STP has summed my specific questions ....
in another thread at this post; as Jon has here as to the general question.
So, here is the general question and the specific sub-questions which are on the floor:
Quote:
as quoted by Jon
My question boils down to whether the "best practices COIN" methodology has any real application where the narrative is factually lousy (the HN government is simply bad news).
and
Quote:
as summed by STP
1. What if the HN government is a bunch of knockleheads themselves ?
2. Is a Strategy of Tactics ("best practices COIN") capable of defeating the insurgency under that condition ?
3. If so, what is the recipe ?
As to the recipe (another way of expressing it in my post above)
Quote:
If the HN government does not provide "good governance", what aspects of "best practices COIN" are useable and what are not ?
Discuss - for the benefit of Jon and others who are or will be in the line of fire.
Regards
Mike
Could well be, STP, could well be
The President framed AQ as the Main Adversary; that the 2001 AUMF continues in effect; and that he wants them gone. The Taliban were not so much declared an enemy as a power to the armed conflict that has to be roughed up for 18 months to lessen its rigidity to sitting at a negotiating table.
Nothing of great comfort to the Karzai government (partner, not a patron); nor to "nation builders" (that was excluded) - and the "civilian surge" seems to aimed at a minimalist, shorter-term effort.
Looks most like a "Peace Enforcement" military effort, with some future commitment expected to take AQ down (which would require some base areas, if that take down doesn't occur in the 18 months). If that could be accomplished, I'd find that a very acceptable result.
Actions will speak much louder than words.
Regards
Mike