Does Decapitating Terrorist Leaderships Work?
Anne Speckhard is a psychiatrist who has looked at women suicide bombers in the past and has written this short commentary for RUSI. From a comment on Amazon.com of her book, a very swift bio:
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She has interviewed over 350 terrorists, extremists, their supporters, hostages, family members and their close associates in Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Iraq, Russia, Belarus, North Ossetia, Morocco, Belgium, UK, the Netherlands and France. She was responsible for the design of the psychological and Islamic challenge portions of the US Department of Defense Detainee Rehabilitation Program in 2006-7 for use with the 20,000+ security detainees held by US forces in Iraq.
She opens with:
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In the last two-years, international counter-terrorism strategies have focused on decapitating terrorist leaderships. But the threat and the ideology remains. In the coming year it is important to address the psychological motivations for conducting terrorist acts.
Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment.../#.UQu8MR26eSo
There is a link to her book 'Talking to Terrorists: Understanding the Psycho-Social Motivations of Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers & Martyrs' too:http://www.amazon.com/product-review...owViewpoints=1
Another time a full, proper read; so straight to her conclusion:
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Continued vigilance is called for and well thought out and well-informed policies that keep in mind all four levels of the terrorist cocktail - decreasing the political grievances that fuel the existence of groups as well as shutting them down, fighting the ideology of terrorism and social support for it and addressing individual vulnerabilities are going to be ever more important to keep us safe in the coming year. Simply decapitating the leadership is not likely to be enough.
HVT decapitation in Northern Ireland: a riposte
TheCurmudgeon posted:
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The British finally gave us these types of targeted killing of IRA members in part because there was never anyone in power long enough to negotiate a final peace. Killings don't change the nature of the grievances, the reason people fight, or the dynamics of the game, it only alters the players.
Cited in part JMA's reply
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Originally Posted by
JMA
I am not aware of the British policy in this regard but would assume that the legality of 'murdering' citizens of their country was a significant factor.
During 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland (1969-1998) there were allegations that the British security forces had a policy 'Shoot to Kill' for those handling weapons, most notably the 1987 Loughall shooting:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loughgall_Ambush and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shoot_t...90_TV_drama%29
This is very different from the 'targeted killing of (senior) IRA members', which if anything was not pursued. Indeed my recollection is that one if not two leaders murder by Loyalists was averted by official security force action. See:http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/d...00/2543503.stm Although not a PIRA leader I recall this:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernade...vlin_McAliskey
I expect there was some political consideration given to a HVT decapitation option, notably after the murder of the Mountbatten family and Warrenpoint.
The Loyalist paramilitaries at various stages engaged in killing HVT and were themselves victims of PIRA HVT murders.
AQ works like the Boy Scouts
An alternative targeting strategy, written by a USAF LtC, first spotted in summary on: http://www.matthewaid.com/post/10440...ty-killing-the
Which cites a WaPo article:http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/s...he-boy-scouts/
In summary:
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...the best terror cells work a lot like a big nonprofit group. Like the Boy Scouts of America. From studying the scouts, he determined the best way to stop terrorists is to target their bureaucrats – not top leader...
The main article 'Boy Scouts, Bureaucracy, and Counternetwork Targeting' cannot readily be located alas, including on Hoover Institution's website.
A contemporary situation review:http://www.theatlantic.com/internati...ership/382548/
Exposure: The Kill List (SOF -v- HVT)
This is a UK ITV documentary:
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...revealing the inside story of how the SAS and US special forces targeted and captured or killed insurgents during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are a number of "talking heads" John Nagl, Michael Hoh, David Kilcullen, Graeme Lamb and a former UK SAS commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Williams, who in one comment said:
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Its purpose was the destruction of al-Qaeda in Iraq and it did deliver from it quite a lot of death.
Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQzQH0ZF9lI
There is a UK website, but it requires registration and a UK post code - hence use of a YouTube link.
It was interesting in places, especially the comments by Graeme Lamb and Richard Williams. David Kilcullen's closing comment was stark.
Killing top terrorists is not enough
An opinion piece by David Ignatius, in the WaPo two weeks ago and rediscovered today. Added as it refers to two academic articles that argue the tactic is not enough:http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio...99_story.html?
Only the first article is openly available, the 2014 article in International Security is behind a pay wall:http://informationcollective.org/wp-.../01/Jordan.pdf
Targeting Top Terrorists Understanding Leadership Removal in CT Strategy
Thread reopened.
A forthcoming book 'Targeting Top Terrorists:Understanding Leadership Removal in Counterterrorism Strategy'; the author's bio suggests it could be valuable:
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Bryan C. Price is the founding executive director of the Buccino Leadership Institute at Seton Hall University. During a twenty-year career as an Army officer, he served in various command and staff positions, including combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2012 to 2018, he directed the Combating Terrorism Center and served as an Academy Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
From the publisher's summary:
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This practice, known as leadership decapitation, is based on the logic that removing key figures will disrupt the organization and contribute to its ultimate failure. Yet many scholars have argued that targeted killings are ineffective or counterproductive, questioning whether taking out a terror network’s leaders causes more problems than it solves.
In Targeting Top Terrorists, Bryan C. Price offers a rich, data-driven examination of leadership decapitation tactics, providing theoretical and empirical explanations of the conditions under which they can be successful. Analyzing hundreds of cases of leadership turnover from over two hundred terrorist groups, Price demonstrates that although the tactic may result in short-term negative side effects, the loss of top leaders significantly reduces terror groups’ life spans.
Link:https://cup.columbia.edu/book/target.../9780231188234
Lessons from the history of the recent history of political assassination
An article that is historical and ends with a very brief mention of machines being used for killing, yes drones. The actual title is: 'Finer points of murder.
Link:https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/p...ation-history/
Moving beyond post 9-11 manhunt translating tactical wins strategic success
An article from MWI @ West Point that deserves reading IMHO. Here are few key passages from near the start as a "taster":
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We have mastered the art of hunting men. Refined over nearly two decades of nonstop counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and enhanced by a suite of increasingly powerful technological tools, the United States military has developed an extraordinary ability to find, fix, and finish targets worldwide.
Fast-forward to the present day: our targeting capabilities are as much science as art, with the military’s Joint Special Operations Command as the standard bearer of lethality. We can connect the dots faster than ever before, combing through data sets of staggering size and diversity, feeding a ruthlessly efficient operational process that we are executing on a global scale.
Why isn’t it working?
Considering our resources, talent, and reach, shouldn’t we have more to show for our efforts? We have proven ourselves highly effective at killing our enemies, but we have done so to limited overall effect. Why are we unable to showcase a single operational theater in which our exceptional lethal targeting prowess at the tactical level is delivering a commensurate strategic result?
(Later) Two examples will help illustrate the disconnect between the successful prosecution of targeting-based, manhunt-style campaigns and the achievement of strategic results. (The examples are Iraq & Mexico).
Link:https://mwi.usma.edu/moving-beyond-p...tegic-success/
The author bio is here, what appears to be a "boutique" London-based advisory company:http://www.frontlineadvisory.com/#leadership
Targeted killing: alternative views
Now awhile ago I reviewed William Matchett's book 'Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that beat the IRA' in a separate thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...y-intelligence
A "lurker" has pointed to an alternative view by Rory Finegan:
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This study has found that TKs over a prolonged period predicated on accurate intelligence had no discernible deterrent effect on PIRA; the desire for backlash was always inherent but negated by security forces measures; with regard to disruption, TKs as implemented in East Tyrone had a cumulative effect on the operational capability of PIRA; and finally in relation to diminishing capacity while PIRA initiated substitution equally under this pillar TKs caused a gradual but incremental decline in operational efficiency and effectiveness.
The author found in a case study focused on East Tyrone PIRA suggests that TKs however, should not be presented as an absolute proven solution in themselves to patterns of political violence. But when combined with other factors if utilised surgically and in a discrete manner they are a factor and therefore as a counterinsurgency tactic, their utility cannot be dismissed.
Finegan's PhD is 4Mb (probably free to download) and there is a summary here:http://doras.dcu.ie/19724/
There is a second article 'Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970-1998' which is alas behind a pay-wall:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full...3.2016.1155932
Copied from the Northern Ireland thread.