The IO sum is greater than its parts ... as is its definition
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
According to JP 3-13, Information Operations, the term is defined as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”
Randy, I don't disagree with what you wrote above, actually I agree strongly with much of it; however, the entire point of this thread was to address the confusing definition of IO (first post).
I would argue what your writing about falls under the Army's definition of:
Influence Operations: to effect the behavior of the intended audience through coercion, information engagement, presence and conduct.
AND
Information Engagement: the government's use of integrated employment of public information programs, psychological operations, and support leader and government activities (reparing a school, security force behavior) to influence a target audience.
Roger! My apologies if you thought that I was shooting outside the barber poles. I agree that the definitions of Influence Operations and Information Engagement do encompass much of what I'm wrestling with in this thread. However, I thought I was aiming a little closer to center-mass, IO definition-wise, in that I would be loathe to divorce the tech-stuff (EW, CNO, the hardware side of PSYOP) from the soft-power stuff. I still think it's germaine; please indulge me a few more sentences to apply SPORTS and get my sight picture again ... (Further apologies for beating my semi-amusing range-fire metaphor to an early death this morning.)
Caveats: the usual U.S. "better-fighting-through-better-technology" bias is definitely at play here, and the fact that I'm a commo guy working in an intel slot (so I gots to have my tech-toys).
Schmedlap: Thanks for your notes regarding "working groups." I'd started to get into the "ad hoc" part in yesterday's rambles, and now wish that I had. I agree that we're in agreement: the interaction and de-confliction regarding IO is best done on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission basis. In the civilian world, I'd even use "virtual team" as another way to say "working group," given that the experts might be geograpically dispersed on the battlefield.
As with Bill's notes regarding "Influence Operations" and "Information Engagement," I am also mentally juggling your points on "Information Superiority." Because the term seems to invite comparison to "Air Superiority" (the subject of some other fun conversations on this site, by the way), I wonder whether this is a way to resolve my apparent need to incorporate the tech-side, as above, AND to address William F. Owen's position that:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
IF (the control of information content and flow across/among BLUFOR, enemy, and population) is the goal, then it is unattainable. It's like "all-weather" and "information dominance." The idea that anyone or anything can "control" information in the Information Age is both illusory and highly damaging.
I agree that information cannot be controlled, but it can and should be shaped to meet battlefield objectives. Taking a page from my engineer buddies, information viewed in obstacle terms can be "fixed, disrupted, turned or blocked."
Information Operations, as defined by JP 3-13, allows for a doctrinal sum greater than its parts. (Granted, unpacking the definition will keep us busy for years--just look at this thread.) For example, when a brigade commander has to weigh whether or not to alienate the civilian population by shaping the local frequency spectrum (perhaps "IO Air Superiority" is "Airwave Superiority"?), it's not ...
... just "messaging." (Because there is a physical-space component.)
... just "collection" or "targeting." (Because it, if nothing else, creates a secondary observer effect on the battlefield.)
... just "electronic warfare." (Because it involves implicit and indirect messages--what do the locals think when the proverbial dial-tone goes dead? What do the bad guys think? How do both populations react?)
I think it's ... "Information Operations." And, short-story-long, I think that means I'm in agreement with the JP 3-13 definition.
(Side note to Schmedlap: The last paragraph is the best way to-date that I've been able to generically articulate a concrete example of how/why I see Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP implications stemming from non-lethal effects targeting.)
(Additional note: I posted before seeing this reminder regarding pros-and-cons of Taliban operations against civilian cellular telephone infrastructure.)
And the competition says.....
On the PSYOP side of the house AQ has recovered its internet capability, while we give lip service to the myth of IO.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...302135_pf.html
Quote:
The war against terrorism has evolved into a war of ideas and propaganda, a struggle for hearts and minds fought on television and the Internet. On those fronts, al-Qaeda's voice has grown much more powerful in recent years. Taking advantage of new technology and mistakes by its adversaries, al-Qaeda's core leadership has built an increasingly prolific propaganda operation, enabling it to communicate constantly, securely and in numerous languages with loyalists and potential recruits worldwide.
