These are excellent points as well
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
That's the key question, isn't it?
We've recently shown a tendency to assume that any government we install is "the government" and anyone opposing it is "an insurgent". Those definitions are debatable.
In Iraq we faced an armed competition to fill the vacuum left by the removal of Saddam. To us that was insurgency, because we had already proclaimed one of the competing factions as "the government". To those who had never acknowledged that faction as the government, this wouldn't have made much sense.
A definition of what makes a government a government will likely be complex, but for starters I'd say it needs to be acknowledged as a government by its populace, and it has to govern. The situation in Somalia, for example, can't be reasonably called an insurgency because there is no government.
In Afghanistan, I'm not convinced that the paradigm we hold up - Taliban vs GIROA, US "doing FID" in support of GIROA's COIN - accurately reflects either popular perception or the reality on the ground. Possibly I'm wrong; I hope so.
The governance delivered to Marjah was a disaster on many levels. From the constitutional requirement that it be selected in Kabul by Karzai, to the fact that it was delivered in USMC helos, guarded by USMC troops.
And this is the problem of being focused on military ops and tactics
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
While you are absolutely correct on this thinking, I believe that over the next year in A'stan we're going to see a lot of "get out of the way and let me do it" do the the increased pressure for results. Hopefully, as the dust is settled, we'll turn it back over to SF.
There are two aspects to the insurgency in Afghanistan: I'll call them "The Top" and "The Base".
Military tactics of Pop-Centric COIN go after the base. You cannot win, IMO, by focusing on the base. The Base is largely a resistance movement, so the more we surge, the more we fuel the base. The base is the target of reintegration; but reintegration cannot happen in an enduring fashion until reconciliation has occurred. The base fights because:
A. We are in their homeland
B. They are Pashtun
C. They earn an honorable wage to fight us
D. The leadership that makes up "The Top" encourages and funds such action.
The Top is largely a revolutionary Insurgency. This is the senior leadership, such as makes up the Qetta Shura. They are driven primarily by the causal factors I have included in the Jones Insurgency Model. They reject the claims of Legitimacy of the Karzai Government; They are excluded from participation in governance or economic opportunity; and they have no trusted, legal means available to them to effect such change. The are also strongly encouraged and enabled, perhaps even directed, by the Government of Pakistan; or at least key elements of The Top are.
The Top is where victory lies. This is the target of Reconciliation. It can be addressed not through Pop-Centric tactics aimed at the insurgent, but through thoughtful, Madison-like reform of the Afghan government. Overt outside support for the Karzai Government fuels The Top; which in turn keeps the base alive.
To resolve the Top cannot be done through man-hunting alone (though certainly there is a place for such activities). It requires addressing the failures of governance that drive them. Actions that could mitigate the Top:
A. True reconciliation Jirgas that are open to all and offer real and reasonable opportunity to include those who are currently excluded from governance and opportunity a chance to come in from the cold.
B. Cutting the strings from Karzai to the West; allowing him to either stand on his own and prove he is not a puppet, or collapse under his own weight as puppet would do. Then for the West to be willing to recognize and work with whatever might come of this.
C. Schedule and announce a constitutional convention to take place following the reconciliation Jirga; specifically so that the new team can address the flaws and make the changes that will most likely help prevent the failures of the current model.
The reason we go after the base rather than the top is that going after the base allows all blame to be placed on the challenger; while going after the top requires an assumption of responsibility on the part of government for Afghanistan; and the risk of an uncontrolled outcome for the West.
I have no problem with Pop-Centric tactics. Just make them a supporting effort, understand their role, and develop a companion main effort to address the Top. Its not only more likely to work, it is way less expensive, its quicker, and it will save thousands of lives on all sides.
I've been trying to tell Bob some of that for two years
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
We intervened to remove and replace a government we didn't like, and in the process created both a government and an insurgency...The situation as it stands is our creation and to some degree we own it. We also have interests at stake...but there's no assurance at all that what comes out of this (likely a Taliban-controlled government) will be willing to work with us... We may not see that perception as accurate, but the perception will still be there, along with all the potential side effects that go with it.
He and Jeremy have paid little attention. You said it far better than I have; hopefully they'll listen to you... :wry:
Ken and Dayuhan: THE MISSION CHANGED.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
He and Jeremy have paid little attention. You said it far better than I have; hopefully they'll listen to you... :wry:
The mission, today, is an intervention in the insurgency of another. If you want to debate what the mission was 5 year ago, or 8 years ago, fine; but I am arguing what the mission should be 5 days from now. How do we move forward.
