Wedded to the warlords: NATO’s unholy Afghan alliance
Hat tip to Watandost for highlighting a Canadian article on the apparent strategy, using the two 'police' generals General Daud Daud in the north and the promotion of Brigadier-General Abdul Razik in the south:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...2047158/page1/
Some choice comments by others and this stark IMHO paragraph:
Quote:
Having failed to establish a working government in many parts of Afghanistan, NATO is increasingly dependent on so-called strongmen, commanders whose power comes not only from their affiliation with Kabul but from militias, tribes and, often, the narcotics trade.
We’re killing the Afghans we should be speaking to
Following the Canadian trail I read this article, which includes a short commentary on Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles's book, which has been commented upon before and elsewhere on The UK in Afghanistan thread.
A partial quote:
Quote:
Such a military-focused approach risks making Afghanistan safe not for better governance, but for the warlords and narco-Mafias whom the Taliban originally targeted when they took power in the mid 1990s. Once again, the poor Afghan people could be the losers.
There's a reference to a previously unheard book by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, researchers who have lived in Kandahar since 2006 and have published their substantial research as 'An Enemy We have Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan 1970-2010'.
IIRC some here are critical of their previous work.
Quote:
(this) offers a rigorous and detailed description of this problem.
They note, first, that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have almost nothing to do with each other any more, beyond some money being channelled to one faction of Taliban fighters. The Taliban, extremely distrusting of foreigners, tend to hate al-Qaeda, which has no Afghan leaders.
But, they warn, this could change if the senior leadership of the various Taliban groups is obliterated: “The new and younger generation of Afghan Taliban is more susceptible to advances by foreign jihadist groups including al-Qaeda … Current policies pursued by domestic and international actors – led by the United States – are a key factor driving the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda together.”
Link:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...rticle2037846/
The Economist: Glimmers of hope
A lengthy article which is upbeat and cites a variety of sources, including two ministers sacked by Karzai:http://www.economist.com/node/18681871
The sub-title is:
Quote:
It’s been a long slog, but Afghanistan may at last be able to contemplate more stable government.
Ninety Percent of Petraeus's Captured "Taliban" Were Civilians
An odd story from a previously unknown source, Gareth Porter of IPS, who let's say has some "baggage" for his unconventional views and is being circulated in the UK by a Muslim think-tank.
Opens with:
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During his intensive initial round of media interviews as commander in Afghanistan in August 2010, Gen. David Petraeus released figures to the news media that claimed spectacular success for raids by Special Operations Forces: in a 90-day period from May through July, SOF units had captured 1,355 rank and file Taliban, killed another 1,031, and killed or captured 365 middle or high-ranking Taliban.
(Continues)..But it turns out that more than 80 percent of those called captured Taliban fighters were released within days of having been picked up, because they were found to have been innocent civilians, according to official U.S. military data.
Link:http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56038
IIRC Afghan detainees in the field are usually transferred to Afghan custody after a short period, maybe 72hours and I do not follow why those captured were treated differently - except it is a JSOC operational process.
Different rules - ISAF vs USFOR-A (OEF)
I read the same Porter article - the term "innocent civilian" is intriguing. :rolleyes:
Here is the story on detention in Astan (current as of last year), Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff A. Bovarnick, Professor and Chair, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia (JUNE 2010, THE ARMY LAWYER, DA PAM 27-50-445).
As to the ISAF vice USFOR-A (OEF) distinction (pp.13-14, footnotes in original omitted below):
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A. Combat Operations in Afghanistan ISAF/NATO and U.S Forces–Afghanistan/OEF
Because the 2 July 2009 detention policy is explicit in its application, it is informative to describe the units operating in Afghanistan. On 30 June 2010, General David Petreaus was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the dual-hatted Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the International and Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Although they fall under the same commander, USFOR-A and ISAF operate under two different detention paradigms. As described in detail below, the 2 July 2009 policy for the new DRBs only applies to USFOR-A/OEF units. This section provides a brief explanation of the ISAF detention policy, which is separate and distinct from the USFOR-A detention policy. The majority of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (78,430 out of approximately 95,000) are assigned to ISAF, which operates as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO) mission in Afghanistan.
The remaining 17,000 or so U.S. troops fall under USFOR-A and continue to operate under the authority of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Currently, USFOR-A is made up of U.S. Special Operations Forces (the capturing units), Joint Task Force 435, which runs all detention operations in Afghanistan (discussed in detail below), and other critical enablers, such as route clearance and Palladin units. The 2 July 2009 detention policy does not apply to roughly 80% of U.S. troops operating in Afghanistan.
As described later, USFOR-A can send captured personnel to the DFIP whereas ISAF units (including the U.S. forces assigned to ISAF) cannot. Since December 2005, all ISAF units have been required to turn captures over to the Afghans within ninety-six hours of capture.
In early 2010, complaints from U.S. units (assigned to ISAF) surfaced over this relatively short time period to turn captured personnel over to Afghan authorities. In March 2010, in response to these complaints, the Secretary of Defense extended the period to fourteen days, thus authorizing the U.S. caveat to the ninety-six-hour rule for U.S. forces assigned to ISAF. The ninety-six-hour rule is still in effect for non-U.S. ISAF units.
All insurgents captured by ISAF troops must be turned over to the Afghan National Security Directorate (NDS), either within ninety-six hours for non-U.S. ISAF units or fourteen days for U.S. ISAF units. The NDS is Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency with jurisdiction over all insurgent and terrorist activity.
In essence, the NDS has the right of first refusal to accept the transfer of captured personnel believed to be insurgents or terrorists. In addition to the personnel that might be expected to make up an intelligence agency, the NDS also has a staff of investigators that specifically work to prepare cases for prosecution within the Afghan criminal justice system. Currently, a team of Afghan prosecutors and judges with special expertise are temporarily assigned to work exclusively with the NDS to coordinate this effort to try suspected insurgents and terrorists under the appropriate Afghan criminal laws within the Afghan criminal justice system. Each province in Afghanistan has at least one judge and several prosecutors assigned to work on NDS cases.
I expect LawVol knows the current conditions better than anyone else at SWC.
Afghanistan: mapping the endgame
Professor Paul Rogers comments, sub-titled:
Quote:
The United States's narrative of progress against the Taliban faces uncomfortable realities on the ground - and unexpected resistance in Washington.
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-ro...6-19%2005%3a30
What I found interesting was his analysis that attacking Afghan state targets was likely to grow, alongside the hardy perennial of insurgents hiding amongst the local population.
Which made me wonder if VIP attacks of late are intended to remove capable opponents before a negoitation and ease the way for traditional Afghan ways of settling disputes afterwards, in which violence historically was minimal. Yes, seen from a faraway "armchair" and ignores the fact that traditional ways often expire in conflict.
Taliban evoke Journalistic flashbacks...
The US media has been trying to evoke Viet Nam for ten years. Their stupid and wrong headed beliefs in this have affected some folks in the services. Fortunately, most have enough sense to realize there are few similarities other than some of the weapons used -- and the flawed tactics... :D