Mini-me is definitely not needed
The trick is in your next to the last paragraph -- not fighting each other.
So far, history is NOT in our favor on that one.
The strengths of the ANA, as planned anyway:
Multi-ethnic, multi-tribal, merit-based entity
Subject to and comfortable with Rule of Law
There are many Afghans dedicated to "making it work this time".
But there are still many who are trying to wait us out so they can revert to the old ways.
Not sure anything but time will tell.
Good point and I think you're correct, Bobs World.
My perception is that a part of the problem in Afghanistan is that the US and possibly NATO, certainly the UN all want a strong central government due to their own experience and the ease of dealing with such an entity versus having to cope with 20 or so fiefdoms in a loose confederation. Old Eagle's post seems to confirm this. I'm dubious such a state is obtainable and sustainable at this time -- possibly after 20 years or so of relative peace...
I think too many in positions of power or influence tend to subscribe to this view LINK which I see as beyond deluded and almost literally living in a dream world -- he obviously missed the Tamil Tigers, various scuffles in Africa, the demise of Yugoslavia -- much less Kosovo -- the Scottish Parliament and a veritable host of other things over the last few years. Nationalism (and to an extent, tribalism) is on the increase except among the chattering classes who foolishly see an implausible if not impossible world government as a panacea for all our ills and who are very fortunately outnumbered by an extremely large number of people with a great deal more sense who understand smaller is better...
My belief is that the future of the world will tend to lean toward the the far more anarchic model described in "Eve of Destruction: The Coming Age of Preventive War" by Thomas M. Nichols; LINK. Nichols makes a case for preventive and preemptive war but more iimportantly, he describes the demise of the Westphalian model of state relationships -- the world has changed and too many are trying to live in the past...
We -- the US, NATO and even the UN -- need to determine a sensible and ACHIEVABLE end state for involvement in Afghanistan and head that way.
Two different national strategies
When I first saw "Crazy Horse" in Bob's post, I thought of a different book - I imagine Ambrose's book is less biased than the one that flashed in my mind.
I thought of Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, which is here.
Spirit tells the story of the Lakota insurgency of 1975 and one of its leaders Leonard Peltier (a Méti, who is presently serving life - and, for purposes of disclosure, is some sort of half-assed distant Pelletier cousin to me and my wife - don't know him or his family). It is not a pleasant book, but seems very relevant to the issues of how a low-level insurgency develops and is handled (or mishandled).
------------------------
Back to the lead of this post. I think it might be informative to compare two contrasting "national strategies" in North America:
1. The American Indian campaigns, rez policies, etc. which made up the expansion westward (really from the 1600's), and reflected a policy of total control and colonization.
2. The CFM-Canada (that's my little avatar guy's unit) and its application of a far different strategy in the period 1610-1760 (when the little guy got his clock cleaned). Basically, these Canadian Marines moved as fish in a sea, which they did not seek to control; but did seek to influence - more by practical diplomacy than by military force - although they were not adverse to that.
Unfortunately, comprehensive books on item #2 are lacking. Francis Parkman, France and England in North America (2 vols) is good, but is very dated:
Quote:
From The Washington Post
The greatest history ever written by an American. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
Product Description
This is the first of two volumes presenting all seven parts of Francis Parkman's monumental narrative history of the struggle for control of the American continent. Thirty years in the writing, Parkman's "history of the American forest" is an accomplishment hardly less awesome than the adventures he describes. This volume begins with the tragic settlement of French Huguenots in Florida, then shifts north as explorers like Samuel de Champlain map the wilderness and wage savage forest warfare against the Iroquois; resolute Jesuits attempt to convert the Indians and suffer captivity, torture, and martyrdom in the wilderness; conflict rages in French Canada between religious extremists and fur traders. Dominating all is the fiercely indomitable La Salle, whose obsession with colonizing the Mississippi Valley leads to vast treks across the western prairie and assassination in a lonely Texas swamp. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
available at Amazon - picked up an unused hardcover set at a used book store for peanuts.
Benefits of a minimally funded and resourced effort
(Canada under the French) and one perhaps over funded (us). Excess money and goodies will let you do dumb stuff.
Some things don't change much...
The City-State Model or something completely different?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
Sometimes more isn't better. I would therefore argue that in many parts of Afghanistan we need to quit pursuing our paternalistic notions of governance and work with the local power structures to ensure their independence from all outsiders - Kabul and Taliban alike. The irony here is that in order to save a central government in Kabul, we may have to undermine its authority in some parts of Afghanistan - at least until it grows in capability and legitimacy enough to overcome the very real and long-standing hostility to central authority among many populations in Afghanistan. In trying to control the entire country, the coalition and Afghan government are overreaching. Better, IMO, to work on governance and legitimacy in those areas where that goal is realistically achievable over the short-to-medium term. In those areas where it is not, try to strike deals that guarantee local independence in exchange denying sanctuary and support to the Taliban and their allies.
Anyway, that's my theory.
Entropy,
Is the City-State Model applicable for Kabul? Could it be a new Samarkand?
Quote:
Samarkand was founded by the Persians in the late 6th century BCE and it was one of the main centers of Persian civilization in the ancient times. It is one of the oldest inhabited cities in the world, prospering from its location on the trade route between China and Europe (Silk Road). At times Samarkand has been one of the greatest cities of Central Asia. Founded circa 700 BC it was already the capital of the Sogdian satrapy under the Achaemenid dynasty of Persia when Alexander the Great conquered it in 329 BC (see Afrasiab, Sogdiana).
For the independent areas outside Kabul what would the model be? From a western view point are we interested in self-sustainable autonomous areas which are able to prevent some of the organizations that we are concerned about from taking root?
Regards,
Steve
Then you'd key in on exactly the wrong thing.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
reed11b
Interesting, what I picked up from that history was not Crook's refusal to negotiate (in the end he did negotiate w/ Geronimo, and he was actually a step up from the previous General in the human relations department) but his use of Forts to geographically isolate his enemy. That would be the lesson that I would key in on.
Reed
What you should key upon is his dumping of large wagon supported forays and large numbers of troops to instead use small columns with mule trains for logistic support, better selection and training of small units that could move as fast as the opponent and the co-opting of members of the pursued tribe, band or group to serve as indigenous trackers in large numbers.
The Forts were not to 'geographically isolate the enemy,' they were simply to provide bases for his light columns and were to shape the area of operations, not isolate. Pretty hard to isolate a crew in their native habitat if they don't want to be isolated with a small fixed installation.
"Refusal to negotiate" and later negotiation are political considerations. Crook's success was in his tactical concepts which created the possibility of negotiation.