We came in conducting UW, we hung around conducting CT; and now we are trying to figure out how to get out conducting COIN. My point being that we will be more effective in what we are doing when we see it as FID.
As to arguments based in "we can't look like the Taliban won", etc. Pure chest beating silliness. It isn't our war. I say again, it isn't our war. It is up to Karzai to either prevail or lose, and arrogance for us to see it otherwise.
Reason we came was primarily two-fold: Get revenge against the 9/11 attackers and to make the US safer. Most Americans would argue that the block is largely checked in terms of gaining revenge, at least from large-scale military operations. Time to take the revenge mission into a relentless pursuit in the shadows. As to making America safer, I contend that interventions that prop up illegitimate leaders put us more at risk, not the other way around. This is where we need to change our thinking.
We lost in Vietnam because we propped up 3 successive illegitimate governments and never understood the nature of the conflict; what was essential, and what was superficial. We are making very similar mistakes in Afghanistan. Ike predicted that if the 1956 election was held that Ho would have won 80% of the popular vote in Vietnam; so instead, to avoid a "loss" to the forces of Communism we threw our lot in with this series of illegitimate leaders. Did we learn nothing? No, but we didn't learn the really important lessons.
Not really. 'We caused the mission to change' is considerably more accurate.
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
The mission, today, is an intervention in the insurgency of another. If you want to debate what the mission was 5 year ago, or 8 years ago, fine; but I am arguing what the mission should be 5 days from now. How do we move forward.
No wish to debate either. I've contended that Afghanistan is on short final for a couple of years. It is. Nothing you or I write is going to change anything. The issue is what the future holds and your good ideas are going to get lost in a cloud of excessive idealism and unreality.
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My point being that we will be more effective in what we are doing when we see it as FID.
I agree. So?
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As to arguments based in "we can't look like the Taliban won", etc. Pure chest beating silliness. It isn't our war. I say again, it isn't our war. It is up to Karzai to either prevail or lose, and arrogance for us to see it otherwise.
That's where you're wrong. On two counts. First and foremost, this is primarily an information and ideological struggle, it is not not a war in the traditional sense; it isn't even traditional FID, not by a long shot. What is silliness to your western eyes is seen quite differently by a half a billion Muslims worldwide -- and by a larger number of non-Muslims who do not wish us well and routinely seize on any excuse the beat up on the 600 pound Gorilla. You ignore their opinion at some peril. You are volunteering to cede points to the opponent and his fans. I believe that to be a step or two beyond very unwise.
Secondly, Karzai is a creation of the US. You cannot -- certainly should not if you're at all ethical -- create a situation and then say you're tired of it. We created the problem and we have not yet solved it. That is the point that I've been trying to make to you for a couple of years and which Dayuhan stated well. To say the mission changed is incorrect. We are changing the mission to suit US domestic politics and while the policy makers have every legal right to do that, it is not smart and it does not change the fact that there would be no 'insurgency' or FID with our involvement had we not interfered in the first place. While I agree that such interference on our part is unwise and should cease in the future, that doesn't change the other fact -- we are there.
What you used to advocate, an abrupt departure from Afghanistan on the basis the intervention there was inimical to our strategic interests is what's likely to happen regardless and the results will almost certainly be another blow to US credibility to rank with that earlier war you cited.
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...I contend that interventions that prop up illegitimate leaders put us more at risk, not the other way around. This is where we need to change our thinking.
I totally agree. However, that laudable future goal doesn't solve the problems of 5 days from now.
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We lost in Vietnam... Did we learn nothing? No, but we didn't learn the really important lessons.
True. One important lesson is that the lack of continuity in the US political process leads to strategic shortsightedness and that excessive emphasis on US domestic politics often clouds the judgment of senior policymakers, military and civilian. A second lesson is that if the policy makers start something they should not have, failure to adequately perform by the Armed Forces can severely complicate the issue. A third lesson is that in event of the second possibility, if as is likely the policy makers continue to show clouded judgment, everything will become even more complex and the potential for failure increases to a probability.
An old lesson to be learned anew is that all those potential problems are the norm.
Until those lessons are embedded or the Armed forces develop workarounds for the first and last and fix the second to the extent they are able, you're the one whistling past the old bone orchard. :wry: