC W
your head down and you'll get attacked. Bulldoze around like you know what you're doing and own the place and they'll leave you alone. That applies in all combat intensities. Excess caution kills...
I don't see the current crop of MRAP-type vehicles being all that useful in Afghanistan because of the lousy road network where a LOT of areas are like this. Hilux's are great there because they're are so light and nimble on those kinds of roads. They're also very dependable :) (part 2, part 3). It seems like the Pentagon sees the disadvantages too and is looking for a new vehicle. See also this. The special ops folks already have some of these, which look pretty cool.
So, if nothing else, this seems like a timely topic. I DO think we need more helo's in Afghanistan (especially 47's), but then again I have a bias since I supported helo ops when I was there.
I'm a bit confused. I've read the entire thread, but I would ask someone to clarify for me.
I believe that we're debating whether the MRAP has a future beyond OEF/OIF? Or are we discussing whether the MRAP should not be fielded currently?
Thanks in advance.
I believe the MRAP was fielded to address the tactics used by units in OIF.
So the idea was to fit the gear to the tactics, not vice versa.
I have not used MRAPs, nor CROWS, nor am I privy to any sort of advanced testing and acquisition process. I am simplying stating that in this case it "looks" like the Pentagon was addressing a need stated by the in-country Commanders.
As the thread starter, I will attempt to clarify. I believe that there is a good case for looking at "MRAPS" beyond the confines of what some call COIN.
Given ,
a.) good levels of protection
b.) Reasonably good mobility
then they would seem to have a role as basic infantry mobility systems. I do not consider them to be MICVs or MBTs.
A bad MRAP is a bad MRAP, so no argument there. The same basic set of argument that apply to all AFVs apply to MRAPs.
If the decision is made to use this for COIN only then the Army could always send them to DRMO to be bought by companies to use them as armored cars, just a thought.
Have already seen many of these vehicles sunk deep in the sands of Iraq.
Its a simple question of weight distribution. That's why I prefer the M113. Holds 10 men plus the crew & weighs only about 10 tons, with the weight caried on tracks with great earth coverage & very low ground pressure. I've commanded them on all types of terrain & they've never let me down. It also swims of course.
Part of the larger issue facing our military establishment is that wheeled vehicles continue to have diminished military application due to their constriction to the roadways.
This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.
If it really is all about weight distribution (which IMO, is wrong) then surely you want a BVS-10 or STK Bronco. IRC the M113 is not amphibious once you load out beyond 11,700kg, and the IDF's up-armoured M-113s are currently tipping the scales at 18,000kg.
The new NIMDA and MTVL spec'd M113s are fine vehicles, but they also have significant limitations, in both protection and mobility.
Not sure what you mean. 30,000kg ISO containers, on three-four axles move around road systems world wide, with very little trouble. Unit level road moves conducted by units in wheeled APCs, are always conducted faster than those done by tracked units. The 2001 UK plan to move an infantry Battalion from Europe to Afghanistan, was possible with a wheeled platform and impossible using tracks.Quote:
Part of the larger issue facing our military establishment is that wheeled vehicles continue to have diminished military application due to their constriction to the roadways.
I spend a lot of time focussed on infantry mobility and W v T is simply not a debate that most of the serious minds in this area ever talk about. It's like debating fixed wing versus helicopters. You need both, and always have.Quote:
This disappoints me and the focus on motorized (wheeled) over mechanized (tracked) as the philosophical heart of Army Leaders disturbs me.
Well, FCS will be tracked ..... if it ever gets built. They rejected wheels a few years ago.
I'm with Wiif, we need all of it in the kitbag.
I also covered my experience with the M113 in the current environment here.
Silence, please.
The Economist.
Also of note:Quote:
Rattling along in the “washing-machine environment” of an armoured personnel-carrier (APC) on steel tracks can vibrate the soldiers inside to the point of exhaustion according to Dan Goure, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute, a think-tank in Arlington, Virginia. Meanwhile J.G. Brunbech, an APC expert at the Danish Army Material Command in Oksboel, observes that the crew’s limbs are prone to becoming prickly and numb, and their hands get tired because they must hold on tightly to the safety handles inside a vehicle’s cabin in order to try to avoid being jostled.
The vehicle itself suffers, too. The vibrations cause rapid wear and tear—not to mention outright damage, especially to its electronics. In the past, engineers have tried to reduce these vibrations by fixing rubber pads to the treads. The results, however, have not been satisfactory. The pads wear out quickly, and often rip apart or even melt. But now tough, new rubbers have come to the rescue. Moreover, these rubbers are not being used just as pads. Instead, they are crafted into enormous rubber bands that replace the steel tracks completely. As a result, the Danes are converting their entire APC fleet to rubber tracks. This means they have raised the amount of time a soldier can safely spend on board from one and a half hours to ten.
Quote:
And although America has not sent APCs with rubber tracks into action, they form part of the Future Combat Systems, the Department of Defence’s principal modernisation programme.
It's an idea whose time has probably come. Both the Canadians and Danes are re-doing all their M113s and others are experimenting with Soucy tracks. Other companies are also playing with the idea. Technological and chemical advances have allowed this but Snowmobiles and ATVs like the Hagglunds BV 206 which the US Army adopted as the M973 Small Unit support Vehicle LINK also use a Soucy made rubber band track and have for years.
The Caterpillar DEUCE LINK also uses a rubber band track.
