"I did it my way..." With apologes to Mr. Sinatra...
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Originally Posted by
Red Rat
...I suspect that we have seen a de facto politicisation (small 'p') of the armed forces in the sense that Iraq was a very unpopular war. This translated into a great deal of political pressure not to take casualties which had the effect of reducing the amount of risk that commanders were willing to take.
Quite true. That occurred in the US Army as a result of Viet Nam. That actually had some precursors in Korea where, after the lines stabilized and the Outpost war began in late 1952, a lot of senior people found they had little to do and began to worry and fret a great deal about very little.
It was, as you say, exacerbated in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. I think that's partly attributable to the adversarial media-military relationship which has always existed but gets more credence today due to more widespread and rapid communication capability. Your follow on point is also correct. It's a mixture of good and bad, not terribly harmful in these kinds of wars and will disappear fairly quickly in major combat operations...
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As for the inability to impose decisions. A hallmark of British command style has been the misapplication of 'Mission Command' where 'Tell them what to do but not how' has resulted in subordinate units going somewhat rogue.
Also true with respect to the US. Though in our case, it has an interesting permutation due to the extent of bureaucratic reach. Subordinates are allowed maximum tactical latitude -- and take it, as they should -- but are administratively constrained to behave in certain ways. The effective result is remarkable compliance on unimportant minutia and somewhat remarkable lack of compliance on things tactical. :eek:
Then there's the human aspect. As a friend of mine once told me "When I was a Lieutenant, I told people one time and things got done; when I was a Captain, I had to tell 'em twice. As a Battalion Commander, it took three or four times and as a Colonel, even more. Sometimes it didn't get done at all..." As the relative rank (and / or experience) of the subordinate increases, the perceived latitude to do it their way increases. Probably exponentially. :D
Consider also that in an existential war, noncompliance brings death, destruction or, at a minimum, relief for cause. In the Armed Forces of democratic societies involved in lesser situations, there is little to no punishment or penalty for failures to obey. Relief is frowned upon, requires the Personnel Wallas to additional work. Add the fact that often, the 'noncompliance' is generally not really harmful other than to the ego of the very senior personage whose wishes were at least partly ignored and it's a perfectly natural and understandable phenomenon.
The real downside of selective application (or, if one thinks negatively, selective neglect...) is that, in peacetime, it inadvertently and unfortunately encourages excessive centralization, micromanagement and over supervision; UAVs that peer over Commander's shoulders; decisions to deny support from TOCs miles away from the action...
It can be partially ameliorated by less bureaucracy and better training. It can be less a perceptual problem if senior people realize "...it doesn't have to be my way to work." IOW, we talk 'mission orders' but a lot of folks -- too many -- don't really mean it when they say that...:D
Thanks for the response...
It appears both our Armies may have that problem:
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Agree with the better training. I think the British Army is currently chronically undertraining and the training is focused almost entirely on Afghanistan. This is resulting in a lack of breadth and professional depth. Units and commanders are not getting the chance to experiment and learn their profession. I fear we are storing up chronic problems for the future.
:(