Gates On COIN: What Was Really Said?
Gates On COIN: What Was Really Said?
Entry Excerpt:
The problem with the coverage of this speech is that it combines hedges and qualifying preambles from disparate parts of the address and paints a picture of a Secretary of Defense disenchanted with counterinsurgency, and repentant about ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Too much attention is given to the shaping of the arguments rather than their intended thrust. A closer read of the address reveals a very different, and very important message, one that is unfortunately struggling to get out.
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Seeing the Other Side of the COIN: A Critique of the Current Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Seeing the Other Side of the COIN: A Critique of the Current Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategies in Afghanistan
Entry Excerpt:
Seeing the Other Side of the COIN:
A Critique of the Current Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategies in Afghanistan
by Metin Turcan
Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN
Though the international visibility of Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments (TRMEs) such as rural Afghanistan has dramatically increased for almost nine years with the efforts of Coalition Forces (CF) in Afghanistan, TRMEs have rarely been studied from Counterinsurgency (COIN) perspective. Although there has emerged a vast literature at the strategic level on the COIN efforts of the CF in Afghanistan and the prospective policies of the international community to resolve the current insurgency, unfortunately, we are still unable to see the other side of the COIN at the tactical level, or view on the ground.
The utmost aim of this article is to attack many “dogmas” currently exist in the COIN literature, and challenges traditional COIN wisdom available in the literature. It also aims to lay out a different perspective regarding the COIN efforts in rural areas at the tactical level, a rarely studied level from COIN perspective. This is, therefore, not an article of problem solver. It may be regarded, instead, as an article of problem setting at the tactical level and concerning Afghanistan in general. It claims that the current situation in rural Afghanistan do not conform to established frames or assumptions in the literature, and the current literature is, thus, far behind from figuring out what the real problem is.
Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one essence and soul.
If one member is afflicted with pain, other members uneasy will remain.
If you have no sympathy for human pain, the name of human you cannot retain.
-Sa’adi Shirazi (13th century Islamic poet)
Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN
Metin Turcan is an ex-military officer who participated in many joint operations in southeastern Turkey (1999,2004,2006,2008), Iraq (1999,2003,2005) and fulfilled liaison and training missions in Kazakhstan(2004), Kyrgyzstan(2004), and Afghanistan(2005) before resigning. Currently, he is a PhD candidate at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
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The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration
The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration
Entry Excerpt:
The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration
by Scott Dempsey
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General Petraeus will be in Washington next week where he continues to extol the progress of counterinsurgency (COIN) in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban's heartland -- and where our war to achieve sufficient stability to enable us to leave will be either won or lost. COIN doctrine argues that with the right combination of security, governance, and development, there will be transformational impact that can marginalize insurgents’ control over local populations. Combined with multiple external factors mostly beyond our ability to influence, COIN was indeed part of the transformational improvement in Iraq – and provided sufficient stability for American troops to withdraw in favor of Iraqi government forces. The Afghanistan surge seeks to create similar results– which would ultimately create conditions for transfer of authority and responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces. A key component to GEN Petraeus’s COIN talking points cites the Nawa District of restive Helmand Province as a "proof of concept" for counterinsurgency dogma, and that the "Nawa model" is durable. However, during my year in Helmand Province, including nine months as the U.S. development lead in Nawa District, I saw a variety of factors that led to Nawa's success – none of which pass this test. Furthermore, to secure even the most basic degree of Afghan government-led stability will require a seemingly endless commitment to continue to fight and finance this effort.
Download The Full Article: The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration
Until February 2011, Scott Dempsey was a USAID Foreign Service Officer, most recently with the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs in Washington. From July 2009 - August 2010, he served as a development officer in Helmand Province. He also previously deployed as a Marine on a civil affairs team in Fallujah in 2005.
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COIN Center Web Cast 15 April
COIN Center Web Cast 15 April
Entry Excerpt:
The US Army COIN Center is pleased to host Dr. Sarah Sewall for an online web cast on 15 April 2011 at 10:00 CDT (1100 EST, 15:00 ZULU). The subject of the web cast is civilian casualties and their mission effect. Dr. Sewall teaches international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, where she also directs the Program on National Security and Human Rights. Dr. Sewall is the founder and faculty director of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project and is currently leading a study on civilian casualties with the United States Military.
Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.
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COIN Center Webcasts on 14 April
COIN Center Webcasts on 14 April
Entry Excerpt:
The US Army COIN Center is pleased to host Dr. Mark Moyar who will conduct two webcasts on key COIN topics: "Leadership in COIN" and "Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency: A New Guide." Both briefs are on Thursday, 14 April.
Dr. Moyar joined Orbis Operations as Director of Research in July 2010 after serving as a professor at the Marine Corps University. He travels to Afghanistan regularly to undertake research and consulting for the ISAF COIN Advisory/Assistance Team and USCENTCOM. Dr. Moyar is the author of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq.
"Leadership in COIN" is 0900-1000 CDT (1000 EDT, 1500 ZULU), 14 April.
"Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency: A New Guide" is 1030-1130 CDT (1130 EDT, 1630 ZULU), 14 April.
As a reminder, don't forget Dr. Sarah Sewall's webcast presentation on Friday, 15 April, 1000-1100 CDT.
Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.
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U.S. Army COIN Center Webcast 22 April
U.S. Army COIN Center Webcast 22 April
Entry Excerpt:
The U.S. Army COIN Center will be hosting Mr. Haider Mullick, a fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University and the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. He will present a webcast presentation entitled "Counterinsurgency Challenges in Pakistan and Effects on ISAF-Afghanistan."
Mr. Mullick advises and consults with U.S. government organizations on security, diplomacy, governance and development issues in South Asia. From 2009-2010, he conducted research for General David H. Petraeuson Pakistan’s national security policy. Mullick is also the President and Chief Executive Officer of Red Teaming Associates. He is the author of Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies.
His brief will be 0900-1100 CDT (1000-1200 EDT, 1500 ZULU), Friday, 22 April 2011.
Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.
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ISW / MCA COIN Event on 2 May
ISW / MCA COIN Event on 2 May
Entry Excerpt:
Field Report: The Fight to Secure Helmand Province; United States Navy Memorial, Washington, D.C., 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm, 2 May 2011. Sponsored by the Institute for the Study of War and the Marine Corps Association.
ISW and MCA cordially invite you to a conversation with Major General Richard Mills, the Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) and ISW’s President, Dr. Kimberly Kagan. During their discussion, Major General Mills and Dr. Kagan will discuss counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, and the recent successes and future challenges in the coalition’s fight to secure southern Afghanistan.
More information and event registration may be found here.
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FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
Entry Excerpt:
A Civilian’s Comprehensive Critique of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual…In 5-6 Pages
by Braden Civins
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2006, quickly became doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. While the manual has its share of detractors, even its fiercest critics acknowledge that it is regarded as “transcendent” and has “become the defining characteristic of the…new way of war.” This critique (1) explores the validity of a key assumption underlying the manual; (2) analyzes specific guidance offered as a result of that assumption; and (3) argues that the manual makes a significant omission of no small consequence.
Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique
Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs.
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COIN Center Webcast, Winning Insurgent War
COIN Center Webcast, Winning Insurgent War
Entry Excerpt:
US Army Counterinsurgency Center Webcast - Winning Insurgent War on Thursday:
The US Army COIN Center is hosting Dr. Geoff Demarest of the US Army Foreign Military Studies Office and author of the recently published book, Winning Insurgent War. He will be discussing important aspects of defeating insurgents including the legitimate use of violence in winning. His brief is tomorrow, Thursday, 2 June 2011, at 10:00 CDT (1100 EST, 15:00 ZULU).
Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.
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COIN Lessons Learned / Best Practices Project
All,
I’ll be joining, in July, an effort by the U.S Army that is conducting a study to determine lessons learned and best practices in support of coalition counterinsurgency infrastructure development and capacity-building operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The study is also intended to provide recommendations for engineer use during campaigns in an “irregular warfare” environment based on both past lessons and likely evolutions in future security environments.
This project will be my first post-Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JFCOM organization that was disestablished) job (excepting what I do at Small Wars Journal) and really need to get a good start going in and would appreciate those with the expertise and experience concerning the issues in paragraph 1 contacting me at ddilegge (at) smallwarsjournal.com. The team will be conducting interviews in support of this project.
Thanks much,
Dave Dilegge