The DEUCE and BV 206 / M973 are fairly recent vehicles but the rubber band track is not that new as an idea; the US M114 Recon Vehicle from the late 50s used 'em:LINK.Quote:
"...The tracks, developed by the Caterpillar Corporation, were of the "rubber band" type, providing the supposed advantages of lower costs, reduced weight and ease of maintenance in comparison with a link track system. Manufactured as a single strip with bolted in track pads and grousers, this development never lived up to expectations. In an unsupported configuration on narrow road wheels, the "rubber band" allowed for the small GM engine, this in turn saved overall space and weight for the entire vehicle. In the event of light damage from mines or direct fire, there was no plan for a crew to repair broken track strips." (emphasis added / kw)
They do need to work out a fix for the item I placed in bold...
Could you just carry spare tracks to replace the broken ones with?
a repair / limp home kit. They'll figure it out sooner rather than later, I think.
Good point, friend, having it all in the kit bag would be great.
I recall when we had Tracks, PCs, 1/4 ton Trucks, 2 & 1/2 ton Trucks, 5 ton Trucks, & Heavy, Medium & Light Tanks, Half-tracks, motorcycles, horses & armored cars.
A Generation ago the Armor Officer's Basic Course taught about five weapons platforms; Stuart, Lee, Gavin, Patton, Sherman, Chafee, Walker & more inclusive. Today there's nothing between the Abrams & the HMMWV at the UMW's Basic Course & the HMMWV is only touched on. Strykers are POI'd directly to the units with great consternation, although they're slowly moving to the school house.
As a Cavalryman operating in OIF today I find myself drawing on experience with the older weapons platforms & in some instances missing them.
In the case of maneuver maybe there really is strength in diversity.
A short and insightful read. Survival Consultants Intl CEO David Woroner raises some food for thought at his website, Defense Tech and at Breach Bang Clear's Blog.
There's even a para or two on Tires vs. Track at the blog link.
Quote:
Tires vs. Tread, how will they move? This would seem to be a no-brainer, but I have to add it in. ... They’ll bog down far less frequently, and they can turn and maneuver far more effectively in urban terrain than anything with wheels.
CV90 ... about 8 psi ground pressure.
M1 Abrams ... about 15 psi.
Patria AMV (the best 8x8 in my eyes) ... about 35psi. More than a heavy truck.
8x8 should be outlawed for anything that comes in direct contact with the enemy (as long as this planet is not one huge parking lot). And for CS/CSS why not take a truck?
6x6 is something for a constabulary and para-mil units.
Bandwagon are not so good over boulders.
So far CV90 shows the way to go.
Will see what BAE/Hagglunds SEP will do. Is it still alive?
Stupid idea from a guy not seriously following the discussion-
Design the vehicle roadwheels to displace adequate ground pressure and exert sufficient clearance to be towed or driven without tow on a hard-surface. Carry extra roadwheels as spaced armor ala' German tanks and Stugs in W.W.II. If the vehicle can reach a reasonable hard surface, off it goes to get the rubber band thingy replaced. Crew needs proficiency replacing a roadwheel (if lost)-not a rubberband track.
Tracked vehicles usually only need to power a single wheel per side to move forward - and that's usually not even one of those that carry the weight, but the first or last wheel - one that merely turns the track around (sorry, I don't know the English terms). That's a very simple mechanism and this simplicity is one of the tracked vehicles' advantages.
Your system would require the roadwheels to be powered (at least one per side) - that might happen with electric drive, but isn't common today (there were such convertible tire/track combos like yours in the late 1920's and 1930's, especially the Christie designs).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christie_suspension
Quote:
Another feature of Christie's designs was the "convertible" drive: the ability to remove the tracks for road travel, allowing for higher speeds and better range, and saving wear and tear on the fragile caterpillar track systems of the 1930s. In order to allow this, Christie used very large rubber-rimmed road wheels, with no return rollers for the tracks. As with many track designs with center guide teeth, dual wheels were used, allowing the guide teeth to run between them. By 1939, the Soviets found that the BT tank's convertible drive was an unnecessary complication which also occupied valuable space in the tank, and the feature was dropped in the T-34.
Your five weapons platforms are the M5 Light series (1941-46); the M3 Medium series (1940-1943); the M113 series -- which was NEVER named the Gavin other than by Mike Sparks and is a name not used by anyone in the Armed Forces that I've heard or read -- (1959-to date); the M26, M47, M48, M60 Medium series (1949-1991); the M4 Medium series (1942-52); the M24 Light series (1943-1953) and the M41 Light series (1951-1969). Surprising to think AOBC taught all those at the same time. That looks like three generations to me. The tracks of a generation ago would seem to be the M60 and the M113 series only. In fact, since I was an AOBC instructor a generation ago, I distinctly remember those were the vehicles used...
More notable is your comment that you recall Halftracks, Horses and Armored Cars. All those pre date me; I can recall them, of course, but am too young to have operated with them -- and I'm over 75. Yet, you're a Cavalryman operating in OIF today. Amazing.
I saw also your comment that:Good for you. Then this appeared:Quote:
"As long as I still get to wear my stetson I can abide the ASU."
Infantry and not Cavalry? That sort of confused me. So did the use of the word zone. :wry:Quote:
"Worked closely in zone with an ESFS that was assigned to my Infantry Battalion in OIF. That ESFS conducted itself very well essentially carrying out a textbook COIN Operation in the area."
However, I'm old and do get confused often. For example, this statement boggled my little mind:Read it four times and still have no idea what it says...:confused:Quote:
"Very useful graphics. You've given me some infights on what to brief in an upcoming OPD here in OIF. I see much related to yours & COL Mansoor's work that applies to the upcoming PH IV of this op.
Then I saw this from you:You are indeed a man of many parts...Quote:
"As a business leader myself I take the lesson that a corporation, like a man, can be good or evil."
Oh crap, don't tell me Mike Sparks has recruited some disciples to espouse his "Gospel of Gavin"... :eek: I felt much safer when I thought that he was isolated and alone.