Lighter is not always better.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
. . .
A bit weighty!!! I carried the bl*ody the M2. 32lbs!! (The M3 is some 23lbs).
. . .
The M3 has a tendency to break. The Rangers and the SEALS have had some problems with it.
The M2 is ultra reliable; with either version you have a lot of ammo choice which is a good thing, add the Simrad sight and you've got a better deal than most missiles for most purposes.
Well, we can disagree - but you're moving the old
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
@ Well we will disagree then. Hatchet Fore, Mike Force (ok Not SOG) and Exploitation Platoons were all basically light infantry, as were the heavier recon teams. Operation Tailwind and the blocking of Route 96, were basically conventional Air mobile operations.
goalposts. Yes, those you mention were essentially light infantry but the SOG specific elements you cite existed solely to support the RTs -- and the SOG mission was more than those RTs as well. Tailwind was a one-off (well, almost...) and several of the blocks were not an advertisement for anything except courage under fire. I'd also say Tailwind wasn't conventional in hardly any respect...
Quote:
@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.
What is your proposal to reduce the load? Not just the buzz words, the realistic proposal.
Quote:
@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.
Uh, actually, that's been tried -- and it didn't work too well. The initial ROCID (Infantry Division in the US Army circa 1956-1964) had a battalion of ~ 60 APCs with a commander / gunner and a driver. The theory was that the Infantry units needing transport would be provided it from that Bn. Didn't work at all well in practice for several reasons so it was abandoned. Not least was the problem of getting the senior Infantry type aboard and the Track Commander to agree on routes, vehicle placement, targets for the .50 cal and so forth. There was also the minor problem that the PC folks though their job was to be a taxi and that any danger was to be avoided -- the transported Infantry OTOH, expected to get shot at and had a sense of mission that the track crews sometimes lacked -- there's that pesky human dimension again...
And maintenance. Everyone always likes to forget maintenance...
But it's a nice theory.
Well, we can disagree - but you're moving the old
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
@ Well we will disagree then. Hatchet Fore, Mike Force (ok Not SOG) and Exploitation Platoons were all basically light infantry, as were the heavier recon teams. Operation Tailwind and the blocking of Route 96, were basically conventional Air mobile operations.
goalposts. Yes, those you mention were essentially light infantry but the SOG specific elements you cite existed solely to support the RTs -- and the SOG mission was more than those RTs as well. Tailwind was a one-off (well, almost...) and several of the blocks were not an advertisement for anything except courage under fire. I'd also say Tailwind wasn't conventional in hardly any respect...
And yes, Mike Force elms were not SOG.
You probably also noted that the 'light infantry' "heavier recon teams" were those that had the most difficulty; the early guys like Dick Meadows who went out and snuck around didn't have nearly the problems (acknowledging that the NVA put more people out in later years as well). Strategic Recon will only succeed by stealth and wits, light infantry stuff (and thinking) will get you killed in that environment. Totally different job and focus.
Quote:
@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.
What is your proposal to reduce the load? Not just the buzz words, the realistic proposal.
Quote:
@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.
Uh, actually, that's been tried -- and it didn't work too well. The initial ROCID (Infantry Division in the US Army circa 1956-1964) had a battalion of ~ 60 APCs with a commander / gunner and a driver. The theory was that the Infantry units needing transport would be provided it from that Bn. Didn't work at all well in practice for several reasons so it was abandoned. Not least was the problem of getting the senior Infantry type aboard and the Track Commander to agree on routes, vehicle placement, targets for the .50 cal and so forth. There was also the minor problem that the PC folks though their job was to be a taxi and that any danger was to be avoided -- the transported Infantry OTOH, expected to get shot at and had a sense of mission that the track crews sometimes lacked -- there's that pesky human dimension again...
And maintenance. Everyone always likes to forget maintenance...
But it's a nice theory.