Every three or four days, on average, a new video or audio from one of al-Qaeda's commanders is released online by as-Sahab, the terrorist network's in-house propaganda studio. Even as its masters dodge a global manhunt, as-Sahab produces documentary-quality films, iPod files and cellphone videos. Last year it released 97 original videos, a sixfold increase from 2005. (As-Sahab means "the clouds" in Arabic, a reference to the skyscraping mountain peaks of Afghanistan.)
This isn't strategic, operational or tactical, but it has a real impact on the battlefied where the population is the primary objective. Coercive power is important in irregular warfare, but using coercive power without understanding how it supports a theme, or message, is like punching in the air, it will have little impact on our opponents if they are even half way competent. Using information to influence target audience is critical, but information superiority is a pipe dream (even in North Korea). Information superiority is a sales pitch that a number of contractors embrace to sell their wares (to include government think tanks). We need realistic objectives instead of pie in sky illusions.
One must also consider what we're trying to do with our influence. Are we trying to sell democracy and capitialism? If that is our method of stability operations, then in many cases we're attacking core identies of the societies we're trying to help, thus our propaganda is easily countered. This simplistic approach of, "hey we can you make you like us" isn't always well received.
Note the OPSEC measures our opponents employ also.
Quote:
The Web forums are password-protected and highly regulated. In certain sections, only high-ranking moderators have the authority to post material -- such as bulletins announcing a new bin Laden video. As a result, al-Fajr and others can quickly spot fake material, ensuring that the propaganda maintains a high level of reliability and consistency, analysts said.
"By controlling that content, al-Fajr Center can make sure everybody who is getting that information knows they're getting it from an authentic source," said Josh Devon, senior analyst at the SITE Intelligence Group, a private firm that monitors Islamist terrorist groups online and serves as a consultant to U.S. and foreign government agencies. "It'd be extremely difficult for the CIA or another intelligence agency to introduce credible and effective counterpropaganda."
Al-Fajr is extremely security-conscious, Devon said. It distributes a manual called the "Technical Mujahid," which advises how to cover electronic footprints and avoid infiltration.
DMO continues at warp speed, we need to stop the IO patrol, take a knee, face out, and get the 2LT off point. Once again he is lost.
Another face in the cloud ...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
On the PSYOP side of the house AQ has recovered its internet capability, while we give lip service to the myth of IO.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...302135_pf.html
This isn't strategic, operational or tactical, but it has a real impact on the battlefied where the population is the primary objective. Coercive power is important in irregular warfare, but using coercive power without understanding how it supports a theme, or message, is like punching in the air, it will have little impact on our opponents if they are even half way competent.
Bill: Great article, thanks! I was struck by how the name of "As-Sahab" ("the clouds," in Arabic, according to the Washington Post writer) also describes/illuminates/suggests its operation as a networked entity, conceptually along the lines of cloud computing, crowd sourcing, and, most importantly, crowdcasting. We have, as a culture and as a military, not yet harnessed the full power of a free Internet.
I'll get off the net for now, but keep those cards and letters coming!
You mean like this 1960s car radio,
Time for our weekly agree/disagree, wm...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
I agree completely with this distinction between IO in Influops. I suspect that the confusion arises because of the inclusion of Psyops under the IO umbrella.
So do I.
Quote:
...H&I artillery fires may well degrade enemy morale and cause an opponent to be more likely to surrender. Does this justify one in calling H&I a Pysops tool?
I'm firmly convinced that H&I Artillery fire is about as effective as strategic bombing -- which means it's almost a total waste and is often counterproductive. It is rarely beneficial and in a COIN situation is invariably detrimental. We use it because we think our opponents are stupid; they are not.
Quote:
But, by using that sort of thinking, a Bradley or M113 is also just a fancy tracked cargo delivery vehicle.
Yes. :D
And the weekly kumbaya response
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
I'm firmly convinced that H&I Artillery fire is about as effective as strategic bombing -- which means it's almost a total waste and is often counterproductive. It is rarely beneficial and in a COIN situation is invariably detrimental. We use it because we think our opponents are stupid; they are not.
Ken,
I don't remember ever saying that H&I achieved its stated purpose. For one's oppponents it primarily serves as a training reinforcement and means of culling the herd. If it has a negative impact on morale, I suspect it does so more on the friendly cannnoneers who have to deliver it at odd hours of the night, sort of like the effect on the unlucky soul who had to pull fire guard in BCT/AIT at 0300. :D