From the same link Wilf provided, there is this:
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"The hybrid warfare challenge is complicated {1}. The 2010 QDR will be helpful only if it provides clear guidance in response. Planning documents that leave leaders unclear about what they are responsible for will result in confusion, not clarity{2}."{Notes added / kw}
While I really agree in principle, in practice I'm terribly afraid Note 1 negates any possibility of Note 2 being provided. Thus it has always been... :wry:
Clarity in military operations is always desirable but rarely provided, thus the requirement for people to THINK instead of merely reacting in a rote manner. He or she who does not rapidly adapt is likely to fail. Any attempt to provide excess clarity in doctrine or planning is also likely to fail -- and to breed further failure in the attempt...
You cannot completely teach adaptability and flexibility. You have to hire for them. As well as fire for the lack of them...
Wilf, I believe this ....
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from Wilf
Having said that, how come 5 years of the current ROE, has meant that US Forces have killed more civilians in 2 x COIN campaigns than Israel did 2 x State v State Wars, in the same time period, and nobody blinked?
is a profoundly intelligent question which should be answered - if the factual premise of the question is correct (I don't know one way or the other).
So, if you will consent to be the expert witness under barrister examination (;)), what are the statistics for the factual premise and the sources for those statistics ?
As we all know, the statistics for civilian casualities have been a matter of dispute as to the numbers and who caused the deaths; and have been spun, spindled and mutilated with reckless abandon.
The comparisons (hopefully leading to the answer to your question) could relate to the relative kinetics vice the opponents in each conflict, and to the relative kinetics vice the conflicts. But, first we have to have facts we can agree on.
Wilf, OK, I'm more comfortable ...
with the comparable statistics going by the boards; and framing the question in your present terms:
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from Wilf
It's political-operational point. [1] 3 years after the US became "COIN"-aware [2] F-18's are rolling in on targets, and [3] civilian deaths by NATO are in excess of 500 a year (maybe 800). That to me, is symptomatic of a problem.
1. Please define the problem; and the general solutions you posit.
2. As to which of the three symptoms does the IDF differ; and how could its experience assist in solving the problem you have defined in answering #1.
I believe your answers will be material to the question of what degrees of force should be used.
PS: This is direct (friendly witness) examination because the questions are totally open-ended - from your friendly barrister :)
Interesting report, but ...
only one side of the story. The data required for a full LOAC analysis is probably not open source. You would need something like the following for each air strike:
Type (CAS, UAV, HAB - whatever other types there are)
No. PGF involved; KIA & WIA (any fratricide ?)
No. AGE involved; KIA & WIA
No. NC involved; KIA & WIA
Based on the report, a couple of events = a lot of KIA & WIA. How many airstrikes involved no NC casualties, for example. The idea is to get at the overall military necessity and proportionality.
The professionals here can improve on this by correcting the terminology, etc.
What's this "we" stuff...
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Originally Posted by
slapout9
In the video I saw we promised the local tribal leader if he quit growing poppies he would receive some financial/economic support. Four years later he has received nothing and his village is starving. That is a good way to drive the village over to the opposition side thus creating as many if not more guerrillas than any Air Strike. If we promise something to somebody we should deliver on it.That is what I would expect the US to do.
I hear what you're saying -- but I think there are a few problems with your rationale ,
Consider:
'Promised' that? First, realize that to most in the ME and Afghanistan, if you are from a different tribe and you say something will occur, you are deemed to have given an oath -- made a promise -- that something will occur. Totally different standard of morality ( ;) ). Conversely, if you're an American and you know the 'policy' is to provide aid to reduce the Poppy production, you're highly likely to say, in an offhand way, "Quit growing Poppies and we'll provide assistance" (with no knowledge of what that might entail and with knowledge it might not happen on your tour). You made a comment, he heard a promise. Two different cultures not meshing.
Second, who's the 'we?' Anyone from the American Ambassador to PFC Phugabosky could've said that and even said it in all innocence expecting it to occur. Regardless, all the Afghan knows is that 'the Americans said...' A person who possibly should not have committed the US to a course of action said something or one who could have did and the system did not follow through. All sorts of things could've occurred and we don't know what went down. Given 50K or so Americans wandering around in a nation almost as big as Texas, a State Department totally screwed up by Congressional meddling and not prepared for the job they got body slammed into, it's amazing we've done as well as we have.
No one knew all those cultural nuances early on; first responders did what they though was right and they did it in the absence of training in what and how to do things. We got smart real quick and told the troops "Never tell them you'll do something." A lot of 'promises' that were not really promises snuck in before we got that word out -- and even today, you and I know there's always the 10%, no doubt in my mind SSG Heebly or CPT Cholmondley are inadvertently making the occasional 'promise.'
I don't think you can totally fix that...
