Thanks for posting that. I'd skimmed it some time ago and recalled two points.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
M.L.
For those of you who are willing to entertain the idea that the vast majority of the military and history communities are not insane, and that there actually might be an operational level of war, I recommend this book:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/OpArt/index.htm
I agreed there is an Operational Art so I guess that proves that I do not consider most of the military and history communities to be insane. My point is the rather more important issue that Military folks are too often slaves to doctrine.
Two items from your link are pertinent. The first by BG (Ret) Harold W. Nelson discussing US history and usage:
Quote:
"The U.S. fought its wars for more than 200 years without needing an “operational level.” Strategy and tactics were good enough for Clausewitz and Jomini - and for our fathers and grandfathers as they fought the biggest wars known to man. They learned how to plan and conduct campaigns without any special terminology, so why do we need a new term, an intermediate level, in our hierarchy of warfighting concepts? I believe the introduction of the new term reflects a revision in our view of war rather than recent changes in the nature of war. A quick look at some of the things our predecessors wrote and studied convinces me that there was a growing awareness of what we now call the operational level of war long before we introduced the term. Its application should, therefore, help us to understand the use of military force in twentieth-century wars while helping us plan for the future."
Good summary and most of us can agree with that to at least some degree.
The second point -- and the problem as it exists with the "Operational Level of War" is illustrated by a clutch of items by BG (Ret) John S. Brown, former Chief Of Military History.
Quote:
"Twentieth-century Americans adopted an egalitarian attitude toward military staff work; rather than evolving a small, highly specialized elite cadre, they rotated officers between staff and line assignments fairly routinely. In the views of the officers themselves, they “did their time” on staff in order to return to the troop, flight, or sea duty they truly preferred.
. . .
The mathematics worked out to a return to troops as a field-grade officer within two to three as opposed to four to five years. A fraction of SAMS’s popularity was its exploitation of a time-honored American technique: Seduce talented officers into staff work by promising to make them line officers in due course.
. . .
Whatever their motives, SAMS graduates proliferated throughout the Army and enhanced staff proficiency - particularly with respect to the operational art heavily emphasized at the time. They were reinforced by an emphasis upon the operational art in the basic course, and thus the tendency of all recent officer graduates of the service school systems to use concepts and vocabulary that facilitated its use. The 1986 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100–5, Operations, deployed an array of historical operational vignettes to make its points; such terms as Center of Gravity, Lines of Operation, and Culminating Point were recommended as key concepts for operational design. Although they did not develop a precise equivalent to SAMS, Navy and Air Force educators also gave due attention to the operational art and campaign planning during this period and developed appropriate literature for their student officers as well." (emphasis added / kw)
The first item placed in bold is important to put SAMS in perspective for what it really is and to add tha another fraction of that popularity is the intellectual cachet note. The point, though, is those officers leave SAMS for a Corps or Division Staff -- but later will likely command Bns and Bdes; thus the SAMS 'Operational' mentality gets transferred to lower level by that as well as the trickle down effect cited in the second item emphasized.
Those two factors mean that the 'Operational level' as a methodology is significantly overly insinuated and thus often misunderstood and misused throughout the Army.
This also from BG (Ret) Brown:
Quote:
"During DESERT STORM the arms and services operated together with an unprecedented virtuosity that smashed a theretofore formidable opponent in a brief time - with astonishingly few casualties. One would be hard put to imagine a more effective demonstration of joint and combined operations than that turned in to liberate Kuwait."
I beg to differ. One would be hard put to find another 'war' wherein the opponent could have been dispatched in half the time with a third the effort. Desert Storm was an aberration, 100 US casualties in 100 hours to accomplish the mission (more or less...) is not a war, it is an FTX with live Ammo. :mad:
Unfortunately, that operation not only set some unattainable expectations in the minds of many (not least US Politicians...), it more damagingly embedded the myth of the Operational level of War in the US Army and due to that essential overselling, over insinuation and potential for misuse of an important concept and the (dare I suggest excessive...) number of SAMS graduates, the Operational Art is prostituted, misused and obscures or deters proper tactics. As Wilf and others with academic and experience at upper echelons cred note {LINK}.
Anyone who espouses the valid need for an Operational art and interface between Tactics and Strategy should be concerned with addressing that very real problem.
CvC explained by Colin S. Gray
Saw this over at Zenpundits website. One of the best and easiest articles to read and understand CvC by Colin S. Gray.
http://www.clausewitz.dk/ColinGray1.pdf