See the above intervening and accurate posts from others...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
Ken, the simple truth is that "winning" in Afghanistan is no longer considered possible and now it is just a matter of a US withdrawal in a face saving manner (if that is possible) if not leave like the Soviets did.
It was never possible. I've been saying that since early 2002 when what we wanted (not necessarily needed) to do there was effectively completed. We should not have decided to stay because once we did we locked ourselves in to a no-win situation.
Unfortunately, George W. Bush forgot his job as POTUS and recalled that he was a good Christan and did the Christan thing, he decided to 'fix' what 'we' had 'broken.' There were four big flaws in that.
- The job of POTUS is to take care of US interests, humanistic follies and US domestic political concerns as well as personal beliefs can be -- should be -- considered but net cost should be weighed against benefits. He did not accept the cost-benefit analysis which pretty much predicted what has occurred though it underestimated those costs. He made a poor decision...
- The possibility of our being able to 'fix' it in less than two generations -- if ever -- was microscopic at best.
- The 'we' gets transmogrified in affairs like this. The US DoD has a vested interest in creating conflicts and places to go, things to do. We as a nation too often succumb to that interest and poke into things we should not and yet we do not have the political will (we here includes uniformed and civilian 'politicians' and their ilk...) to use force properly so we end up doing a poor job -- and get way with it... :mad: That same organization has a 'can do' attitude and will salute and say "Yes, Sir" while marching over a cliff. It is reluctant to say that some things are not possible or not with the tools available so the relatively ignorant civilian masters give a flawed task and the Armed Forces will try to execute even if they do not have the wherewithal to do it. G.W.B. said "go forth and do great things" and few if any said "Boss, that is really stoopid..."
- We did not break it, it was already broken.
So we got engaged where we should not have in a manner that we had earlier proven was totally futile and not appropriate to the US and I've been saying since '02 that we'd get out based on the US electoral cycle. Just as we 'got out' of Iraq and elsewhere...
We're slow learners, we have no continuity mostly because of oversize egos so we love to reinvent the wheel, because, after all the "They failed but we're smarter so we can do it correctly" attitude, while very human, has adversely affected nations for years. See socialism... :rolleyes:
Agreed. I simply point out how we exacerbate this problem.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
Bob:
Land tenure by political favor is not a viable way forward, whether in the past, present or future.
It undermines that basic concept of community essential to a stable society.
And yet it happens over and over again in Afghanistan.
How does one possibly arrive at a "just" resolution when vitually every title of any value could be disputed by previous owners or their heirs who have reasonable claims that they were illegally disposessed of their land?
A good laydown from this report:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3E2AD065B3616B2D802570B7005876F4/$file/Land_disputes_NRC_june04.pdf
"The underlying causes of land and property disputes
The main causes of land disputes in Afghanistan can be summarized under the following headings:
· Conflict. Since the invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979 Afghanistan has experienced 25 years of almost continual conflict that has caused millions of people to flee from their homes. During their absence, these people’s land and property was often occupied, or bought and sold and now, as they return home, they are demanding its restitution.
· Regime changes. Successive governments have violently replaced one another over the last 30 years and different regimes have pursued different land policies, often based on rewarding their own supporters through favorable land allocations.
· Unclear ownership. The unorganized land registration system, the large number of missing title deeds, and the fact that disputed land has often been sold many times over, makes it very difficult to determine who owns what.
· Reliance on customary documents and mechanisms. Many land and property transactions take place without being officially approved by the courts, using customary documents or traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as Shuras and Jirgas.
· Land shortage. Only 12 per cent of the land area of Afghanistan is suitable for arable farming. A further 45 per cent is currently being used as pastureland by both settled and nomadic farmers, but tenure arrangements over pastureland are often unclear and disputes are frequent. Land pressure is exacerbated by Afghanistan’s high birth rate and the rapid return of so many refugees in 2002.
· Landlessness. A large number of people in Afghanistan have no land and when they return back from exile they sometimes occupy other people’s land, or government-owned land because they have nowhere else to go.
· Tribal and ethnic disputes. Competition for scarce resources, such as land and water, is often linked to ethnic or tribal tensions or to other political conflicts.
· Corruption. There are numerous reliable reports that members of the judiciary and executive organs are abusing their positions for personal or political interests, or due to pressure exercised by other powerful members of society.
· Lack of a rule of law. Even where the courts, public authorities or customary dispute resolution mechanisms issue fair decisions there is no guarantee that these can be enforced. A large number of powerful commanders, and their supporters, consider themselves to be ‘above the la w’ and the lack of an effectively functioning legal system means that many people rely on the use of force to settle disputes."