Lastly, define the 'US.' Yeah, I expect them to do that also -- deliver on a promise; keep their word. However, having been in that part of the world, I know there are several difficulties with that. A casual comment is not a promise -- and they know that but one will always be used as a 'promise' to get what can be gotten out of it. Haggling is a national sport...
It is not possible to make all Americans behave in the national interest -- look at your crooks and the politicians (but I repeat myself... :D ). The US government is a big, huge, diffuse bureaucracy. The left hand often doesn't know what the right hand is doing. Even within the Army -- heck, within a Battalion -- sometime folks don't know what other folks are doing and it takes a lot of effort to get things pulling together. A LOT of effort...
We have a lot of well intentioned laws to guard tax dollars that aren't helpful to getting projects started or completed, the reviews and checks are significant and a lot of intended things fall afoul of one law or another -- or simply get killed by higher Hq -- due to a law or rule or just the perception that "The Boss doesn't like that stuff..." can pave the road to hell with good intentions that don't happen.
We didn't promise anything; some guy said.
Nor can we do it -- the politicians won't let us... :(
In short, I totally agree with you philosophically but in reality on the ground, it ain't anywhere near that simple.
4 Attachment(s)
Executive summary - 2009 Farah report
The executive summary of CENTCOM's report on the bombing incident in May, linked by Carl above and whose full .pdf is here, is a good report and well mapped for understanding.
Before looking at that summary, I should mention Cavguy's course - Counterinsurgency 101 is the first .ppt - which I downloaded (adding his articles - all in their own little folder "Niel Smith COIN") and went through at home in my armchair. I expect his articles supply some of what the actual brief is - and RTFMs cited - adds up to a "Clear, Hold, Build for Dummies" story. Well worthwhile DLing, if you haven't done so. In the process of trying to find the direct url, I managed to wipe out the first version of this post.
Now, back to the executive summary.
The basic factual situation was that Astan forces, contrary to Marine advice, executed an un-planned rush up the road into the arms of what amounted to a L-ambush by 3 Taliban "companies" (roughly 100 men each). The Marines had to go to the rescue. In the course of the firefight and medivacs, 4 F-18 strikes hit the long leg of the ambush; and later, 3 B-1 strikes hit its angle near or in the village. The last two strikes were problematic.
Since the .pdf does not allow cut & paste (at least for me), I've clipped .jpgs of its key points.
Its Overview concludes that there were no LOAC violations (a conclusion totally supported by the longer rendition of facts); but that the last two B-1 strikes, made in the absence of evidence as to the presence and locations of civilians, were contrary to specific guidance and Commander's intent. In a strict sense, the two strikes were not contrary to ROE (engagement was with a hostile force).
Whether there was a strict violation of RUF would depend on the tenor of the specific RUF (not given) - was it termed a "must do" or "should do" (a distinction beween the two flag officers' statements, quoted here and here - pointed out to me by PM from Blackjack).
The F-18 strikes were given a clean bill, but no civilian casualties resulted from them.
The Assessment states that all of the strikes (including the last 2 B-1 strikes) were justified in their "lawful military nature". But, that the absence of evidence re: civilians (precluding a complete pre-strike assessment of possible collateral damage) was contrary to the policy objective of the "US Government".
This choice of wording may evince an important point, that the source of the guidance and intent came from the Diplomacy, Policy & Political Ring of the ROE Triad - which I've explained elsewhere - and not from the Operational Requirements & Law Rings.
The Conclusion - if you take its language literally - would have far reaching consequences for application of proportionality to any situation. Of course, we have no idea of how much of that concept is included in the elephant we haven't yet seen.
I'll take up the 2008 UN report (linked by Blackjack) later tonite if I have the time.
Hey, Bob, haven't talked for a while ....
I'm not sure where you want to go with the six aphorisms stated. Wherever it is, lay it all out because I'd like to travel along with you on the trip (with or without the dinosaur ;) ).
Let's just take the first one - which really has two parts:
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[1] While we agonize over "was it legal or illegal" based on our laws; [2] the populace is probably more concerned about was it "right or wrong based on their perspective.
Point 1: Agonization over "legal or illegal" (add "moral and ethical" ?).
In the actual case under discussion (Farah), no agonization over "legal or illegal" was necessary. Given its facts, legal under LOAC was a no-brainer.
I'd suggest that consideration of "legal or illegal" is a starting point in developing any course of action, military or civilian. Normally, most courses of action are no-brainers (go or no go). Some, however, are real brain breakers, which tend to involve morals and ethics as well as legal or illegal.
Here's a cookie for you and everyone else here.
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Friday, August 17, 2007
Killed by the rules
Now that Marcus Luttrell's book "Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10" is a national bestseller, maybe Americans are ready to start discussing the core issue his story brings to light: the inverted morality, even insanity, of the American military's rules of engagement (ROE). .....
