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An Americas-centric View of the Pacific Pivot
I thought I'd post this image to relate our "Pacific Pivot" to the areas to the west of what I believe are the far littorals that the US must protect.
Attachment 1789
That is, the areas to the west of the limit of US force projection to protect that littoral (blue line), which have Aus-NZ separate (dark blue line); and then the non-Chinese East, Southeast and South Asian countries (orange line), not to include Astan and Pstan. The US "pivot to the Pacific" began well over a hundred years ago and most of the islands are either part of the United States or are states freely associated with the US.
The states ringing China have somewhat different interests than the US vis--vis China; and cannot, without losing credibility, be seen as American lapdogs. Therefore, separate China policies are indicated, but co-operation is also indicated.
In a recent speech, the new Indian ambassador emphasized India's "shift to the east".
Regards
Mike
But, Bill, I Like To Draw Lines In The Seas
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Your blue lines indicate a conventional threat we must be prepared to block at your proposed defensive line. I don't think a conventional military threat to the U.S. proper exists in my opinion in East Asia. Instead we are faced with a number of asymmetric/unconventional threats ranging from long range missiles, WMD, to cyber that drawing defensive line in the water won't protect us from.
Lines, whether "lines drawn in the sand" or "lines drawn in the sea", are symbolic representations of real policies. Thus, we have the Line of Gaius Popillius Laenas (a Containment Zone) and the Lakshman Rekha (a Protective Zone); and both legends provide us useful advice.
My little lines drawn in the seas establish both a Containment Zone (vis-a-vis China; is your "East Asia" a euphemism for China ?); and a Protective Zone (for the Americas, by extending force projection to the far littorals of the Atlantic and the Pacific). With respect to the Americas, cultivation of strategic co-operation (bi-lateral) between the US and those American states that can afford to join in far littoral naval force projection is indicated. Brazil is an easy example.
You and I certainly don't want to engage in a semantic debate about defining "conventional" and "unconventional", or "symmetrical" and "asymmetrical", in this thread. So, I'll take your "conventional military threat" to mean something like carrier task forces, divisional landing faces and air wings - Normandy, Okinawa, etc.
So long as a solid Protective Zone exists, the "U.S. Proper" will face little risk of large conventional attacks from anywhere in the World. That type of attack (the Red Dawn Scenario) would play into our high-tech, highly violent abilities. However, the "U.S. Proper" could face risk from attacks by smaller conventional forces - whether an independent group of TVNSAs, or a proxy group for another state. Moreover, in the "Inland Sea" area from Japan-Korea to Taiwan, and in the "Guam Salient", a US-China conventional armed conflict might well have an unpredictable outcome.
I look at carrier task forces, divisional landing faces and air wings + your "long range missiles, WMD, to cyber" as being part of our tool chest - and part of the aggregate "tool chest" of our possible opponents. Not all are as blessed individually in certain areas as we are; but we cannot continue to engage them on their terms. We have to pick and choose our fights, remembering that both the military struggle and the political struggle must be included in our plans.
My "defensive line" (your words, twice used) is scarcely that. Of course, since WWII and the UN Charter, the concept of "Aggressive War" has been outlawed. So, we Americans start with something of a "defensive posture" - no "first strike" (but, that has exceptions ranging from an all-out nuclear attack to the smallest direct action targeting one person - "It all depends ..."). My views are not one of "passive defense", where one will get his a$$ knocked around the boxing or wrestling ring. My views are best viewed as those of aggressive counter-punching and counter-grappling - with multiple attack options. Some are local, some are regional, and some (because of the nature and source of the threat, especially if existential or near so) are global. Some are directly USAian and some would be via "proxies". They do include DIME and more.
I could go on to everyone's boredom; so, I'll simply say that in policy and strategy (political and military working together), my view is along the lines suggested by Andre Beaufre - e.g., Introduction to Strategy (with particular reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age) (and link to following review):
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In a book of searing brilliance, General Andre Beaufre contends that the West has failed to develop a strategic method of thought in politics, economics, and diplomacy to employ in the dialectic of two opposing wills on the world scene. We have assumed, wrongly, that military strategy is the only strategy (and military strength the most important strength) and because military strategy has often failed, we have relegated the whole strategic art to the museum shelf.
