STP, Iraq turned out much better ...
than I expected at the end of 2003. So, you and others here can take credit for that.
My questions were more addressed to the political side of "best practices COIN" in general. I see some disconnects in the concept as laid out in FMI 3-24.3. For that matter, I see the same disconnects in the 1980s Summers-Krepinevich debate, and the current Gentile-Nagl debate - all very interesting from a military standpoint (the military effort); but without any real consideration by any of them as to the political effort required.
Most particularly, what do you do with an incompetent (corrupt, etc.) HN government ?
---------------------------------
I'd quibble about what what "expeditions" and "expeditionary forces" do. Of course they can invade with the purpose of occupying the country - we seem to be fixated on that, as opposed to a punitive raid no matter how gigantic it might be. FM 27-10 (par. 352 explains the distinction).
Coincidentally, I was just re-reading parts of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. At p.91, he deals with War Plan Green (a war with Mexico). We've had war plans for Mexico since the 1800s, but by 1922 the Mexican army was so weak that War Plan Green was changed to Special Plan Green, an occupation plan not unlike what we intended for Iraq: the army would establish a government, reform the education and legal systems, employ honest police and civil servants, with the clear and expressed US intention to create "peace and good order."
Now, it came to pass in 1924 that Special Plan Green was war gamed; and, surprise, the most probable COA for the Mexicans was not to resist the main invasion columns, but to wait a while and then engage in guerrilla warfare, etc. The majority staff conclusion was that the occupation would morph into a long, slow and frustrating unconventional war.
So, in 1927, Special Plan Green was amended to provide for a rapidly moving direct attack with the purpose of deposing the Mexican government, and then immediately withdrawing. The plan required that it be made clear that it did not intend a military occupation, was not an operation against the Mexican nation, but was an operation against the Mexican government.
OK, in Linn's terminology, I'm just a dinosaur "Guardian" of the "Never Again but" school, who apparently sees disconnects where others don't.
Regards
Mike
Taliban negotiations pre- and post-9/11
Jon,
There were a number of back-channel US-Taliban contacts before and after 9/11 re: extradition of UBL and where he should be tried. The Taliban proposal (IIRC post-9/11) was an Islamic court under Sharia law. Efforts by both the Clinton and Bush II administrations went around in circles. Steve Coll covers some of this in Ghost Wars; and also Mike Scheuer (Anonymous) in his books on UBL.
IMO, based on what I've read and the Web stuff I was following at the time, there was nothing there which we would want to go back to. Present negotiations (via proxies) with the Taliban might be another story; but the Taliban are pretty rigid (especially if they think they are winning and inflicting more pain than they are suffering).
My best shot at creating a time machine to move SWC back in time to 2001. :D
Regards
Mike
No silver bullets...however
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jcustis
Guys, so besides the routine IO/psyop drivel, how do we counter this reality, in concrete terms?
I'm looking for ideas here, so that my key leader engagement script doesn't come off as the routine party line, "Well you know, the government is working to improve things, and the army is a key part of that. You need to be patient with them."
Official graft and corruption had a history behind it in Iraq, but unless I am reading things wrong, the Pashtun are either 1) just plain fed up with it in their areas, or 2) it has grown in a scale so great that it cannot be overlooked. Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?
Jon,
David's link for Adam Holloway's points on Afghanistan was worth the read.
My to-do list for a deployment includes:
1. Prepping my team.
2. Gaining an understanding of at least the governance, economic, and security systems before deploying.
3. Continually updating my understanding of at least the governance, economic, and security systems once I am on the ground.
4. Regularly reconciling my to-do list, timeline, and cost estimates with that of my internal and external customers.
You know as well as I do that it just sounds simple and easy...I'll send along a pm :wry:
Steve
Don't know what a non-kinetics effects team is ...
and don't really need to know. Based on your question from your last deployment, you will count sheep - didn't know that Bates had a course in animal husbandry.
However, I posit that the team will be Marines; hence riflemen and capable of protecting themselves and others. So much the good. I also posit that non-kinetic might mean more contact with ANP than ANA. Hence, as to this:
Quote:
from Jon
Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?
I can't speak to the ANA, but since Steve (Surferbeetle) assigned me the task of looking at the ANP and the rest of the Astan Justice System, I did - here are the official assessments for the ANP, prosecutors, judges, at this post, The dumb lawyer again. Four fairly short reports, which suggest you would probably be better off without ANP in your sector (yeah, there probably are exceptions).
One of the provinces studied (all then considered "secure") was Kunduz. For the latest in ANP developments in Kunduz, see this post, Taliban in Kunduz. Not a pretty picture. Your Marines would probably make better cops, providing they have interpreters who speak the local dialect (an important point made by Adam Holloway, a good read cited by Steve).
Beyond that, I've learned that both Huey Long and J. Edgar Hoover bequeathed to Slap their books of TTPs in digging up dirt on notables; and that Steve has duly placed in coded form the concept of the Continuing Area Study Assessment:
Quote:
from SB
4. Regularly reconciling my to-do list, timeline, and cost estimates with that of my internal and external customers.
:D
Cheers
Mike