[JMM: obviously there are polemics in this article. I suggest looking more to the facts and questioning how would I resolve the legal, moral and ethical issues in my head if that situation came up in my life - not what you would do, because no one can say that for certain.]
This is an on-its-face simple Point A to Point B problem, but with the shepherd boy in the middle. That complicates things.
If you had Yale Kamisar for Crim Law & Proc I, you would have spent 6 weeks on the Case of the Speluncean Explorers, and all the degrees and issues surrounding homicide, justified or not. Now, this case is a make up, but there have been actual cases similar to it - e.g., should we kill and eat the cabin boy ?
Now all of this is more Philosophy than Law - and Practical Layman's Philosophy at that. Here's the course and materials (all in one).
If you want to know what issues I think about, take the course. It should take a hour to read the materials and the rest of your life to resolve the issues - hint: they are resolved when you die.
So, we should look at legalities, morals and ethics before getting involved in situations - and, where they are brain busters we should agonize before acting. If you are talking about agonizing after the fact, my position is that is closing the door after the horse has escaped. At best, that is a lesson learned.
Point 2: The Village's Perception
I'd posit that all the civilians in the Farah village saw the column advancing up the road as "wrong" (unless they were insane). What civilian wants to be involved in a firefight ? As Cavguy pointed out "Another way to think about it - should the cops level your house because criminals take refuge in it?"
So, where does that perception take us ? Don't take the column up the road. Which may be a part of the new policy that may be developing, but how do a group of blind men view an elephant ?
Or:"Never, never, leave the f**king boat." But wait, there was a tiger in the jungle. Was it a man-eater ? Don't know; but it charged us. Should we go back to find out ? Will the tiger kill someone else ? What is our obligation ? "Naw, never leave the f**king boat".
More than a little philosophy tied up in that scene as they went upriver to visit the crazy SF COL :D :D :D
OK, enough of a complete devil's advocate. Heck, I'm a civilian; and like talking to animals (it's kind of spiritual), not killing them. I'm about the least physically kinetic person you will ever meet.
So, for most of your populace-centric mumbo jumbo, I'm on board. But, when I work as a lawyer, I'm one very doctrine-based SOB - and I want to see the practical implementations spelled out.
And, there are man-eating tigers in this world - and they have to dealt with - to keep them from killing the innocents.
This took too long - just to answer one sentence.
COG for what? Defeat of the insurgent, or the insurgency?
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Originally Posted by
slapout9
If I come to your village I want talk about targeting anything but the food:)
As for the COG I still believe it is the Insurgent Infrastructure as long as that is there the Insurgency can come back and often does as some of your posts have pointed out. This is also why the Strategy of nation building/modernizing/globalization/pop centric may have a Fatal Flaw in it.
You may be doing nothing more then modernizing the Insurgents Capabilities while he does nothing but remain dormant and reemerge at a better time with better capabilities. I have seen gang ops run out of broken down houses and state of the art convenience stores, the difference one had better capabilities than the other. the similarities the same criminal infrastructure still existed.
Your Populace based vs Population Centric would deal with this (I think) and is a better way to go IMO. Incidentally I have seen something similar used in LE with remarkably results but I didn't have the propaganda machine to promote it. Plus it was really invented by a 50 year old grandmother with about a 10th grade education so none of the egg heads were interested in something like that. After all COIN and Crime Prevention are the PHd Levels, the fact that it is waged and won by kinder gardeners escapes them;)
I have felt and made the case for several years that the COG for AQ, and other like networked organizations is their network. Disrupt the network, disrupt the organization. ID the nodes that are critical to operations by area, and focus on them. Similarly, to pick your HVIs, pick the ones critical to making those nodes function, not just the ones the intel guys say are senior in the chain of command.
To defeat the insurgency however, is another matter. Here the COG is the populace, and their support is essential to the greater victory. Both must be addressed concurrently, but dealing with the insurgent is a supporting effort while addressing the populace the main. That does not mean that one must not at times address the supporting effort first in order to create conditions that allow addressing the populace, but it is still the supporting effort.
"Marines in Afghan standoff" story
Jeez you guys are quick on the draw. :)
While I wonder if saying the new rules seem to be working
based on one action that appears to be still in process might not be just a tad premature... :wry:
Both the Army and the Marines have been taking females
on patrols in Afghanistan since 2002. Given the articles I've read on this one, I saw no opportunity to use any females. Obviously, when the second batch came out, the Marines shouldn't have allowed themselves to be distracted by the one wounded female but they did. That happens -- but they learned and won't make that mistake again.
Next time they'll have the female Marines -- or Soldiers (since the Army has more females in Afghanistan than do the Marines) -- check all 'females' and hold 'em under (female if possible) guard until the action is completed. Early days, new unit, new AO -- there's always a learning curve.
One take on this one could be that the new rules do not work as they were used to manipulate and escape -- but it's way too early to say that, certainly based only on a couple of fragmentary news articles. Time will tell.