General Beaufre constructs a modern "algebra of war" that incorporates classic military strategy as well as nuclear and indirect strategies - examining them as abstract concepts of attack, surprise, deception, and showing how and when they can be used most effectively in achieving specific aims in global conflict. In our time, when the awesomeness of nuclear weapons, imposes limits on the use of military strength, it is the other aspects of strategy that must come to the fore. Indirect strategy is the strategy of the future.
"I am convinced that in strategy, as in all human affairs, it is ideas which must be dominant and the guiding force. In war the loser deserves to lose because his defeat must result from errors of thinking, made either before or during the conflict."
and, Deterrence and Strategy:
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General Beaufre applies his capacity for clear logical thinking and lucid expression to this basic problem of deterrence. He shows that it is governed by special laws, differing according to degree of force employed and the number of participants in this frightening game. He analyzes its effect upon military structure in the nuclear age and gives a thought-provoking picture of the world problems which may face us the year 2000.
Both books are needed to understand where Beaufre is coming from and going to. See also, Liddell-Hart, Strategy: the indirect approach; and Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, are useful companions to Beaupre - besides Clausewitz, Jomini and Frederick the Great, a masterful counter-puncher and counter-grappler.
Regards
Mike
Drawing Lines in Economic Waters ...
I invite examples and discussion as to Bill's comment:
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Furthermore, half the population of the earth and the economic center of the global economy lies beyond your blue line, and the U.S. has strategic economic interests it must protect in that region, which is the driving reason for our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. This is also the reason the rebalance isn't all about the military, but unfortunately the military gets 95% of the media coverage which creates a terrible misrepresentation of what we're trying to do.
Yes, there are lots of people, land and wealth in Eurasia and Africa. Besides, MacKinder told us in 1904 that we had to focus our Worldview there.
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Later, in 1919, Mackinder summarised his theory as:
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"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the world."
(Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 106)
Any power which controlled the World-Island would control well over 50% of the world's resources. The Heartland's size and central position made it the key to controlling the World-Island.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi.../Heartland.png
Of course, we "dumb" Americans and TR were ignoring MacKinder back in 1904:
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A century ago, on 25 January 1904, Halford J. Mackinder delivered a paper entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History" to an audience of the Royal Geographic Society. The distinguished English geographer contended that the age of sea power was ending and land power was about to become the key element of global strategic dominance. The new pivot in Mackinder's system of geographical determinism consisted of "the closed heartland of Euro-Asia" (p. 8), that is, Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. He believed that if Russia were to ally with Germany they would form the strongest empire in the world. Britain, the United States, and Japan—the world's most powerful sea powers—would be at a fatal strategic disadvantage and powerless to contest with the heartland powers for control over the economic, military, and political future of the world.
Mackinder had the bad fortune to deliver his prescient paper at precisely the moment when each of the three major sea powers was making its distinctive bid to demonstrate the controlling power of navies. Japan was challenging Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and demonstrating that a relatively small nation with a major navy and shrewd naval strategy could resoundingly defeat Mackinder's potentially all-powerful land power. The United States, under the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, was building almost two battleships per year and had just commenced construction of the Panama Canal. This combination would enable the U.S. Navy to exert Mahanian command of the seas in both the western Atlantic and throughout much of the Pacific Ocean. England was about to launch the super battleship Dreadnought, which would render all other major naval combatants hopelessly inferior and obsolescent—much as would be the case with the American super carriers of the Cold War era.
So, what the hay, why should we bow to that long-deceased monument today ?
Seriously, I am interested in your statement:
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... the U.S. has strategic economic interests it must protect ...
If you could, I'd appreciate some examples to have a framework for a reasoned discussion. My general questions about "US strategic economic interests" are the following:
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1. Is the economic interest "had" by the US people; i.e., the US as a nation state "owns" it; or
2. Is the economic interest "had" by US special interest groups; they "own" it; or
3. Is the economic interest "had" by a foreign state or foreign interest groups; it or they "own" it.
Another set of questions applicable to all three situations is whether:
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1. The economic interest is of direct strategic import to the "US as a nation-state", and/or to "US special interest groups"; or
2. The economic interest is of indirect strategic import to the "US as a nation-state", and/or to "US special interest groups", but of more direct strategic import to US "allies, partners, etc." (and whether they are capable or not of protecting that interest themselves).
I'm open to discussion.
Regards
Mike