This highlights a couple of the critical problems with terming our ops as "COIN"
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Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
Fuchs brings up the obvious point that is both critical to the mission, and central to the metrics of that mission.
Afghanization is the mission, or converting what we now consider as a foreign effort into an Afghan one.
In that regard, doesn't the number of bad guys (or Talib brothers) NOT killed by ISAF provide a relevant metric of actual success in Afghanization?
I'm all down with Wilf's and other's views that a military is "supposed to" be in the business of finding, fixing and immobilizing/killing and enemy, but that is not the mission here, and is probably impractical.
If hearts and minds comes from "projects," how many projects? What have they accomplished toward hearts and minds?
In the bad guy realm, is the ratio of detained/killed by Afghans vs. ISAF a better measure? How's that going?
1. The definition of COIN is written from the perspective of the HN government, but does not clarify that fine point, so when an intervening power comes in to assist and calls its mission COIN as well, they tend to take on roles and responsibilities that exceed thresholds in ways that often dis-enable the same HN whose capacity they are attempting to build; and also tend to reinforce perspective among an already wavering populace that their
government is unable to serve them adequately.
2. COIN also brings with it a presumption that "success" is measured by a defeat of the insurgent, coupled with a preservation of the current government. This lures the intervening power away from a broad focus on stability and the preservation of the national interests that led them to intervene to begin with that might be achievable in many ways, to a much narrower perspective that limits options tremendously.
This is why I think it is important that we back away from the widely accepted terminology such as "COIN" and "War" for our interventions in places like Afghanistan; and instead see them in softer, more flexible terms such as "FID", "IDAD" and "MSCA". It is also why I suggest we need a more effective overarching construct for the approach globally than "CT" or "COIN" offer, the most accurate one being "Counter UW."
WILF makes sound points for warfighting; and if indeed warfighting is what is required for success he is right. Others argue for approaching the problem in a very non-warlike way, but still cling to the "war" moniker.
I think shaping the operation as a whole is critical to its proper execution, and that a recharacterization of this operation as something other than War and COIN frees our minds to design effective supporting engagement that is focused on our interests and adequate stability to support the same. This is far more that semantic namesmanship; it is as simple as painting lines on the road so that everyone understands what their lane is.
Oman: a coalition war that was won
Originally Posted by JMA:
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With respect the brush is too broad here.
What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?
Which Red Rat replied to:
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Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.
JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976):wry:, mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort (:wry: RR is wrong). I am not familiar with how the Omani government, the Sultan, asserted national control or oversight, but present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians:D on contracts.
From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.