"Value added" from academia?!?
Hi Bill,
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Marc, you're begining to soften my position on academia. You have made several observations that are value added, and ones that I'll think about at length on my next short TDY.
Thanks :) Just don't mention it to any of my academic colleagues, or I would be drummed out of the academy for "Conduct Unbecoming..." (LOLOL)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I find COGs of limited value at the military level, and as some claim if they are constantly moving then they are of zero value. However, using Clausewitz's original definition of a COG (and he admits they don't always exist), then they could be a useful construct at the interagency level, which is what EBO is attempting integrate.
In all honesty, I suspect that they are a heuristic of somewhat limited value in the type of battlespace we are operating in (i.e. global political, military, economic and symbolic conflict). I think they can be a very useful heuristic at both the interagency level, as you mentioned, and also at the level of Grand Strategy (i.e. the global population is the theatre of operations). Given the prevalence of the concept within the militray, they can also, probably, serve as useful heuristics in more restricted levels of operation.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Then on the other hand, as mentioned earlier by one of the council members, it is a fanasty to believe that we actually have other government agencies beyond the military with any real capability to make things happen. State is severely underresourced, so they can stand up and say this is our job all they want, but they can't do it. Who exactly runs our national level IO? Seems to me that every agency plays in this game, but where is the over all coordinator?
And to add to the list, how about other nations agencies and militaries? If this is a Global War on Terror, then where is the Global co-ordination?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
It is a little bit late after the war starts to start thinking if we only had more civil affairs, better IO, more ground troops, etc. We could have (and did) accomplish much in both countries, the only reason it appears that we're struggling is our desire to emplace democracies there.
One of the things I dislike most about many of my colleagues is their habit of living in the past without using it to bring meaning to the present and help construct the future. You're perfectly right about playing the "what if" game - it is really counter-productive, especially in democracies where it is likely to be used by short sighted politicians for immediate election gains. We need to look at the past to find the problems, opportunities and patterns of action that can help us to achieve our current and future goals.
On the subject of emplacing democracies, I'm really unsure. On the one hand, there is a certain international perception about the message coming from the Bush administration "Democracy is good, and we'll give it to everyone." The problem I think that many of us have with this idea is that democracy, in the true, philosophical sense of the term, cannot be "given" it must be earned (Thomas Paine had some good things to say about this in Common Sense). At its heart, a democracy relies on an informed and educated citizenry that is both willing to engage in a pluralistuc debate and, at the same time, willing to defend the right of other people to hold contrary opinions.
At the same time, one pattern that has been repeated over and over again historically is the shift from a democracy into either an aristocracy (e.g. Rome) or a mob-ocracy (e.g. Athens). I'm not particularly sanguine about where democracy will go in either Afghanistan or Iraq. On a purely personal level, and, yes, I know I'm am showing my bias here :), I really wish that the old King of Afghanistan had either accepted the throne or let his son do so. Oh, well, that's water under the bridge.
Marc
Always great when you can begin at the end
Concur! Have seen all inexperienced staffs, and many experienced ones, die on the CG-CC-CR-CV hill early in mission analysis.
Unfortunately, it is a vulnerability's special relationship to the CG that makes it a CRITICAL vulnerability, rather than just a run-of-the-mill or trivial vulnerability. So can't completely dismiss the topic. Just need to move to it and through it more smartly.
Sometimes that may mean starting in the middle and working in both directions, say from CC or CR. Have seen that employed well. Have also failed miserably myself in attempting to do it, so that is not a panacea.
Wise commanders understand this
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Wise commanders understand this, while others look for the lockstep answer.
Steve, I'm not convinced that anyone gets it, and there are plenty of smart people on this site that are debating it. Neither the Marines nor Army nor SOF have yet found anything resembling a COG that we can effectively influence to achieve our objectives in our current conflict. The COG normally has little relevance in COIN, except from the stand point of identifying our own and protecting them.
The COG isn't a shifting thing or a process, it is a COG. It only shifts when your objective shifts or you didn't properly identify it in the first place, assuming it even exists. Obviously the COG for phase III in OIF is not the same as phase IV, but phase IV is really a different war, not a different phase.
Our process is MDMP, not COG. Many planners try to use COGs to focus their efforts, and in a strictly kinetic fight that makes perfect sense (it is a form of EBO). Normally, (never say never, and never say always) if you focus your efforts in COIN (e.g. identify the COG and mass your efforts against it), then you're neglecting the the bigger picture, and most likely you'll find what you identified as COG wasn't, such as Fallujah. It was an important battle, but not the COG of the Sunni insurgency that some folks said it was at the time.
Some of you mentioned using multiple COG's, but excessive COGs limit the utility of the concept in the first place. Every COG has decisive points (DPs) that we target/influence to achieve the desired effect on the COG, but DPs are not COGs. It sounds like the Marines use critical vulnerabilities instead of DPs. I wonder if our terminology and thought processes differ so much due to the French influencing the Marines and the Germans the Army in their formative years? (This was before the French were evil :-), if I didn't that the Corp make think I'm making a jab at them).
What is missing in this conflict is clarity of intent and thought and ambiguity leads to chaos. If a COG existed beyond their will, then it would be useful, but if it doesn't (I haven't seen one yet) exist, then lets use other models to figure the problem out. We're defending freedom, so let's not be robotic and defend dinasour concepts to the death. No one is rejecting the COG concept completely, but in many situations the utility of it is questionable at best. If it limits our ability to accurately define and solve the problem, shift to another model.
While I still think EBO has potential, the truth is I haven't seen it effectively integrated into our MDMP, so there is must be alternative models that we can collectively design. That is why this council exists isn't it?
Effects Based Process Special Studies
Bill,
We have in process 2 effects-based process studies at the BCT and battalion level that should be out soon. They represent 4 years of work, practice, and operational use and should be of interest to you.
Best
Tom